TruffleHog vs Gecko Security

Agent access

1. ai-native userPoint an agent at llms.txt or agent-oriented docs

   weight 2 · round to Gecko Security
   TruffleHog~partialprobed4/10

   llms.txt itself returns a 404, but the docs site serves markdown versions of pages (e.g. docs.md, pre-commit-hooks.md, customizing-detection.md) that an agent could fetch directly, showing some agent-oriented doc structure without a formal llms.txt manifest. missing for 10: a working llms.txt file, any explicit agent/LLM-consumption guidance, and confirmation these .md endpoints are documented as an intentional agent-facing interface.

   • [probe] “PROBE llms.txt: HTTP 404 at https://trufflesecurity.com/llms.txt”
   • [probe] “PROBE docs-md: HTTP 200 at https://trufflesecurity.com/docs.md --- title: Choose your adventure slug: docs description: Compare TruffleHog O…”
   • [claimed-docs] “Pre-commit hooks are a useful way to prevent secrets in code from being pushed from a git repository.”
   • [claimed-docs] “The custom regex detector allows you to define your own detector using regular expressions with optional verification using a webhook.”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Gecko Security✓fullprobed9/10

   Direct probes confirm Gecko serves both llms.txt (HTTP 200) and a docs.md aggregate at the docs root, plus an OpenAPI spec and documented MCP/AI-tool integration for agents to consume — exactly the agent-oriented docs surface the story asks for. Missing for 10: no independent/community confirmation that an agent actually consumed llms.txt successfully in practice.

   • [probe] “PROBE llms.txt: HTTP 200 at https://gecko.security/llms.txt # Gecko Security > Gecko Security is an AI security engineer that finds exploit…”
   • [probe] “PROBE docs-md: HTTP 200 at https://gecko.security/docs.md --- title: "Gecko Security - Gecko Security" description: "An AI security engineer…”
   • [probe] “PROBE openapi: HTTP 200 at https://gecko.security/openapi.json — contains "openapi" key”
   • [claimed-docs] “Connect it to an AI tool and the tool can list your repositories and scans, pull full vulnerability evidence (proof of concept, call chain, …”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

2. ai-native userRun the product headlessly / in CI for automation

   weight 2 · round drawn
   TruffleHog✓fullclaimed7/10

   TruffleHog ships as a CLI and Docker image that can be invoked non-interactively (e.g. `trufflehog github --only-verified --repo ...`, `docker run ... trufflesecurity/trufflehog:latest github --org=...`) and supports automation-friendly flags like `--fail` and `--results=verified,unknown` for pipeline gating, plus pre-commit/pre-receive hook integration for git automation. missing for 10: explicit first-party CI/CD platform docs (e.g. GitHub Actions, GitLab CI templates) and independent hands-on confirmation of headless CI usage beyond docs.

   • [claimed-docs] “trufflehog github --only-verified --repo https://github.com/trufflesecurity/test_keys”
   • [claimed-docs] “trufflehog git file://. --since-commit HEAD --results=verified,unknown --fail”
   • [github] “docker run --rm -it -v "$PWD:/pwd" trufflesecurity/trufflehog:latest github --org=trufflesecurity”
   • [github] “docker run --rm -it -v "$PWD:/pwd" trufflesecurity/trufflehog:latest github --repo https://github.com/trufflesecurity/test_keys”
   • [claimed-docs] “Pre-commit hooks are a useful way to prevent secrets in code from being pushed from a git repository.”
   • [claimed-docs] “This approach uses Git's `core.hooksPath` to apply hooks to all repositories without requiring any per-repository setup”
   • [github] “brew install trufflehog”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Gecko Security✓fullprobed7/10

   Gecko exposes a v1 API to trigger scans and read/triage results, dedicated CI/CD-labeled API keys, PR-check integration with configurable fail-on-severity thresholds that post pass/fail status back to GitHub/GitLab, and webhooks for automation pipelines — all enabling headless operation in CI. Missing for 10: independent/hands-on verification that CI pipelines actually work end-to-end, and no explicit example CI configs (e.g., GitHub Actions YAML) are shown.

   • [claimed-docs] “Gecko's v1 API lets you trigger scans, read scan, repository, and vulnerability data, triage findings, manage scan schedules, rotate your Gi…”
   • [claimed-docs] “Give the key a descriptive name, such as `CI/CD Pipeline` or `Production`.”
   • [claimed-docs] “Gecko posts a pass/fail check back to GitHub or GitLab so reviewers see the security status inline.”
   • [claimed-docs] “**Fail-on severity**: the severity threshold that fails the check (for example, fail on High and above).”
   • [claimed-docs] “Gecko can push events to your systems as scans run and findings change: page a channel when a scan fails, open a workflow when a critical la…”
   • [probe] “PROBE openapi: HTTP 200 at https://gecko.security/openapi.json — contains "openapi" key”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

3. ai-native userUse an official CLI

   weight 2 · round to TruffleHog
   TruffleHog✓fullprobed8/10

   TruffleHog ships a well-documented official CLI (installable via brew/docker) with a rich set of subcommands and flags (git, github, scan, analyze, --include-detectors, --verify-detectors, --fail, --results) suitable for scripted/agentic invocation, and is explicitly used in automation contexts like pre-commit hooks and CI pipelines. Missing for 10: explicit documentation of machine-readable (JSON) output formats or exit-code semantics tailored for agent/automation consumption, and independent corroboration beyond vendor docs/GitHub.

   • [github] “brew install trufflehog”
   • [github] “docker run --rm -it -v "$PWD:/pwd" trufflesecurity/trufflehog:latest github --org=trufflesecurity”
   • [github] “docker run --rm -it -v "$PWD:/pwd" trufflesecurity/trufflehog:latest github --repo https://github.com/trufflesecurity/test_keys”
   • [claimed-docs] “trufflehog git file://. --since-commit HEAD --results=verified,unknown --fail”
   • [claimed-docs] “./trufflehog scan --config=config.yaml --include-detectors=AWS,GitHub”
   • [claimed-docs] “You can manually specify which detectors to use with the `--include-detectors` flag.”
   • [claimed-docs] “the `--verify-detectors` and `--no-verify-detectors` CLI flags can be used to configure detector-specific verification override settings”
   • [probe] “official CLI documented at https://github.com/trufflesecurity/trufflehog”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Gecko Security—none0/10

   No evidence of an official CLI; Gecko offers a GitHub App, REST API, webhooks, and an MCP server for AI tools, but nothing in the docs, changelog, or probes mentions a CLI tool for AI-native workflows.

   ⚑ flag

4. ai-native userDrive the product through a documented public API

   weight 3 · round to Gecko Security
   TruffleHog—none0/10

   No evidence of a documented public API (REST/GraphQL/SDK) for programmatically driving TruffleHog; probes for llms.txt and openapi/swagger specs both 404, and only CLI flags/config and a webhook for custom-detector verification are documented, not a driving API.

   • [probe] “PROBE llms.txt: HTTP 404 at https://trufflesecurity.com/llms.txt”
   • [probe] “PROBE openapi: all candidate paths 404 (https://trufflesecurity.com/openapi.json, https://trufflesecurity.com/swagger.json, https://truffles…”
   • [claimed-docs] “Verification is done via a webhook POST request to the provided `endpoint`.”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Gecko Security✓fullprobed8/10

   Gecko documents a public v1 API (trigger scans, read scan/repo/vulnerability data, triage findings, manage schedules, rotate tokens, webhooks) with a live OpenAPI spec confirmed by probe, plus API key management and per-request logging. missing for 10: independent third-party developer confirmation of API usage/reliability beyond docs and probes, and more detail on API rate limits/versioning stability.

   • [claimed-docs] “Gecko's v1 API lets you trigger scans, read scan, repository, and vulnerability data, triage findings, manage scan schedules, rotate your Gi…”
   • [claimed-docs] “API keys are now visible to the whole team with owner attribution and per-request usage logging”
   • [claimed-docs] “Gecko can push events to your systems as scans run and findings change: page a channel when a scan fails, open a workflow when a critical la…”
   • [claimed-docs] “Give the key a descriptive name, such as `CI/CD Pipeline` or `Production`.”
   • [probe] “PROBE openapi: HTTP 200 at https://gecko.security/openapi.json — contains "openapi" key”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

5. ai-native userBuild against official SDKs

   weight 2 · round to Gecko Security
   TruffleHog—none0/10

   The evidence pack documents TruffleHog's CLI, Docker image, detectors, and API-like analyzer features, but contains no mention of an official SDK (Python, JS, Go client library, etc.) for developers to build against; probes for OpenAPI specs also returned 404s, indicating no such offering.

   • [probe] “PROBE openapi: all candidate paths 404 (https://trufflesecurity.com/openapi.json, https://trufflesecurity.com/swagger.json, https://truffles…”
   • [github] “brew install trufflehog”
   • [claimed-docs] “trufflehog github --only-verified --repo https://github.com/trufflesecurity/test_keys”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Gecko Security~partialprobed5/10

   Gecko documents a v1 REST API with OpenAPI spec, API keys, and webhooks that developers can build against, but there is no evidence of official client SDK libraries (e.g., Python/JS packages) beyond the raw API/OpenAPI reference. missing for 10: dedicated SDK libraries/language clients, independent developer corroboration of building against them.

   • [claimed-docs] “Gecko's v1 API lets you trigger scans, read scan, repository, and vulnerability data, triage findings, manage scan schedules, rotate your Gi…”
   • [claimed-docs] “API keys are now visible to the whole team with owner attribution and per-request usage logging”
   • [probe] “PROBE openapi: HTTP 200 at https://gecko.security/openapi.json — contains "openapi" key”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

6. ai-native userSubscribe to events via webhooks

   weight 2 · round to Gecko Security
   TruffleHog~partialprobed4/10

   Docs mention routing findings to webhooks and setting up alerts across chosen platforms, indicating an outbound webhook notification capability exists, but there is no detailed documentation of webhook subscription/configuration, payload schema, or an API/OpenAPI spec (probe shows no OpenAPI found) to confirm depth of support. missing for 10: documented webhook configuration/subscription API, payload schema examples, independent/hands-on confirmation.

   • [claimed-docs] “Route findings to Slack, Jira, email, or webhooks so the right people can act on them.”
   • [claimed-docs] “TruffleHog continuously tracks the status of all key types to identify whether remediation has occurred. Set up alerts across the platform o…”
   • [claimed-docs] “TruffleHog continuously tracks the status of all key types to identify whether remediation has occurred. Set up alerts across the platform o…”
   • [probe] “PROBE openapi: all candidate paths 404 (https://trufflesecurity.com/openapi.json, https://trufflesecurity.com/swagger.json, https://truffles…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Gecko Security✓fullclaimed8/10

   Docs explicitly describe webhook subscriptions for scan/finding lifecycle events (scan fail, critical finding) and the API reference lists webhook events as a first-class capability alongside the API. This directly matches the story's ask for event subscription via webhooks. Missing for 10: independent/hands-on confirmation that webhook delivery works reliably and no detail on payload schema/retry semantics.

   • [claimed-docs] “Gecko can push events to your systems as scans run and findings change: page a channel when a scan fails, open a workflow when a critical la…”
   • [claimed-docs] “Gecko's v1 API lets you trigger scans, read scan, repository, and vulnerability data, triage findings, manage scan schedules, rotate your Gi…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

Agentic features

1. ai-native userGet AI-generated insights and suggestions from my data inside the product

   weight 2 · round to Gecko Security
   TruffleHog—none0/10

   TruffleHog is a secrets-scanning/detection tool; the evidence pack describes verification, classification, and analyzer features but no AI-generated insights, summaries, or suggestions surfaced to users—no LLM-based feature is mentioned anywhere.

   ⚑ flag

   Gecko Security!disputedcontradicted5/10

   Gecko generates AI insights (severity, confidence score, call chain, PoC, suggested patch, AI-written repo wiki, endpoint map, PR review summaries) directly from scanned code data, per docs-2/17/18/19. However, hands-on community reports show these AI-generated findings can be inaccurate — 100%-confidence 'vulnerabilities' that weren't real, missed real issues a competing tool caught, and a trivial/irrelevant finding on another scan — directly contradicting the reliability of the insights. Missing for 10: independent validation of insight accuracy at scale, resolution of the false-positive/false-negative reports.

   • [claimed-docs] “Each finding includes a severity (CVSS 4.0), a confidence score, the full source-to-sink call chain, a proof of concept, and a suggested pat…”
   • [claimed-docs] “Repository wiki: An AI-written map of your app: architecture, routing, and security model.”
   • [claimed-docs] “Endpoint map: The HTTP attack surface Gecko discovered in your code.”
   • [claimed-docs] “PR reviews & fixes: On pull requests, a security review summary and one-click fixes.”
   • [community] “Tool gave 100% confidence for two vulnerabilities (severity 9.4 and 6.5) that turned out not to be real.”
   • [community] “Ran Gecko on a C project after Semgrep AI flagged a minor real issue; Gecko found nothing. After removing the fix and recreating the project…”
   • [community] “Uploaded a project (sydbox) to scan; took 10 minutes and found only one vulnerability, an 'RCE: IRC Message Command Execution Bypass' in an …”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

2. ai-native userSet up automations that run autonomously in the background

   weight 2 · round to Gecko Security
   TruffleHog~partialclaimed5/10

   TruffleHog supports background automation in the sense of continuous monitoring of sources (Git, Jira, Slack, etc.), hosted/self-hosted scanning, and automated alert routing (Slack, Jira, webhooks) that can run unattended, which fits the 'runs autonomously in the background' part of the story. However, this is generic security-scanning automation, not an AI-agent-specific or LLM-orchestrated automation framework, and there's no evidence of agent-triggered workflows, scheduling APIs, or AI-native orchestration hooks beyond CI/pre-commit hooks and continuous monitoring. Missing for 10: explicit AI-agent/LLM-triggered automation setup, scheduling/orchestration API for autonomous runs, and independent confirmation that background monitoring runs reliably unattended.

   • [github] “Are you interested in continuously monitoring Git, Jira, Slack, Confluence, Microsoft Teams, Sharepoint (and more) for credentials?”
   • [github] “continuously monitoring Git, Jira, Slack, Confluence, Microsoft Teams, Sharepoint (and more) for credentials”
   • [claimed-docs] “TruffleHog continuously tracks the status of all key types to identify whether remediation has occurred. Set up alerts across the platform o…”
   • [claimed-docs] “TruffleHog continuously tracks the status of all key types to identify whether remediation has occurred. Set up alerts across the platform o…”
   • [claimed-docs] “Deploy hosted or self-hosted scanners, scan your critical systems for secrets, and notify the right teams to remediate and rotate.”
   • [claimed-docs] “Choose hosted (managed by Truffle Security) or self-hosted (running in your environment).”
   • [claimed-docs] “Route findings to Slack, Jira, email, or webhooks so the right people can act on them.”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Gecko Security✓fullclaimed7/10

   Gecko documents autonomous background workflows: scheduled scans via the API ('manage scan schedules'), automatic PR-triggered scans with pass/fail checks, auto-fix PR generation and re-verification, ticket creation, and webhook events pushed to external systems as scans run — all without manual intervention once configured. This directly matches the 'automations that run autonomously in the background' story for a security-scanning product. missing for 10: independent/hands-on confirmation that scheduled scans and auto-fix loops run reliably unattended over time, and more detail on configuring recurring schedules beyond a brief API mention.

   • [claimed-docs] “Gecko's v1 API lets you trigger scans, read scan, repository, and vulnerability data, triage findings, manage scan schedules, rotate your Gi…”
   • [claimed-docs] “Gecko can push events to your systems as scans run and findings change: page a channel when a scan fails, open a workflow when a critical la…”
   • [claimed-docs] “Gecko posts a pass/fail check back to GitHub or GitLab so reviewers see the security status inline.”
   • [claimed-docs] “Click Request fix to open a gecko/* pull request with the patch applied, or apply the patch yourself.”
   • [claimed-docs] “Gecko rechecks the finding and marks it Fix verified once the vulnerability is gone.”
   • [claimed-docs] “create a ticket in Jira, Linear, ClickUp, or Shortcut”
   • [claimed-docs] “Commit to an existing PR: For findings from a PR scan, Gecko can commit the fix directly to the PR's head branch so the fix rides along with…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

Api quality

1. ai-native userExplore an interactive API reference with runnable examples

   weight 2 · round drawn
   TruffleHog—none0/10

   TruffleHog is a CLI/scanning tool with docs and CLI examples, but there is no evidence of an interactive API reference (e.g., Swagger/OpenAPI explorer) with runnable examples; the openapi probe explicitly returned 404s for all candidate API spec paths and no interactive docs are mentioned.

   • [probe] “PROBE openapi: all candidate paths 404 (https://trufflesecurity.com/openapi.json, https://trufflesecurity.com/swagger.json, https://truffles…”
   • [probe] “PROBE llms.txt: HTTP 404 at https://trufflesecurity.com/llms.txt”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Gecko Security—none0/10

   While Gecko exposes an OpenAPI spec (gecko-security-probe-3) and documents API capabilities (gecko-security-docs-10), there is no evidence of an interactive API reference UI with runnable/try-it examples for developers or AI agents to explore.

   • [probe] “PROBE openapi: HTTP 200 at https://gecko.security/openapi.json — contains "openapi" key”
   • [claimed-docs] “Gecko's v1 API lets you trigger scans, read scan, repository, and vulnerability data, triage findings, manage scan schedules, rotate your Gi…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

2. ai-native userDownload a machine-readable API spec (OpenAPI or equivalent)

   weight 2 · round to Gecko Security
   TruffleHog—none0/10

   A direct probe for OpenAPI/swagger endpoints returned 404 for all candidate paths, and no evidence anywhere in the pack points to a downloadable machine-readable API spec.

   • [probe] “PROBE openapi: all candidate paths 404 (https://trufflesecurity.com/openapi.json, https://trufflesecurity.com/swagger.json, https://truffles…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Gecko Security✓fullprobed9/10

   A probe confirms a live OpenAPI spec at gecko.security/openapi.json (HTTP 200, contains 'openapi' key), and docs describe a full v1 API for scans, vulnerabilities, webhooks, and integrations. Missing for 10: no independent/community confirmation of the spec's completeness or usage beyond the vendor's own probe.

   • [probe] “PROBE openapi: HTTP 200 at https://gecko.security/openapi.json — contains "openapi" key”
   • [claimed-docs] “Gecko's v1 API lets you trigger scans, read scan, repository, and vulnerability data, triage findings, manage scan schedules, rotate your Gi…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

3. ai-native userTest against a sandbox environment without touching production data

   weight 1 · round drawn
   TruffleHog—none0/10

   TruffleHog's evidence only shows a demo scan against a public 'test_keys' GitHub repo used to illustrate CLI usage, not a dedicated sandbox/test environment for AI-native agents to validate behavior without touching production systems or secrets. There is no mention of an isolated sandbox mode, mock API, or non-production testing environment tailored for agentic use.

   • [claimed-docs] “trufflehog github --only-verified --repo https://github.com/trufflesecurity/test_keys”
   • [github] “docker run --rm -it -v "$PWD:/pwd" trufflesecurity/trufflehog:latest github --repo https://github.com/trufflesecurity/test_keys”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Gecko Security—none0/10

   The evidence describes scanning source repos/ZIP uploads and hybrid AWS deployment (scanner runs in customer's own account), but nothing explicitly describes a dedicated sandbox environment for safely testing exploits or PoCs without touching production data. missing for 10: explicit sandbox/isolated test environment description, confirmation that PoC execution or exploit verification never touches live production systems or data.

   • [claimed-docs] “Paste a public repository URL or upload a ZIP instead. No provider connection required.”
   • [claimed-docs] “the scanner, S3 storage, and all AI inference run inside your AWS account. Gecko hosts only the dashboard, database, and scan orchestration.”
   • [claimed-docs] “the scanner, S3 storage, and all AI inference run inside your AWS account.”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

4. ai-native userRely on versioned APIs with a documented deprecation policy

   weight 2 · round to Gecko Security
   TruffleHog—none0/10

   No evidence of versioned APIs or a documented deprecation policy; probe results show no OpenAPI spec found (404s across all candidate paths), and no docs mention API versioning or deprecation practices.

   • [probe] “PROBE openapi: all candidate paths 404 (https://trufflesecurity.com/openapi.json, https://trufflesecurity.com/swagger.json, https://truffles…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Gecko Security~partialprobed3/10

   Gecko documents a versioned v1 API with an OpenAPI spec and a release/channel/version resolution endpoint (digest-pinned image refs), showing some notion of API versioning, but there is no documented deprecation policy, version sunset timeline, or migration guidance for API consumers. missing for 10: explicit deprecation policy, version support lifecycle/EOL dates, migration guides between API versions.

   • [claimed-docs] “Gecko's v1 API lets you trigger scans, read scan, repository, and vulnerability data, triage findings, manage scan schedules, rotate your Gi…”
   • [claimed-docs] “resolves a version to its release... the response includes the digest-pinned image_ref to pull”
   • [claimed-docs] “GET /releases/{channel}/{version} resolves a version to its release.”
   • [probe] “PROBE openapi: HTTP 200 at https://gecko.security/openapi.json — contains "openapi" key”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

1. ai-native userPerform bulk operations across many items at once

   weight 2 · round drawn
   TruffleHog~partialclaimed5/10

   TruffleHog can scan across many sources at once (whole orgs, multiple repos, Docker images, Slack, Jira, Confluence, filesystems, etc.) and supports batch verification/classification of hundreds of secret types, which is a form of bulk operation. However, this is bulk *scanning*, not general-purpose bulk operations across arbitrary 'items' in an AI-native/automation sense (e.g., no evidence of bulk remediation, bulk API-driven item processing, or agent-orchestrated batch workflows beyond scanning). missing for 10: evidence of bulk actions beyond scanning (e.g., bulk remediation/rotation across many secrets programmatically), AI-agent-oriented batch orchestration, and independent confirmation of bulk-scale performance at scale.

   • [claimed-docs] “TruffleHog scans beyond code repositories to identify secrets hidden in comments, Docker images, and more.”
   • [claimed-docs] “TruffleHog can look for secrets in many places including git, chats, wikis, logs, api testing platforms, object stores, filesystems and more”
   • [github] “Are you interested in continuously monitoring Git, Jira, Slack, Confluence, Microsoft Teams, Sharepoint (and more) for credentials?”
   • [github] “continuously monitoring Git, Jira, Slack, Confluence, Microsoft Teams, Sharepoint (and more) for credentials”
   • [claimed-docs] “trufflehog classifies over 800 secret types, mapping them back to the specific identity they belong to”
   • [claimed-docs] “for every secret trufflehog can classify, it can also log in to confirm if that secret is live or not”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Gecko Security~partialclaimed5/10

   The v1 API and AI-tool integration let a user programmatically list repositories/scans, pull vulnerability data, triage findings, and trigger scans across many items, which supports scripted bulk-style automation, but there is no documented bulk-fix, bulk-triage, or multi-select UI action for operating on many findings/repos simultaneously. missing for 10: a dedicated bulk-action endpoint or UI (e.g., bulk fix/triage/dismiss across many findings at once), independent evidence of bulk workflows in practice.

   • [claimed-docs] “Connect it to an AI tool and the tool can list your repositories and scans, pull full vulnerability evidence (proof of concept, call chain, …”
   • [claimed-docs] “Gecko's v1 API lets you trigger scans, read scan, repository, and vulnerability data, triage findings, manage scan schedules, rotate your Gi…”
   • [claimed-docs] “Gecko can push events to your systems as scans run and findings change: page a channel when a scan fails, open a workflow when a critical la…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

2. ai-native userDefine rules that trigger actions automatically on events

   weight 3 · round to TruffleHog
   TruffleHog~partialclaimed6/10

   TruffleHog supports event-driven automation via pre-commit/pre-receive git hooks that block commits/pushes containing secrets, custom detectors with webhook-based verification, and routing of findings to Slack/Jira/email/webhooks with continuous monitoring and alerting when remediation occurs. This is real rule-triggered action but it's scoped narrowly to secret-detection events rather than a general-purpose rule engine where arbitrary conditions map to arbitrary actions. Missing for 10: a documented general rules/policy engine with configurable conditions beyond hooks and webhooks, and independent hands-on confirmation that alerting/webhook routing works end-to-end in practice.

   • [claimed-docs] “Pre-commit hooks are a useful way to prevent secrets in code from being pushed from a git repository.”
   • [claimed-docs] “trufflehog git file://. --since-commit HEAD --results=verified,unknown --fail”
   • [claimed-docs] “This approach uses Git's `core.hooksPath` to apply hooks to all repositories without requiring any per-repository setup”
   • [claimed-docs] “If you run your own git server, consider the pre-receive hook option which can block commits with secrets from being accepted.”
   • [claimed-docs] “Route findings to Slack, Jira, email, or webhooks so the right people can act on them.”
   • [claimed-docs] “TruffleHog continuously tracks the status of all key types to identify whether remediation has occurred. Set up alerts across the platform o…”
   • [claimed-docs] “Verification is done via a webhook POST request to the provided `endpoint`.”
   • [claimed-docs] “The custom regex detector allows you to define your own detector using regular expressions with optional verification using a webhook.”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Gecko Security~partialclaimed5/10

   Gecko supports some event-driven automation—webhooks that fire on scan completion/finding changes, configurable fail-on-severity thresholds for PR checks, and automatic ticket/ PR creation on findings—but these are fixed, product-defined triggers rather than a user-configurable rules engine where arbitrary conditions map to arbitrary actions. missing for 10: a general-purpose rule/condition builder, support for chaining multiple custom actions per event, and evidence of user-defined logic beyond severity thresholds.

   • [claimed-docs] “Gecko can push events to your systems as scans run and findings change: page a channel when a scan fails, open a workflow when a critical la…”
   • [claimed-docs] “**Fail-on severity**: the severity threshold that fails the check (for example, fail on High and above).”
   • [claimed-docs] “create a ticket in Jira, Linear, ClickUp, or Shortcut”
   • [claimed-docs] “Click Request fix to open a gecko/* pull request with the patch applied, or apply the patch yourself.”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

3. ai-native userSchedule recurring jobs or workflows

   weight 2 · round to Gecko Security
   TruffleHog—none0/10

   TruffleHog's docs mention 'continuously monitoring' sources and 'continuously tracks the status of all key types' (trufflehog-docs-17, trufflehog-gh-8/9), but there is no evidence of an actual scheduler, cron integration, or workflow/job orchestration feature that lets a user configure recurring scans or automation pipelines. The CLI and docs focus on one-off scans, CI/pre-commit hook triggers, and hosted dashboards, not recurring job scheduling.

   • [claimed-docs] “TruffleHog continuously tracks the status of all key types to identify whether remediation has occurred. Set up alerts across the platform o…”
   • [github] “Are you interested in continuously monitoring Git, Jira, Slack, Confluence, Microsoft Teams, Sharepoint (and more) for credentials?”
   • [github] “continuously monitoring Git, Jira, Slack, Confluence, Microsoft Teams, Sharepoint (and more) for credentials”
   • [claimed-docs] “Deploy hosted or self-hosted scanners, scan your critical systems for secrets, and notify the right teams to remediate and rotate.”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Gecko Security~partialclaimed4/10

   The v1 API reference states it lets you 'manage scan schedules,' implying recurring scan jobs can be configured programmatically, but there is no dedicated doc page, UI walkthrough, or example showing how to set cadence, or evidence this extends to broader 'workflows' beyond scanning. missing for 10: dedicated scheduling documentation/UI, example of setting recurring cadence, evidence of scheduling beyond scans (e.g., recurring triage/ticket workflows), independent confirmation it works as claimed.

   • [claimed-docs] “Gecko's v1 API lets you trigger scans, read scan, repository, and vulnerability data, triage findings, manage scan schedules, rotate your Gi…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

Agent scanning

1. ai-native userHave an agent run a scan headlessly via the CLI, parse machine-readable results, and file issues for real findings

   weight 3 · round to TruffleHog
   TruffleHog~partialclaimed5/10

   TruffleHog's CLI clearly supports headless, scriptable scanning (e.g. `trufflehog git ... --results=verified,unknown --fail`, `--include-detectors`, `--verify-detectors`) and Docker/CI usage patterns are well documented, and Enterprise routing to Jira/Slack/webhooks is mentioned. However, there is no evidence of a structured/JSON machine-readable output flag, nor any documented mechanism for the CLI itself to file issues (e.g. GitHub issue creation) based on findings. Missing for 10: explicit machine-readable output format documentation, and evidence of automated issue-filing integration from CLI results.

   • [claimed-docs] “trufflehog git file://. --since-commit HEAD --results=verified,unknown --fail”
   • [claimed-docs] “this trufflehog invocation will force verification for AWS and Buildkite secrets, irrespective of whether the configured sources have their …”
   • [claimed-docs] “the `--verify-detectors` and `--no-verify-detectors` CLI flags can be used to configure detector-specific verification override settings”
   • [claimed-docs] “Deploy hosted or self-hosted scanners, scan your critical systems for secrets, and notify the right teams to remediate and rotate.”
   • [claimed-docs] “Route findings to Slack, Jira, email, or webhooks so the right people can act on them.”
   • [github] “docker run --rm -it -v "$PWD:/pwd" trufflesecurity/trufflehog:latest github --org=trufflesecurity”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Gecko Security~partialcommunity4/10

   Gecko exposes a v1 API and webhooks that can trigger scans, pull machine-readable vulnerability data, triage findings, and file tickets in Jira/Linear/ClickUp/Shortcut, and an MCP/AI-tools connector for agents to do the same — satisfying the 'headless, parse, file issues' intent via API rather than a literal CLI. However, no dedicated CLI binary/command is documented anywhere in the evidence, and community reports raise concrete concerns about false positives (100% confidence findings that weren't real, missed real issues) undermining 'file issues for real findings'. Missing for 10: an actual CLI tool/subcommand documented, and independent confirmation that AI-driven ticket filing acts only on validated/real findings rather than the false positives community testers observed.

   • [claimed-docs] “Connect it to an AI tool and the tool can list your repositories and scans, pull full vulnerability evidence (proof of concept, call chain, …”
   • [claimed-docs] “Gecko's v1 API lets you trigger scans, read scan, repository, and vulnerability data, triage findings, manage scan schedules, rotate your Gi…”
   • [claimed-docs] “create a ticket in Jira, Linear, ClickUp, or Shortcut”
   • [claimed-docs] “Gecko can push events to your systems as scans run and findings change: page a channel when a scan fails, open a workflow when a critical la…”
   • [community] “Tool gave 100% confidence for two vulnerabilities (severity 9.4 and 6.5) that turned out not to be real.”
   • [community] “Uploaded a project (sydbox) to scan; took 10 minutes and found only one vulnerability, an 'RCE: IRC Message Command Execution Bypass' in an …”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

2. ai-native userWire the scanner into my coding agent so AI-generated code is scanned for issues before it lands

   weight 2 · round to Gecko Security
   TruffleHog~partialclaimed5/10

   TruffleHog ships well-documented pre-commit and pre-receive git hooks (trufflehog-docs-5, -13, -19, -20, -26, -30, -31) that scan code for secrets before it is committed, which can technically catch AI-generated code paths through standard git hooks or CI. However there is no evidence of any specific integration point for coding agents (e.g., an MCP server, IDE/agent plugin, or agent-specific pre-generation hook) — it's a generic pre-commit mechanism, not an AI-agent-aware wiring. Missing for 10: explicit coding-agent/AI-tool integration (MCP server, agent plugin, or IDE hook), evidence of scanning AI-generated code specifically, and independent confirmation the pre-commit flow works well with agent-driven commit workflows.

   • [claimed-docs] “Pre-commit hooks are a useful way to prevent secrets in code from being pushed from a git repository.”
   • [claimed-docs] “trufflehog git file://. --since-commit HEAD --results=verified,unknown --fail”
   • [claimed-docs] “This approach uses Git's `core.hooksPath` to apply hooks to all repositories without requiring any per-repository setup”
   • [claimed-docs] “Husky is a popular tool for managing Git hooks in JavaScript/Node.js projects.”
   • [claimed-docs] “In rare cases, you may need to bypass pre-commit hooks: `git commit --no-verify -m "Your commit message"`”
   • [claimed-docs] “If you run your own git server, consider the pre-receive hook option which can block commits with secrets from being accepted.”
   • [claimed-docs] “git commit --no-verify -m "Your commit message"”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Gecko Security~partialprobed6/10

   Gecko documents an MCP/AI-tool integration that lets an agent list repos/scans, pull vulnerability evidence, triage findings, and file tickets, plus PR/CI checks that fail builds above a severity threshold — together enabling a coding-agent workflow to scan AI-generated code before merge. However, independent hands-on reports raise real accuracy concerns (false positives at 100% confidence, missed real bugs, UI/scan bugs), which undercuts confidence that the scanning is reliable enough for a pre-merge gate. Missing for 10: independent corroboration that the MCP/agent wiring works smoothly in practice, and evidence addressing the accuracy complaints specifically in an agent-driven pre-commit/pre-merge context.

   • [claimed-docs] “Connect it to an AI tool and the tool can list your repositories and scans, pull full vulnerability evidence (proof of concept, call chain, …”
   • [probe] “official MCP server documented at https://gecko.security/docs/ai-tools/overview”
   • [claimed-docs] “Gecko posts a pass/fail check back to GitHub or GitLab so reviewers see the security status inline.”
   • [claimed-docs] “**Fail-on severity**: the severity threshold that fails the check (for example, fail on High and above).”
   • [community] “Tool gave 100% confidence for two vulnerabilities (severity 9.4 and 6.5) that turned out not to be real.”
   • [community] “Ran Gecko on a C project after Semgrep AI flagged a minor real issue; Gecko found nothing. After removing the fix and recreating the project…”
   • [community] “Uploaded a project (sydbox) to scan; took 10 minutes and found only one vulnerability, an 'RCE: IRC Message Command Execution Bypass' in an …”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

Ci gates

1. devops-leadRun scans in CI on every pull request and fail the build on new findings via exit codes

   weight 3 · round to Gecko Security
   TruffleHog~partialclaimed6/10

   TruffleHog docs show the `--fail` flag (trufflehog-docs-13) which exits non-zero on findings, and Docker/CLI invocations suitable for CI pipelines (trufflehog-gh-2, trufflehog-gh-6), plus verified-only filtering to reduce noise. However, the evidence is framed around pre-commit/pre-receive hooks rather than an explicit CI-on-PR integration (e.g., GitHub Actions example, diffing against base branch for 'new findings only'), and there's no first-party CI pipeline template or independent confirmation of CI usage. missing for 10: explicit CI/PR pipeline example (e.g. GitHub Actions workflow), documentation of scanning only new commits in a PR diff context, and independent/hands-on confirmation of CI fail-on-new-finding behavior.

   • [claimed-docs] “trufflehog git file://. --since-commit HEAD --results=verified,unknown --fail”
   • [github] “docker run --rm -it -v "$PWD:/pwd" trufflesecurity/trufflehog:latest github --org=trufflesecurity”
   • [github] “docker run --rm -it -v "$PWD:/pwd" trufflesecurity/trufflehog:latest github --repo https://github.com/trufflesecurity/test_keys”
   • [claimed-docs] “Pre-commit hooks are a useful way to prevent secrets in code from being pushed from a git repository.”
   • [claimed-docs] “If you run your own git server, consider the pre-receive hook option which can block commits with secrets from being accepted.”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Gecko Security✓fullclaimed8/10

   Docs describe PR-triggered scans that post a pass/fail check to GitHub/GitLab, with a configurable fail-on-severity threshold and separation of new vs pre-existing findings, which together enable failing a PR build on new findings. This matches the CI/PR-gating story closely, though it's implemented as a GitHub/GitLab check status rather than an explicit CLI exit code and lacks independent hands-on confirmation of build-failing behavior. Missing for 10: independent verification that the pass/fail check actually blocks merges/builds in practice, and explicit mention of CLI exit-code semantics for non-GitHub CI runners.

   • [claimed-docs] “Gecko posts a pass/fail check back to GitHub or GitLab so reviewers see the security status inline.”
   • [claimed-docs] “Findings introduced by the PR are separated from pre-existing ones, so reviewers focus on what the change adds.”
   • [claimed-docs] “**Fail-on severity**: the severity threshold that fails the check (for example, fail on High and above).”
   • [claimed-docs] “install the Gecko GitHub App and pick repositories”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

2. developerSee scan findings surfaced as pull-request comments or checks in GitHub or GitLab

   weight 2 · round to Gecko Security
   TruffleHog—none0/10

   Evidence covers pre-commit hooks, pre-receive hooks, CLI scanning, and routing findings to Slack/Jira/email/webhooks, but there is no mention of PR comments or status checks in GitHub or GitLab CI workflows.

   ⚑ flag

   Gecko Security✓fullclaimed8/10

   Docs describe a GitHub/GitLab App integration that posts pass/fail checks and PR security review summaries, separates new vs pre-existing findings, supports fail-on-severity thresholds, and can auto-commit fixes to the PR — a fairly complete PR-check/comment workflow (gecko-security-docs-5, -19, -28, -29, -30). Missing for 10: independent/hands-on confirmation that PR comments/checks actually render as described (community evidence only discusses finding accuracy, not the PR-check UX itself).

   • [claimed-docs] “Gecko posts a pass/fail check back to GitHub or GitLab so reviewers see the security status inline.”
   • [claimed-docs] “PR reviews & fixes: On pull requests, a security review summary and one-click fixes.”
   • [claimed-docs] “Findings introduced by the PR are separated from pre-existing ones, so reviewers focus on what the change adds.”
   • [claimed-docs] “**Fail-on severity**: the severity threshold that fails the check (for example, fail on High and above).”
   • [claimed-docs] “Commit to an existing PR: For findings from a PR scan, Gecko can commit the fix directly to the PR's head branch so the fix rides along with…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

Pre commit

1. developerRun the scanner as a pre-commit hook so secrets and issues never enter my git history

   weight 3 · round to TruffleHog
   TruffleHog✓fullclaimed9/10

   TruffleHog has dedicated first-party documentation for pre-commit hooks, including a specific example invocation (`trufflehog git file://. --since-commit HEAD --results=verified,unknown --fail`), guidance on repo-wide setup via `core.hooksPath`, Husky integration, a pre-receive hook alternative for server-side enforcement, and even the bypass flag (`--no-verify`) — directly matching the story of preventing secrets from entering git history at commit time. Missing for 10: independent/community hands-on confirmation that the pre-commit workflow works smoothly in practice (community evidence is mostly about unrelated aspects like licensing and other scanners).

   • [claimed-docs] “Pre-commit hooks are a useful way to prevent secrets in code from being pushed from a git repository.”
   • [claimed-docs] “trufflehog git file://. --since-commit HEAD --results=verified,unknown --fail”
   • [claimed-docs] “This approach uses Git's `core.hooksPath` to apply hooks to all repositories without requiring any per-repository setup”
   • [claimed-docs] “Husky is a popular tool for managing Git hooks in JavaScript/Node.js projects.”
   • [claimed-docs] “In rare cases, you may need to bypass pre-commit hooks: `git commit --no-verify -m "Your commit message"`”
   • [claimed-docs] “If you run your own git server, consider the pre-receive hook option which can block commits with secrets from being accepted.”
   • [claimed-docs] “git commit --no-verify -m "Your commit message"”
   • [claimed-docs] “Use pre-commit and pre-receive hooks so that developers can prevent leaked keys in the first place.”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Gecko Security—none0/10

   Gecko's documented workflow is GitHub App/PR-based scanning with pass/fail PR checks, not a local pre-commit git hook that blocks commits before they enter history — no evidence of a pre-commit hook, CLI hook script, or local git-hook integration exists in the evidence pack.

   ⚑ flag

Coverage

1. developerScan projects across all the major languages and package ecosystems my organization uses

   weight 2 · round drawn
   TruffleHog~partialclaimed5/10

   TruffleHog scans raw content (git repos, filesystems, Docker images, chats, wikis, logs, object stores) rather than parsing by programming language, so it inherently ignores language/ecosystem boundaries for secret detection, and docs confirm broad source-type coverage beyond code repos. However there is no explicit documentation enumerating support across major languages or package-ecosystem-specific scanning (e.g., dependency manifests, language-specific SBOM/package files), so coverage-accuracy across ecosystems is implied rather than demonstrated. Missing for 10: explicit language/ecosystem coverage claims, package-manifest-aware scanning, and independent verification that all major ecosystems are handled equally well.

   • [claimed-docs] “TruffleHog scans beyond code repositories to identify secrets hidden in comments, Docker images, and more.”
   • [claimed-docs] “TruffleHog can look for secrets in many places including git, chats, wikis, logs, api testing platforms, object stores, filesystems and more”
   • [github] “Are you interested in continuously monitoring Git, Jira, Slack, Confluence, Microsoft Teams, Sharepoint (and more) for credentials?”
   • [github] “continuously monitoring Git, Jira, Slack, Confluence, Microsoft Teams, Sharepoint (and more) for credentials”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Gecko Security~partialcommunity5/10

   Docs list a defined set of 'compiler-accurate' languages (TypeScript, JavaScript, Python, Go, Java, Scala, C#, Rust) supporting cross-file analysis, but there is no mention of package/dependency-ecosystem scanning (npm, pip, Maven, Cargo, etc.) or of broader language coverage (C/C++, Ruby, PHP, Kotlin, Swift). Community testing on a C project (unsupported language) found nothing, reinforcing that coverage is limited to the stated language list rather than 'all major languages and ecosystems.' Missing for 10: explicit package/dependency-ecosystem scanning support, broader language list, and independent verification of coverage breadth.

   • [claimed-docs] “Compiler-accurate (precise cross-file analysis) | TypeScript · JavaScript · Python · Go · Java · Scala · C# · Rust”
   • [community] “Ran Gecko on a C project after Semgrep AI flagged a minor real issue; Gecko found nothing. After removing the fix and recreating the project…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

Output formats

1. developerEmit scan results in machine-readable formats like JSON or SARIF for downstream tooling

   weight 2 · round to Gecko Security
   TruffleHog—none0/10

   The evidence pack describes scanning capabilities, verification, and CLI flags extensively, but no citation mentions JSON, SARIF, or any specific machine-readable output format for downstream tooling integration. Absence of evidence for this applicable capability yields 'none'.

   ⚑ flag

   Gecko Security~partialprobed4/10

   Gecko's v1 API lets developers read scan, repository, and vulnerability data programmatically (implying JSON responses) and an OpenAPI spec is published, but there is no explicit documentation of a SARIF export format or dedicated 'JSON report' output for CI pipelines. Missing for 10: explicit SARIF format support, documented JSON report export command, and any CI-integration example showing machine-readable output being consumed downstream.

   • [claimed-docs] “Gecko's v1 API lets you trigger scans, read scan, repository, and vulnerability data, triage findings, manage scan schedules, rotate your Gi…”
   • [probe] “PROBE openapi: HTTP 200 at https://gecko.security/openapi.json — contains "openapi" key”
   • [claimed-docs] “Gecko can push events to your systems as scans run and findings change: page a channel when a scan fails, open a workflow when a critical la…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

1. ai-native userDo everything through the API that I can do in the UI

   weight 2 · round to Gecko Security
   TruffleHog—none0/10

   While TruffleHog ships a CLI and an Enterprise UI/platform, the evidence pack shows no documented API (OpenAPI/swagger endpoints all 404) that would let a user replicate UI actions programmatically; only CLI flags and webhook-based verification for custom detectors are documented, not a general platform API.

   • [probe] “PROBE openapi: all candidate paths 404 (https://trufflesecurity.com/openapi.json, https://trufflesecurity.com/swagger.json, https://truffles…”
   • [claimed-docs] “single sign on saml 2 0 or oauth 2 0 ❌ ✅ role based access control ❌ ✅”
   • [claimed-docs] “By the end, you'll have a running scanner, your first source connected, and findings flowing into the web UI.”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Gecko Security~partialprobed6/10

   Gecko exposes a documented v1 API (and OpenAPI spec) covering scans, repository/vulnerability data, triage, scheduling, token rotation and webhooks, plus an AI-tools/MCP-style integration that can list repos, pull evidence, triage, and file tickets — a substantial subset of UI functionality. However, there's no explicit claim or evidence that every UI feature (e.g., repository wiki generation, endpoint map, PR review summaries, initial GitHub App connection setup) is API-accessible, so full UI/API parity isn't demonstrated. Missing for 10: explicit parity statement or evidence that wiki/endpoint-map/PR-review generation and account/connection setup are API-triggerable, independent confirmation of API completeness.

   • [claimed-docs] “Gecko's v1 API lets you trigger scans, read scan, repository, and vulnerability data, triage findings, manage scan schedules, rotate your Gi…”
   • [claimed-docs] “Connect it to an AI tool and the tool can list your repositories and scans, pull full vulnerability evidence (proof of concept, call chain, …”
   • [probe] “PROBE openapi: HTTP 200 at https://gecko.security/openapi.json — contains "openapi" key”
   • [claimed-docs] “Repository wiki: An AI-written map of your app: architecture, routing, and security model.”
   • [claimed-docs] “Endpoint map: The HTTP attack surface Gecko discovered in your code.”
   • [claimed-docs] “PR reviews & fixes: On pull requests, a security review summary and one-click fixes.”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

2. ai-native userExport all of my data in open formats and leave

   weight 3 · round to Gecko Security
   TruffleHog—none0/10

   The evidence covers scanning, detection, verification, and hosted/self-hosted deployment options, but there is no documentation of any data export feature, open export format, or migration/exit path for users of the hosted platform or CLI findings store.

   ⚑ flag

   Gecko Security~partialprobed3/10

   The v1 API lets users read scan, repository, and vulnerability data programmatically (JSON via OpenAPI), which provides a technical path to export findings data, but there is no documented bulk 'export all data' feature, no mention of open-format guarantees for full account data, and no offboarding/exit workflow. missing for 10: explicit full-data export tooling, documented open-format (e.g. CSV/JSON) export guarantee, and account-closure/data-portability policy.

   • [claimed-docs] “Gecko's v1 API lets you trigger scans, read scan, repository, and vulnerability data, triage findings, manage scan schedules, rotate your Gi…”
   • [probe] “PROBE openapi: HTTP 200 at https://gecko.security/openapi.json — contains "openapi" key”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

3. ai-native userRead the product's source under an open license

   weight 2 · round to TruffleHog
   TruffleHog✓fullprobed7/10

   TruffleHog's source is hosted publicly on GitHub (trufflehog-gh-1..8) and community discussion confirms it is licensed under AGPL (v3, shifted from GPL) — an OSI-recognized open license, satisfying the ability to read the source under an open license. Missing for 10: no direct citation of a LICENSE file or official docs statement confirming license terms, and no independent corroboration beyond the HN comment.

   • [community] “Note that v3 shifts to AGPL, from GPL in prior versions. Doesn't bother me personally, but I know a lot of companies won't touch AGPL'd proj…”
   • [github] “brew install trufflehog”
   • [probe] “official CLI documented at https://github.com/trufflesecurity/trufflehog”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Gecko Security—none0/10

   No evidence that Gecko Security's source code is published or licensed openly; it is a proprietary SaaS/security scanning product with documented APIs and hybrid deployment, but nothing indicates its codebase is open source.

   ⚑ flag

4. ai-native userSelf-host the core product

   weight 3 · round to TruffleHog
   TruffleHog✓fullclaimed8/10

   TruffleHog is open source (CLI installable via brew/Docker/GitHub) and docs explicitly offer a self-hosted deployment option distinct from the hosted/managed offering, with getting-started guidance for running your own scanner. Missing for 10: detailed self-hosting infrastructure/deployment docs (e.g., Kubernetes/Helm charts, scaling guidance) and independent hands-on confirmation of self-hosting the full platform (vs just the OSS CLI).

   • [claimed-docs] “Deploy hosted or self-hosted scanners, scan your critical systems for secrets, and notify the right teams to remediate and rotate.”
   • [claimed-docs] “Choose hosted (managed by Truffle Security) or self-hosted (running in your environment).”
   • [claimed-docs] “By the end, you'll have a running scanner, your first source connected, and findings flowing into the web UI.”
   • [github] “brew install trufflehog”
   • [github] “docker run --rm -it -v "$PWD:/pwd" trufflesecurity/trufflehog:latest github --org=trufflesecurity”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Gecko Security~partialclaimed6/10

   Docs confirm a 'hybrid' deployment where the scanner, S3 storage, and AI inference all run inside the customer's AWS account, and the pricing page lists an 'On-prem / self-hosted / private cloud' tier — both indicating genuine self-hosting options exist. However, the same hybrid docs state Gecko still hosts the dashboard, database, and scan orchestration, so the core control plane is not actually self-hostable in the standard offering, and no architecture/setup docs for the full on-prem tier are provided. Missing for 10: detailed on-prem deployment guide/architecture for the fully self-hosted tier, and confirmation that dashboard/orchestration can also run on customer infrastructure.

   • [claimed-docs] “the scanner, S3 storage, and all AI inference run inside your AWS account. Gecko hosts only the dashboard, database, and scan orchestration.”
   • [claimed-docs] “the scanner, S3 storage, and all AI inference run inside your AWS account.”
   • [claimed-docs] “Unlimited scanning * On-prem / self-hosted / private cloud”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

1. ai-native userChoose where my data is stored (region/residency)

   weight 2 · round to Gecko Security
   TruffleHog~partialclaimed4/10

   TruffleHog offers a self-hosted deployment option ("Choose hosted (managed by Truffle Security) or self-hosted (running in your environment)"), which lets an org keep all scan data within its own infrastructure/region, giving indirect control over data residency. However, there is no explicit region-selection feature or documented multi-region hosting for the managed/enterprise offering. Missing for 10: explicit region/residency selection controls for the hosted service, and any documentation addressing data-locality guarantees.

   • [claimed-docs] “Choose hosted (managed by Truffle Security) or self-hosted (running in your environment).”
   • [claimed-docs] “Deploy hosted or self-hosted scanners, scan your critical systems for secrets, and notify the right teams to remediate and rotate.”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Gecko Security~partialclaimed5/10

   Gecko offers a hybrid deployment where the scanner, S3 storage, and AI inference run inside the customer's own AWS account, and an on-prem/self-hosted/private cloud pricing tier, both of which let customers effectively control where their data resides. However, there's no explicit UI/setting for choosing a region for the Gecko-hosted dashboard/database components, and no documentation of specific supported regions or compliance certifications tied to residency. Missing for 10: explicit region-selection controls for Gecko-hosted components, list of supported regions, and residency/compliance documentation (e.g., GDPR/data-locality guarantees).

   • [claimed-docs] “the scanner, S3 storage, and all AI inference run inside your AWS account. Gecko hosts only the dashboard, database, and scan orchestration.”
   • [claimed-docs] “the scanner, S3 storage, and all AI inference run inside your AWS account.”
   • [claimed-docs] “Unlimited scanning * On-prem / self-hosted / private cloud”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

2. ai-native userControl data retention and deletion

   weight 2 · round drawn
   TruffleHog—none0/10

   TruffleHog is a secrets-scanning tool (self-hosted or hosted scanner); the evidence pack shows scanning, detection, verification, and alerting capabilities but contains no mention of data retention policies, deletion controls, or user-facing settings for managing stored scan data/findings lifecycle. Since TruffleHog does offer a hosted enterprise option (docs-28), retention/deletion controls are a fair question but no evidence confirms them.

   ⚑ flag

   Gecko Security—none0/10

   The evidence pack covers scanning, PR fixes, integrations, hybrid deployment, and API/webhooks, but there is no mention of data retention policies, data deletion controls, or user ability to purge stored findings/scan data. Hybrid deployment keeps scanner/AI inference in the customer's AWS account, but this does not address retention/deletion of dashboard-hosted data. missing for 10: explicit data retention policy documentation, a deletion/purge mechanism or API, and any account/data-export or GDPR-style deletion workflow.

   • [claimed-docs] “the scanner, S3 storage, and all AI inference run inside your AWS account. Gecko hosts only the dashboard, database, and scan orchestration.”
   • [claimed-docs] “the scanner, S3 storage, and all AI inference run inside your AWS account.”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

3. ai-native userOpt out of telemetry and usage tracking

   weight 2 · round drawn
   TruffleHog—none0/10

   No evidence pack item mentions telemetry, usage tracking, or any opt-out mechanism/flag for TruffleHog; the docs cover secret scanning features but are silent on data collection practices.

   ⚑ flag

   Gecko Security—none0/10

   No evidence anywhere in the pack of a telemetry/usage-tracking opt-out setting, privacy policy control, or data-collection toggle; the docs focus on scanning, PR fixes, API keys, and deployment but never mention telemetry opt-out.

   ⚑ flag

Custom rules

1. security-engineerWrite custom static-analysis rules in a simple syntax and share them across repositories

   weight 2 · round to TruffleHog
   TruffleHog~partialclaimed5/10

   TruffleHog supports 'custom regex detectors' defined in a config file with optional webhook verification, which is a form of custom rule authoring in a simple (regex/YAML) syntax, and these config files can in principle be reused across scans/repos via `--config=config.yaml`. However, this is scoped narrowly to secret-detection regex patterns rather than general static-analysis rules, and there is no documented feature for centrally sharing/distributing these custom detector configs across repositories (e.g. a rule registry or team-wide rule sync). Missing for 10: broader SAST rule language beyond regex, explicit cross-repo rule-sharing/distribution mechanism, and independent evidence of teams using this for rule sharing.

   • [claimed-docs] “The custom regex detector allows you to define your own detector using regular expressions with optional verification using a webhook.”
   • [claimed-docs] “Verification is done via a webhook POST request to the provided `endpoint`.”
   • [claimed-docs] “./trufflehog scan --config=config.yaml --include-detectors=AWS,GitHub”
   • [claimed-docs] “You can manually specify which detectors to use with the `--include-detectors` flag.”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Gecko Security—none0/10

   Gecko Security is an AI-driven vulnerability scanner using compiler-accurate cross-file analysis, not a rule-based SAST engine; there is no evidence of a custom rule-writing syntax (e.g., YAML/DSL rules like Semgrep) or any mechanism to define and share such rules across repositories.

   • [claimed-docs] “Compiler-accurate (precise cross-file analysis) | TypeScript · JavaScript · Python · Go · Java · Scala · C# · Rust”
   • [claimed-docs] “Repository wiki: An AI-written map of your app: architecture, routing, and security model.”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

Fix suggestions

1. developerApply suggested or automatic code fixes for findings instead of only reading reports

   weight 2 · round to Gecko Security
   TruffleHog—none0/10

   TruffleHog is a secrets-detection/scanning tool that finds, verifies, and reports on exposed secrets, and notifies teams to rotate/remediate them manually; there is no evidence of any auto-fix, patch-suggestion, or code-remediation capability—only alerting, tracking remediation status, and pre-commit/pre-receive blocking.

   • [claimed-docs] “TruffleHog continuously tracks the status of all key types to identify whether remediation has occurred. Set up alerts across the platform o…”
   • [claimed-docs] “TruffleHog continuously tracks the status of all key types to identify whether remediation has occurred. Set up alerts across the platform o…”
   • [claimed-docs] “Pre-commit hooks are a useful way to prevent secrets in code from being pushed from a git repository.”
   • [claimed-docs] “If you run your own git server, consider the pre-receive hook option which can block commits with secrets from being accepted.”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Gecko Security✓fullclaimed8/10

   Docs describe a full remediation loop: suggested patches with 'Request fix' opening a gecko/* PR, ability to commit fixes directly to an existing PR's head branch, and automatic re-scan marking 'Fix verified' once resolved — this goes beyond read-only reporting into applied/automatic fixes. missing for 10: independent/hands-on confirmation that generated fixes actually work correctly (community evidence focuses on detection false positives, not fix application quality).

   • [claimed-docs] “Click Request fix to open a gecko/* pull request with the patch applied, or apply the patch yourself.”
   • [claimed-docs] “Gecko rechecks the finding and marks it Fix verified once the vulnerability is gone.”
   • [claimed-docs] “Commit to an existing PR: For findings from a PR scan, Gecko can commit the fix directly to the PR's head branch so the fix rides along with…”
   • [claimed-docs] “PR reviews & fixes: On pull requests, a security review summary and one-click fixes.”
   • [claimed-docs] “Click **Request fix** to open a `gecko/*` pull request with the patch applied, or apply the patch yourself.”
   • [claimed-docs] “When the fix merges, Gecko rechecks the finding and marks it **Fix verified** once the vulnerability is gone.”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

Custom detection

1. security-engineerDefine custom detection rules for my organization's internal token and secret formats

   weight 2 · round to TruffleHog
   TruffleHog✓fullclaimed9/10

   TruffleHog explicitly supports custom regex detectors for defining organization-specific secret formats, with optional webhook-based verification (trufflehog-docs-6, trufflehog-docs-27), plus CLI flags to include/exclude detectors and control verification (trufflehog-docs-7, trufflehog-docs-14, trufflehog-docs-21). This is documented first-party capability directly matching the story. Missing for 10: independent/community corroboration specifically of the custom-detector feature working in practice (community evidence in the pack discusses licensing/comparisons, not custom rules).

   • [claimed-docs] “The custom regex detector allows you to define your own detector using regular expressions with optional verification using a webhook.”
   • [claimed-docs] “Verification is done via a webhook POST request to the provided `endpoint`.”
   • [claimed-docs] “You can manually specify which detectors to use with the `--include-detectors` flag.”
   • [claimed-docs] “./trufflehog scan --config=config.yaml --include-detectors=AWS,GitHub”
   • [claimed-docs] “the `--verify-detectors` and `--no-verify-detectors` CLI flags can be used to configure detector-specific verification override settings”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Gecko Security—none0/10

   Gecko Security is a vulnerability-scanning tool focused on code security review (SAST-style findings, PR checks, fixes), and none of the evidence mentions custom secret/token pattern detection rules or any mechanism for defining organization-specific secret formats.

   ⚑ flag

Secret scanning

1. developerScan a repository and its full git history for hardcoded secrets and credentials

   weight 3 · round to TruffleHog
   TruffleHog✓fullclaimed9/10

   TruffleHog's core documented functionality is scanning git repos (and full history via commands like `trufflehog github --repo ...`) for hardcoded secrets, with 800+ detectors and live verification, corroborated by both official docs and GitHub README. Community commentary criticizes maturity/hype but does not contradict the core git-history scanning capability. Missing for 10: independent hands-on benchmark of full-history scan accuracy/performance beyond vendor docs.

   • [claimed-docs] “trufflehog github --only-verified --repo https://github.com/trufflesecurity/test_keys”
   • [github] “docker run --rm -it -v "$PWD:/pwd" trufflesecurity/trufflehog:latest github --repo https://github.com/trufflesecurity/test_keys”
   • [claimed-docs] “TruffleHog™ is a secrets scanning tool that digs deep into your code repositories to find secrets, passwords, and sensitive keys.”
   • [claimed-docs] “TruffleHog classifies over 800 secret types, mapping them back to the specific identity they belong to.”
   • [github] “For every secret TruffleHog can classify, it can also log in to confirm if that secret is live or not.”
   • [claimed-docs] “trufflehog git file://. --since-commit HEAD --results=verified,unknown --fail”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Gecko Security—none0/10

   Gecko's documented capability is AI-driven vulnerability discovery (source-to-sink call chains, CVSS scoring, PoCs, patches) for application code, not secret/credential scanning or git-history scanning. Missing for 10: any mention of secret/credential detection, hardcoded key scanning, or scanning git commit history for leaked secrets.

   • [claimed-docs] “Each finding includes a severity (CVSS 4.0), a confidence score, the full source-to-sink call chain, a proof of concept, and a suggested pat…”
   • [claimed-docs] “Repository wiki: An AI-written map of your app: architecture, routing, and security model.”
   • [claimed-docs] “Compiler-accurate (precise cross-file analysis) | TypeScript · JavaScript · Python · Go · Java · Scala · C# · Rust”
   • [probe] “PROBE llms.txt: HTTP 200 at https://gecko.security/llms.txt # Gecko Security > Gecko Security is an AI security engineer that finds exploit…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

Ai triage

1. ai-native userUse AI to triage findings — explaining them, deduplicating, and flagging likely false positives

   weight 3 · round to Gecko Security
   TruffleHog—none0/10

   TruffleHog's evidence shows credential verification, classification, and permission analysis (analyzer) to reduce false positives, but none of this involves AI/LLM-based explanation, deduplication, or triage of findings — it's rule-based verification, not AI reasoning. No mention of AI, LLM, or natural-language explanation features appears anywhere in the pack.

   • [claimed-docs] “for every secret trufflehog can classify, it can also log in to confirm if that secret is live or not”
   • [claimed-docs] “TruffleHog Analyze evaluates access patterns to identify a secret’s metadata, permissions, and resources.”
   • [github] “instead of sending one request to check if the secret can log in, TruffleHog can send many requests to learn everything there is to know abo…”
   • [claimed-docs] “TruffleHog classifies over 800 secret types, mapping them back to the specific identity they belong to.”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Gecko Security!disputedcontradicted4/10

   Docs describe confidence scores, severity, call chains, and PR-introduced vs pre-existing separation, plus an AI-tools API explicitly for triaging findings (gecko-security-docs-2, -9, -28), which maps to explaining/deduplicating/flagging false positives. However, hands-on community reports directly contradict the false-positive flagging claim: the tool assigned 100% confidence to two non-existent vulnerabilities and flagged an implausible 'RCE' in a CTF IRC bot script as high severity, while missing a real issue found by another scanner (gecko-security-comm-3, gecko-security-comm-5, gecko-security-comm-4). Missing for 10: independent validation that confidence scoring reliably suppresses false positives, and resolution of the reported inaccurate high-confidence findings.

   • [claimed-docs] “Each finding includes a severity (CVSS 4.0), a confidence score, the full source-to-sink call chain, a proof of concept, and a suggested pat…”
   • [claimed-docs] “Connect it to an AI tool and the tool can list your repositories and scans, pull full vulnerability evidence (proof of concept, call chain, …”
   • [claimed-docs] “Findings introduced by the PR are separated from pre-existing ones, so reviewers focus on what the change adds.”
   • [community] “Tool gave 100% confidence for two vulnerabilities (severity 9.4 and 6.5) that turned out not to be real.”
   • [community] “Uploaded a project (sydbox) to scan; took 10 minutes and found only one vulnerability, an 'RCE: IRC Message Command Execution Bypass' in an …”
   • [community] “Ran Gecko on a C project after Semgrep AI flagged a minor real issue; Gecko found nothing. After removing the fix and recreating the project…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

Fp management

1. security-engineerBaseline or ignore existing and false-positive findings so only new issues alert

   weight 3 · round to Gecko Security
   TruffleHog~partialclaimed5/10

   TruffleHog supports scanning only new commits via `--since-commit` (used in pre-commit hooks) and reduces false positives via `--only-verified`/verification flags, which can approximate 'ignore existing/false positives, alert only new'. However there is no documented allowlist, ignore-file, or finding-suppression mechanism for marking specific findings as accepted/false-positive across full scans. missing for 10: explicit baseline/ignore-list feature, per-finding suppression or allowlisting, independent confirmation that verified-only filtering meaningfully reduces false positives in practice.

   • [claimed-docs] “trufflehog git file://. --since-commit HEAD --results=verified,unknown --fail”
   • [claimed-docs] “this trufflehog invocation will force verification for AWS and Buildkite secrets, irrespective of whether the configured sources have their …”
   • [claimed-docs] “the `--verify-detectors` and `--no-verify-detectors` CLI flags can be used to configure detector-specific verification override settings”
   • [claimed-docs] “trufflehog github --only-verified --repo https://github.com/trufflesecurity/test_keys”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Gecko Security~partialcommunity6/10

   Docs show PR scans separate pre-existing findings from new ones so reviewers focus on what changed (docs-28), and the API supports 'triage findings' (docs-10), implying some noise-reduction workflow. However, there's no explicit documentation of a false-positive marking/ignore mechanism or a persistent baseline snapshot feature, and community reports flag inaccurate high-confidence findings (comm-3) without confirming a suppression workflow exists. missing for 10: explicit 'mark as false positive'/dismiss UI, documented baseline snapshotting across scans, independent confirmation that dismissed findings stay suppressed on rescans.

   • [claimed-docs] “Findings introduced by the PR are separated from pre-existing ones, so reviewers focus on what the change adds.”
   • [claimed-docs] “Gecko's v1 API lets you trigger scans, read scan, repository, and vulnerability data, triage findings, manage scan schedules, rotate your Gi…”
   • [claimed-docs] “create a ticket in Jira, Linear, ClickUp, or Shortcut”
   • [community] “Tool gave 100% confidence for two vulnerabilities (severity 9.4 and 6.5) that turned out not to be real.”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

2. developerFilter and gate on findings by severity or confidence so low-value noise does not block builds

   weight 2 · round drawn
   TruffleHog~partialclaimed6/10

   TruffleHog supports filtering/gating via verification status rather than explicit severity/confidence scores — flags like --only-verified, --results=verified,unknown --fail, --include-detectors, and --verify-detectors/--no-verify-detectors let developers restrict findings and control build-blocking behavior (e.g., in pre-commit hooks). This addresses the triage-noise goal but doesn't map to a formal severity/confidence scale as the story implies. Missing for 10: explicit severity levels or confidence scoring, independent/hands-on confirmation of noise reduction in CI gating.

   • [claimed-docs] “trufflehog github --only-verified --repo https://github.com/trufflesecurity/test_keys”
   • [claimed-docs] “trufflehog git file://. --since-commit HEAD --results=verified,unknown --fail”
   • [claimed-docs] “the `--verify-detectors` and `--no-verify-detectors` CLI flags can be used to configure detector-specific verification override settings”
   • [claimed-docs] “You can manually specify which detectors to use with the `--include-detectors` flag.”
   • [claimed-docs] “this trufflehog invocation will force verification for AWS and Buildkite secrets, irrespective of whether the configured sources have their …”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Gecko Security~partialclaimed6/10

   Docs confirm a 'fail-on severity' threshold for PR checks (e.g., fail on High and above) and that findings carry both severity and confidence scores, supporting build-gating by severity. However, there's no documented mechanism to gate/filter specifically by confidence score, only severity threshold is described as configurable. Missing for 10: explicit confidence-based filtering/gating controls, and independent verification that severity gating reliably suppresses low-value noise.

   • [claimed-docs] “Each finding includes a severity (CVSS 4.0), a confidence score, the full source-to-sink call chain, a proof of concept, and a suggested pat…”
   • [claimed-docs] “**Fail-on severity**: the severity threshold that fails the check (for example, fail on High and above).”
   • [claimed-docs] “Findings introduced by the PR are separated from pre-existing ones, so reviewers focus on what the change adds.”

   proof ↗⚑ flag