1Password vs Proton Pass

Agent access

1. ai-native userPoint an agent at llms.txt or agent-oriented docs

   weight 2 · round to 1Password
   1Password✓fullprobed9/10

   1Password.dev and support.1password.com both serve confirmed llms.txt/llms-full.txt files plus markdown mirrors of every docs page, and this is directly verified via live probes, not just claims. missing for 10: independent third-party (non-vendor) confirmation that agents actually consume these files successfully in practice.

   • [probe] “PROBE llms.txt: HTTP 200 at https://support.1password.com/llms.txt # 1Password Support > LLM-friendly exports of English public support gui…”
   • [probe] “PROBE runtime (recorded 2026-09-15): 1password.dev serves llms.txt ('# 1Password Developer Documentation') plus llms-full.txt, and every doc…”
   • [claimed-docs] “The 1Password Environments MCP Server lets MCP clients such as Claude Code, Codex, Cursor, and Kiro securely manage your 1Password Environme…”
   • [probe] “PROBE runtime (recorded 2026-09-15): 1Password's public docs MCP server at https://www.1password.dev/mcp completed a FULL keyless initialize…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Proton Pass—none0/10

   No llms.txt or agent-oriented docs found; probes explicitly return 404 for llms.txt and docs.md endpoints, and no evidence mentions agent-readable documentation formats.

   • [probe] “PROBE llms.txt: HTTP 404 at https://proton.me/llms.txt”
   • [probe] “PROBE docs-md: HTTP 404 at https://proton.me/support/pass.md”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

2. ai-native userRun the product headlessly / in CI for automation

   weight 2 · round to 1Password
   1Password✓fullprobed8/10

   1Password ships a dedicated CLI (confirmed packaged via Homebrew cask), Service Accounts explicitly for automating secrets in CI/infrastructure without extra services, Connect Servers exposing a REST API for machine workflows, and a Credential Broker for CI/CD short-lived access — all first-party documented and headless by design. Missing for 10: independent hands-on case studies/community reports specifically validating CI pipeline usage rather than just vendor docs.

   • [claimed-docs] “1Password CLI brings 1Password to your terminal. Learn how to install the CLI, then integrate it with your 1Password app and sign in with To…”
   • [claimed-docs] “Use the 1Password Credential Broker to give CI/CD and other machine workflows short-lived access to secrets, without managing service accoun…”
   • [claimed-docs] “1Password Connect Servers allow you to securely access your 1Password items and vaults in your company's apps and cloud infrastructure using…”
   • [claimed-docs] “1Password Service Accounts help automate secrets management in your applications and infrastructure without the need to deploy additional se…”
   • [probe] “PROBE runtime (recorded 2026-09-15): the official op CLI is packaged in Homebrew as the 1password-cli cask ('Command-line interface for 1Pas…”
   • [probe] “official CLI documented at https://www.1password.dev/cli/get-started”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Proton Pass~partialprobed6/10

   Proton Pass ships an official CLI documented as designed for scripts, deployments, and CI/CD pipelines, supporting CRUD on vaults and items — a clear headless/automation capability. However, evidence is limited to vendor blog docs with no independent/hands-on corroboration of CI usage, no details on authentication flow for non-interactive/headless environments, and no community validation of real-world CI deployment. Missing for 10: independent hands-on CI usage reports, details on non-interactive auth/session handling for automation, and broader ecosystem examples (e.g., GitHub Actions integration).

   • [claimed-docs] “enables you to securely retrieve secrets and other items across scripts, deployments, and continuous integration/ continuous delivery (CI/CD…”
   • [claimed-docs] “the CLI enables you to securely retrieve secrets and other items across scripts, deployments, and continuous integration/ continuous deliver…”
   • [claimed-docs] “View, create, update, and delete items including passwords, secure notes, credit cards, identities, WiFi entries, custom items, and stored S…”
   • [probe] “official CLI documented at https://proton.me/blog/proton-pass-cli”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

3. ai-native userConnect an agent via an official MCP server

   weight 3 · round to 1Password
   1Password✓fullprobed8/10

   1Password ships an official Environments MCP Server that lets MCP clients (Claude Code, Codex, Cursor, Kiro) securely manage 1Password Environments without exposing secrets to the agent, and a runtime probe confirms a live keyless MCP initialize handshake against 1Password's own MCP endpoint. This is first-party documentation plus real runtime corroboration of the server actually working. Missing for 10: broader independent/community hands-on reports beyond the vendor probe, and clarity since the Environments MCP server is explicitly marked Beta.

   • [claimed-docs] “The 1Password Environments MCP Server lets MCP clients such as Claude Code, Codex, Cursor, and Kiro securely manage your 1Password Environme…”
   • [probe] “official MCP server documented at https://www.1password.dev/environments/mcp-server”
   • [probe] “PROBE runtime (recorded 2026-09-15): 1Password's public docs MCP server at https://www.1password.dev/mcp completed a FULL keyless initialize…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Proton Pass—none0/10

   The axis applies to this product kind (peer products hold positive or none verdicts on this story), so lack of evidence for an applicable capability is "none", never "na". (na/none harmonized at arena bring-up — see pipeline/scripts/na-harmonize.ts.)

   ⚑ flag

4. ai-native userUse an official CLI

   weight 2 · round to 1Password
   1Password✓fullprobed9/10

   1Password ships an official `op` CLI with detailed docs, reference commands, Homebrew packaging, and integration with secrets automation, service accounts, and SSH/Git workflows, making it well-suited to AI-native/agentic scripting. missing for 10: independent hands-on review or benchmark of the CLI's use in agentic workflows beyond vendor docs and packaging.

   • [claimed-docs] “1Password CLI brings 1Password to your terminal. Learn how to install the CLI, then integrate it with your 1Password app and sign in with To…”
   • [claimed-docs] “op item list --vault Private”
   • [probe] “official CLI documented at https://www.1password.dev/cli/get-started”
   • [probe] “PROBE runtime (recorded 2026-09-15): the official op CLI is packaged in Homebrew as the 1password-cli cask ('Command-line interface for 1Pas…”
   • [claimed-docs] “Use the 1Password SSH Agent to authenticate all your Git and SSH workflows.”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Proton Pass✓fullprobed7/10

   Proton Pass has an official CLI documented in a first-party blog post that supports CRUD on vaults and items (including SSH keys) and secret retrieval for scripts/CI/CD pipelines, which is directly relevant to AI-native/agentic automation workflows. Missing for 10: independent/hands-on corroboration of the CLI's reliability, no mention of AI-agent-specific integrations or MCP-style tooling, and no detail on scripting API depth or language bindings.

   • [claimed-docs] “enables you to securely retrieve secrets and other items across scripts, deployments, and continuous integration/ continuous delivery (CI/CD…”
   • [claimed-docs] “the CLI enables you to securely retrieve secrets and other items across scripts, deployments, and continuous integration/ continuous deliver…”
   • [claimed-docs] “View, create, update, and delete items including passwords, secure notes, credit cards, identities, WiFi entries, custom items, and stored S…”
   • [probe] “official CLI documented at https://proton.me/blog/proton-pass-cli”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

5. ai-native userDrive the product through a documented public API

   weight 3 · round to 1Password
   1Password✓fullprobed9/10

   1Password exposes a well-documented public API surface for programmatic control: a scriptable CLI (op), official SDKs in Go/JS/Python, a Connect Server REST API, Service Accounts, Events API, and even a public MCP server for AI agents — all backed by first-party docs and confirmed via runtime probes (CLI packaged in Homebrew, MCP handshake succeeding, llms.txt/markdown mirrors of docs). This directly satisfies an AI-native user's need to drive the product via documented APIs rather than only a GUI. Missing for 10: independent third-party developer testimonials/case studies of building against these APIs beyond vendor docs and probes.

   • [claimed-docs] “1Password CLI brings 1Password to your terminal. Learn how to install the CLI, then integrate it with your 1Password app and sign in with To…”
   • [claimed-docs] “op item list --vault Private”
   • [claimed-docs] “1Password Connect Servers allow you to securely access your 1Password items and vaults in your company's apps and cloud infrastructure using…”
   • [claimed-docs] “1Password Service Accounts help automate secrets management in your applications and infrastructure without the need to deploy additional se…”
   • [claimed-docs] “1Password SDKs allow you to build integrations that programmatically interact with 1Password using Go, JavaScript, or Python.”
   • [github] “Build integrations that programmatically interact with 1Password.”
   • [claimed-docs] “The 1Password Environments MCP Server lets MCP clients such as Claude Code, Codex, Cursor, and Kiro securely manage your 1Password Environme…”
   • [probe] “official MCP server documented at https://www.1password.dev/environments/mcp-server”
   • [probe] “official CLI documented at https://www.1password.dev/cli/get-started”
   • [probe] “PROBE runtime (recorded 2026-09-15): 1Password's public docs MCP server at https://www.1password.dev/mcp completed a FULL keyless initialize…”
   • [probe] “PROBE runtime (recorded 2026-09-15): 1password.dev serves llms.txt ('# 1Password Developer Documentation') plus llms-full.txt, and every doc…”
   • [probe] “PROBE runtime (recorded 2026-09-15): the official op CLI is packaged in Homebrew as the 1password-cli cask ('Command-line interface for 1Pas…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Proton Pass~partialprobed5/10

   Proton Pass offers a CLI for CRUD operations on vaults and items (passwords, notes, SSH keys, etc.) usable in scripts/CI pipelines, which provides programmatic access, but this is a CLI wrapper rather than a documented public REST/GraphQL API with SDKs, and llms.txt/docs.md probes both 404. missing for 10: a formal public API specification (REST/GraphQL/SDK), API reference docs, and independent developer corroboration of programmatic/agentic use beyond the CLI.

   • [claimed-docs] “enables you to securely retrieve secrets and other items across scripts, deployments, and continuous integration/ continuous delivery (CI/CD…”
   • [claimed-docs] “Create, read, update, and delete vaults”
   • [claimed-docs] “the CLI enables you to securely retrieve secrets and other items across scripts, deployments, and continuous integration/ continuous deliver…”
   • [claimed-docs] “View, create, update, and delete items including passwords, secure notes, credit cards, identities, WiFi entries, custom items, and stored S…”
   • [probe] “PROBE llms.txt: HTTP 404 at https://proton.me/llms.txt”
   • [probe] “PROBE docs-md: HTTP 404 at https://proton.me/support/pass.md”
   • [probe] “official CLI documented at https://proton.me/blog/proton-pass-cli”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

6. ai-native userIssue scoped/least-privilege API credentials for an agent

   weight 2 · round to 1Password
   1Password~partialprobed6/10

   1Password Service Accounts and Connect Servers support scoped, vault-limited, short-lived credentials for machine/agent workflows, and the Environments MCP Server explicitly avoids returning secrets to the agent, which aligns with least-privilege agent access. However, evidence doesn't show fine-grained per-agent scoping controls, credential rotation/expiry specifics, or audit tooling tailored to AI agents specifically (vs generic machine/service workflows). missing for 10: documentation of granular per-agent permission scoping, credential lifecycle/expiry controls for agents, and independent/hands-on verification of least-privilege enforcement in agent contexts.

   • [claimed-docs] “Use the 1Password Credential Broker to give CI/CD and other machine workflows short-lived access to secrets, without managing service accoun…”
   • [claimed-docs] “1Password Connect Servers allow you to securely access your 1Password items and vaults in your company's apps and cloud infrastructure using…”
   • [claimed-docs] “1Password Service Accounts help automate secrets management in your applications and infrastructure without the need to deploy additional se…”
   • [claimed-docs] “The 1Password Environments MCP Server lets MCP clients such as Claude Code, Codex, Cursor, and Kiro securely manage your 1Password Environme…”
   • [probe] “PROBE runtime (recorded 2026-09-15): 1Password's public docs MCP server at https://www.1password.dev/mcp completed a FULL keyless initialize…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Proton Pass—none0/10

   Proton Pass CLI supports retrieving secrets/items for CI/CD and vault-level CRUD, but there is no evidence of issuing scoped or least-privilege API credentials/tokens specifically for an AI agent (e.g., fine-grained scopes, agent-specific permission tiers). Vaults provide organizational grouping, not credential scoping mechanisms for automated agents.

   • [claimed-docs] “enables you to securely retrieve secrets and other items across scripts, deployments, and continuous integration/ continuous delivery (CI/CD…”
   • [claimed-docs] “Create, read, update, and delete vaults”
   • [claimed-docs] “the CLI enables you to securely retrieve secrets and other items across scripts, deployments, and continuous integration/ continuous deliver…”
   • [claimed-docs] “View, create, update, and delete items including passwords, secure notes, credit cards, identities, WiFi entries, custom items, and stored S…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

7. ai-native userBuild against official SDKs

   weight 2 · round to 1Password
   1Password✓fullprobed8/10

   1Password ships official SDKs for Go, JavaScript, and Python for programmatically interacting with vaults, secrets, and items, backed by GitHub repos, docs, and complementary CLI/Connect/Service Accounts tooling for automation workflows. missing for 10: independent third-party developer testimonials/case studies validating real-world SDK usage beyond vendor docs and GitHub repo descriptions.

   • [claimed-docs] “Secure your applications: Load secrets into your code with secret references or read environment variables from 1Password Environments.”
   • [claimed-docs] “Automate item management: Programmatically manage items in your 1Password account.”
   • [claimed-docs] “1Password SDKs allow you to build integrations that programmatically interact with 1Password using Go, JavaScript, or Python.”
   • [github] “Build integrations that programmatically interact with 1Password.”
   • [claimed-docs] “1Password Service Accounts help automate secrets management in your applications and infrastructure without the need to deploy additional se…”
   • [claimed-docs] “1Password Connect Servers allow you to securely access your 1Password items and vaults in your company's apps and cloud infrastructure using…”
   • [probe] “PROBE runtime (recorded 2026-09-15): the official op CLI is packaged in Homebrew as the 1password-cli cask ('Command-line interface for 1Pas…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Proton Pass—none0/10

   Evidence shows only a CLI tool for secrets retrieval in CI/CD pipelines, not a developer SDK for building applications; no mention of SDKs, API libraries, or language bindings for programmatic integration exists in the evidence pack.

   ⚑ flag

8. ai-native userSubscribe to events via webhooks

   weight 2 · round drawn
   1Password—none0/10

   1Password documents an Events API for retrieving account activity and forwarding it to a SIEM system, but this is a pull-based polling API, not a webhook subscription mechanism. No evidence anywhere in the pack shows a webhook registration/callback capability for AI-native or any consumers.

   • [claimed-docs] “The 1Password Events API allows you to retrieve information about activity in your 1Password Business account and send it to your security i…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Proton Pass—none0/10

   No evidence of any webhook or event subscription mechanism; Proton Pass offers a CLI for CRUD operations but nothing about push/webhook notifications. Missing for 10: any webhook API, event subscription mechanism, or documentation referencing such a feature.

   ⚑ flag

Agentic features

1. ai-native userGet AI-generated insights and suggestions from my data inside the product

   weight 2 · round drawn
   1Password—none0/10

   1Password's evidence shows rule-based security features (Watchtower flags weak/breached passwords) and developer-facing MCP/SDK/CLI tooling for external agents to access secrets, but nothing about the product itself generating AI-driven insights or suggestions from a user's stored data. Missing for 10: any AI-generated analysis, recommendations, or summaries surfaced inside the 1Password app/UI itself.

   • [claimed-docs] “Watchtower tells you about breaches, weak passwords, duplicate items, and other security problems with the items you have saved in 1Password…”
   • [claimed-docs] “The 1Password Environments MCP Server lets MCP clients such as Claude Code, Codex, Cursor, and Kiro securely manage your 1Password Environme…”
   • [probe] “PROBE runtime (recorded 2026-09-15): 1Password's public docs MCP server at https://www.1password.dev/mcp completed a FULL keyless initialize…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Proton Pass—none0/10

   Evidence only covers password/vault management, monitoring, and Sentinel's fraud-detection AI for account security — none of this provides AI-generated insights or suggestions derived from the user's stored data (e.g., summarization, pattern detection, recommendations beyond breach/weak-password alerts). No feature described as generating insights or suggestions from the data itself.

   ⚑ flag

2. ai-native userSet up automations that run autonomously in the background

   weight 2 · round to 1Password
   1Password~partialprobed5/10

   1Password provides machine-facing automation building blocks — Service Accounts, Connect Servers, Credential Broker, CLI, and SDKs — that let CI/CD pipelines and other unattended workflows fetch secrets autonomously in the background, and the Environments MCP Server lets AI agents manage secrets without human intervention. However, there's no evidence of a general-purpose scheduler, trigger system, or orchestration layer for building broader 'automations' beyond secrets retrieval/injection. Missing for 10: native scheduling/triggers, workflow orchestration UI, and evidence of autonomous multi-step automations beyond secret access.

   • [claimed-docs] “Use the 1Password Credential Broker to give CI/CD and other machine workflows short-lived access to secrets, without managing service accoun…”
   • [claimed-docs] “1Password Connect Servers allow you to securely access your 1Password items and vaults in your company's apps and cloud infrastructure using…”
   • [claimed-docs] “1Password Service Accounts help automate secrets management in your applications and infrastructure without the need to deploy additional se…”
   • [claimed-docs] “Secure your applications: Load secrets into your code with secret references or read environment variables from 1Password Environments.”
   • [claimed-docs] “1Password SDKs allow you to build integrations that programmatically interact with 1Password using Go, JavaScript, or Python.”
   • [probe] “PROBE runtime (recorded 2026-09-15): 1Password's public docs MCP server at https://www.1password.dev/mcp completed a FULL keyless initialize…”
   • [claimed-docs] “The 1Password Environments MCP Server lets MCP clients such as Claude Code, Codex, Cursor, and Kiro securely manage your 1Password Environme…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Proton Pass—none0/10

   The axis applies to this product kind (peer products hold positive or none verdicts on this story), so lack of evidence for an applicable capability is "none", never "na". (na/none harmonized at arena bring-up — see pipeline/scripts/na-harmonize.ts.)

   ⚑ flag

3. ai-native userOperate the product with natural-language commands

   weight 2 · round to 1Password
   1Password~partialprobed6/10

   1Password ships an official Environments MCP Server that lets AI agents (Claude Code, Codex, Cursor, Kiro) manage 1Password Environments via natural-language prompts through MCP clients, and a public docs MCP server for AI-readable documentation — genuine natural-language operability. However this is explicitly Beta and scoped only to Environments/secrets management, not the broader vault/login/passkey functionality that makes up most of 1Password's product surface, and the primary automation surface (CLI, SDKs) is structured commands, not natural language. Missing for 10: NL control over core password/vault/item management, general-availability status of the MCP server, independent hands-on verification of the NL workflow.

   • [claimed-docs] “The 1Password Environments MCP Server lets MCP clients such as Claude Code, Codex, Cursor, and Kiro securely manage your 1Password Environme…”
   • [probe] “PROBE runtime (recorded 2026-09-15): 1Password's public docs MCP server at https://www.1password.dev/mcp completed a FULL keyless initialize…”
   • [probe] “official MCP server documented at https://www.1password.dev/environments/mcp-server”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Proton Pass—none0/10

   Proton Pass offers a CLI for scripted secret retrieval and CRUD operations, but there is no evidence of natural-language command support, AI assistant integration, or conversational interface anywhere in the docs or community discussion. Missing for 10: any NL command parsing, chat/AI interface, or agentic natural-language control.

   ⚑ flag

Api quality

1. ai-native userExplore an interactive API reference with runnable examples

   weight 2 · round drawn
   1Password—none0/10

   1Password ships CLI/SDK/API docs, llms.txt exports, and an MCP server, but nothing in the evidence describes an interactive API reference with runnable/try-it examples (e.g., an API console or embedded sandbox); the CLI reference is static text, not executable in-browser. missing for 10: an interactive API explorer/playground, evidence of runnable code samples, any 'try it' console for the REST or SDK APIs.

   • [claimed-docs] “op item list --vault Private”
   • [claimed-docs] “1Password Connect Servers allow you to securely access your 1Password items and vaults in your company's apps and cloud infrastructure using…”
   • [claimed-docs] “1Password SDKs allow you to build integrations that programmatically interact with 1Password using Go, JavaScript, or Python.”
   • [probe] “PROBE runtime (recorded 2026-09-15): 1password.dev serves llms.txt ('# 1Password Developer Documentation') plus llms-full.txt, and every doc…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Proton Pass—none0/10

   No evidence of an interactive API reference or runnable examples; documentation covers CLI usage and product features only, and probes for docs/llms.txt endpoints returned 404. Missing for 10: interactive API reference, runnable code examples, developer API docs portal.

   • [probe] “PROBE llms.txt: HTTP 404 at https://proton.me/llms.txt”
   • [probe] “PROBE docs-md: HTTP 404 at https://proton.me/support/pass.md”
   • [probe] “official CLI documented at https://proton.me/blog/proton-pass-cli”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

2. ai-native userDownload a machine-readable API spec (OpenAPI or equivalent)

   weight 2 · round drawn
   1Password—none0/10

   1Password documents REST APIs (Connect Server, Events API) and SDKs, but no evidence pack item mentions a downloadable OpenAPI/Swagger spec or any machine-readable API schema for these APIs. Missing for 10: any OpenAPI/Swagger file, schema reference, or equivalent machine-readable spec for Connect, Events API, or SDKs.

   ⚑ flag

   Proton Pass—none0/10

   No evidence of a machine-readable API spec (OpenAPI or similar); only a CLI tool for scripts/CI/CD is documented, and probes for llms.txt and docs-md endpoints both returned 404.

   • [probe] “PROBE llms.txt: HTTP 404 at https://proton.me/llms.txt”
   • [probe] “PROBE docs-md: HTTP 404 at https://proton.me/support/pass.md”
   • [claimed-docs] “enables you to securely retrieve secrets and other items across scripts, deployments, and continuous integration/ continuous delivery (CI/CD…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

3. ai-native userRely on versioned APIs with a documented deprecation policy

   weight 2 · round drawn
   1Password—none0/10

   The evidence pack shows 1Password has developer APIs, SDKs, CLI, and Connect servers, but nowhere does it document API versioning schemes or a formal deprecation policy for these interfaces. Missing for 10: explicit API version numbers/headers, a published deprecation/sunset policy, changelog or migration guides for breaking changes.

   ⚑ flag

   Proton Pass—none0/10

   The axis applies to this product kind (peer products hold positive or none verdicts on this story), so lack of evidence for an applicable capability is "none", never "na". (na/none harmonized at arena bring-up — see pipeline/scripts/na-harmonize.ts.)

   ⚑ flag

1. ai-native userPerform bulk operations across many items at once

   weight 2 · round to 1Password
   1Password~partialprobed6/10

   The 1Password CLI (`op item list`, etc.) and SDKs explicitly support programmatic, scriptable management of items ('Automate item management: Programmatically manage items in your 1Password account'), which enables bulk operations via scripting loops or SDK calls. However, there is no dedicated bulk-edit/batch-update command or documentation showing native multi-item bulk operations (e.g., bulk delete, bulk tag) — missing for 10: explicit bulk-operation commands/API endpoints, documented examples of bulk updates across many items, and independent verification of bulk-scale performance.

   • [claimed-docs] “op item list --vault Private”
   • [claimed-docs] “Automate item management: Programmatically manage items in your 1Password account.”
   • [claimed-docs] “1Password SDKs allow you to build integrations that programmatically interact with 1Password using Go, JavaScript, or Python.”
   • [probe] “PROBE runtime (recorded 2026-09-15): the official op CLI is packaged in Homebrew as the 1password-cli cask ('Command-line interface for 1Pas…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Proton Pass~partialclaimed5/10

   The official CLI supports scripted CRUD on vaults and items (passwords, notes, SSH keys, etc.) which could be used to script bulk operations, and the import/export tools allow migrating many items at once. However, there is no documented explicit 'bulk edit/delete/tag' feature or batch API, and no community evidence of anyone actually scripting bulk operations at scale. Missing for 10: dedicated bulk-action API/UI, documented batch limits, and independent confirmation of large-scale scripted use.

   • [claimed-docs] “enables you to securely retrieve secrets and other items across scripts, deployments, and continuous integration/ continuous delivery (CI/CD…”
   • [claimed-docs] “the CLI enables you to securely retrieve secrets and other items across scripts, deployments, and continuous integration/ continuous deliver…”
   • [claimed-docs] “View, create, update, and delete items including passwords, secure notes, credit cards, identities, WiFi entries, custom items, and stored S…”
   • [claimed-docs] “Create, read, update, and delete vaults”
   • [claimed-docs] “With our import tool, you can migrate passwords and other items from most major password managers in just a few minutes.”
   • [claimed-docs] “You have three options for export: 1. A ZIP file containing a PGP-encrypted JSON file 2. An unencrypted ZIP file 3. A CSV file”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

1. ai-native userDo everything through the API that I can do in the UI

   weight 2 · round drawn
   1Password~partialclaimed5/10

   1Password's CLI, SDKs (Go/JS/Python), Connect Server, and Service Accounts let AI/automation programmatically read, create, and manage vault items and secrets ([1password-docs-2],[1password-docs-4],[1password-docs-5],[1password-docs-8],[1password-docs-26]), which covers the core secrets-management workflows. However, many UI-only capabilities — passkey creation/autofill in the browser extension, Watchtower breach/weak-password monitoring, Apple Watch lookups, import/export flows, SSH agent autofill — have no documented API/CLI equivalent, so full UI/API parity is not evidenced. Missing for 10: API-exposed passkey management, Watchtower/security-alerts API, and full item-type/browser-feature parity via CLI or SDK.

   • [claimed-docs] “op item list --vault Private”
   • [claimed-docs] “1Password Connect Servers allow you to securely access your 1Password items and vaults in your company's apps and cloud infrastructure using…”
   • [claimed-docs] “1Password Service Accounts help automate secrets management in your applications and infrastructure without the need to deploy additional se…”
   • [claimed-docs] “Automate item management: Programmatically manage items in your 1Password account.”
   • [claimed-docs] “1Password SDKs allow you to build integrations that programmatically interact with 1Password using Go, JavaScript, or Python.”
   • [claimed-docs] “Watchtower tells you about breaches, weak passwords, duplicate items, and other security problems with the items you have saved in 1Password…”
   • [claimed-docs] “you can now create, manage, and sign in with passkeys on a growing number of websites and apps directly from the 1Password browser extension”
   • [claimed-docs] “1Password lets you easily sign in to sites, use suggested passwords, and find what you need – all without leaving your browser.”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Proton Pass~partialprobed5/10

   Proton Pass ships a CLI/API that supports CRUD on vaults and items (passwords, notes, cards, identities, SSH keys, custom items), enabling scripted/CI access similar to core UI functions. However, there's no evidence the CLI/API exposes other UI capabilities like vault sharing, TOTP generation, Pass Monitor/Sentinel checks, alias management, or emergency access. Missing for 10: API coverage for sharing, TOTP/2FA, monitoring, aliases, emergency access, and any independent confirmation of API completeness.

   • [claimed-docs] “enables you to securely retrieve secrets and other items across scripts, deployments, and continuous integration/ continuous delivery (CI/CD…”
   • [claimed-docs] “Create, read, update, and delete vaults”
   • [claimed-docs] “the CLI enables you to securely retrieve secrets and other items across scripts, deployments, and continuous integration/ continuous deliver…”
   • [claimed-docs] “View, create, update, and delete items including passwords, secure notes, credit cards, identities, WiFi entries, custom items, and stored S…”
   • [probe] “official CLI documented at https://proton.me/blog/proton-pass-cli”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

2. ai-native userExport all of my data in open formats and leave

   weight 3 · round to Proton Pass
   1Password~partialclaimed5/10

   1Password documents a built-in export feature explicitly for moving data to another app, and separately documents CSV import compatibility, implying an open-format export path (e.g. CSV) exists — but the evidence never states which formats export actually produces (1Password's native export is typically 1PUX, not just CSV) nor confirms full data coverage (attachments, SSH keys, secure notes) is included. missing for 10: explicit confirmation that exported format is open/interoperable (not proprietary 1PUX), evidence of full-fidelity data portability, and independent/hands-on confirmation of successful migration.

   • [claimed-docs] “You can export your information from the 1Password apps if you want to move it to a different app.”
   • [claimed-docs] “You can import data into 1Password from many different browsers and applications, including applications that export data in the comma-separ…”
   • [claimed-docs] “Learn how to transfer your passwords and other information from other applications into 1Password.”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Proton Pass✓fullclaimed7/10

   Proton Pass supports data export in multiple open, portable formats (unencrypted ZIP, CSV, PGP-encrypted JSON) allowing users to leave with their data, and also offers an import tool for migrating in from other managers. Missing for 10: independent hands-on verification of export completeness/fidelity, and no evidence of bulk API/CLI-based export for programmatic 'leave' workflows beyond CLI CRUD operations.

   • [claimed-docs] “If you want to use your passwords elsewhere or create a separate hardcopy, you can easily export your data from Proton Pass.”
   • [claimed-docs] “You have three options for export: 1. A ZIP file containing a PGP-encrypted JSON file 2. An unencrypted ZIP file 3. A CSV file”
   • [claimed-docs] “With our import tool, you can migrate passwords and other items from most major password managers in just a few minutes.”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

3. ai-native userRead the product's source under an open license

   weight 2 · round to Proton Pass
   1Password—none0/10

   1Password is closed-source proprietary software; the evidence pack shows CLI, SDKs, MCP servers and docs, but nothing indicating source code is published under an open license. Missing for 10: any evidence of an open-source license, public source repository, or statement of source availability.

   ⚑ flag

   Proton Pass~partialcommunity5/10

   Community evidence confirms Proton Pass client apps are open source on GitHub (protonpass org), but users note this covers only the clients, not the full product/server-side, and there was confusion over whether it was truly open-sourced. No first-party docs in the pack mention a license or open-source repo at all. Missing for 10: official documentation citing the open-source license, confirmation that server/backend code is open, and clarity on license terms.

   • [community] “It seems only the clients are open source? https://github.com/orgs/protonpass/repositories”
   • [community] “Am I correct in believing that they haven't open-sourced Proton Pass yet?... Their official announcement post says it's now open source, how…”
   • [community] “Please note that we do have encrypted notes... And it is open source: https://github.com/protonpass”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

4. ai-native userSelf-host the core product

   weight 3 · round drawn
   1Password—none0/10

   1Password is a cloud-hosted SaaS vault; the only 'self-hosted' pieces are Connect Servers/Environments proxies that still require a cloud 1Password account behind them, not the core vault itself. Community comments explicitly confirm the loss of local/offline vault storage and no self-host option ('no native apps, no local vault storage... VC rot has already set in'), and there is no docs evidence of a self-hostable core product.

   • [claimed-docs] “1Password Connect Servers allow you to securely access your 1Password items and vaults in your company's apps and cloud infrastructure using…”
   • [community] “Use a tiny portion of that to continue support for local, non-cloud-based vault files please.”
   • [community] “Except they have already started to diminish what used to make 1P great. We now get no native apps, no local vault storage, no upfront payme…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Proton Pass—none0/10

   No evidence anywhere in the docs pack of a self-hosted server option; Proton Pass is offered only as a hosted SaaS with client apps, and community comments confirm only the client apps are open source while the backend/server is closed ('only the clients are open source').

   • [community] “It seems only the clients are open source? https://github.com/orgs/protonpass/repositories”
   • [community] “Am I correct in believing that they haven't open-sourced Proton Pass yet?... Their official announcement post says it's now open source, how…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

Storage

1. everyday userThe app stores passkeys and signs me into websites and apps with them, not just TOTP codes

   weight 3 · round to 1Password
   1Password✓fullclaimed8/10

   1Password's own support docs confirm passkey creation, storage, and sign-in on websites/apps directly through 1Password (browser extension and apps), plus Watchtower flagging logins that can upgrade to passkeys, going well beyond just TOTP storage which is also documented separately. Missing for 10: independent hands-on verification of passkey sign-in reliability across many sites and no explicit mobile-app (non-browser) passkey autofill confirmation.

   • [claimed-docs] “you can now create, manage, and sign in with passkeys on a growing number of websites and apps directly from the 1Password browser extension”
   • [claimed-docs] “opening Watchtower in 1Password, which now flags all of your existing logins that could be updated with a passkey”
   • [claimed-docs] “You can use 1Password to save the passkeys you create for your accounts and sign in to websites with passkeys in your browser.”
   • [claimed-docs] “Learn how to use 1Password to store and quickly access your one-time passwords when you turn on two-step verification for a website.”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Proton Pass~partialclaimed6/10

   Docs confirm Proton Pass supports passkeys for passwordless authentication and separately supports TOTP code generation, indicating both capabilities coexist rather than TOTP-only. However, there is no detailed description of the sign-in autofill flow for passkeys or independent/hands-on confirmation that passkey sign-in works reliably across sites/apps. Missing for 10: hands-on/community validation of passkey autofill and sign-in success, cross-platform passkey sync confirmation, and detail on browser/app integration for passkey use.

   • [claimed-docs] “Passkeys allow you to authenticate yourself for online accounts without using passwords or passphrases.”
   • [claimed-docs] “Proton Pass can securely generate TOTP codes for websites that you have saved login details for.”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

Sync

1. power userMy passkeys sync across ecosystems — iOS, Android, Windows, Linux, browsers — instead of being locked to one platform vendor

   weight 2 · round to 1Password
   1Password~partialcommunity6/10

   1Password's docs show passkeys can be created, saved, and used from the browser extension across 'a growing number of websites and apps' and Watchtower flags logins for passkey upgrade, implying sync across whatever platform the extension/app runs on rather than vendor lock-in. However the evidence pack never explicitly confirms native passkey support/sync parity on Linux or Android apps (only browser extension and Apple-ecosystem mentions like Apple Watch/Touch ID), and an older community comment specifically raises concerns about a missing Linux client, leaving cross-platform parity unconfirmed by direct docs. Missing for 10: explicit Linux and Android app passkey documentation, independent hands-on confirmation of parity across all five listed platforms.

   • [claimed-docs] “you can now create, manage, and sign in with passkeys on a growing number of websites and apps directly from the 1Password browser extension”
   • [claimed-docs] “opening Watchtower in 1Password, which now flags all of your existing logins that could be updated with a passkey”
   • [claimed-docs] “You can use 1Password to save the passkeys you create for your accounts and sign in to websites with passkeys in your browser.”
   • [community] “Mandatory 'No Linux client' comment :| Does anyone have any insight if this is a pure business decision or there's something holding them ba…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Proton Pass~partialcommunity4/10

   Proton Pass confirms passkey support (proton-pass-docs-8) and offers apps across iOS, Android, browsers, and a desktop app (with offline access per proton-pass-docs-9), implying cross-platform sync of vault items including passkeys. However, there's no explicit documentation confirming passkeys specifically sync across all platforms (vs. just being stored), and community comments note desktop app limitations/lack thereof at the time (proton-pass-comm-2, proton-pass-comm-14), raising doubt about full ecosystem parity. Missing for 10: explicit cross-platform passkey sync confirmation, Linux/Windows native app evidence beyond browser extensions, and independent hands-on verification that passkeys created on one platform are usable on another.

   • [claimed-docs] “Passkeys allow you to authenticate yourself for online accounts without using passwords or passphrases.”
   • [claimed-docs] “You don’t need to do anything to access Proton Pass offline. Everything in your vaults is accessible whether you’re connected to the interne…”
   • [community] “If you are paying for Pass Plus or Proton Unlimited then you have integrated 2FA/TOTP which Bitwarden also makes you pay for... And no deskt…”
   • [community] “Pity it's only available on iOS and Android as apps and as browser extensions elsewhere. I would've been interested to check out a desktop p…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

Export

1. power userExport all my TOTP secrets in an open, readable format and leave for another app whenever I choose — no lock-in

   weight 3 · round to Proton Pass
   1Password~partialclaimed4/10

   1Password documents a general export feature to move data to another app ([1password-docs-15]), and TOTP/OTP storage is documented ([1password-docs-20]), but no evidence specifies that TOTP secrets are included in the export or that the export format is an open, readable standard (e.g., otpauth:// URIs or plain text) rather than 1Password's proprietary 1PUX format. Missing for 10: explicit confirmation that TOTP secrets are exportable, evidence of an open/readable export format, and independent/hands-on corroboration of successful migration of OTP secrets to another app.

   • [claimed-docs] “You can export your information from the 1Password apps if you want to move it to a different app.”
   • [claimed-docs] “Learn how to use 1Password to store and quickly access your one-time passwords when you turn on two-step verification for a website.”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Proton Pass~partialclaimed5/10

   Proton Pass docs confirm a general data-export feature with multiple output options (PGP-encrypted ZIP, unencrypted ZIP, CSV), which supports the 'open, readable format' portability need, but no evidence explicitly confirms that TOTP secrets/seeds specifically are included in these exports (as opposed to being locked to Proton's own TOTP display). No community or hands-on report verifies successful TOTP secret export and re-import elsewhere. missing for 10: explicit confirmation that TOTP seeds are included in CSV/JSON export, independent verification that exported TOTP secrets can be imported into another app.

   • [claimed-docs] “If you want to use your passwords elsewhere or create a separate hardcopy, you can easily export your data from Proton Pass.”
   • [claimed-docs] “You have three options for export: 1. A ZIP file containing a PGP-encrypted JSON file 2. An unencrypted ZIP file 3. A CSV file”
   • [claimed-docs] “Proton Pass can securely generate TOTP codes for websites that you have saved login details for.”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

Import

1. power userImport tokens in bulk from other authenticator apps instead of re-enrolling every account by hand

   weight 2 · round drawn
   1Password~partialclaimed4/10

   1Password documents general import from other apps/browsers via CSV and the newer Credential Exchange standard on iOS 26+, and it supports storing one-time passwords, but no evidence explicitly confirms bulk import of authenticator/OTP tokens specifically from other authenticator apps (e.g., Google Authenticator, Authy) rather than just passwords/logins. Missing for 10: explicit documentation of OTP-specific bulk import/migration flow from named authenticator apps, and any hands-on/community confirmation that OTP secrets survive the CSV or Credential Exchange import.

   • [claimed-docs] “You can import data into 1Password from many different browsers and applications, including applications that export data in the comma-separ…”
   • [claimed-docs] “If you use 1Password on iOS or iPadOS 26 or later, you can import data directly from apps that support the Credential Exchange standard.”
   • [claimed-docs] “Learn how to transfer your passwords and other information from other applications into 1Password.”
   • [claimed-docs] “Learn how to use 1Password to store and quickly access your one-time passwords when you turn on two-step verification for a website.”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Proton Pass~partialclaimed4/10

   Proton Pass documents a general import tool that migrates passwords and other items from most major password managers, and it can generate TOTP codes for saved logins, but there is no explicit evidence of bulk import specifically from dedicated authenticator apps or of preserving TOTP secrets during that import process. missing for 10: explicit documentation of bulk TOTP import from authenticator apps, confirmation that the import tool carries over 2FA secrets rather than just passwords, independent or hands-on confirmation of successful token migration.

   • [claimed-docs] “With our import tool, you can migrate passwords and other items from most major password managers in just a few minutes.”
   • [claimed-docs] “Unlike other password managers, Proton Pass uses end-to-end encryption on every field you fill for the items you create (usernames, website …”
   • [claimed-docs] “Proton Pass can securely generate TOTP codes for websites that you have saved login details for.”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

Migration

1. everyday userMoving to a new phone transfers all my tokens in one guided step

   weight 2 · round to Proton Pass
   1Password—none0/10

   The evidence pack covers CLI/SDK/Connect integrations, browser passkeys, import/export from other apps, and OTP storage, but nothing describes a guided 'move to new phone' flow that automatically transfers all tokens/OTPs in one step. Cloud sync via account sign-in is 1Password's usual mechanism, but no citation confirms this specific onboarding experience or that it covers OTP/token migration seamlessly.

   ⚑ flag

   Proton Pass~partialclaimed3/10

   Proton Pass stores TOTP secrets in E2E-encrypted vaults that sync via the cloud (docs-5, docs-9, docs-16), which implies that logging into a new phone would pull down existing 2FA tokens, but no evidence explicitly documents a guided 'new device setup' or migration wizard for phones. The only explicit migration flows described are import/export between different password manager products (docs-3, docs-4, docs-11), not device-to-device transfer. missing for 10: explicit documentation of a phone-to-phone onboarding/migration step, confirmation that TOTP tokens sync automatically without manual re-entry, and any hands-on account of switching phones.

   • [claimed-docs] “Proton Pass can securely generate TOTP codes for websites that you have saved login details for.”
   • [claimed-docs] “You don’t need to do anything to access Proton Pass offline. Everything in your vaults is accessible whether you’re connected to the interne…”
   • [claimed-docs] “Vaults can be used to organize items — in the example above, we have a vault for personal items and one for work items.”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

1. ai-native userChoose where my data is stored (region/residency)

   weight 2 · round drawn
   1Password—none0/10

   No evidence pack item mentions data residency, regional storage options, or the ability to choose where a vault/account's data is physically stored; 1Password's architecture appears to be a single managed cloud service without documented regional selection. Missing for 10: any documentation of region/residency selection, EU/US data center choice, or self-hosted storage location controls.

   ⚑ flag

   Proton Pass—none0/10

   No evidence pack item mentions data residency, regional data storage options, or any control over where user data is physically stored; Proton Pass docs cover encryption, vaults, CLI, and export but not region selection. Missing for 10: any documentation of data residency/region choice, EU-only or multi-region storage options, or admin controls for data location.

   ⚑ flag

2. ai-native userPrevent my data from being used to train AI models

   weight 3 · round to Proton Pass
   1Password—none0/10

   No evidence in the pack addresses any policy, setting, or documentation about opting out of or preventing data use for AI model training; the pack covers CLI/SDK/Connect/SSH/passkeys but nothing about AI training data usage or opt-outs.

   ⚑ flag

   Proton Pass~partialclaimed4/10

   Proton Pass's end-to-end encryption of all vault fields (docs-10) structurally means Proton cannot access plaintext user data, which would prevent it from being used to train AI models, but there is no explicit policy statement addressing AI training data use. Missing for 10: an explicit privacy policy or documentation statement about AI training opt-out/data usage, and independent confirmation of this claim.

   • [claimed-docs] “Unlike other password managers, Proton Pass uses end-to-end encryption on every field you fill for the items you create (usernames, website …”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

3. ai-native userControl data retention and deletion

   weight 2 · round to Proton Pass
   1Password—none0/10

   The pack shows data export/import and an MCP design that avoids returning secrets to agents, but there is no evidence of explicit controls for data retention policies or deletion (e.g., audit-log retention settings, vault/item purge, GDPR-style deletion) tailored to AI-native workflows. missing for 10: retention policy controls, explicit deletion/purge mechanisms for AI-consumed data, documentation tying these to AI agent use.

   ⚑ flag

   Proton Pass~partialclaimed5/10

   Docs show users can create/read/update/delete vaults and items via the CLI/app, and can export or migrate data before deleting it, giving concrete control over stored data. However there is no explicit documentation on account-level data retention policies, deletion timelines, or how long Proton retains deleted data, which is central to a full 'control retention and deletion' story. Missing for 10: explicit retention-period/account-deletion policy documentation, independent confirmation that deleted data is purged.

   • [claimed-docs] “Create, read, update, and delete vaults”
   • [claimed-docs] “View, create, update, and delete items including passwords, secure notes, credit cards, identities, WiFi entries, custom items, and stored S…”
   • [claimed-docs] “If you want to use your passwords elsewhere or create a separate hardcopy, you can easily export your data from Proton Pass.”
   • [claimed-docs] “You have three options for export: 1. A ZIP file containing a PGP-encrypted JSON file 2. An unencrypted ZIP file 3. A CSV file”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

4. ai-native userOpt out of telemetry and usage tracking

   weight 2 · round to Proton Pass
   1Password—none0/10

   No evidence pack item addresses telemetry/usage-tracking opt-out settings or privacy controls for AI-native usage; all evidence covers unrelated features like CLI, SSH, SDKs, and password management. This is a fair axis for any product handling sensitive data, but no documentation or community evidence confirms or denies a telemetry opt-out option.

   ⚑ flag

   Proton Pass~partialcommunity4/10

   Community evidence confirms telemetry exists in the browser extension and can be disabled, but only via Proton account settings, not directly within the extension itself, indicating a real but limited opt-out mechanism (proton-pass-comm-13). No first-party documentation from Proton Pass describes a formal telemetry/opt-out policy or setting. missing for 10: official docs on telemetry settings, in-extension opt-out toggle, confirmation of no tracking by default.

   • [community] “There's still nothing about the telemetry in the browser extension?... telemetry data is anonymous, but it's always sent to the remote endpo…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

App lock

1. everyday userThe app itself locks behind biometrics or a PIN, so a borrowed phone doesn't expose my codes

   weight 2 · round drawn
   1Password—none0/10

   The evidence pack only covers CLI/SDK sign-in via system authentication (Touch ID/Windows Hello) for developer tooling, not the everyday consumer app's biometric/PIN lock screen protecting saved logins or OTP codes on a borrowed phone. No documentation or community evidence in the pack describes the mobile/desktop app requiring biometrics or PIN to unlock and view items like one-time passwords.

   ⚑ flag

   Proton Pass—none0/10

   No evidence pack item mentions app-level biometric or PIN lock for Proton Pass; the closest related items cover offline vault access, 2FA/TOTP generation, and encryption, but none address a lock screen or app-level authentication gate. Missing for 10: any mention of biometric unlock, app PIN lock, or auto-lock timeout feature.

   ⚑ flag

Audits

1. security engineerThe vendor publishes independent security audits of the app and its sync protocol

   weight 2 · round drawn
   1Password—none0/10

   No evidence in the pack references independent third-party security audits, pen-test reports, or cryptographic protocol reviews of 1Password's app or sync protocol (e.g., no mention of the publicly known white paper audits by NCC Group/etc.). All citations cover CLI, SDKs, SSH, passkeys, and general product docs, none addressing audit publication.

   ⚑ flag

   Proton Pass—none0/10

   No evidence of any independent third-party security audit report, pentest, or audit of the sync protocol; evidence only covers feature docs (encryption claims, Sentinel, Monitor) and open-source status debates in community threads. Community comments even question whether the client is fully open source, but no audit report is cited or linked anywhere.

   ⚑ flag

Monitoring

1. power userThe app warns me when a service I use is breached or a stored credential is weak, reused, or exposed

   weight 2 · round drawn
   1Password✓fullclaimed8/10

   Watchtower explicitly flags breaches, weak passwords, duplicate/reused items, and other security problems across saved items, directly matching the story's requirements, and it's surfaced natively in the app/browser extension (also flagging passkey-upgrade opportunities). Missing for 10: independent hands-on verification of Watchtower's breach-detection accuracy/coverage beyond vendor docs.

   • [claimed-docs] “Watchtower tells you about breaches, weak passwords, duplicate items, and other security problems with the items you have saved in 1Password…”
   • [claimed-docs] “opening Watchtower in 1Password, which now flags all of your existing logins that could be updated with a passkey”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Proton Pass✓fullclaimed8/10

   Pass Monitor explicitly scans the dark web for credential leaks (breach detection), checks password health (weak/reused detection), and flags accounts missing 2FA, directly matching the story; this is documented as a core built-in feature rather than a third-party tool. Missing for 10: independent hands-on verification of Pass Monitor's accuracy/coverage and detail on exposed-credential alerting granularity beyond docs claims.

   • [claimed-docs] “Pass Monitor is a security feature in Proton Pass that scans the dark web for credential leaks, checks on the health of your passwords, and …”
   • [claimed-docs] “Pass Monitor is a security feature in Proton Pass that scans the dark web for credential leaks, checks on the health of your passwords, and …”
   • [claimed-docs] “Proton Sentinel uses AI and human analysis to make it much harder for an attacker to take over your account.”
   • [claimed-docs] “Proton Sentinel is an advanced account protection program that provides maximum security for those who need it. It mitigates security threat…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

Push

1. it adminPush-based sign-in includes phishing defenses — number matching, location context, and admin-enforced MFA policies

   weight 2 · round drawn
   1Password—none0/10

   The axis applies to this product kind (peer products hold positive or none verdicts on this story), so lack of evidence for an applicable capability is "none", never "na". (na/none harmonized at arena bring-up — see pipeline/scripts/na-harmonize.ts.)

   ⚑ flag

   Proton Pass—none0/10

   The axis applies to this product kind (peer products hold positive or none verdicts on this story), so lack of evidence for an applicable capability is "none", never "na". (na/none harmonized at arena bring-up — see pipeline/scripts/na-harmonize.ts.)

   ⚑ flag

Server

1. it adminSelf-host the sync server on my own infrastructure and keep every secret inside my perimeter

   weight 2 · round to 1Password
   1Password!disputedcontradicted4/10

   1Password markets a 'Connect Server' that can be deployed in a company's own infrastructure to access items via REST API (docs-4), which sounds like partial self-hosting, but this is only a caching/access layer in front of 1Password's cloud vaults, not a full self-hosted sync server. Community evidence directly contradicts the idea that secrets can stay entirely within an admin's perimeter: users note 1Password has 'no local vault storage' anymore and ask the vendor to 'continue support for local, non-cloud-based vault files' (comm-7, comm-8), confirming that the cloud remains the source of truth. Missing for 10: any documented on-prem deployment of the full sync/vault backend, migration guide for self-hosted secret storage, or evidence that Connect Server operates without 1Password's cloud.

   • [claimed-docs] “1Password Connect Servers allow you to securely access your 1Password items and vaults in your company's apps and cloud infrastructure using…”
   • [community] “Use a tiny portion of that to continue support for local, non-cloud-based vault files please.”
   • [community] “Except they have already started to diminish what used to make 1P great. We now get no native apps, no local vault storage, no upfront payme…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Proton Pass—none0/10

   The axis applies to this product kind (peer products hold positive or none verdicts on this story), so lack of evidence for an applicable capability is "none", never "na". (na/none harmonized at arena bring-up — see pipeline/scripts/na-harmonize.ts.)

   ⚑ flag

Source

1. security engineerThe client apps are open source, so the code handling my seeds can be inspected and community-reviewed

   weight 2 · round to Proton Pass
   1Password—none0/10

   No evidence in the pack indicates 1Password's client apps are open source or available for community code review; all citations describe closed commercial SDKs, CLI, Connect servers, and browser extension features without any open-source licensing or public repository claims for the core vault/client apps themselves. missing for 10: any statement of open-source licensing for 1Password clients, a public source repository for the desktop/mobile/browser apps, or third-party audit citing open code review.

   ⚑ flag

   Proton Pass~partialcommunity6/10

   Community evidence confirms Proton Pass clients are open source with a public GitHub repo (github.com/protonpass), directly supporting inspectability of the code handling secrets. However, other community comments show confusion/skepticism about finding or verifying this ('haven't been able to find the repository', 'it seems only the clients are open source'), and there's no first-party doc in the pack explicitly stating open-source status or citing security audits. Missing for 10: first-party documentation confirming open-source licensing/repo, evidence of independent security audits or community code review of the seed-handling logic, and clarity on scope (client-only vs. broader).

   • [community] “Please note that we do have encrypted notes... And it is open source: https://github.com/protonpass”
   • [community] “It seems only the clients are open source? https://github.com/orgs/protonpass/repositories”
   • [community] “Am I correct in believing that they haven't open-sourced Proton Pass yet?... Their official announcement post says it's now open source, how…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

Automation

1. ai-native userAn agent can fetch a current TOTP code programmatically — via CLI or API — to complete a 2FA login inside an automated workflow

   weight 2 · round drawn
   1Password~partialprobed4/10

   1Password docs confirm OTP storage/lookup in the app (docs-20, docs-24, docs-19) and a general-purpose CLI/SDK for programmatic item access (docs-1, docs-2, docs-26, probe-rt-3), which together imply an agent could retrieve a TOTP field via CLI, but no evidence explicitly documents a TOTP-specific command or API response format for pulling a live 2FA code in an automated workflow. missing for 10: explicit CLI/API documentation of TOTP field retrieval (e.g., a `--otp` flag or field type), and any example/community confirmation of an agent completing 2FA end-to-end.

   • [claimed-docs] “Learn how to use 1Password to store and quickly access your one-time passwords when you turn on two-step verification for a website.”
   • [claimed-docs] “Use 1Password on your Apple Watch to quickly look up information: credit card numbers and PINs, one-time passwords”
   • [claimed-docs] “Use 1Password on your Apple Watch to quickly look up information: credit card numbers and PINs, one-time passwords, bank account details, pa…”
   • [claimed-docs] “1Password CLI brings 1Password to your terminal. Learn how to install the CLI, then integrate it with your 1Password app and sign in with To…”
   • [claimed-docs] “op item list --vault Private”
   • [claimed-docs] “1Password SDKs allow you to build integrations that programmatically interact with 1Password using Go, JavaScript, or Python.”
   • [probe] “PROBE runtime (recorded 2026-09-15): the official op CLI is packaged in Homebrew as the 1password-cli cask ('Command-line interface for 1Pas…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Proton Pass~partialprobed4/10

   Proton Pass ships an official CLI documented for scripting/CI-CD use that can 'securely retrieve secrets and other items' (docs-1/14) and lists item types it can read (docs-15), but TOTP/2FA codes are not explicitly named among the retrievable item types, and no docs or community evidence confirm a CLI/API command that outputs a live TOTP code for use in an automated login flow. missing for 10: explicit CLI/API command or output field for TOTP codes, hands-on confirmation of an agent successfully pulling a 2FA code programmatically.

   • [claimed-docs] “enables you to securely retrieve secrets and other items across scripts, deployments, and continuous integration/ continuous delivery (CI/CD…”
   • [claimed-docs] “the CLI enables you to securely retrieve secrets and other items across scripts, deployments, and continuous integration/ continuous deliver…”
   • [claimed-docs] “View, create, update, and delete items including passwords, secure notes, credit cards, identities, WiFi entries, custom items, and stored S…”
   • [claimed-docs] “Proton Pass can securely generate TOTP codes for websites that you have saved login details for.”
   • [probe] “official CLI documented at https://proton.me/blog/proton-pass-cli”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

2. ai-native userExpose the vault through a local programmatic endpoint an agent can query for codes and secrets without screen-scraping the app

   weight 1 · round to 1Password
   1Password✓fullprobed8/10

   The 1Password CLI (`op`) and SDKs/Connect Server provide a local, scriptable, programmatic interface (not screen-scraping) that returns items, secrets, and OTP codes directly, and this is corroborated by real-world packaging (Homebrew cask) confirming it's a genuine local endpoint agents can shell out to. Missing for 10: no direct hands-on evidence of an AI agent actually querying the CLI/Connect Server for codes, and the newer MCP server explicitly withholds raw secrets from the agent, so full 'codes and secrets' access is only fully realized via CLI/SDK, not MCP.

   • [claimed-docs] “1Password CLI brings 1Password to your terminal. Learn how to install the CLI, then integrate it with your 1Password app and sign in with To…”
   • [claimed-docs] “op item list --vault Private”
   • [claimed-docs] “Use the 1Password Credential Broker to give CI/CD and other machine workflows short-lived access to secrets, without managing service accoun…”
   • [claimed-docs] “1Password Connect Servers allow you to securely access your 1Password items and vaults in your company's apps and cloud infrastructure using…”
   • [claimed-docs] “1Password SDKs allow you to build integrations that programmatically interact with 1Password using Go, JavaScript, or Python.”
   • [probe] “official CLI documented at https://www.1password.dev/cli/get-started”
   • [probe] “PROBE runtime (recorded 2026-09-15): the official op CLI is packaged in Homebrew as the 1password-cli cask ('Command-line interface for 1Pas…”
   • [probe] “PROBE runtime (recorded 2026-09-15): 1Password's public docs MCP server at https://www.1password.dev/mcp completed a FULL keyless initialize…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Proton Pass~partialprobed6/10

   Proton Pass ships an official CLI that allows secure programmatic retrieval of secrets, passwords, SSH keys, and other items across scripts and CI/CD pipelines, which functions as a local endpoint an agent could query instead of screen-scraping the app. However, the docs don't explicitly confirm TOTP/2FA code retrieval via the CLI (2FA generation is only described in the app itself), and there is no mention of an agent-specific or MCP-style interface, nor independent hands-on verification of CLI use by AI agents. Missing for 10: explicit CLI support for TOTP code retrieval, agent/MCP-oriented interface documentation, independent corroboration of CLI usage in agentic workflows.

   • [claimed-docs] “enables you to securely retrieve secrets and other items across scripts, deployments, and continuous integration/ continuous delivery (CI/CD…”
   • [claimed-docs] “the CLI enables you to securely retrieve secrets and other items across scripts, deployments, and continuous integration/ continuous deliver…”
   • [claimed-docs] “View, create, update, and delete items including passwords, secure notes, credit cards, identities, WiFi entries, custom items, and stored S…”
   • [claimed-docs] “Proton Pass can securely generate TOTP codes for websites that you have saved login details for.”
   • [probe] “official CLI documented at https://proton.me/blog/proton-pass-cli”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

Browser

1. everyday userA browser extension autofills my TOTP codes and passkeys during login instead of making me retype them

   weight 2 · round drawn
   1Password✓fullcommunity8/10

   Docs confirm browser extension autofills passkeys during sign-in and stores/retrieves one-time passwords (TOTP), covering both parts of the story, with community corroboration of browser extension quality and iframe-aware autofill behavior. Missing for 10: explicit first-party statement or hands-on demo showing TOTP codes specifically autofilled (rather than just 'stored/accessed') and independent confirmation of passkey autofill working reliably across sites.

   • [claimed-docs] “you can now create, manage, and sign in with passkeys on a growing number of websites and apps directly from the 1Password browser extension”
   • [claimed-docs] “You can use 1Password to save the passkeys you create for your accounts and sign in to websites with passkeys in your browser.”
   • [claimed-docs] “Learn how to use 1Password to store and quickly access your one-time passwords when you turn on two-step verification for a website.”
   • [claimed-docs] “1Password lets you easily sign in to sites, use suggested passwords, and find what you need – all without leaving your browser.”
   • [community] “1Password fills iframes based on their domain rather than the parents... In my opinion this is the right security model.”
   • [community] “Both the Fastmail and Privacy integrations have made 1Password a joy to use in the past few years. I've used premium BitWarden in the past, …”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Proton Pass✓fullcommunity8/10

   Docs confirm TOTP code generation for saved logins and passkey support, and community evidence from an actual user confirms the browser extension autofills TOTP/2FA smoothly ('Proton Pass is my default for all 2FA. I love the browser extension, so easy and sleek'). Passkey autofill is documented but not independently corroborated with hands-on testing. Missing for 10: independent hands-on confirmation of passkey autofill specifically, and more detail on passkey UX in the extension.

   • [claimed-docs] “Proton Pass can securely generate TOTP codes for websites that you have saved login details for.”
   • [claimed-docs] “Passkeys allow you to authenticate yourself for online accounts without using passwords or passphrases.”
   • [community] “I've been a Proton Unlimited subscriber... Proton Pass is my default for all 2FA. I love the browser extension, so easy and sleek.”
   • [community] “If you are paying for Pass Plus or Proton Unlimited then you have integrated 2FA/TOTP which Bitwarden also makes you pay for... And no deskt…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

Desktop

1. power userA first-class desktop app gives me codes and vault access on my computer, not just on mobile

   weight 2 · round to 1Password
   1Password~partialcommunity5/10

   Evidence confirms a desktop 1Password app exists (CLI integrates with 'the 1Password app' via Touch ID/Windows Hello, and community references to the Electron-based desktop client) and that vault/OTP data is stored centrally and accessible from apps generally, but no evidence pack item explicitly documents desktop-specific vault UI or OTP display screens, and community notes flag desktop app quality concerns (Electron complaints, no native app comments). missing for 10: dedicated desktop-app feature docs (OTP display, vault browsing UI on Mac/Windows/Linux), first-party screenshots or hands-on confirmation of parity with mobile, and resolution of the Electron/native-app criticism.

   • [claimed-docs] “1Password CLI brings 1Password to your terminal. Learn how to install the CLI, then integrate it with your 1Password app and sign in with To…”
   • [claimed-docs] “Learn how to use 1Password to store and quickly access your one-time passwords when you turn on two-step verification for a website.”
   • [community] “Except they have already started to diminish what used to make 1P great. We now get no native apps, no local vault storage, no upfront payme…”
   • [community] “It would be nice to say goodbye to Electron, though... (referring to 1Password's desktop app).”
   • [community] “Mandatory 'No Linux client' comment :| Does anyone have any insight if this is a pure business decision or there's something holding them ba…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Proton Pass!disputedcontradicted5/10

   Proton's own support docs describe a dedicated desktop app with offline vault access and TOTP code generation (docs-9, docs-16, docs-5), suggesting a first-class desktop experience. However, community hands-on reports explicitly state there was no desktop app for Proton Pass ('And no desktop app for proton pass, maybe some day though?' and 'Pity it's only available on iOS and Android as apps and as browser extensions elsewhere'), directly contradicting the vendor's desktop-app documentation. Missing for 10: independent corroboration that the desktop app actually exists and works as described, and resolution of the timeline discrepancy between docs and community reports.

   • [claimed-docs] “You don’t need to do anything to access Proton Pass offline. Everything in your vaults is accessible whether you’re connected to the interne…”
   • [claimed-docs] “Vaults can be used to organize items — in the example above, we have a vault for personal items and one for work items.”
   • [claimed-docs] “Proton Pass can securely generate TOTP codes for websites that you have saved login details for.”
   • [community] “If you are paying for Pass Plus or Proton Unlimited then you have integrated 2FA/TOTP which Bitwarden also makes you pay for... And no deskt…”
   • [community] “Pity it's only available on iOS and Android as apps and as browser extensions elsewhere. I would've been interested to check out a desktop p…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

Watch

1. everyday userRead my codes from my smartwatch without pulling out my phone

   weight 1 · round to 1Password
   1Password✓fullclaimed8/10

   1Password explicitly documents Apple Watch support for quickly looking up saved information including one-time passwords, letting users read codes without pulling out their phone. This directly matches the story, though evidence is limited to Apple Watch (no mention of other smartwatch platforms like Wear OS) and lacks independent hands-on corroboration. Missing for 10: evidence of Android/Wear OS smartwatch support, independent user reviews confirming the watch OTP experience.

   • [claimed-docs] “Use 1Password on your Apple Watch to quickly look up information: credit card numbers and PINs, one-time passwords, bank account details, pa…”
   • [claimed-docs] “Use 1Password on your Apple Watch to quickly look up information: credit card numbers and PINs, one-time passwords”
   • [claimed-docs] “Learn how to use 1Password to store and quickly access your one-time passwords when you turn on two-step verification for a website.”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Proton Pass—none0/10

   No evidence of a smartwatch app, watch companion, or complication for viewing TOTP codes; evidence only covers mobile, browser extension, and CLI surfaces, with community notes even lamenting lack of a desktop app. Missing for 10: any smartwatch app/companion, watch complication, or documentation of viewing codes without the phone.

   • [claimed-docs] “Proton Pass can securely generate TOTP codes for websites that you have saved login details for.”
   • [community] “Pity it's only available on iOS and Android as apps and as browser extensions elsewhere. I would've been interested to check out a desktop p…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

Backup

1. security engineerBackups are end-to-end encrypted with a key the vendor never holds, and the encryption design is documented

   weight 3 · round to Proton Pass
   1Password—none0/10

   The evidence pack contains no documentation of 1Password's end-to-end encryption architecture, Secret Key design, or zero-knowledge claims for vaults/backups — it only covers CLI/SDK/Connect/SSH tooling and unrelated community commentary on UX and pricing. Without any citation describing the encryption design or vendor-key-never-held guarantee, this axis is unevidenced.

   ⚑ flag

   Proton Pass~partialclaimed5/10

   Proton Pass documents that all vault data is end-to-end encrypted (docs-10) and offers a PGP-encrypted export option that could serve as a backup (docs-11), implying the vendor cannot read backed-up data. However, there is no dedicated 'backup' feature documentation (only export/import), and no detailed cryptographic architecture whitepaper or independent audit is cited to substantiate the zero-knowledge key design in depth. missing for 10: dedicated backup-feature docs, detailed encryption architecture/whitepaper, independent security audit confirming vendor never holds keys

   • [claimed-docs] “Unlike other password managers, Proton Pass uses end-to-end encryption on every field you fill for the items you create (usernames, website …”
   • [claimed-docs] “You have three options for export: 1. A ZIP file containing a PGP-encrypted JSON file 2. An unencrypted ZIP file 3. A CSV file”
   • [claimed-docs] “Vaults can be used to organize items — in the example above, we have a vault for personal items and one for work items.”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

Multi device

1. everyday userMy tokens are available on my phone, tablet, and computer at the same time, kept in sync automatically

   weight 2 · round to 1Password
   1Password✓fullcommunity6/10

   Docs show 1Password stores and retrieves one-time-passwords (tokens) across the browser, Apple Watch, and other apps (docs-20, docs-19/24, docs-21), implying that the same vault (and thus tokens) is accessible from phone, tablet, and desktop, and a community comment confirms 'desktop and mobile work great' (comm-9), suggesting real-world cross-device consistency. However none of the evidence explicitly describes the automatic sync mechanism or confirms real-time consistency across all three device types simultaneously. Missing for 10: explicit documentation of the cloud-sync architecture ensuring instant multi-device consistency, and independent testing/benchmarks of sync latency or conflict handling.

   • [claimed-docs] “Learn how to use 1Password to store and quickly access your one-time passwords when you turn on two-step verification for a website.”
   • [claimed-docs] “Use 1Password on your Apple Watch to quickly look up information: credit card numbers and PINs, one-time passwords, bank account details, pa…”
   • [claimed-docs] “Use 1Password on your Apple Watch to quickly look up information: credit card numbers and PINs, one-time passwords”
   • [claimed-docs] “1Password lets you easily sign in to sites, use suggested passwords, and find what you need – all without leaving your browser.”
   • [community] “I've used 1password for years and so far haven't had any problem, all apps (desktop and mobile) work great, but I don't understand why they …”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Proton Pass~partialcommunity5/10

   Docs confirm cross-platform clients (mobile apps, browser extensions, and a desktop app referenced in the desktop-app guide) and offline access that presumably reconciles when back online, implying cloud sync of vault items including TOTP tokens. However, no first-party documentation explicitly describes the sync mechanism or guarantees real-time multi-device consistency, and community comments note a historical lack of a desktop app and inconsistent browser-extension availability (e.g., Firefox ESR incompatibility), suggesting platform coverage has been uneven over time. Missing for 10: explicit sync/consistency documentation, independent verification that sync is truly automatic and near-instant across phone/tablet/computer.

   • [claimed-docs] “You don’t need to do anything to access Proton Pass offline. Everything in your vaults is accessible whether you’re connected to the interne…”
   • [claimed-docs] “Proton Pass can securely generate TOTP codes for websites that you have saved login details for.”
   • [community] “If you are paying for Pass Plus or Proton Unlimited then you have integrated 2FA/TOTP which Bitwarden also makes you pay for... And no deskt…”
   • [community] “Pity it's only available on iOS and Android as apps and as browser extensions elsewhere. I would've been interested to check out a desktop p…”
   • [community] “Can't use the Firefox extension, FF 102 ESR is apparently too old”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

Recovery

1. everyday userLosing my phone doesn't lose my accounts — a documented recovery path restores my tokens on a new device

   weight 3 · round to Proton Pass
   1Password—none0/10

   The evidence pack covers 1Password's password/OTP storage, sync, import/export between apps, SSH/passkey features, and developer tooling, but contains no documentation of a lost-device recovery path (e.g., Emergency Kit, Secret Key re-enrollment, account recovery flow) that would restore an everyday user's tokens on a new device after losing their phone. Missing for 10: documented device-loss/account-recovery procedure, evidence of Secret Key or Emergency Kit restoration flow, any confirmation that OTPs specifically survive a lost-device scenario.

   ⚑ flag

   Proton Pass~partialclaimed4/10

   Proton Pass stores TOTP codes and other secrets inside end-to-end encrypted vaults that live on Proton's servers (docs-5, docs-10), and offers export (docs-4/11) and Emergency Access (docs-20) features that could serve as backup/recovery mechanisms, implying data isn't lost with a device. However, there is no explicit documentation in the pack describing a dedicated 'lost phone / new device' recovery flow, account recovery phrase, or step-by-step restoration of 2FA tokens after device loss. Missing for 10: explicit account-recovery/recovery-phrase documentation, explicit cross-device sync confirmation, and a stated process for restoring TOTP secrets specifically after losing a device.

   • [claimed-docs] “Proton Pass can securely generate TOTP codes for websites that you have saved login details for.”
   • [claimed-docs] “Unlike other password managers, Proton Pass uses end-to-end encryption on every field you fill for the items you create (usernames, website …”
   • [claimed-docs] “If you want to use your passwords elsewhere or create a separate hardcopy, you can easily export your data from Proton Pass.”
   • [claimed-docs] “You have three options for export: 1. A ZIP file containing a PGP-encrypted JSON file 2. An unencrypted ZIP file 3. A CSV file”
   • [claimed-docs] “Emergency Access”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

Automation

1. ai-native userAn agent can create and update vault entries — seeding new TOTP secrets, storing credentials — through documented programmatic surfaces

   weight 2 · round to 1Password
   1Password✓fullprobed7/10

   1Password documents multiple programmatic surfaces (CLI, SDKs in Go/JS/Python, Connect Servers REST API, Service Accounts) explicitly for 'Automate item management: Programmatically manage items in your 1Password account,' which covers creating and updating vault entries including credentials. These are official, well-documented interfaces suitable for agent-driven automation. Missing for 10: an explicit documented example/field reference for seeding TOTP secrets via these APIs, and independent/hands-on verification that write operations (create/update, not just read) work reliably in practice.

   • [claimed-docs] “Automate item management: Programmatically manage items in your 1Password account.”
   • [claimed-docs] “1Password SDKs allow you to build integrations that programmatically interact with 1Password using Go, JavaScript, or Python.”
   • [claimed-docs] “1Password Connect Servers allow you to securely access your 1Password items and vaults in your company's apps and cloud infrastructure using…”
   • [claimed-docs] “1Password Service Accounts help automate secrets management in your applications and infrastructure without the need to deploy additional se…”
   • [claimed-docs] “1Password CLI brings 1Password to your terminal. Learn how to install the CLI, then integrate it with your 1Password app and sign in with To…”
   • [probe] “PROBE runtime (recorded 2026-09-15): the official op CLI is packaged in Homebrew as the 1password-cli cask ('Command-line interface for 1Pas…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Proton Pass~partialprobed6/10

   Proton Pass CLI documentation shows programmatic create/read/update/delete of items (including passwords, secure notes, SSH keys) and vaults, which an agent could invoke via scripts. However, there's no explicit mention of TOTP secret seeding via the CLI, and no dedicated agent/AI integration or API/SDK beyond the CLI is documented, and no independent confirmation of these CLI capabilities working reliably. Missing for 10: explicit TOTP-seeding support via CLI, broader API/SDK for agents, and independent hands-on verification of programmatic write operations.

   • [claimed-docs] “Create, read, update, and delete vaults”
   • [claimed-docs] “View, create, update, and delete items including passwords, secure notes, credit cards, identities, WiFi entries, custom items, and stored S…”
   • [claimed-docs] “the CLI enables you to securely retrieve secrets and other items across scripts, deployments, and continuous integration/ continuous deliver…”
   • [probe] “official CLI documented at https://proton.me/blog/proton-pass-cli”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

Policy

1. it adminEnforce org-wide policies — require app lock, restrict export, mandate strong master credentials — across every member's app

   weight 1 · round drawn
   1Password—none0/10

   The evidence pack covers CLI/SDK developer tooling, personal password features, import/export, and community sentiment, but contains no documentation of admin console policies for enforcing app lock, restricting export, or mandating master password strength across an organization. This axis clearly applies to a business password manager, but no supporting evidence is present.

   ⚑ flag

   Proton Pass—none0/10

   No evidence of org-wide admin policy controls (enforced app lock, export restrictions, mandated master password strength) for organization members; docs cover vaults, CLI, export, 2FA, sharing but nothing about admin-enforced policies across a team.

   ⚑ flag

Sharing

1. it adminMy team can share TOTP-protected logins through shared vaults or collections with per-member access control

   weight 2 · round to Proton Pass
   1Password—none0/10

   The evidence pack covers 1Password's developer tooling (CLI, SDKs, Connect, SSH agent) and personal features (Watchtower, OTP storage, passkeys) but contains no mention of shared vaults, collections, group/per-member permissions, or admin controls for team sharing of TOTP items. Missing for 10: documentation of shared vaults/collections, per-member access control settings, or admin console screenshots showing granular sharing permissions for TOTP logins.

   • [claimed-docs] “Learn how to use 1Password to store and quickly access your one-time passwords when you turn on two-step verification for a website.”
   • [claimed-docs] “Watchtower tells you about breaches, weak passwords, duplicate items, and other security problems with the items you have saved in 1Password…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Proton Pass~partialclaimed5/10

   Evidence confirms Proton Pass supports TOTP/2FA generation for saved logins (docs-5) and secure vault sharing plus vault-based organization of items (docs-16, docs-17), which together imply TOTP items can be shared via vaults. However, there is no documentation of granular per-member access control (roles/permissions) or 'collections' as a distinct sharing unit, and no team-admin console evidence for managing member access levels within shared vaults. Missing for 10: explicit permission-level (viewer/editor/admin) documentation for shared vaults, evidence of 'collections' as an admin feature, and any IT-admin console showing per-member access management.

   • [claimed-docs] “Proton Pass can securely generate TOTP codes for websites that you have saved login details for.”
   • [claimed-docs] “Vaults can be used to organize items — in the example above, we have a vault for personal items and one for work items.”
   • [claimed-docs] “Secure vault sharing”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

Enrollment

1. everyday userScan a QR code and immediately start generating TOTP codes for a new account

   weight 3 · round to Proton Pass
   1Password~partialclaimed4/10

   Docs confirm 1Password stores and generates one-time passwords for two-step verification (docs-20, docs-19/24), which implies TOTP support, but no evidence explicitly describes the QR-code scanning flow for adding a new TOTP account. Missing for 10: explicit documentation or screenshots of QR code scanning to add a new TOTP entry, and independent/hands-on confirmation of the immediate code-generation experience.

   • [claimed-docs] “Learn how to use 1Password to store and quickly access your one-time passwords when you turn on two-step verification for a website.”
   • [claimed-docs] “Use 1Password on your Apple Watch to quickly look up information: credit card numbers and PINs, one-time passwords, bank account details, pa…”
   • [claimed-docs] “Use 1Password on your Apple Watch to quickly look up information: credit card numbers and PINs, one-time passwords”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Proton Pass~partialcommunity5/10

   Docs confirm Proton Pass generates TOTP codes for saved logins (proton-pass-docs-5) and community reports use it as their default 2FA tool (proton-pass-comm-12), but no evidence explicitly describes scanning a QR code to add a new TOTP secret and instantly getting codes. Missing for 10: explicit QR-code scanning workflow documentation, mobile camera scan support evidence, and independent hands-on confirmation of the scan-to-code flow.

   • [claimed-docs] “Proton Pass can securely generate TOTP codes for websites that you have saved login details for.”
   • [community] “I've been a Proton Unlimited subscriber... Proton Pass is my default for all 2FA. I love the browser extension, so easy and sleek.”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

Offline

1. power userCodes generate fully offline — no network, no vendor account required just to see my TOTP codes

   weight 2 · round to 1Password
   1Password!disputedcontradicted3/10

   1Password does store and display OTP codes (docs-20, docs-24), but the product fundamentally requires a 1Password account/subscription and cloud-synced vault to unlock and view items — community evidence explicitly states 1Password has moved away from local, non-cloud vault storage ('no native apps, no local vault storage... The VC rot has already set in'), directly contradicting the 'no vendor account required' claim. Missing for 10: any first-party or independent confirmation of a fully offline mode with no account signup/sync dependency, and no evidence disputes this gap.

   • [claimed-docs] “Learn how to use 1Password to store and quickly access your one-time passwords when you turn on two-step verification for a website.”
   • [claimed-docs] “Use 1Password on your Apple Watch to quickly look up information: credit card numbers and PINs, one-time passwords”
   • [community] “My 1Password installation is grandfathered from a time when it was just a standalone app, without subscription. Will it just stop working on…”
   • [community] “Use a tiny portion of that to continue support for local, non-cloud-based vault files please.”
   • [community] “Except they have already started to diminish what used to make 1P great. We now get no native apps, no local vault storage, no upfront payme…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Proton Pass—none0/10

   Proton Pass is fundamentally an account-based, encrypted-vault service — using it at all requires creating and logging into a Proton account, and TOTP codes are stored as fields within account-synced vaults. Evidence only shows that once logged in, offline access to already-synced vaults works (proton-pass-docs-9), but nothing supports generating/viewing TOTP codes without ever creating or authenticating a vendor account, which the story explicitly requires.

   • [claimed-docs] “You don’t need to do anything to access Proton Pass offline. Everything in your vaults is accessible whether you’re connected to the interne…”
   • [claimed-docs] “Proton Pass can securely generate TOTP codes for websites that you have saved login details for.”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

Organization

1. power userKeep dozens of tokens organized — search, folders or groups, and service icons — so the right code is always two taps away

   weight 2 · round to Proton Pass
   1Password~partialclaimed3/10

   Docs confirm 1Password stores and quickly surfaces one-time passwords (including via Apple Watch) and flags login issues via Watchtower, but the pack provides no evidence of folder/tag/group organization, dedicated search, or service icons for TOTP entries specifically. missing for 10: explicit search functionality, folder/tag/group organization for TOTP items, service icon display for OTP entries, independent hands-on validation of organizing many tokens.

   • [claimed-docs] “Learn how to use 1Password to store and quickly access your one-time passwords when you turn on two-step verification for a website.”
   • [claimed-docs] “Use 1Password on your Apple Watch to quickly look up information: credit card numbers and PINs, one-time passwords, bank account details, pa…”
   • [claimed-docs] “Use 1Password on your Apple Watch to quickly look up information: credit card numbers and PINs, one-time passwords”
   • [claimed-docs] “Watchtower tells you about breaches, weak passwords, duplicate items, and other security problems with the items you have saved in 1Password…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Proton Pass~partialcommunity4/10

   Proton Pass supports TOTP generation tied to saved logins and vaults for organizing items into groups (e.g., personal vs. work), but there is no evidence of search functionality or service icons, and a community report explicitly notes the browser popup overlay was inadequate for managing hundreds of logins, suggesting scaling friction for power users. Missing for 10: dedicated TOTP search/filter feature, service icon display, and evidence of smooth navigation across dozens of tokens.

   • [claimed-docs] “Proton Pass can securely generate TOTP codes for websites that you have saved login details for.”
   • [claimed-docs] “Vaults can be used to organize items — in the example above, we have a vault for personal items and one for work items.”
   • [community] “Would like to see web/desktop clients for this. When I used it recently I found the unexpandable pop-up overlay in the browser to not be ade…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

Variants

1. power userNon-standard tokens work too — Steam Guard, HOTP counters, custom periods and digit lengths

   weight 2 · round drawn
   1Password—none0/10

   The evidence only confirms basic one-time password storage (docs-20, docs-19) but contains no mention of Steam Guard tokens, HOTP counter-based codes, or custom period/digit-length TOTP support. Missing for 10: any documentation of Steam Guard support, HOTP counter handling, or custom period/digit configuration.

   ⚑ flag

   Proton Pass—none0/10

   Evidence only confirms basic TOTP code generation for saved logins; no mention of Steam Guard tokens, HOTP counters, or custom period/digit length support anywhere in the docs or community discussion. Missing for 10: any documentation of Steam Guard support, HOTP counter-based tokens, or custom TOTP period/digit configuration.

   • [claimed-docs] “Proton Pass can securely generate TOTP codes for websites that you have saved login details for.”

   proof ↗⚑ flag