Trivy vs Gecko Security

Agent access

1. ai-native userPoint an agent at llms.txt or agent-oriented docs

   weight 2 · round to Gecko Security
   Trivy—none0/10

   Probes confirm no llms.txt exists (404) and no agent-oriented docs format is available; while an MCP server exists (separate axis), there's no evidence of llms.txt or agent-native documentation being served.

   • [probe] “PROBE llms.txt: HTTP 404 at https://trivy.dev/llms.txt”
   • [probe] “PROBE docs-md: HTTP 404 at https://trivy.dev/docs/latest/guide/.md”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Gecko Security✓fullprobed9/10

   Direct probes confirm Gecko serves both llms.txt (HTTP 200) and a docs.md aggregate at the docs root, plus an OpenAPI spec and documented MCP/AI-tool integration for agents to consume — exactly the agent-oriented docs surface the story asks for. Missing for 10: no independent/community confirmation that an agent actually consumed llms.txt successfully in practice.

   • [probe] “PROBE llms.txt: HTTP 200 at https://gecko.security/llms.txt # Gecko Security > Gecko Security is an AI security engineer that finds exploit…”
   • [probe] “PROBE docs-md: HTTP 200 at https://gecko.security/docs.md --- title: "Gecko Security - Gecko Security" description: "An AI security engineer…”
   • [probe] “PROBE openapi: HTTP 200 at https://gecko.security/openapi.json — contains "openapi" key”
   • [claimed-docs] “Connect it to an AI tool and the tool can list your repositories and scans, pull full vulnerability evidence (proof of concept, call chain, …”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

2. ai-native userRun the product headlessly / in CI for automation

   weight 2 · round to Trivy
   Trivy✓fullprobed9/10

   Trivy is a CLI-first tool distributed via brew/docker/binary with commands like `trivy image`, `trivy k8s --report summary`, designed for scripted/automated scanning, and community evidence confirms it's widely integrated into CI/CD pipelines ('super easy to integrate in every ci/cd pipeline', 'very easy to write automation around'). Missing for 10: no first-party CI-specific docs (e.g., GitHub Actions integration guide) cited in the pack, though community corroboration is strong.

   • [github] “trivy k8s --report summary cluster”
   • [github] “Trivy is available in most common distribution channels. ... `brew install trivy` ... `docker run aquasec/trivy`”
   • [community] “I've had a great experience with Trivy, very solid tool, very easy to write automation around.”
   • [community] “we use AquaSec and it's absolutely the same engine. Trivy is so good we were tempted to drop AquaSec entirely as we only use it in our CI an…”
   • [community] “it's super easy to integrate in every ci/cd pipeline”
   • [probe] “official CLI documented at https://github.com/aquasecurity/trivy”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Gecko Security✓fullprobed7/10

   Gecko exposes a v1 API to trigger scans and read/triage results, dedicated CI/CD-labeled API keys, PR-check integration with configurable fail-on-severity thresholds that post pass/fail status back to GitHub/GitLab, and webhooks for automation pipelines — all enabling headless operation in CI. Missing for 10: independent/hands-on verification that CI pipelines actually work end-to-end, and no explicit example CI configs (e.g., GitHub Actions YAML) are shown.

   • [claimed-docs] “Gecko's v1 API lets you trigger scans, read scan, repository, and vulnerability data, triage findings, manage scan schedules, rotate your Gi…”
   • [claimed-docs] “Give the key a descriptive name, such as `CI/CD Pipeline` or `Production`.”
   • [claimed-docs] “Gecko posts a pass/fail check back to GitHub or GitLab so reviewers see the security status inline.”
   • [claimed-docs] “**Fail-on severity**: the severity threshold that fails the check (for example, fail on High and above).”
   • [claimed-docs] “Gecko can push events to your systems as scans run and findings change: page a channel when a scan fails, open a workflow when a critical la…”
   • [probe] “PROBE openapi: HTTP 200 at https://gecko.security/openapi.json — contains "openapi" key”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

3. ai-native userConnect an agent via an official MCP server

   weight 3 · round to Trivy
   Trivy✓fullprobed8/10

   Trivy ships an official trivy-mcp plugin that starts a Model Context Protocol server integrating Trivy's scanning with VS Code and other MCP-enabled tools, enabling natural-language security queries — directly matching the story. Missing for 10: independent/hands-on third-party corroboration of the MCP server's reliability beyond vendor docs.

   • [claimed-docs] “This plugin starts a Model Context Protocol (MCP) server that integrates Trivy's security scanning capabilities with VS Code and other MCP-e…”
   • [claimed-docs] “Natural Language Scanning: Ask questions about security issues in natural language”
   • [claimed-docs] “**Natural Language Scanning**: Ask questions about security issues in natural language”
   • [probe] “official MCP server documented at https://github.com/aquasecurity/trivy-mcp”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Gecko Security✓fullprobed7/10

   Gecko documents an official MCP/AI-tools integration (docs-9, probe-4) letting a connected AI agent list repositories/scans, pull full vulnerability evidence, triage findings, and file tickets, and the docs.md/llms.txt endpoints confirm agent-facing documentation exists. Missing for 10: independent or hands-on confirmation that the MCP server works as described, and details on setup/auth flow for connecting an external agent.

   • [claimed-docs] “Connect it to an AI tool and the tool can list your repositories and scans, pull full vulnerability evidence (proof of concept, call chain, …”
   • [probe] “official MCP server documented at https://gecko.security/docs/ai-tools/overview”
   • [probe] “PROBE docs-md: HTTP 200 at https://gecko.security/docs.md --- title: "Gecko Security - Gecko Security" description: "An AI security engineer…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

4. ai-native userUse an official CLI

   weight 2 · round to Trivy
   Trivy✓fullprobed8/10

   Trivy is fundamentally shipped as an official CLI (trivy image, trivy fs, trivy k8s, trivy aws) distributed via brew/docker/github release, and community reports confirm it is easy to script and integrate into CI/CD pipelines. Missing for 10: dedicated independent benchmarking of CLI ergonomics for AI-agent use cases and any first-party AI-specific CLI flags (the AI-native/natural-language angle is handled by the separate MCP server, not the core CLI itself).

   • [github] “trivy k8s --report summary cluster”
   • [github] “Trivy is available in most common distribution channels. ... `brew install trivy` ... `docker run aquasec/trivy`”
   • [probe] “official CLI documented at https://github.com/aquasecurity/trivy”
   • [claimed-docs] “It detects known vulnerabilities in your container image... `$ trivy image [YOUR_IMAGE_NAME]`”
   • [community] “I've had a great experience with Trivy, very solid tool, very easy to write automation around.”
   • [community] “it's super easy to integrate in every ci/cd pipeline”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Gecko Security—none0/10

   No evidence of an official CLI; Gecko offers a GitHub App, REST API, webhooks, and an MCP server for AI tools, but nothing in the docs, changelog, or probes mentions a CLI tool for AI-native workflows.

   ⚑ flag

5. ai-native userDrive the product through a documented public API

   weight 3 · round to Gecko Security
   Trivy~partialprobed6/10

   Trivy exposes a documented CLI and an official MCP server (trivy-mcp) that explicitly targets AI-agent/natural-language driving of scans, which fits the agenticness/AI-native story. However, probes confirm no OpenAPI/REST API or machine-readable API spec (openapi.json, swagger.json all 404) and no llms.txt, so there's no general-purpose documented public API beyond the CLI/MCP surface. Missing for 10: a formal OpenAPI/REST API spec, broader API documentation beyond MCP, and independent confirmation of MCP server reliability/adoption.

   • [claimed-docs] “Natural Language Scanning: Ask questions about security issues in natural language”
   • [claimed-docs] “**Natural Language Scanning**: Ask questions about security issues in natural language”
   • [claimed-docs] “This plugin starts a Model Context Protocol (MCP) server that integrates Trivy's security scanning capabilities with VS Code and other MCP-e…”
   • [probe] “PROBE openapi: all candidate paths 404 (https://trivy.dev/openapi.json, https://trivy.dev/swagger.json, https://trivy.dev/api/openapi.json, …”
   • [probe] “official MCP server documented at https://github.com/aquasecurity/trivy-mcp”
   • [probe] “PROBE llms.txt: HTTP 404 at https://trivy.dev/llms.txt”
   • [github] “Trivy is available in most common distribution channels. ... `brew install trivy` ... `docker run aquasec/trivy`”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Gecko Security✓fullprobed8/10

   Gecko documents a public v1 API (trigger scans, read scan/repo/vulnerability data, triage findings, manage schedules, rotate tokens, webhooks) with a live OpenAPI spec confirmed by probe, plus API key management and per-request logging. missing for 10: independent third-party developer confirmation of API usage/reliability beyond docs and probes, and more detail on API rate limits/versioning stability.

   • [claimed-docs] “Gecko's v1 API lets you trigger scans, read scan, repository, and vulnerability data, triage findings, manage scan schedules, rotate your Gi…”
   • [claimed-docs] “API keys are now visible to the whole team with owner attribution and per-request usage logging”
   • [claimed-docs] “Gecko can push events to your systems as scans run and findings change: page a channel when a scan fails, open a workflow when a critical la…”
   • [claimed-docs] “Give the key a descriptive name, such as `CI/CD Pipeline` or `Production`.”
   • [probe] “PROBE openapi: HTTP 200 at https://gecko.security/openapi.json — contains "openapi" key”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

6. ai-native userBuild against official SDKs

   weight 2 · round to Gecko Security
   Trivy—none0/10

   Trivy's evidence pack documents a CLI, container/filesystem scanning, SBOM generation, and an MCP server plugin, but no official language SDKs (Go/Python/JS client libraries) for developers to build against are mentioned anywhere; probes for llms.txt/openapi also return 404. missing for 10: any documented official SDK/client library, language-specific package for programmatic integration, API reference for building custom tooling.

   • [probe] “PROBE openapi: all candidate paths 404 (https://trivy.dev/openapi.json, https://trivy.dev/swagger.json, https://trivy.dev/api/openapi.json, …”
   • [probe] “PROBE llms.txt: HTTP 404 at https://trivy.dev/llms.txt”
   • [claimed-docs] “This plugin starts a Model Context Protocol (MCP) server that integrates Trivy's security scanning capabilities with VS Code and other MCP-e…”
   • [github] “Trivy is available in most common distribution channels. ... `brew install trivy` ... `docker run aquasec/trivy`”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Gecko Security~partialprobed5/10

   Gecko documents a v1 REST API with OpenAPI spec, API keys, and webhooks that developers can build against, but there is no evidence of official client SDK libraries (e.g., Python/JS packages) beyond the raw API/OpenAPI reference. missing for 10: dedicated SDK libraries/language clients, independent developer corroboration of building against them.

   • [claimed-docs] “Gecko's v1 API lets you trigger scans, read scan, repository, and vulnerability data, triage findings, manage scan schedules, rotate your Gi…”
   • [claimed-docs] “API keys are now visible to the whole team with owner attribution and per-request usage logging”
   • [probe] “PROBE openapi: HTTP 200 at https://gecko.security/openapi.json — contains "openapi" key”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

7. ai-native userSubscribe to events via webhooks

   weight 2 · round to Gecko Security
   Trivy—none0/10

   Trivy is a CLI security scanner with an MCP server for AI querying, but there is no evidence of webhook subscription/event notification capability anywhere in the docs, GitHub repo, or probes. missing for 10: any webhook API/endpoint, event subscription mechanism, or documentation of push-based notifications.

   • [probe] “PROBE openapi: all candidate paths 404 (https://trivy.dev/openapi.json, https://trivy.dev/swagger.json, https://trivy.dev/api/openapi.json, …”
   • [github] “trivy k8s --report summary cluster”
   • [claimed-docs] “This plugin starts a Model Context Protocol (MCP) server that integrates Trivy's security scanning capabilities with VS Code and other MCP-e…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Gecko Security✓fullclaimed8/10

   Docs explicitly describe webhook subscriptions for scan/finding lifecycle events (scan fail, critical finding) and the API reference lists webhook events as a first-class capability alongside the API. This directly matches the story's ask for event subscription via webhooks. Missing for 10: independent/hands-on confirmation that webhook delivery works reliably and no detail on payload schema/retry semantics.

   • [claimed-docs] “Gecko can push events to your systems as scans run and findings change: page a channel when a scan fails, open a workflow when a critical la…”
   • [claimed-docs] “Gecko's v1 API lets you trigger scans, read scan, repository, and vulnerability data, triage findings, manage scan schedules, rotate your Gi…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

Agentic features

1. ai-native userGet AI-generated insights and suggestions from my data inside the product

   weight 2 · round to Trivy
   Trivy~partialprobed5/10

   Trivy ships an official MCP server (trivy-mcp) that lets AI tools query scan results via natural language ('Ask questions about security issues in natural language'), which enables AI-generated interaction with Trivy's data, but the evidence never shows Trivy itself producing AI-generated insights, remediation suggestions, or summaries beyond raw scan results being queryable. missing for 10: evidence of AI-generated remediation/insight suggestions produced by Trivy itself, first-party docs detailing what kind of AI reasoning the MCP server enables beyond Q&A, independent hands-on validation of the natural-language feature.

   • [claimed-docs] “Natural Language Scanning: Ask questions about security issues in natural language”
   • [claimed-docs] “**Natural Language Scanning**: Ask questions about security issues in natural language”
   • [claimed-docs] “This plugin starts a Model Context Protocol (MCP) server that integrates Trivy's security scanning capabilities with VS Code and other MCP-e…”
   • [probe] “official MCP server documented at https://github.com/aquasecurity/trivy-mcp”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Gecko Security!disputedcontradicted5/10

   Gecko generates AI insights (severity, confidence score, call chain, PoC, suggested patch, AI-written repo wiki, endpoint map, PR review summaries) directly from scanned code data, per docs-2/17/18/19. However, hands-on community reports show these AI-generated findings can be inaccurate — 100%-confidence 'vulnerabilities' that weren't real, missed real issues a competing tool caught, and a trivial/irrelevant finding on another scan — directly contradicting the reliability of the insights. Missing for 10: independent validation of insight accuracy at scale, resolution of the false-positive/false-negative reports.

   • [claimed-docs] “Each finding includes a severity (CVSS 4.0), a confidence score, the full source-to-sink call chain, a proof of concept, and a suggested pat…”
   • [claimed-docs] “Repository wiki: An AI-written map of your app: architecture, routing, and security model.”
   • [claimed-docs] “Endpoint map: The HTTP attack surface Gecko discovered in your code.”
   • [claimed-docs] “PR reviews & fixes: On pull requests, a security review summary and one-click fixes.”
   • [community] “Tool gave 100% confidence for two vulnerabilities (severity 9.4 and 6.5) that turned out not to be real.”
   • [community] “Ran Gecko on a C project after Semgrep AI flagged a minor real issue; Gecko found nothing. After removing the fix and recreating the project…”
   • [community] “Uploaded a project (sydbox) to scan; took 10 minutes and found only one vulnerability, an 'RCE: IRC Message Command Execution Bypass' in an …”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

2. ai-native userSet up automations that run autonomously in the background

   weight 2 · round to Gecko Security
   Trivy~partialprobed4/10

   Trivy is a CLI scanner that community evidence shows is easy to wire into CI/CD pipelines (trivy-comm-14) and it ships an MCP server (trivy-docs-13, trivy-probe-4) that lets agentic tools invoke scans via natural language, which supports background/automated invocation by an AI agent. However there is no documented native scheduler, daemon mode, or first-party 'autonomous background job' feature — automation depends entirely on external CI/cron infrastructure. Missing for 10: evidence of built-in scheduling/daemon mode, first-party autonomous trigger/orchestration docs, and independent confirmation of unattended long-running automation.

   • [community] “it's super easy to integrate in every ci/cd pipeline”
   • [claimed-docs] “This plugin starts a Model Context Protocol (MCP) server that integrates Trivy's security scanning capabilities with VS Code and other MCP-e…”
   • [probe] “official MCP server documented at https://github.com/aquasecurity/trivy-mcp”
   • [claimed-docs] “Natural Language Scanning: Ask questions about security issues in natural language”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Gecko Security✓fullclaimed7/10

   Gecko documents autonomous background workflows: scheduled scans via the API ('manage scan schedules'), automatic PR-triggered scans with pass/fail checks, auto-fix PR generation and re-verification, ticket creation, and webhook events pushed to external systems as scans run — all without manual intervention once configured. This directly matches the 'automations that run autonomously in the background' story for a security-scanning product. missing for 10: independent/hands-on confirmation that scheduled scans and auto-fix loops run reliably unattended over time, and more detail on configuring recurring schedules beyond a brief API mention.

   • [claimed-docs] “Gecko's v1 API lets you trigger scans, read scan, repository, and vulnerability data, triage findings, manage scan schedules, rotate your Gi…”
   • [claimed-docs] “Gecko can push events to your systems as scans run and findings change: page a channel when a scan fails, open a workflow when a critical la…”
   • [claimed-docs] “Gecko posts a pass/fail check back to GitHub or GitLab so reviewers see the security status inline.”
   • [claimed-docs] “Click Request fix to open a gecko/* pull request with the patch applied, or apply the patch yourself.”
   • [claimed-docs] “Gecko rechecks the finding and marks it Fix verified once the vulnerability is gone.”
   • [claimed-docs] “create a ticket in Jira, Linear, ClickUp, or Shortcut”
   • [claimed-docs] “Commit to an existing PR: For findings from a PR scan, Gecko can commit the fix directly to the PR's head branch so the fix rides along with…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

3. ai-native userDelegate tasks to a built-in AI assistant inside the product

   weight 3 · round to Gecko Security
   Trivy—none0/10

   Trivy is a CLI/scanner and provides an MCP server (trivy-mcp) so external AI assistants (e.g., in VS Code) can call Trivy's scanning capabilities — this is the reverse relationship of 'delegating tasks to a built-in AI assistant inside the product.' There is no evidence of an assistant embedded within Trivy itself that a user can delegate tasks to.

   • [claimed-docs] “Natural Language Scanning: Ask questions about security issues in natural language”
   • [claimed-docs] “This plugin starts a Model Context Protocol (MCP) server that integrates Trivy's security scanning capabilities with VS Code and other MCP-e…”
   • [probe] “official MCP server documented at https://github.com/aquasecurity/trivy-mcp”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Gecko Security~partialprobed5/10

   Gecko is framed as an 'AI security engineer' that autonomously scans, triages, patches, and files tickets, so users can delegate security tasks (request fix, ticket creation, PR fixes) to its built-in AI (gecko-security-docs-3, gecko-security-docs-6, gecko-security-docs-15, gecko-security-probe-1). However, this is a fixed pipeline of security actions rather than a general-purpose in-product assistant you can converse with or direct on arbitrary tasks; community reports also raise doubts about the AI's accuracy in these delegated tasks (gecko-security-comm-3, gecko-security-comm-5). Missing for 10: an explicit conversational/task-delegation assistant UI, evidence of open-ended task delegation beyond the scan/fix/ticket workflow, and independent confirmation the delegated AI reliably completes tasks.

   • [claimed-docs] “Click Request fix to open a gecko/* pull request with the patch applied, or apply the patch yourself.”
   • [claimed-docs] “create a ticket in Jira, Linear, ClickUp, or Shortcut”
   • [claimed-docs] “Click **Request fix** to open a `gecko/*` pull request with the patch applied, or apply the patch yourself.”
   • [probe] “PROBE llms.txt: HTTP 200 at https://gecko.security/llms.txt # Gecko Security > Gecko Security is an AI security engineer that finds exploit…”
   • [community] “Tool gave 100% confidence for two vulnerabilities (severity 9.4 and 6.5) that turned out not to be real.”
   • [community] “Uploaded a project (sydbox) to scan; took 10 minutes and found only one vulnerability, an 'RCE: IRC Message Command Execution Bypass' in an …”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

4. ai-native userOperate the product with natural-language commands

   weight 2 · round drawn
   Trivy~partialprobed6/10

   Trivy ships an official MCP server (trivy-mcp) explicitly advertised for 'Natural Language Scanning: Ask questions about security issues in natural language,' integrating with VS Code and other MCP-enabled tools, which enables natural-language operation via AI assistants. However, this is a separate plugin, not native to the core CLI, and evidence lacks independent hands-on validation of the natural-language experience quality. Missing for 10: independent/hands-on confirmation of natural-language query accuracy, broader detail on supported commands/scope beyond the one-line docs claim.

   • [claimed-docs] “Natural Language Scanning: Ask questions about security issues in natural language”
   • [claimed-docs] “**Natural Language Scanning**: Ask questions about security issues in natural language”
   • [claimed-docs] “This plugin starts a Model Context Protocol (MCP) server that integrates Trivy's security scanning capabilities with VS Code and other MCP-e…”
   • [probe] “official MCP server documented at https://github.com/aquasecurity/trivy-mcp”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Gecko Security~partialprobed6/10

   Gecko documents an official MCP/AI-tools integration letting a connected AI assistant list repos/scans, pull vulnerability evidence, triage findings, and file tickets via natural language, plus a full v1 API and OpenAPI spec (docs-9, docs-10, probe-3, probe-4). However, there's no hands-on or independent evidence confirming the natural-language workflow actually works well end-to-end — community reports focus on scan accuracy issues rather than the NL/agent interface itself. Missing for 10: independent/hands-on verification of the MCP natural-language workflow, and detail on command coverage/limitations.

   • [claimed-docs] “Connect it to an AI tool and the tool can list your repositories and scans, pull full vulnerability evidence (proof of concept, call chain, …”
   • [claimed-docs] “Gecko's v1 API lets you trigger scans, read scan, repository, and vulnerability data, triage findings, manage scan schedules, rotate your Gi…”
   • [probe] “PROBE openapi: HTTP 200 at https://gecko.security/openapi.json — contains "openapi" key”
   • [probe] “official MCP server documented at https://gecko.security/docs/ai-tools/overview”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

Api quality

1. ai-native userExplore an interactive API reference with runnable examples

   weight 2 · round drawn
   Trivy—none0/10

   Trivy is a CLI security scanner with no public API reference; probes confirm no OpenAPI/Swagger spec exists (trivy-probe-3) and no llms.txt (trivy-probe-1). There is no evidence of any interactive API reference with runnable examples.

   • [probe] “PROBE openapi: all candidate paths 404 (https://trivy.dev/openapi.json, https://trivy.dev/swagger.json, https://trivy.dev/api/openapi.json, …”
   • [probe] “PROBE llms.txt: HTTP 404 at https://trivy.dev/llms.txt”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Gecko Security—none0/10

   While Gecko exposes an OpenAPI spec (gecko-security-probe-3) and documents API capabilities (gecko-security-docs-10), there is no evidence of an interactive API reference UI with runnable/try-it examples for developers or AI agents to explore.

   • [probe] “PROBE openapi: HTTP 200 at https://gecko.security/openapi.json — contains "openapi" key”
   • [claimed-docs] “Gecko's v1 API lets you trigger scans, read scan, repository, and vulnerability data, triage findings, manage scan schedules, rotate your Gi…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

2. ai-native userDownload a machine-readable API spec (OpenAPI or equivalent)

   weight 2 · round to Gecko Security
   Trivy—none0/10

   Trivy is a CLI/scanner tool, not an API-driven service, but the story asks specifically for a downloadable machine-readable API spec; probes explicitly confirm no OpenAPI/swagger spec exists at any expected location and no llms.txt either. No evidence of any published API spec anywhere in the evidence pack.

   • [probe] “PROBE openapi: all candidate paths 404 (https://trivy.dev/openapi.json, https://trivy.dev/swagger.json, https://trivy.dev/api/openapi.json, …”
   • [probe] “PROBE llms.txt: HTTP 404 at https://trivy.dev/llms.txt”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Gecko Security✓fullprobed9/10

   A probe confirms a live OpenAPI spec at gecko.security/openapi.json (HTTP 200, contains 'openapi' key), and docs describe a full v1 API for scans, vulnerabilities, webhooks, and integrations. Missing for 10: no independent/community confirmation of the spec's completeness or usage beyond the vendor's own probe.

   • [probe] “PROBE openapi: HTTP 200 at https://gecko.security/openapi.json — contains "openapi" key”
   • [claimed-docs] “Gecko's v1 API lets you trigger scans, read scan, repository, and vulnerability data, triage findings, manage scan schedules, rotate your Gi…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

3. ai-native userTest against a sandbox environment without touching production data

   weight 1 · round drawn
   Trivy—none0/10

   The evidence pack shows Trivy scans real filesystems, images, repos, and IaC configs, and even documents an MCP plugin and CLI, but nothing describes a dedicated sandbox/test environment or non-production test mode that isolates it from production data. No mention of dry-run, mock targets, or staging environment support exists anywhere in the pack.

   ⚑ flag

   Gecko Security—none0/10

   The evidence describes scanning source repos/ZIP uploads and hybrid AWS deployment (scanner runs in customer's own account), but nothing explicitly describes a dedicated sandbox environment for safely testing exploits or PoCs without touching production data. missing for 10: explicit sandbox/isolated test environment description, confirmation that PoC execution or exploit verification never touches live production systems or data.

   • [claimed-docs] “Paste a public repository URL or upload a ZIP instead. No provider connection required.”
   • [claimed-docs] “the scanner, S3 storage, and all AI inference run inside your AWS account. Gecko hosts only the dashboard, database, and scan orchestration.”
   • [claimed-docs] “the scanner, S3 storage, and all AI inference run inside your AWS account.”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

4. ai-native userRely on versioned APIs with a documented deprecation policy

   weight 2 · round to Gecko Security
   Trivy—none0/10

   No evidence of versioned APIs or a documented deprecation policy; probes show no OpenAPI spec, and docs evidence never mentions API versioning or deprecation guarantees.

   • [probe] “PROBE openapi: all candidate paths 404 (https://trivy.dev/openapi.json, https://trivy.dev/swagger.json, https://trivy.dev/api/openapi.json, …”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Gecko Security~partialprobed3/10

   Gecko documents a versioned v1 API with an OpenAPI spec and a release/channel/version resolution endpoint (digest-pinned image refs), showing some notion of API versioning, but there is no documented deprecation policy, version sunset timeline, or migration guidance for API consumers. missing for 10: explicit deprecation policy, version support lifecycle/EOL dates, migration guides between API versions.

   • [claimed-docs] “Gecko's v1 API lets you trigger scans, read scan, repository, and vulnerability data, triage findings, manage scan schedules, rotate your Gi…”
   • [claimed-docs] “resolves a version to its release... the response includes the digest-pinned image_ref to pull”
   • [claimed-docs] “GET /releases/{channel}/{version} resolves a version to its release.”
   • [probe] “PROBE openapi: HTTP 200 at https://gecko.security/openapi.json — contains "openapi" key”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

1. ai-native userPerform bulk operations across many items at once

   weight 2 · round drawn
   Trivy~partialcommunity5/10

   Trivy's CLI supports scanning multiple targets (images, filesystems, repos) and cluster-wide scans (e.g., trivy k8s cluster), and community evidence confirms it's easy to script and integrate into CI/CD pipelines for batch automation. However, there's no explicit documentation of a dedicated bulk/batch API, parallel multi-target job orchestration, or native support for processing large lists of items in one invocation beyond shell-level scripting. missing for 10: documented bulk/batch processing API, evidence of parallelized multi-target scanning at scale, first-party guidance on bulk operations beyond single-target CLI invocations.

   • [github] “trivy k8s --report summary cluster”
   • [community] “I've had a great experience with Trivy, very solid tool, very easy to write automation around.”
   • [community] “it's super easy to integrate in every ci/cd pipeline”
   • [claimed-docs] “Trivy will look for vulnerabilities based on lock files such as Gemfile.lock and package-lock.json.”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Gecko Security~partialclaimed5/10

   The v1 API and AI-tool integration let a user programmatically list repositories/scans, pull vulnerability data, triage findings, and trigger scans across many items, which supports scripted bulk-style automation, but there is no documented bulk-fix, bulk-triage, or multi-select UI action for operating on many findings/repos simultaneously. missing for 10: a dedicated bulk-action endpoint or UI (e.g., bulk fix/triage/dismiss across many findings at once), independent evidence of bulk workflows in practice.

   • [claimed-docs] “Connect it to an AI tool and the tool can list your repositories and scans, pull full vulnerability evidence (proof of concept, call chain, …”
   • [claimed-docs] “Gecko's v1 API lets you trigger scans, read scan, repository, and vulnerability data, triage findings, manage scan schedules, rotate your Gi…”
   • [claimed-docs] “Gecko can push events to your systems as scans run and findings change: page a channel when a scan fails, open a workflow when a critical la…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

2. ai-native userDefine rules that trigger actions automatically on events

   weight 3 · round to Gecko Security
   Trivy—none0/10

   Trivy is a scanner run on-demand or in CI pipelines; the evidence shows no rule-based/event-triggered automation engine (e.g., defining rules that fire actions on events) within Trivy itself—only scan integrations into CI/CD and an MCP server for querying results conversationally. No evidence of a rules engine or event-driven action system.

   ⚑ flag

   Gecko Security~partialclaimed5/10

   Gecko supports some event-driven automation—webhooks that fire on scan completion/finding changes, configurable fail-on-severity thresholds for PR checks, and automatic ticket/ PR creation on findings—but these are fixed, product-defined triggers rather than a user-configurable rules engine where arbitrary conditions map to arbitrary actions. missing for 10: a general-purpose rule/condition builder, support for chaining multiple custom actions per event, and evidence of user-defined logic beyond severity thresholds.

   • [claimed-docs] “Gecko can push events to your systems as scans run and findings change: page a channel when a scan fails, open a workflow when a critical la…”
   • [claimed-docs] “**Fail-on severity**: the severity threshold that fails the check (for example, fail on High and above).”
   • [claimed-docs] “create a ticket in Jira, Linear, ClickUp, or Shortcut”
   • [claimed-docs] “Click Request fix to open a gecko/* pull request with the patch applied, or apply the patch yourself.”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

Agent scanning

1. ai-native userHave an agent run a scan headlessly via the CLI, parse machine-readable results, and file issues for real findings

   weight 3 · round to Trivy
   Trivy~partialcommunity7/10

   Trivy is a CLI-first scanner explicitly designed for headless CI use, with documented commands (trivy image/fs) and structured output formats like SBOM (CycloneDX/SPDX), and community reports confirm it's 'super easy to integrate in every ci/cd pipeline' and easy to script automation around. However, the evidence pack lacks explicit documentation of JSON/table output flags for machine parsing, and there's no evidence of built-in issue-filing/ticketing integration (that would require external glue code an agent would write). missing for 10: explicit --format json output docs, native issue-tracker filing integration, independent validation of an agent successfully parsing results end-to-end.

   • [claimed-docs] “It detects known vulnerabilities in your container image.”
   • [claimed-docs] “Trivy will look for vulnerabilities based on lock files such as Gemfile.lock and package-lock.json.”
   • [claimed-docs] “Trivy can generate the following SBOM formats. * [CycloneDX](#cyclonedx) * [SPDX](#spdx)”
   • [github] “trivy k8s --report summary cluster”
   • [github] “Trivy is available in most common distribution channels. ... `brew install trivy` ... `docker run aquasec/trivy`”
   • [community] “I've had a great experience with Trivy, very solid tool, very easy to write automation around.”
   • [community] “it's super easy to integrate in every ci/cd pipeline”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Gecko Security~partialcommunity4/10

   Gecko exposes a v1 API and webhooks that can trigger scans, pull machine-readable vulnerability data, triage findings, and file tickets in Jira/Linear/ClickUp/Shortcut, and an MCP/AI-tools connector for agents to do the same — satisfying the 'headless, parse, file issues' intent via API rather than a literal CLI. However, no dedicated CLI binary/command is documented anywhere in the evidence, and community reports raise concrete concerns about false positives (100% confidence findings that weren't real, missed real issues) undermining 'file issues for real findings'. Missing for 10: an actual CLI tool/subcommand documented, and independent confirmation that AI-driven ticket filing acts only on validated/real findings rather than the false positives community testers observed.

   • [claimed-docs] “Connect it to an AI tool and the tool can list your repositories and scans, pull full vulnerability evidence (proof of concept, call chain, …”
   • [claimed-docs] “Gecko's v1 API lets you trigger scans, read scan, repository, and vulnerability data, triage findings, manage scan schedules, rotate your Gi…”
   • [claimed-docs] “create a ticket in Jira, Linear, ClickUp, or Shortcut”
   • [claimed-docs] “Gecko can push events to your systems as scans run and findings change: page a channel when a scan fails, open a workflow when a critical la…”
   • [community] “Tool gave 100% confidence for two vulnerabilities (severity 9.4 and 6.5) that turned out not to be real.”
   • [community] “Uploaded a project (sydbox) to scan; took 10 minutes and found only one vulnerability, an 'RCE: IRC Message Command Execution Bypass' in an …”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

2. ai-native userWire the scanner into my coding agent so AI-generated code is scanned for issues before it lands

   weight 2 · round drawn
   Trivy~partialprobed6/10

   Trivy ships an official MCP server (trivy-mcp) that integrates with VS Code and other MCP-enabled tools, letting coding agents invoke Trivy's scanning and query results in natural language — a direct fit for wiring into an AI coding agent. However, evidence is limited to first-party docs with no independent hands-on account of this specific workflow catching AI-generated code issues pre-merge. Missing for 10: independent/hands-on validation of the MCP integration in real agent workflows, and specifics on scanning AI-generated code specifically before it lands (e.g., pre-commit/pre-merge gating via the agent).

   • [claimed-docs] “Natural Language Scanning: Ask questions about security issues in natural language”
   • [claimed-docs] “**Natural Language Scanning**: Ask questions about security issues in natural language”
   • [claimed-docs] “This plugin starts a Model Context Protocol (MCP) server that integrates Trivy's security scanning capabilities with VS Code and other MCP-e…”
   • [probe] “official MCP server documented at https://github.com/aquasecurity/trivy-mcp”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Gecko Security~partialprobed6/10

   Gecko documents an MCP/AI-tool integration that lets an agent list repos/scans, pull vulnerability evidence, triage findings, and file tickets, plus PR/CI checks that fail builds above a severity threshold — together enabling a coding-agent workflow to scan AI-generated code before merge. However, independent hands-on reports raise real accuracy concerns (false positives at 100% confidence, missed real bugs, UI/scan bugs), which undercuts confidence that the scanning is reliable enough for a pre-merge gate. Missing for 10: independent corroboration that the MCP/agent wiring works smoothly in practice, and evidence addressing the accuracy complaints specifically in an agent-driven pre-commit/pre-merge context.

   • [claimed-docs] “Connect it to an AI tool and the tool can list your repositories and scans, pull full vulnerability evidence (proof of concept, call chain, …”
   • [probe] “official MCP server documented at https://gecko.security/docs/ai-tools/overview”
   • [claimed-docs] “Gecko posts a pass/fail check back to GitHub or GitLab so reviewers see the security status inline.”
   • [claimed-docs] “**Fail-on severity**: the severity threshold that fails the check (for example, fail on High and above).”
   • [community] “Tool gave 100% confidence for two vulnerabilities (severity 9.4 and 6.5) that turned out not to be real.”
   • [community] “Ran Gecko on a C project after Semgrep AI flagged a minor real issue; Gecko found nothing. After removing the fix and recreating the project…”
   • [community] “Uploaded a project (sydbox) to scan; took 10 minutes and found only one vulnerability, an 'RCE: IRC Message Command Execution Bypass' in an …”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

Ci gates

1. devops-leadRun scans in CI on every pull request and fail the build on new findings via exit codes

   weight 3 · round to Gecko Security
   Trivy~partialcommunity4/10

   Evidence confirms Trivy is widely used in CI/CD pipelines and is 'super easy to integrate' (trivy-comm-14, trivy-comm-11), and its scanning targets (image, filesystem, git) support PR-triggered scans, but the pack lacks any documentation of exit-code flags, fail-on-new-findings logic, or CI-specific configuration (e.g., GitHub Actions, exit-code thresholds). Missing for 10: explicit docs on --exit-code / --exit-on-eol flags, examples of failing CI builds on new vs. baseline findings, and first-party GitHub Actions/pipeline integration guides.

   • [community] “it's super easy to integrate in every ci/cd pipeline”
   • [community] “I've had a great experience with Trivy, very solid tool, very easy to write automation around.”
   • [claimed-docs] “It detects known vulnerabilities in your container image.”
   • [claimed-docs] “Trivy scans any container image, filesystem and git repository to detect exposed secrets like passwords, api keys, and tokens. Secret scanni…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Gecko Security✓fullclaimed8/10

   Docs describe PR-triggered scans that post a pass/fail check to GitHub/GitLab, with a configurable fail-on-severity threshold and separation of new vs pre-existing findings, which together enable failing a PR build on new findings. This matches the CI/PR-gating story closely, though it's implemented as a GitHub/GitLab check status rather than an explicit CLI exit code and lacks independent hands-on confirmation of build-failing behavior. Missing for 10: independent verification that the pass/fail check actually blocks merges/builds in practice, and explicit mention of CLI exit-code semantics for non-GitHub CI runners.

   • [claimed-docs] “Gecko posts a pass/fail check back to GitHub or GitLab so reviewers see the security status inline.”
   • [claimed-docs] “Findings introduced by the PR are separated from pre-existing ones, so reviewers focus on what the change adds.”
   • [claimed-docs] “**Fail-on severity**: the severity threshold that fails the check (for example, fail on High and above).”
   • [claimed-docs] “install the Gecko GitHub App and pick repositories”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

2. developerSee scan findings surfaced as pull-request comments or checks in GitHub or GitLab

   weight 2 · round to Gecko Security
   Trivy—none0/10

   No evidence in the pack mentions PR/MR comments, GitHub/GitLab checks, or CI annotation integration; the pack only covers scanning targets, SBOM, MCP server, and unrelated security incidents. This is a plausible capability for a scanner (via CI actions), so the axis applies, but absence of evidence means 'none' rather than 'na'.

   ⚑ flag

   Gecko Security✓fullclaimed8/10

   Docs describe a GitHub/GitLab App integration that posts pass/fail checks and PR security review summaries, separates new vs pre-existing findings, supports fail-on-severity thresholds, and can auto-commit fixes to the PR — a fairly complete PR-check/comment workflow (gecko-security-docs-5, -19, -28, -29, -30). Missing for 10: independent/hands-on confirmation that PR comments/checks actually render as described (community evidence only discusses finding accuracy, not the PR-check UX itself).

   • [claimed-docs] “Gecko posts a pass/fail check back to GitHub or GitLab so reviewers see the security status inline.”
   • [claimed-docs] “PR reviews & fixes: On pull requests, a security review summary and one-click fixes.”
   • [claimed-docs] “Findings introduced by the PR are separated from pre-existing ones, so reviewers focus on what the change adds.”
   • [claimed-docs] “**Fail-on severity**: the severity threshold that fails the check (for example, fail on High and above).”
   • [claimed-docs] “Commit to an existing PR: For findings from a PR scan, Gecko can commit the fix directly to the PR's head branch so the fix rides along with…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

Pre commit

1. developerRun the scanner as a pre-commit hook so secrets and issues never enter my git history

   weight 3 · round drawn
   Trivy—none0/10

   Evidence shows Trivy scans secrets and filesystems and is easy to integrate into CI/CD generally, but no documentation or mention of a pre-commit hook framework integration (e.g., .pre-commit-hooks.yaml) is provided in the evidence pack.

   ⚑ flag

   Gecko Security—none0/10

   Gecko's documented workflow is GitHub App/PR-based scanning with pass/fail PR checks, not a local pre-commit git hook that blocks commits before they enter history — no evidence of a pre-commit hook, CLI hook script, or local git-hook integration exists in the evidence pack.

   ⚑ flag

Containers

1. devops-leadScan container images for OS-package and application-layer vulnerabilities before deploying them

   weight 3 · round to Trivy
   Trivy✓fullcommunity9/10

   Trivy's core, well-documented capability is scanning container images for OS-package vulnerabilities (trivy-docs-1, trivy-docs-17) and application-layer/lock-file vulnerabilities (trivy-docs-2), backed by community corroboration of strong real-world CI/CD scanning use (trivy-comm-11, trivy-comm-12, trivy-comm-14). This directly matches the devops-lead's pre-deployment scanning need. missing for 10: independent benchmark/comparison of detection accuracy beyond community sentiment.

   • [claimed-docs] “It detects known vulnerabilities in your container image.”
   • [claimed-docs] “It detects known vulnerabilities in your container image... `$ trivy image [YOUR_IMAGE_NAME]`”
   • [claimed-docs] “Trivy will look for vulnerabilities based on lock files such as Gemfile.lock and package-lock.json.”
   • [community] “I've had a great experience with Trivy, very solid tool, very easy to write automation around.”
   • [community] “we use AquaSec and it's absolutely the same engine. Trivy is so good we were tempted to drop AquaSec entirely as we only use it in our CI an…”
   • [community] “it's super easy to integrate in every ci/cd pipeline”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Gecko Security—none0/10

   Gecko's documented capability is AI-driven source-code (SAST) analysis across languages like TypeScript, Python, Go, Java, etc., producing call-chain/PoC findings and PR fixes — no evidence describes scanning container images for OS-package (e.g., CVE feeds on apt/rpm packages) or layered image vulnerabilities. The only container-adjacent mention is a changelog entry resolving a version to a digest-pinned image_ref, which is about release artifact resolution, not vulnerability scanning of container layers.

   • [claimed-docs] “Compiler-accurate (precise cross-file analysis) | TypeScript · JavaScript · Python · Go · Java · Scala · C# · Rust”
   • [claimed-docs] “resolves a version to its release... the response includes the digest-pinned image_ref to pull”
   • [claimed-docs] “GET /releases/{channel}/{version} resolves a version to its release.”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

Iac misconfig

1. devops-leadScan Terraform, Kubernetes, and other IaC files for security misconfigurations

   weight 2 · round to Trivy
   Trivy✓fullcommunity9/10

   Trivy's docs explicitly state built-in misconfiguration checks for Docker, Kubernetes, Terraform, CloudFormation and more, plus k8s cluster scanning via `trivy k8s`, and community reviews corroborate strong CI/CD IaC scanning usage. Missing for 10: independent hands-on validation specifically of Terraform/K8s misconfig detection accuracy (only Docker/vuln scanning has community corroboration).

   • [claimed-docs] “Trivy provides built-in checks to detect configuration issues in popular Infrastructure as Code files, such as: Docker, Kubernetes, Terrafor…”
   • [github] “trivy k8s --report summary cluster”
   • [community] “I've had a great experience with Trivy, very solid tool, very easy to write automation around.”
   • [community] “it's super easy to integrate in every ci/cd pipeline”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Gecko Security—none0/10

   Gecko's documented scanning scope is source-code vulnerability analysis (TypeScript, JavaScript, Python, Go, Java, Scala, C#, Rust) with call-chain/PoC findings; no evidence anywhere mentions Terraform, Kubernetes manifests, or IaC misconfiguration scanning. The axis is plausible for a security-scanning product, but no capability is evidenced, so this is 'none' rather than 'na'.

   • [claimed-docs] “Compiler-accurate (precise cross-file analysis) | TypeScript · JavaScript · Python · Go · Java · Scala · C# · Rust”
   • [claimed-docs] “Repository wiki: An AI-written map of your app: architecture, routing, and security model.”
   • [claimed-docs] “Endpoint map: The HTTP attack surface Gecko discovered in your code.”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

Coverage

1. developerScan projects across all the major languages and package ecosystems my organization uses

   weight 2 · round to Trivy
   Trivy~partialcommunity7/10

   Trivy documents scanning of container images, filesystems, and git repos for vulnerabilities via lock files (e.g., Gemfile.lock, package-lock.json), plus secrets, misconfigurations, licenses, and SBOM generation—covering many languages/ecosystems and package managers broadly. However, the evidence pack lacks an explicit enumerated list of 'all major languages/ecosystems' supported, and one community report notes a runtime panic on a specific scan type (AWS scanning), suggesting coverage gaps or bugs in some scan modes. missing for 10: an authoritative full list of supported languages/package managers, independent verification of breadth across ecosystems, and confirmation that edge-case scans (e.g., cloud scanning) are reliable.

   • [claimed-docs] “It detects known vulnerabilities in your container image.”
   • [claimed-docs] “Trivy will look for vulnerabilities based on lock files such as Gemfile.lock and package-lock.json.”
   • [claimed-docs] “Trivy scans any container image, filesystem and git repository to detect exposed secrets like passwords, api keys, and tokens. Secret scanni…”
   • [claimed-docs] “Trivy provides built-in checks to detect configuration issues in popular Infrastructure as Code files, such as: Docker, Kubernetes, Terrafor…”
   • [claimed-docs] “Trivy scans any container image for license files and offers an opinionated view on the risk associated with the license.”
   • [claimed-docs] “Trivy can generate the following SBOM formats. * [CycloneDX](#cyclonedx) * [SPDX](#spdx)”
   • [community] “Just tried it: ./trivy aws --region us-east-1 -> panic: runtime error: invalid memory address or nil pointer dereference. Posted a Github is…”
   • [community] “I would kill for an all-in-one solution where I work... today we use a different scanner for every single type of scan we perform, and it's …”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Gecko Security~partialcommunity5/10

   Docs list a defined set of 'compiler-accurate' languages (TypeScript, JavaScript, Python, Go, Java, Scala, C#, Rust) supporting cross-file analysis, but there is no mention of package/dependency-ecosystem scanning (npm, pip, Maven, Cargo, etc.) or of broader language coverage (C/C++, Ruby, PHP, Kotlin, Swift). Community testing on a C project (unsupported language) found nothing, reinforcing that coverage is limited to the stated language list rather than 'all major languages and ecosystems.' Missing for 10: explicit package/dependency-ecosystem scanning support, broader language list, and independent verification of coverage breadth.

   • [claimed-docs] “Compiler-accurate (precise cross-file analysis) | TypeScript · JavaScript · Python · Go · Java · Scala · C# · Rust”
   • [community] “Ran Gecko on a C project after Semgrep AI flagged a minor real issue; Gecko found nothing. After removing the fix and recreating the project…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

Output formats

1. developerEmit scan results in machine-readable formats like JSON or SARIF for downstream tooling

   weight 2 · round to Gecko Security
   Trivy—none0/10

   The evidence pack shows Trivy generates SBOM formats (CycloneDX/SPDX) and integrates well with CI/CD, but nowhere documents the --format flag or explicit JSON/SARIF vulnerability-scan output that this story asks about. missing for 10: explicit documentation of JSON/SARIF output format flags for vulnerability/misconfiguration scan results, any example of SARIF file generation, and confirmation of downstream tool consumption (e.g., GitHub Code Scanning integration).

   • [community] “I would kill for an all-in-one solution where I work... today we use a different scanner for every single type of scan we perform, and it's …”
   • [community] “it's super easy to integrate in every ci/cd pipeline”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Gecko Security~partialprobed4/10

   Gecko's v1 API lets developers read scan, repository, and vulnerability data programmatically (implying JSON responses) and an OpenAPI spec is published, but there is no explicit documentation of a SARIF export format or dedicated 'JSON report' output for CI pipelines. Missing for 10: explicit SARIF format support, documented JSON report export command, and any CI-integration example showing machine-readable output being consumed downstream.

   • [claimed-docs] “Gecko's v1 API lets you trigger scans, read scan, repository, and vulnerability data, triage findings, manage scan schedules, rotate your Gi…”
   • [probe] “PROBE openapi: HTTP 200 at https://gecko.security/openapi.json — contains "openapi" key”
   • [claimed-docs] “Gecko can push events to your systems as scans run and findings change: page a channel when a scan fails, open a workflow when a critical la…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

Dependency fixes

1. developerGet concrete upgrade paths or automated fix pull requests that remediate vulnerable dependencies

   weight 2 · round drawn
   Trivy—none0/10

   Trivy is purely a scanner/detector—evidence shows it detects vulnerabilities, misconfigurations, secrets, and generates SBOMs, but nothing indicates it suggests upgrade paths, fix versions, or opens automated remediation pull requests. No auto-fix PR or dependency-upgrade feature is documented anywhere in the evidence pack.

   • [claimed-docs] “It detects known vulnerabilities in your container image.”
   • [claimed-docs] “Trivy will look for vulnerabilities based on lock files such as Gemfile.lock and package-lock.json.”
   • [claimed-docs] “Trivy can generate the following SBOM formats. * [CycloneDX](#cyclonedx) * [SPDX](#spdx)”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Gecko Security—none0/10

   Gecko's documented capability is source-to-sink code vulnerability detection (SAST-style) with a generic 'Request fix' PR mechanism for findings it detects in application code; there is no evidence of dependency/package manifest scanning, CVE-to-package matching, or specific upgrade-path recommendations for vulnerable dependencies (SCA). Missing for 10: any mention of software composition analysis, dependency manifest parsing, package version resolution, or upgrade-path guidance tied to third-party library CVEs.

   • [claimed-docs] “Each finding includes a severity (CVSS 4.0), a confidence score, the full source-to-sink call chain, a proof of concept, and a suggested pat…”
   • [claimed-docs] “Click Request fix to open a gecko/* pull request with the patch applied, or apply the patch yourself.”
   • [claimed-docs] “Click **Request fix** to open a `gecko/*` pull request with the patch applied, or apply the patch yourself.”
   • [claimed-docs] “Compiler-accurate (precise cross-file analysis) | TypeScript · JavaScript · Python · Go · Java · Scala · C# · Rust”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

Sca scanning

1. developerScan my dependency manifests and lockfiles for packages with known vulnerabilities

   weight 3 · round to Trivy
   Trivy✓fullcommunity9/10

   Trivy explicitly documents scanning lockfiles like Gemfile.lock and package-lock.json for known vulnerabilities, with strong first-party docs and positive independent community feedback on its CI/CD scanning usage. missing for 10: broader independent benchmark of lockfile-specific detection accuracy across more ecosystems.

   • [claimed-docs] “Trivy will look for vulnerabilities based on lock files such as Gemfile.lock and package-lock.json.”
   • [community] “I've had a great experience with Trivy, very solid tool, very easy to write automation around.”
   • [community] “it's super easy to integrate in every ci/cd pipeline”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Gecko Security—none0/10

   Gecko's documented capability is AI-driven source-code (SAST) analysis — call-chain tracing, endpoint mapping, PR-level code review — with no mention of scanning package manifests, lockfiles, or third-party dependency CVEs. Since Gecko is a security scanner, dependency/SCA scanning is a fair axis to ask about, but no evidence shows it exists.

   ⚑ flag

2. security-engineerPrioritize dependency alerts by whether the vulnerable code is actually reachable from my code

   weight 2 · round drawn
   Trivy—none0/10

   Trivy's evidence pack shows vulnerability detection, SBOM generation, secret scanning, and misconfiguration checks, but nothing about reachability analysis or code-path tracing to determine if vulnerable dependency code is actually invoked/exposed. No mention of call-graph analysis, static reachability, or exploitability-based prioritization.

   ⚑ flag

   Gecko Security—none0/10

   Gecko's docs describe source-to-sink call-chain analysis and reachability for vulnerabilities found in first-party code, but there is no evidence it ingests dependency/SCA alerts (e.g., known-CVE package advisories) or prioritizes them by reachability — it's positioned as a SAST-style code vulnerability scanner, not a dependency/SCA tool.

   • [claimed-docs] “Each finding includes a severity (CVSS 4.0), a confidence score, the full source-to-sink call chain, a proof of concept, and a suggested pat…”
   • [claimed-docs] “Compiler-accurate (precise cross-file analysis) | TypeScript · JavaScript · Python · Go · Java · Scala · C# · Rust”
   • [claimed-docs] “Repository wiki: An AI-written map of your app: architecture, routing, and security model.”
   • [claimed-docs] “Endpoint map: The HTTP attack surface Gecko discovered in your code.”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

1. ai-native userExport all of my data in open formats and leave

   weight 3 · round to Trivy
   Trivy~partialclaimed5/10

   Trivy generates SBOMs and scan reports in open, interoperable standards (CycloneDX, SPDX) rather than proprietary formats, and being open-source/self-hosted there is inherently no vendor lock-in to escape from. However, there's no explicit documentation framing this as 'exporting all your data to leave' — it's a scanner tool, not a data-storing platform, so the story is only partially applicable and evidenced. Missing for 10: explicit statement about exporting full scan history/config, independent corroboration that these formats are freely portable across tools, and clarity on what 'all data' means for a stateless CLI scanner.

   • [claimed-docs] “Trivy can generate the following SBOM formats. * [CycloneDX](#cyclonedx) * [SPDX](#spdx)”
   • [claimed-docs] “Trivy can generate the following SBOM formats.”
   • [claimed-docs] “Trivy can generate the following SBOM formats. * CycloneDX * SPDX”
   • [claimed-docs] “Trivy can generate SBOM for local projects.”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Gecko Security~partialprobed3/10

   The v1 API lets users read scan, repository, and vulnerability data programmatically (JSON via OpenAPI), which provides a technical path to export findings data, but there is no documented bulk 'export all data' feature, no mention of open-format guarantees for full account data, and no offboarding/exit workflow. missing for 10: explicit full-data export tooling, documented open-format (e.g. CSV/JSON) export guarantee, and account-closure/data-portability policy.

   • [claimed-docs] “Gecko's v1 API lets you trigger scans, read scan, repository, and vulnerability data, triage findings, manage scan schedules, rotate your Gi…”
   • [probe] “PROBE openapi: HTTP 200 at https://gecko.security/openapi.json — contains "openapi" key”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

2. ai-native userRead the product's source under an open license

   weight 2 · round to Trivy
   Trivy~partialprobed6/10

   Trivy's source is hosted publicly on GitHub (aquasecurity/trivy) and its own site describes it as an 'open source vulnerability scanning' tool, implying an open license, but no evidence pack item explicitly cites a license file (e.g., Apache-2.0) or license text. Missing for 10: explicit license identifier/citation, confirmation of license terms (permissions, redistribution), and independent corroboration of license compliance.

   • [github] “trivy k8s --report summary cluster”
   • [github] “Trivy is available in most common distribution channels. ... `brew install trivy` ... `docker run aquasec/trivy`”
   • [claimed-docs] “After evaluating several leading options for open source vulnerability scanning, Trivy really stood out”
   • [probe] “official CLI documented at https://github.com/aquasecurity/trivy”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Gecko Security—none0/10

   No evidence that Gecko Security's source code is published or licensed openly; it is a proprietary SaaS/security scanning product with documented APIs and hybrid deployment, but nothing indicates its codebase is open source.

   ⚑ flag

3. ai-native userSelf-host the core product

   weight 3 · round to Trivy
   Trivy✓fullprobed7/10

   Trivy is an open-source CLI/binary distributed via package managers and Docker images, meaning the core scanning engine runs entirely on the user's own infrastructure with no mandatory SaaS dependency, satisfying the self-hosting expectation for an AI-native user who wants full control over the tool. Missing for 10: explicit documentation of a self-hosted 'Trivy Server' mode/architecture for shared caching, and independent hands-on confirmation of air-gapped/offline self-hosted deployments.

   • [github] “Trivy is available in most common distribution channels. ... `brew install trivy` ... `docker run aquasec/trivy`”
   • [probe] “official CLI documented at https://github.com/aquasecurity/trivy”
   • [claimed-docs] “After evaluating several leading options for open source vulnerability scanning, Trivy really stood out”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Gecko Security~partialclaimed6/10

   Docs confirm a 'hybrid' deployment where the scanner, S3 storage, and AI inference all run inside the customer's AWS account, and the pricing page lists an 'On-prem / self-hosted / private cloud' tier — both indicating genuine self-hosting options exist. However, the same hybrid docs state Gecko still hosts the dashboard, database, and scan orchestration, so the core control plane is not actually self-hostable in the standard offering, and no architecture/setup docs for the full on-prem tier are provided. Missing for 10: detailed on-prem deployment guide/architecture for the fully self-hosted tier, and confirmation that dashboard/orchestration can also run on customer infrastructure.

   • [claimed-docs] “the scanner, S3 storage, and all AI inference run inside your AWS account. Gecko hosts only the dashboard, database, and scan orchestration.”
   • [claimed-docs] “the scanner, S3 storage, and all AI inference run inside your AWS account.”
   • [claimed-docs] “Unlimited scanning * On-prem / self-hosted / private cloud”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

1. ai-native userControl data retention and deletion

   weight 2 · round drawn
   Trivy—none0/10

   No evidence describes any data retention, storage duration, or deletion controls for Trivy's scan results, cache, vulnerability DB, or MCP interactions; the docs focus solely on scanning capabilities and CLI/MCP setup, not privacy/retention policy.

   ⚑ flag

   Gecko Security—none0/10

   The evidence pack covers scanning, PR fixes, integrations, hybrid deployment, and API/webhooks, but there is no mention of data retention policies, data deletion controls, or user ability to purge stored findings/scan data. Hybrid deployment keeps scanner/AI inference in the customer's AWS account, but this does not address retention/deletion of dashboard-hosted data. missing for 10: explicit data retention policy documentation, a deletion/purge mechanism or API, and any account/data-export or GDPR-style deletion workflow.

   • [claimed-docs] “the scanner, S3 storage, and all AI inference run inside your AWS account. Gecko hosts only the dashboard, database, and scan orchestration.”
   • [claimed-docs] “the scanner, S3 storage, and all AI inference run inside your AWS account.”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

2. ai-native userOpt out of telemetry and usage tracking

   weight 2 · round drawn
   Trivy—none0/10

   No evidence pack item mentions telemetry, usage tracking, or an opt-out mechanism for Trivy or its MCP server; the axis is plausible for a CLI/MCP tool but no documentation confirms or denies it.

   ⚑ flag

   Gecko Security—none0/10

   No evidence anywhere in the pack of a telemetry/usage-tracking opt-out setting, privacy policy control, or data-collection toggle; the docs focus on scanning, PR fixes, API keys, and deployment but never mention telemetry opt-out.

   ⚑ flag

Ai remediation

1. ai-native userHave AI draft remediation pull requests for security findings that I review and merge

   weight 2 · round to Gecko Security
   Trivy—none0/10

   Trivy is a scanner that detects vulnerabilities, misconfigurations, secrets, and generates SBOMs; the evidence shows an MCP server for natural-language querying of scan results, but nowhere does it show Trivy or its MCP integration drafting remediation pull requests for review/merge. No evidence of automated PR generation capability.

   • [claimed-docs] “Natural Language Scanning: Ask questions about security issues in natural language”
   • [claimed-docs] “This plugin starts a Model Context Protocol (MCP) server that integrates Trivy's security scanning capabilities with VS Code and other MCP-e…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Gecko Security✓fullcommunity8/10

   Docs describe a complete AI-drafted remediation PR workflow: 'Request fix' opens a gecko/* PR with the patch applied, fixes can commit directly to the PR's head branch, and Gecko rechecks and marks 'Fix verified' once merged and the vulnerability is resolved — squarely matching the ai-native review-and-merge story. Community reports raise concerns about finding accuracy/false positives, but do not contradict that the PR-drafting/remediation mechanism itself works as documented. Missing for 10: independent hands-on confirmation that the auto-generated patches are high quality and mergeable without heavy rework.

   • [claimed-docs] “Click Request fix to open a gecko/* pull request with the patch applied, or apply the patch yourself.”
   • [claimed-docs] “Click **Request fix** to open a `gecko/*` pull request with the patch applied, or apply the patch yourself.”
   • [claimed-docs] “When the fix merges, Gecko rechecks the finding and marks it **Fix verified** once the vulnerability is gone.”
   • [claimed-docs] “Commit to an existing PR: For findings from a PR scan, Gecko can commit the fix directly to the PR's head branch so the fix rides along with…”
   • [claimed-docs] “PR reviews & fixes: On pull requests, a security review summary and one-click fixes.”
   • [community] “Tool gave 100% confidence for two vulnerabilities (severity 9.4 and 6.5) that turned out not to be real.”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

Code analysis

1. security-engineerDetect taint-style vulnerabilities that flow across files and function boundaries

   weight 2 · round to Gecko Security
   Trivy—none0/10

   Trivy is a vulnerability/misconfiguration/secret/SBOM scanner focused on known-CVE and dependency detection; the evidence pack shows no taint-analysis or cross-file/cross-function data-flow SAST capability (e.g. no mention of source-code taint tracking like Semgrep/CodeQL). This is an applicable axis for a security scanning tool, but there is no evidence Trivy performs taint-style SAST analysis.

   ⚑ flag

   Gecko Security!disputedcontradicted5/10

   Docs explicitly claim 'compiler-accurate' cross-file analysis and 'full source-to-sink call chain' reporting, which directly describes taint-style detection across file/function boundaries (gecko-security-docs-2, gecko-security-docs-20). However, independent hands-on reports show concrete failures of this claim: 100%-confidence findings that were not real vulnerabilities, missed a real known issue flagged by another tool, and an inaccurate/irrelevant finding on a scanned project (gecko-security-comm-3, gecko-security-comm-4, gecko-security-comm-5). Missing for 10: independent verification of true-positive cross-file taint chains, resolution of the reported false positive/negative cases, and reproducible benchmark data.

   • [claimed-docs] “Each finding includes a severity (CVSS 4.0), a confidence score, the full source-to-sink call chain, a proof of concept, and a suggested pat…”
   • [claimed-docs] “Compiler-accurate (precise cross-file analysis) | TypeScript · JavaScript · Python · Go · Java · Scala · C# · Rust”
   • [community] “Tool gave 100% confidence for two vulnerabilities (severity 9.4 and 6.5) that turned out not to be real.”
   • [community] “Ran Gecko on a C project after Semgrep AI flagged a minor real issue; Gecko found nothing. After removing the fix and recreating the project…”
   • [community] “Uploaded a project (sydbox) to scan; took 10 minutes and found only one vulnerability, an 'RCE: IRC Message Command Execution Bypass' in an …”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

2. developerRun static analysis that finds vulnerability classes like injection and XSS in my source code

   weight 3 · round to Gecko Security
   Trivy—none0/10

   Trivy's documented capabilities are vulnerability scanning (known CVEs in dependencies/images), secret detection, IaC misconfiguration checks, license and SBOM generation — none of the evidence shows a SAST engine that analyzes source code for vulnerability classes like injection or XSS. This is a fair axis for a security scanning product, but no evidence supports it, so it is 'none' rather than 'na'.

   • [claimed-docs] “It detects known vulnerabilities in your container image.”
   • [claimed-docs] “Trivy will look for vulnerabilities based on lock files such as Gemfile.lock and package-lock.json.”
   • [claimed-docs] “Trivy scans any container image, filesystem and git repository to detect exposed secrets like passwords, api keys, and tokens. Secret scanni…”
   • [claimed-docs] “Trivy provides built-in checks to detect configuration issues in popular Infrastructure as Code files, such as: Docker, Kubernetes, Terrafor…”
   • [claimed-docs] “Trivy scans any container image for license files and offers an opinionated view on the risk associated with the license.”
   • [claimed-docs] “Trivy can generate the following SBOM formats. * [CycloneDX](#cyclonedx) * [SPDX](#spdx)”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Gecko Security!disputedcontradicted5/10

   Gecko's docs describe compiler-accurate, cross-file static analysis with source-to-sink call chains, CVSS severity, and confidence scores that would encompass classes like SQLi/XSS (docs-2, docs-20), and it supports multiple languages. However, independent hands-on testing on Hacker News reports both missed real vulnerabilities and high-confidence false positives (comm-3, comm-4, comm-5), directly contradicting the accuracy implied by the docs. Missing for 10: independent benchmark data on injection/XSS detection rates, and resolution of the false-positive/false-negative reports.

   • [claimed-docs] “Each finding includes a severity (CVSS 4.0), a confidence score, the full source-to-sink call chain, a proof of concept, and a suggested pat…”
   • [claimed-docs] “Compiler-accurate (precise cross-file analysis) | TypeScript · JavaScript · Python · Go · Java · Scala · C# · Rust”
   • [community] “Tool gave 100% confidence for two vulnerabilities (severity 9.4 and 6.5) that turned out not to be real.”
   • [community] “Ran Gecko on a C project after Semgrep AI flagged a minor real issue; Gecko found nothing. After removing the fix and recreating the project…”
   • [community] “Uploaded a project (sydbox) to scan; took 10 minutes and found only one vulnerability, an 'RCE: IRC Message Command Execution Bypass' in an …”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

Custom rules

1. security-engineerWrite custom static-analysis rules in a simple syntax and share them across repositories

   weight 2 · round drawn
   Trivy—none0/10

   Trivy's evidence covers vulnerability, misconfiguration, secret, license, and SBOM scanning, but there is no mention of a custom rule-writing syntax (e.g., Rego/OPA policies) or a mechanism for sharing custom rules across repositories in this evidence pack.

   ⚑ flag

   Gecko Security—none0/10

   Gecko Security is an AI-driven vulnerability scanner using compiler-accurate cross-file analysis, not a rule-based SAST engine; there is no evidence of a custom rule-writing syntax (e.g., YAML/DSL rules like Semgrep) or any mechanism to define and share such rules across repositories.

   • [claimed-docs] “Compiler-accurate (precise cross-file analysis) | TypeScript · JavaScript · Python · Go · Java · Scala · C# · Rust”
   • [claimed-docs] “Repository wiki: An AI-written map of your app: architecture, routing, and security model.”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

Fix suggestions

1. developerApply suggested or automatic code fixes for findings instead of only reading reports

   weight 2 · round to Gecko Security
   Trivy—none0/10

   Trivy is purely a scanner that detects vulnerabilities, misconfigurations, secrets, and licenses and reports findings; there is no evidence of any suggested-fix or auto-remediation capability in the docs, CLI, or MCP integration, which only supports natural-language querying of scan results.

   • [claimed-docs] “It detects known vulnerabilities in your container image.”
   • [claimed-docs] “Trivy provides built-in checks to detect configuration issues in popular Infrastructure as Code files, such as: Docker, Kubernetes, Terrafor…”
   • [claimed-docs] “Trivy scans any container image, filesystem and git repository to detect exposed secrets like passwords, api keys, and tokens. Secret scanni…”
   • [claimed-docs] “This plugin starts a Model Context Protocol (MCP) server that integrates Trivy's security scanning capabilities with VS Code and other MCP-e…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Gecko Security✓fullclaimed8/10

   Docs describe a full remediation loop: suggested patches with 'Request fix' opening a gecko/* PR, ability to commit fixes directly to an existing PR's head branch, and automatic re-scan marking 'Fix verified' once resolved — this goes beyond read-only reporting into applied/automatic fixes. missing for 10: independent/hands-on confirmation that generated fixes actually work correctly (community evidence focuses on detection false positives, not fix application quality).

   • [claimed-docs] “Click Request fix to open a gecko/* pull request with the patch applied, or apply the patch yourself.”
   • [claimed-docs] “Gecko rechecks the finding and marks it Fix verified once the vulnerability is gone.”
   • [claimed-docs] “Commit to an existing PR: For findings from a PR scan, Gecko can commit the fix directly to the PR's head branch so the fix rides along with…”
   • [claimed-docs] “PR reviews & fixes: On pull requests, a security review summary and one-click fixes.”
   • [claimed-docs] “Click **Request fix** to open a `gecko/*` pull request with the patch applied, or apply the patch yourself.”
   • [claimed-docs] “When the fix merges, Gecko rechecks the finding and marks it **Fix verified** once the vulnerability is gone.”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

Custom detection

1. security-engineerDefine custom detection rules for my organization's internal token and secret formats

   weight 2 · round drawn
   Trivy—none0/10

   Evidence confirms Trivy has built-in secret scanning for passwords, API keys, and tokens (trivy-docs-3, trivy-docs-10), but nothing in the pack describes an ability for users to define custom regex/rules for organization-specific token formats. Missing for 10: any documentation of custom secret rule configuration, regex pattern definition, or allow/deny-list rule authoring.

   • [claimed-docs] “Trivy scans any container image, filesystem and git repository to detect exposed secrets like passwords, api keys, and tokens. Secret scanni…”
   • [claimed-docs] “Trivy scans any container image, filesystem and git repository to detect exposed secrets like passwords, api keys, and tokens.”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Gecko Security—none0/10

   Gecko Security is a vulnerability-scanning tool focused on code security review (SAST-style findings, PR checks, fixes), and none of the evidence mentions custom secret/token pattern detection rules or any mechanism for defining organization-specific secret formats.

   ⚑ flag

Secret scanning

1. developerScan a repository and its full git history for hardcoded secrets and credentials

   weight 3 · round to Trivy
   Trivy~partialclaimed5/10

   Trivy explicitly supports secret scanning across filesystem, container image, and git repository targets, enabled by default (trivy-docs-3, trivy-docs-10). However, the evidence never confirms that this scan traverses the full git commit history (e.g., detecting secrets committed and later removed) rather than just the current working tree/HEAD state. Missing for 10: explicit documentation or demonstration of full git-history secret scanning, independent verification of history-depth coverage.

   • [claimed-docs] “Trivy scans any container image, filesystem and git repository to detect exposed secrets like passwords, api keys, and tokens. Secret scanni…”
   • [claimed-docs] “Trivy scans any container image, filesystem and git repository to detect exposed secrets like passwords, api keys, and tokens.”
   • [claimed-docs] “it stores analysis results, using the latest commit hash as the key.”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Gecko Security—none0/10

   Gecko's documented capability is AI-driven vulnerability discovery (source-to-sink call chains, CVSS scoring, PoCs, patches) for application code, not secret/credential scanning or git-history scanning. Missing for 10: any mention of secret/credential detection, hardcoded key scanning, or scanning git commit history for leaked secrets.

   • [claimed-docs] “Each finding includes a severity (CVSS 4.0), a confidence score, the full source-to-sink call chain, a proof of concept, and a suggested pat…”
   • [claimed-docs] “Repository wiki: An AI-written map of your app: architecture, routing, and security model.”
   • [claimed-docs] “Compiler-accurate (precise cross-file analysis) | TypeScript · JavaScript · Python · Go · Java · Scala · C# · Rust”
   • [probe] “PROBE llms.txt: HTTP 200 at https://gecko.security/llms.txt # Gecko Security > Gecko Security is an AI security engineer that finds exploit…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

Licenses

1. devops-leadDetect the licenses of my dependencies and enforce a license policy in scans

   weight 1 · round to Trivy
   Trivy~partialclaimed5/10

   Trivy documents dedicated license scanning that detects license files in container images and gives an opinionated risk categorization (trivy-docs-5), which covers the 'detect licenses' half of the story. However, the evidence pack contains no documentation of configurable allow/deny license lists or exit-code/policy enforcement gating a build on disallowed licenses—only the general misconfiguration/IaC policy engine is described (trivy-docs-4), not license-specific policy enforcement. missing for 10: explicit license allow/deny-list configuration, CI/CD gating or exit-code enforcement tied to license violations, independent confirmation of license policy enforcement in practice.

   • [claimed-docs] “Trivy scans any container image for license files and offers an opinionated view on the risk associated with the license.”
   • [claimed-docs] “Trivy provides built-in checks to detect configuration issues in popular Infrastructure as Code files, such as: Docker, Kubernetes, Terrafor…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Gecko Security—none0/10

   Gecko is positioned as an AI vulnerability/exploit scanner (SAST-style call-chain analysis, patch suggestions) with no mention anywhere in docs, changelog, or API reference of dependency license detection, SBOM generation, or license policy enforcement.

   ⚑ flag

Sbom

1. security-engineerGenerate a software bill of materials (SPDX or CycloneDX) for my project or image

   weight 2 · round to Trivy
   Trivy✓fullclaimed9/10

   Trivy's docs explicitly document SBOM generation in both CycloneDX and SPDX formats for container images and filesystems/local projects, backed by a dedicated supply-chain SBOM guide and CLI usage. Missing for 10: independent/hands-on community corroboration specifically of SBOM output quality (community evidence focuses on vulnerability scanning and unrelated security incidents, not SBOM generation).

   • [claimed-docs] “Trivy can generate the following SBOM formats. * [CycloneDX](#cyclonedx) * [SPDX](#spdx)”
   • [claimed-docs] “Trivy can generate the following SBOM formats.”
   • [claimed-docs] “Trivy can generate SBOM for local projects.”
   • [claimed-docs] “Trivy can generate the following SBOM formats. * CycloneDX * SPDX”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Gecko Security—none0/10

   Gecko Security is an AI vulnerability scanner focused on code review, exploit findings, and auto-fix PRs; no evidence anywhere mentions generating an SBOM in SPDX or CycloneDX format for a project or container image.

   ⚑ flag

Ai triage

1. ai-native userUse AI to triage findings — explaining them, deduplicating, and flagging likely false positives

   weight 3 · round to Trivy
   Trivy~partialprobed4/10

   Trivy's official MCP server (trivy-mcp) enables natural-language querying/explanation of scan findings via AI-enabled tools like VS Code, which supports the 'explaining findings' part of the story, but there is no documented feature for AI-driven deduplication of findings or automated false-positive flagging. Missing for 10: explicit deduplication logic, false-positive triage/suppression via AI, and independent hands-on evidence that MCP-based triage actually reduces noise in practice.

   • [claimed-docs] “Natural Language Scanning: Ask questions about security issues in natural language”
   • [claimed-docs] “**Natural Language Scanning**: Ask questions about security issues in natural language”
   • [claimed-docs] “This plugin starts a Model Context Protocol (MCP) server that integrates Trivy's security scanning capabilities with VS Code and other MCP-e…”
   • [probe] “official MCP server documented at https://github.com/aquasecurity/trivy-mcp”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Gecko Security!disputedcontradicted4/10

   Docs describe confidence scores, severity, call chains, and PR-introduced vs pre-existing separation, plus an AI-tools API explicitly for triaging findings (gecko-security-docs-2, -9, -28), which maps to explaining/deduplicating/flagging false positives. However, hands-on community reports directly contradict the false-positive flagging claim: the tool assigned 100% confidence to two non-existent vulnerabilities and flagged an implausible 'RCE' in a CTF IRC bot script as high severity, while missing a real issue found by another scanner (gecko-security-comm-3, gecko-security-comm-5, gecko-security-comm-4). Missing for 10: independent validation that confidence scoring reliably suppresses false positives, and resolution of the reported inaccurate high-confidence findings.

   • [claimed-docs] “Each finding includes a severity (CVSS 4.0), a confidence score, the full source-to-sink call chain, a proof of concept, and a suggested pat…”
   • [claimed-docs] “Connect it to an AI tool and the tool can list your repositories and scans, pull full vulnerability evidence (proof of concept, call chain, …”
   • [claimed-docs] “Findings introduced by the PR are separated from pre-existing ones, so reviewers focus on what the change adds.”
   • [community] “Tool gave 100% confidence for two vulnerabilities (severity 9.4 and 6.5) that turned out not to be real.”
   • [community] “Uploaded a project (sydbox) to scan; took 10 minutes and found only one vulnerability, an 'RCE: IRC Message Command Execution Bypass' in an …”
   • [community] “Ran Gecko on a C project after Semgrep AI flagged a minor real issue; Gecko found nothing. After removing the fix and recreating the project…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

Fp management

1. security-engineerBaseline or ignore existing and false-positive findings so only new issues alert

   weight 3 · round to Gecko Security
   Trivy—none0/10

   The evidence pack contains no mention of Trivy's .trivyignore file, ignore-policies, baseline/suppression features, or VEX-based suppression that would let a security engineer mark existing findings as accepted/false-positive so only new issues alert. All docs excerpts focus on scanning capabilities (vulnerabilities, secrets, misconfig, SBOM) with none addressing triage/ignore workflows. Missing for 10: documentation of .trivyignore/ignore-file support, VEX suppression, baseline diffing, or any triage-noise reduction feature.

   ⚑ flag

   Gecko Security~partialcommunity6/10

   Docs show PR scans separate pre-existing findings from new ones so reviewers focus on what changed (docs-28), and the API supports 'triage findings' (docs-10), implying some noise-reduction workflow. However, there's no explicit documentation of a false-positive marking/ignore mechanism or a persistent baseline snapshot feature, and community reports flag inaccurate high-confidence findings (comm-3) without confirming a suppression workflow exists. missing for 10: explicit 'mark as false positive'/dismiss UI, documented baseline snapshotting across scans, independent confirmation that dismissed findings stay suppressed on rescans.

   • [claimed-docs] “Findings introduced by the PR are separated from pre-existing ones, so reviewers focus on what the change adds.”
   • [claimed-docs] “Gecko's v1 API lets you trigger scans, read scan, repository, and vulnerability data, triage findings, manage scan schedules, rotate your Gi…”
   • [claimed-docs] “create a ticket in Jira, Linear, ClickUp, or Shortcut”
   • [community] “Tool gave 100% confidence for two vulnerabilities (severity 9.4 and 6.5) that turned out not to be real.”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

2. developerFilter and gate on findings by severity or confidence so low-value noise does not block builds

   weight 2 · round to Gecko Security
   Trivy—none0/10

   The evidence pack contains no mention of severity or confidence filtering flags (e.g. --severity, --exit-code) or any gating mechanism to suppress low-value findings; all cited docs focus on scan targets (image, filesystem, secrets, misconfig, SBOM) rather than triage/filtering controls. Missing for 10: any documentation of severity/confidence thresholds, exit-code gating, or ignore-file mechanisms to reduce noise.

   ⚑ flag

   Gecko Security~partialclaimed6/10

   Docs confirm a 'fail-on severity' threshold for PR checks (e.g., fail on High and above) and that findings carry both severity and confidence scores, supporting build-gating by severity. However, there's no documented mechanism to gate/filter specifically by confidence score, only severity threshold is described as configurable. Missing for 10: explicit confidence-based filtering/gating controls, and independent verification that severity gating reliably suppresses low-value noise.

   • [claimed-docs] “Each finding includes a severity (CVSS 4.0), a confidence score, the full source-to-sink call chain, a proof of concept, and a suggested pat…”
   • [claimed-docs] “**Fail-on severity**: the severity threshold that fails the check (for example, fail on High and above).”
   • [claimed-docs] “Findings introduced by the PR are separated from pre-existing ones, so reviewers focus on what the change adds.”

   proof ↗⚑ flag