Authy vs 1Password

Agent access

1. ai-native userPoint an agent at llms.txt or agent-oriented docs

   weight 2 · round to 1Password
   Authy—none0/10

   The axis applies to this product kind (peer products hold positive or none verdicts on this story), so lack of evidence for an applicable capability is "none", never "na". (na/none harmonized at arena bring-up — see pipeline/scripts/na-harmonize.ts.)

   ⚑ flag

   1Password✓fullprobed9/10

   1Password.dev and support.1password.com both serve confirmed llms.txt/llms-full.txt files plus markdown mirrors of every docs page, and this is directly verified via live probes, not just claims. missing for 10: independent third-party (non-vendor) confirmation that agents actually consume these files successfully in practice.

   • [probe] “PROBE llms.txt: HTTP 200 at https://support.1password.com/llms.txt # 1Password Support > LLM-friendly exports of English public support gui…”
   • [probe] “PROBE runtime (recorded 2026-09-15): 1password.dev serves llms.txt ('# 1Password Developer Documentation') plus llms-full.txt, and every doc…”
   • [claimed-docs] “The 1Password Environments MCP Server lets MCP clients such as Claude Code, Codex, Cursor, and Kiro securely manage your 1Password Environme…”
   • [probe] “PROBE runtime (recorded 2026-09-15): 1Password's public docs MCP server at https://www.1password.dev/mcp completed a FULL keyless initialize…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

2. ai-native userRun the product headlessly / in CI for automation

   weight 2 · round to 1Password
   Authy—none0/10

   The axis applies to this product kind (peer products hold positive or none verdicts on this story), so lack of evidence for an applicable capability is "none", never "na". (na/none harmonized at arena bring-up — see pipeline/scripts/na-harmonize.ts.)

   ⚑ flag

   1Password✓fullprobed8/10

   1Password ships a dedicated CLI (confirmed packaged via Homebrew cask), Service Accounts explicitly for automating secrets in CI/infrastructure without extra services, Connect Servers exposing a REST API for machine workflows, and a Credential Broker for CI/CD short-lived access — all first-party documented and headless by design. Missing for 10: independent hands-on case studies/community reports specifically validating CI pipeline usage rather than just vendor docs.

   • [claimed-docs] “1Password CLI brings 1Password to your terminal. Learn how to install the CLI, then integrate it with your 1Password app and sign in with To…”
   • [claimed-docs] “Use the 1Password Credential Broker to give CI/CD and other machine workflows short-lived access to secrets, without managing service accoun…”
   • [claimed-docs] “1Password Connect Servers allow you to securely access your 1Password items and vaults in your company's apps and cloud infrastructure using…”
   • [claimed-docs] “1Password Service Accounts help automate secrets management in your applications and infrastructure without the need to deploy additional se…”
   • [probe] “PROBE runtime (recorded 2026-09-15): the official op CLI is packaged in Homebrew as the 1password-cli cask ('Command-line interface for 1Pas…”
   • [probe] “official CLI documented at https://www.1password.dev/cli/get-started”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

3. ai-native userConnect an agent via an official MCP server

   weight 3 · round to 1Password
   Authy—none0/10

   The axis applies to this product kind (peer products hold positive or none verdicts on this story), so lack of evidence for an applicable capability is "none", never "na". (na/none harmonized at arena bring-up — see pipeline/scripts/na-harmonize.ts.)

   ⚑ flag

   1Password✓fullprobed8/10

   1Password ships an official Environments MCP Server that lets MCP clients (Claude Code, Codex, Cursor, Kiro) securely manage 1Password Environments without exposing secrets to the agent, and a runtime probe confirms a live keyless MCP initialize handshake against 1Password's own MCP endpoint. This is first-party documentation plus real runtime corroboration of the server actually working. Missing for 10: broader independent/community hands-on reports beyond the vendor probe, and clarity since the Environments MCP server is explicitly marked Beta.

   • [claimed-docs] “The 1Password Environments MCP Server lets MCP clients such as Claude Code, Codex, Cursor, and Kiro securely manage your 1Password Environme…”
   • [probe] “official MCP server documented at https://www.1password.dev/environments/mcp-server”
   • [probe] “PROBE runtime (recorded 2026-09-15): 1Password's public docs MCP server at https://www.1password.dev/mcp completed a FULL keyless initialize…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

4. ai-native userUse an official CLI

   weight 2 · round to 1Password
   Authy—none0/10

   The axis applies to this product kind (peer products hold positive or none verdicts on this story), so lack of evidence for an applicable capability is "none", never "na". (na/none harmonized at arena bring-up — see pipeline/scripts/na-harmonize.ts.)

   ⚑ flag

   1Password✓fullprobed9/10

   1Password ships an official `op` CLI with detailed docs, reference commands, Homebrew packaging, and integration with secrets automation, service accounts, and SSH/Git workflows, making it well-suited to AI-native/agentic scripting. missing for 10: independent hands-on review or benchmark of the CLI's use in agentic workflows beyond vendor docs and packaging.

   • [claimed-docs] “1Password CLI brings 1Password to your terminal. Learn how to install the CLI, then integrate it with your 1Password app and sign in with To…”
   • [claimed-docs] “op item list --vault Private”
   • [probe] “official CLI documented at https://www.1password.dev/cli/get-started”
   • [probe] “PROBE runtime (recorded 2026-09-15): the official op CLI is packaged in Homebrew as the 1password-cli cask ('Command-line interface for 1Pas…”
   • [claimed-docs] “Use the 1Password SSH Agent to authenticate all your Git and SSH workflows.”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

5. ai-native userDrive the product through a documented public API

   weight 3 · round to 1Password
   Authy!disputedcontradicted2/10

   Twilio's own docs describe an SDK/API for integrating Authy (authy-docs-1, authy-docs-13), but a direct probe of the same page shows the Authy API is deprecated and 'closed to new customers' with 'no programmatic surface remains open to new integrations' (authy-probe-rt-1), meaning an AI-native user cannot actually drive Authy via a documented public API today. Missing for 10: an open, actively maintained public API for new integrations, migration path documentation usable by AI agents, and independent confirmation of working programmatic access.

   • [claimed-docs] “we provide an SDK for common web languages. If your language is supported, it's the fastest way to get started.”
   • [claimed-docs] “So you don't have to use the Authy API directly to integrate two-factor authentication into your app, we provide an SDK for common web langu…”
   • [probe] “PROBE runtime (recorded 2026-09-15): Twilio's own docs page carries the deprecation notice verbatim — 'The Authy API is now closed to new cu…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   1Password✓fullprobed9/10

   1Password exposes a well-documented public API surface for programmatic control: a scriptable CLI (op), official SDKs in Go/JS/Python, a Connect Server REST API, Service Accounts, Events API, and even a public MCP server for AI agents — all backed by first-party docs and confirmed via runtime probes (CLI packaged in Homebrew, MCP handshake succeeding, llms.txt/markdown mirrors of docs). This directly satisfies an AI-native user's need to drive the product via documented APIs rather than only a GUI. Missing for 10: independent third-party developer testimonials/case studies of building against these APIs beyond vendor docs and probes.

   • [claimed-docs] “1Password CLI brings 1Password to your terminal. Learn how to install the CLI, then integrate it with your 1Password app and sign in with To…”
   • [claimed-docs] “op item list --vault Private”
   • [claimed-docs] “1Password Connect Servers allow you to securely access your 1Password items and vaults in your company's apps and cloud infrastructure using…”
   • [claimed-docs] “1Password Service Accounts help automate secrets management in your applications and infrastructure without the need to deploy additional se…”
   • [claimed-docs] “1Password SDKs allow you to build integrations that programmatically interact with 1Password using Go, JavaScript, or Python.”
   • [github] “Build integrations that programmatically interact with 1Password.”
   • [claimed-docs] “The 1Password Environments MCP Server lets MCP clients such as Claude Code, Codex, Cursor, and Kiro securely manage your 1Password Environme…”
   • [probe] “official MCP server documented at https://www.1password.dev/environments/mcp-server”
   • [probe] “official CLI documented at https://www.1password.dev/cli/get-started”
   • [probe] “PROBE runtime (recorded 2026-09-15): 1Password's public docs MCP server at https://www.1password.dev/mcp completed a FULL keyless initialize…”
   • [probe] “PROBE runtime (recorded 2026-09-15): 1password.dev serves llms.txt ('# 1Password Developer Documentation') plus llms-full.txt, and every doc…”
   • [probe] “PROBE runtime (recorded 2026-09-15): the official op CLI is packaged in Homebrew as the 1password-cli cask ('Command-line interface for 1Pas…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

6. ai-native userIssue scoped/least-privilege API credentials for an agent

   weight 2 · round to 1Password
   Authy—none0/10

   The axis applies to this product kind (peer products hold positive or none verdicts on this story), so lack of evidence for an applicable capability is "none", never "na". (na/none harmonized at arena bring-up — see pipeline/scripts/na-harmonize.ts.)

   ⚑ flag

   1Password~partialprobed6/10

   1Password Service Accounts and Connect Servers support scoped, vault-limited, short-lived credentials for machine/agent workflows, and the Environments MCP Server explicitly avoids returning secrets to the agent, which aligns with least-privilege agent access. However, evidence doesn't show fine-grained per-agent scoping controls, credential rotation/expiry specifics, or audit tooling tailored to AI agents specifically (vs generic machine/service workflows). missing for 10: documentation of granular per-agent permission scoping, credential lifecycle/expiry controls for agents, and independent/hands-on verification of least-privilege enforcement in agent contexts.

   • [claimed-docs] “Use the 1Password Credential Broker to give CI/CD and other machine workflows short-lived access to secrets, without managing service accoun…”
   • [claimed-docs] “1Password Connect Servers allow you to securely access your 1Password items and vaults in your company's apps and cloud infrastructure using…”
   • [claimed-docs] “1Password Service Accounts help automate secrets management in your applications and infrastructure without the need to deploy additional se…”
   • [claimed-docs] “The 1Password Environments MCP Server lets MCP clients such as Claude Code, Codex, Cursor, and Kiro securely manage your 1Password Environme…”
   • [probe] “PROBE runtime (recorded 2026-09-15): 1Password's public docs MCP server at https://www.1password.dev/mcp completed a FULL keyless initialize…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

7. ai-native userBuild against official SDKs

   weight 2 · round to 1Password
   Authy!disputedcontradicted3/10

   Twilio's docs claim official SDKs for common web languages to integrate Authy 2FA (authy-docs-1, authy-docs-13), but the same docs page also states the Authy API is closed to new customers and being deprecated in favor of Verify v2, meaning no new AI-native integration can actually be built against it. Missing for 10: evidence of an actively maintained, open-to-new-customers SDK, and any agentic/AI-specific tooling or examples.

   • [claimed-docs] “we provide an SDK for common web languages. If your language is supported, it's the fastest way to get started.”
   • [claimed-docs] “So you don't have to use the Authy API directly to integrate two-factor authentication into your app, we provide an SDK for common web langu…”
   • [probe] “PROBE runtime (recorded 2026-09-15): Twilio's own docs page carries the deprecation notice verbatim — 'The Authy API is now closed to new cu…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   1Password✓fullprobed8/10

   1Password ships official SDKs for Go, JavaScript, and Python for programmatically interacting with vaults, secrets, and items, backed by GitHub repos, docs, and complementary CLI/Connect/Service Accounts tooling for automation workflows. missing for 10: independent third-party developer testimonials/case studies validating real-world SDK usage beyond vendor docs and GitHub repo descriptions.

   • [claimed-docs] “Secure your applications: Load secrets into your code with secret references or read environment variables from 1Password Environments.”
   • [claimed-docs] “Automate item management: Programmatically manage items in your 1Password account.”
   • [claimed-docs] “1Password SDKs allow you to build integrations that programmatically interact with 1Password using Go, JavaScript, or Python.”
   • [github] “Build integrations that programmatically interact with 1Password.”
   • [claimed-docs] “1Password Service Accounts help automate secrets management in your applications and infrastructure without the need to deploy additional se…”
   • [claimed-docs] “1Password Connect Servers allow you to securely access your 1Password items and vaults in your company's apps and cloud infrastructure using…”
   • [probe] “PROBE runtime (recorded 2026-09-15): the official op CLI is packaged in Homebrew as the 1password-cli cask ('Command-line interface for 1Pas…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

8. ai-native userSubscribe to events via webhooks

   weight 2 · round drawn
   Authy—none0/10

   No evidence of any webhook subscription capability in Authy's docs or community reports; the product's API is deprecated with no new programmatic integrations mentioned. This is a fair axis for an authentication/API platform, but no support is documented.

   • [claimed-docs] “we provide an SDK for common web languages. If your language is supported, it's the fastest way to get started.”
   • [probe] “PROBE runtime (recorded 2026-09-15): Twilio's own docs page carries the deprecation notice verbatim — 'The Authy API is now closed to new cu…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   1Password—none0/10

   1Password documents an Events API for retrieving account activity and forwarding it to a SIEM system, but this is a pull-based polling API, not a webhook subscription mechanism. No evidence anywhere in the pack shows a webhook registration/callback capability for AI-native or any consumers.

   • [claimed-docs] “The 1Password Events API allows you to retrieve information about activity in your 1Password Business account and send it to your security i…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

Agentic features

1. ai-native userSet up automations that run autonomously in the background

   weight 2 · round to 1Password
   Authy—none0/10

   The axis applies to this product kind (peer products hold positive or none verdicts on this story), so lack of evidence for an applicable capability is "none", never "na". (na/none harmonized at arena bring-up — see pipeline/scripts/na-harmonize.ts.)

   ⚑ flag

   1Password~partialprobed5/10

   1Password provides machine-facing automation building blocks — Service Accounts, Connect Servers, Credential Broker, CLI, and SDKs — that let CI/CD pipelines and other unattended workflows fetch secrets autonomously in the background, and the Environments MCP Server lets AI agents manage secrets without human intervention. However, there's no evidence of a general-purpose scheduler, trigger system, or orchestration layer for building broader 'automations' beyond secrets retrieval/injection. Missing for 10: native scheduling/triggers, workflow orchestration UI, and evidence of autonomous multi-step automations beyond secret access.

   • [claimed-docs] “Use the 1Password Credential Broker to give CI/CD and other machine workflows short-lived access to secrets, without managing service accoun…”
   • [claimed-docs] “1Password Connect Servers allow you to securely access your 1Password items and vaults in your company's apps and cloud infrastructure using…”
   • [claimed-docs] “1Password Service Accounts help automate secrets management in your applications and infrastructure without the need to deploy additional se…”
   • [claimed-docs] “Secure your applications: Load secrets into your code with secret references or read environment variables from 1Password Environments.”
   • [claimed-docs] “1Password SDKs allow you to build integrations that programmatically interact with 1Password using Go, JavaScript, or Python.”
   • [probe] “PROBE runtime (recorded 2026-09-15): 1Password's public docs MCP server at https://www.1password.dev/mcp completed a FULL keyless initialize…”
   • [claimed-docs] “The 1Password Environments MCP Server lets MCP clients such as Claude Code, Codex, Cursor, and Kiro securely manage your 1Password Environme…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

2. ai-native userOperate the product with natural-language commands

   weight 2 · round to 1Password
   Authy—none0/10

   The axis applies to this product kind (peer products hold positive or none verdicts on this story), so lack of evidence for an applicable capability is "none", never "na". (na/none harmonized at arena bring-up — see pipeline/scripts/na-harmonize.ts.)

   ⚑ flag

   1Password~partialprobed6/10

   1Password ships an official Environments MCP Server that lets AI agents (Claude Code, Codex, Cursor, Kiro) manage 1Password Environments via natural-language prompts through MCP clients, and a public docs MCP server for AI-readable documentation — genuine natural-language operability. However this is explicitly Beta and scoped only to Environments/secrets management, not the broader vault/login/passkey functionality that makes up most of 1Password's product surface, and the primary automation surface (CLI, SDKs) is structured commands, not natural language. Missing for 10: NL control over core password/vault/item management, general-availability status of the MCP server, independent hands-on verification of the NL workflow.

   • [claimed-docs] “The 1Password Environments MCP Server lets MCP clients such as Claude Code, Codex, Cursor, and Kiro securely manage your 1Password Environme…”
   • [probe] “PROBE runtime (recorded 2026-09-15): 1Password's public docs MCP server at https://www.1password.dev/mcp completed a FULL keyless initialize…”
   • [probe] “official MCP server documented at https://www.1password.dev/environments/mcp-server”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

Api quality

1. ai-native userExplore an interactive API reference with runnable examples

   weight 2 · round drawn
   Authy—none0/10

   No evidence of an interactive API reference with runnable examples for Authy; docs pack only describes SDKs and app features, and the Authy API itself is now closed/deprecated in favor of Verify, with no mention of interactive docs or runnable code samples.

   • [claimed-docs] “we provide an SDK for common web languages. If your language is supported, it's the fastest way to get started.”
   • [claimed-docs] “So you don't have to use the Authy API directly to integrate two-factor authentication into your app, we provide an SDK for common web langu…”
   • [probe] “PROBE runtime (recorded 2026-09-15): Twilio's own docs page carries the deprecation notice verbatim — 'The Authy API is now closed to new cu…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   1Password—none0/10

   1Password ships CLI/SDK/API docs, llms.txt exports, and an MCP server, but nothing in the evidence describes an interactive API reference with runnable/try-it examples (e.g., an API console or embedded sandbox); the CLI reference is static text, not executable in-browser. missing for 10: an interactive API explorer/playground, evidence of runnable code samples, any 'try it' console for the REST or SDK APIs.

   • [claimed-docs] “op item list --vault Private”
   • [claimed-docs] “1Password Connect Servers allow you to securely access your 1Password items and vaults in your company's apps and cloud infrastructure using…”
   • [claimed-docs] “1Password SDKs allow you to build integrations that programmatically interact with 1Password using Go, JavaScript, or Python.”
   • [probe] “PROBE runtime (recorded 2026-09-15): 1password.dev serves llms.txt ('# 1Password Developer Documentation') plus llms-full.txt, and every doc…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

2. ai-native userDownload a machine-readable API spec (OpenAPI or equivalent)

   weight 2 · round drawn
   Authy—none0/10

   Evidence only mentions SDKs and API docs (Verify/Authy), with no mention of a downloadable OpenAPI/Swagger spec or other machine-readable API definition; the Authy API is also noted as deprecated with no new integrations possible.

   • [claimed-docs] “we provide an SDK for common web languages. If your language is supported, it's the fastest way to get started.”
   • [claimed-docs] “So you don't have to use the Authy API directly to integrate two-factor authentication into your app, we provide an SDK for common web langu…”
   • [probe] “PROBE runtime (recorded 2026-09-15): Twilio's own docs page carries the deprecation notice verbatim — 'The Authy API is now closed to new cu…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   1Password—none0/10

   1Password documents REST APIs (Connect Server, Events API) and SDKs, but no evidence pack item mentions a downloadable OpenAPI/Swagger spec or any machine-readable API schema for these APIs. Missing for 10: any OpenAPI/Swagger file, schema reference, or equivalent machine-readable spec for Connect, Events API, or SDKs.

   ⚑ flag

3. ai-native userRely on versioned APIs with a documented deprecation policy

   weight 2 · round to Authy
   Authy~partialprobed4/10

   Twilio's docs do carry an explicit deprecation notice for the Authy API, stating it is closed to new customers and pointing to a migration guide toward Verify v2, which is a documented deprecation policy of sorts. However there is no evidence of a broader versioning scheme (e.g., v1/v2 semantics, changelogs, sunset timelines) beyond this one-time 'this API is dying' notice, and it applies to abandonment rather than an ongoing API lifecycle policy. missing for 10: evidence of a formal API versioning scheme, sunset/timeline commitments, changelog practices, and confirmation that Verify (the successor) itself has a documented deprecation policy.

   • [claimed-docs] “For more information about migration, see Migrating from Authy to Verify for SMS”
   • [probe] “PROBE runtime (recorded 2026-09-15): Twilio's own docs page carries the deprecation notice verbatim — 'The Authy API is now closed to new cu…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   1Password—none0/10

   The evidence pack shows 1Password has developer APIs, SDKs, CLI, and Connect servers, but nowhere does it document API versioning schemes or a formal deprecation policy for these interfaces. Missing for 10: explicit API version numbers/headers, a published deprecation/sunset policy, changelog or migration guides for breaking changes.

   ⚑ flag

1. ai-native userPerform bulk operations across many items at once

   weight 2 · round to 1Password
   Authy—none0/10

   The axis applies to this product kind (peer products hold positive or none verdicts on this story), so lack of evidence for an applicable capability is "none", never "na". (na/none harmonized at arena bring-up — see pipeline/scripts/na-harmonize.ts.)

   ⚑ flag

   1Password~partialprobed6/10

   The 1Password CLI (`op item list`, etc.) and SDKs explicitly support programmatic, scriptable management of items ('Automate item management: Programmatically manage items in your 1Password account'), which enables bulk operations via scripting loops or SDK calls. However, there is no dedicated bulk-edit/batch-update command or documentation showing native multi-item bulk operations (e.g., bulk delete, bulk tag) — missing for 10: explicit bulk-operation commands/API endpoints, documented examples of bulk updates across many items, and independent verification of bulk-scale performance.

   • [claimed-docs] “op item list --vault Private”
   • [claimed-docs] “Automate item management: Programmatically manage items in your 1Password account.”
   • [claimed-docs] “1Password SDKs allow you to build integrations that programmatically interact with 1Password using Go, JavaScript, or Python.”
   • [probe] “PROBE runtime (recorded 2026-09-15): the official op CLI is packaged in Homebrew as the 1password-cli cask ('Command-line interface for 1Pas…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

1. ai-native userDo everything through the API that I can do in the UI

   weight 2 · round to 1Password
   Authy—none0/10

   Authy's API (the Twilio Authy API) is explicitly deprecated and closed to new customers per Twilio's own docs, and community reports confirm there is no way to export/manage 2FA data programmatically outside the mobile/desktop UI—users describe hacky workarounds just to extract seeds. There is no evidence of a supported API that mirrors the app's UI capabilities (device management, backup, sync, disabling installs, etc.).

   • [probe] “PROBE runtime (recorded 2026-09-15): Twilio's own docs page carries the deprecation notice verbatim — 'The Authy API is now closed to new cu…”
   • [community] “Authy makes it hard to migrate away. Anyone know how to get the seed of the 2FA codes? Is there really no export option?”
   • [community] “I just migrated off of Authy last week... Never liked it but they make it extremely difficult to export your data. Twilio really doesn't wan…”
   • [community] “They intentionally make it really hard to migrate your data off their app under the premise of 'security'. Now they are EOL'ing desktop apps…”
   • [community] “Note how insane the Authy export instructions are: 'Paste in a bunch of code to an Electron app running Authy in debug mode to dump the toke…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   1Password~partialclaimed5/10

   1Password's CLI, SDKs (Go/JS/Python), Connect Server, and Service Accounts let AI/automation programmatically read, create, and manage vault items and secrets ([1password-docs-2],[1password-docs-4],[1password-docs-5],[1password-docs-8],[1password-docs-26]), which covers the core secrets-management workflows. However, many UI-only capabilities — passkey creation/autofill in the browser extension, Watchtower breach/weak-password monitoring, Apple Watch lookups, import/export flows, SSH agent autofill — have no documented API/CLI equivalent, so full UI/API parity is not evidenced. Missing for 10: API-exposed passkey management, Watchtower/security-alerts API, and full item-type/browser-feature parity via CLI or SDK.

   • [claimed-docs] “op item list --vault Private”
   • [claimed-docs] “1Password Connect Servers allow you to securely access your 1Password items and vaults in your company's apps and cloud infrastructure using…”
   • [claimed-docs] “1Password Service Accounts help automate secrets management in your applications and infrastructure without the need to deploy additional se…”
   • [claimed-docs] “Automate item management: Programmatically manage items in your 1Password account.”
   • [claimed-docs] “1Password SDKs allow you to build integrations that programmatically interact with 1Password using Go, JavaScript, or Python.”
   • [claimed-docs] “Watchtower tells you about breaches, weak passwords, duplicate items, and other security problems with the items you have saved in 1Password…”
   • [claimed-docs] “you can now create, manage, and sign in with passkeys on a growing number of websites and apps directly from the 1Password browser extension”
   • [claimed-docs] “1Password lets you easily sign in to sites, use suggested passwords, and find what you need – all without leaving your browser.”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

2. ai-native userExport all of my data in open formats and leave

   weight 3 · round to 1Password
   Authy!disputedcontradicted2/10

   Authy provides no official open-format export tool; community reports (authy-comm-3, authy-comm-4, authy-comm-10, authy-comm-18) describe deliberately obstructed migration, requiring hacky Electron debug-mode QR dumps (authy-comm-14) rather than any documented export feature, directly contradicting any implicit claim of open portability. missing for 10: any first-party documentation of a data export feature or open format, evidence of a supported 'leave the platform' workflow, and confirmation that TOTP seeds/secrets can be retrieved without workarounds.

   • [community] “Authy makes it hard to migrate away. Anyone know how to get the seed of the 2FA codes? Is there really no export option?”
   • [community] “I just migrated off of Authy last week... Never liked it but they make it extremely difficult to export your data. Twilio really doesn't wan…”
   • [community] “They intentionally make it really hard to migrate your data off their app under the premise of 'security'. Now they are EOL'ing desktop apps…”
   • [community] “Note how insane the Authy export instructions are: 'Paste in a bunch of code to an Electron app running Authy in debug mode to dump the toke…”
   • [community] “I will also never forgive Authy for removing desktop support with near immediate deprecation and no way to export off their platform. I will…”
   • [claimed-docs] “Use our backup feature incase you lose your phone. We encrypt your data, and only decrypt on the devices using a password only you know.”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   1Password~partialclaimed5/10

   1Password documents a built-in export feature explicitly for moving data to another app, and separately documents CSV import compatibility, implying an open-format export path (e.g. CSV) exists — but the evidence never states which formats export actually produces (1Password's native export is typically 1PUX, not just CSV) nor confirms full data coverage (attachments, SSH keys, secure notes) is included. missing for 10: explicit confirmation that exported format is open/interoperable (not proprietary 1PUX), evidence of full-fidelity data portability, and independent/hands-on confirmation of successful migration.

   • [claimed-docs] “You can export your information from the 1Password apps if you want to move it to a different app.”
   • [claimed-docs] “You can import data into 1Password from many different browsers and applications, including applications that export data in the comma-separ…”
   • [claimed-docs] “Learn how to transfer your passwords and other information from other applications into 1Password.”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

3. ai-native userRead the product's source under an open license

   weight 2 · round drawn
   Authy—none0/10

   The axis applies to this product kind (peer products hold positive or none verdicts on this story), so lack of evidence for an applicable capability is "none", never "na". (na/none harmonized at arena bring-up — see pipeline/scripts/na-harmonize.ts.)

   ⚑ flag

   1Password—none0/10

   1Password is closed-source proprietary software; the evidence pack shows CLI, SDKs, MCP servers and docs, but nothing indicating source code is published under an open license. Missing for 10: any evidence of an open-source license, public source repository, or statement of source availability.

   ⚑ flag

4. ai-native userSelf-host the core product

   weight 3 · round drawn
   Authy—none0/10

   The axis applies to this product kind (peer products hold positive or none verdicts on this story), so lack of evidence for an applicable capability is "none", never "na". (na/none harmonized at arena bring-up — see pipeline/scripts/na-harmonize.ts.)

   ⚑ flag

   1Password—none0/10

   1Password is a cloud-hosted SaaS vault; the only 'self-hosted' pieces are Connect Servers/Environments proxies that still require a cloud 1Password account behind them, not the core vault itself. Community comments explicitly confirm the loss of local/offline vault storage and no self-host option ('no native apps, no local vault storage... VC rot has already set in'), and there is no docs evidence of a self-hostable core product.

   • [claimed-docs] “1Password Connect Servers allow you to securely access your 1Password items and vaults in your company's apps and cloud infrastructure using…”
   • [community] “Use a tiny portion of that to continue support for local, non-cloud-based vault files please.”
   • [community] “Except they have already started to diminish what used to make 1P great. We now get no native apps, no local vault storage, no upfront payme…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

Storage

1. everyday userThe app stores passkeys and signs me into websites and apps with them, not just TOTP codes

   weight 3 · round to 1Password
   Authy—none0/10

   Evidence only shows Twilio's separate Verify API service listing 'Passkeys' as one of many verification factors developers can integrate (authy-docs-2), not that the Authy consumer app itself stores user passkeys or lets users sign into websites/apps with them. All Authy app feature docs (docs-3 through docs-12) describe only TOTP/2FA sync, backups, and device management — no passkey storage or autofill capability is mentioned, and community evidence never discusses passkey sign-in via Authy.

   • [claimed-docs] “Quickly verify users via SMS, Passkeys, Silent Network Auth, Voice, WhatsApp, TOTP, Push, Silent Device Approval, and Email.”
   • [claimed-docs] “Sync 2FA across mobile and tablet.”
   • [claimed-docs] “Use TouchID, PIN protection and passwords to protect access to your 2FA tokens.”
   • [claimed-docs] “Easily capture 2FA QR codes from Facebook, Amazon, Google, Microsoft, Dropbox and many more.”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   1Password✓fullclaimed8/10

   1Password's own support docs confirm passkey creation, storage, and sign-in on websites/apps directly through 1Password (browser extension and apps), plus Watchtower flagging logins that can upgrade to passkeys, going well beyond just TOTP storage which is also documented separately. Missing for 10: independent hands-on verification of passkey sign-in reliability across many sites and no explicit mobile-app (non-browser) passkey autofill confirmation.

   • [claimed-docs] “you can now create, manage, and sign in with passkeys on a growing number of websites and apps directly from the 1Password browser extension”
   • [claimed-docs] “opening Watchtower in 1Password, which now flags all of your existing logins that could be updated with a passkey”
   • [claimed-docs] “You can use 1Password to save the passkeys you create for your accounts and sign in to websites with passkeys in your browser.”
   • [claimed-docs] “Learn how to use 1Password to store and quickly access your one-time passwords when you turn on two-step verification for a website.”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

Sync

1. power userMy passkeys sync across ecosystems — iOS, Android, Windows, Linux, browsers — instead of being locked to one platform vendor

   weight 2 · round to 1Password
   Authy—none0/10

   Authy's own docs describe syncing TOTP/2FA tokens across mobile/tablet devices (authy-docs-3, authy-docs-4), not passkeys; the only 'Passkeys' mention is in Twilio Verify API docs, which is a separate developer verification service, not evidence Authy itself stores or syncs WebAuthn passkeys across iOS/Android/Windows/Linux/browsers. No evidence shows Authy functioning as a cross-platform passkey manager.

   • [claimed-docs] “Quickly verify users via SMS, Passkeys, Silent Network Auth, Voice, WhatsApp, TOTP, Push, Silent Device Approval, and Email.”
   • [claimed-docs] “Sync 2FA across mobile and tablet.”
   • [claimed-docs] “On any device. Your phone, tablet, even your Apple Watch.”
   • [claimed-docs] “It's available for iOS, Android, macOS, Windows, and Linux.”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   1Password~partialcommunity6/10

   1Password's docs show passkeys can be created, saved, and used from the browser extension across 'a growing number of websites and apps' and Watchtower flags logins for passkey upgrade, implying sync across whatever platform the extension/app runs on rather than vendor lock-in. However the evidence pack never explicitly confirms native passkey support/sync parity on Linux or Android apps (only browser extension and Apple-ecosystem mentions like Apple Watch/Touch ID), and an older community comment specifically raises concerns about a missing Linux client, leaving cross-platform parity unconfirmed by direct docs. Missing for 10: explicit Linux and Android app passkey documentation, independent hands-on confirmation of parity across all five listed platforms.

   • [claimed-docs] “you can now create, manage, and sign in with passkeys on a growing number of websites and apps directly from the 1Password browser extension”
   • [claimed-docs] “opening Watchtower in 1Password, which now flags all of your existing logins that could be updated with a passkey”
   • [claimed-docs] “You can use 1Password to save the passkeys you create for your accounts and sign in to websites with passkeys in your browser.”
   • [community] “Mandatory 'No Linux client' comment :| Does anyone have any insight if this is a pure business decision or there's something holding them ba…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

Export

1. power userExport all my TOTP secrets in an open, readable format and leave for another app whenever I choose — no lock-in

   weight 3 · round to 1Password
   Authy!disputedcontradicted2/10

   Authy provides no official export feature for TOTP secrets, and community reports (authy-comm-3, authy-comm-4, authy-comm-10, authy-comm-18) confirm the app deliberately blocks migration/export, with users resorting to hacky workarounds like extracting keys via a deprecated Chrome extension debug mode (authy-comm-13, authy-comm-14). Docs never claim an export feature exists — only backup/sync within Authy's own ecosystem (authy-docs-5, authy-docs-3). missing for 10: any documented open/standard export format, first-party export tool, official migration path preserving secrets, and evidence contradicting the well-documented lock-in behavior.

   • [claimed-docs] “Use our backup feature incase you lose your phone. We encrypt your data, and only decrypt on the devices using a password only you know.”
   • [community] “Authy makes it hard to migrate away. Anyone know how to get the seed of the 2FA codes? Is there really no export option?”
   • [community] “I just migrated off of Authy last week... Never liked it but they make it extremely difficult to export your data. Twilio really doesn't wan…”
   • [community] “They intentionally make it really hard to migrate your data off their app under the premise of 'security'. Now they are EOL'ing desktop apps…”
   • [community] “After a lot of trouble, I was able to extract my private keys from Authy by installing their deprecated Chrome extension and using some hack…”
   • [community] “Note how insane the Authy export instructions are: 'Paste in a bunch of code to an Electron app running Authy in debug mode to dump the toke…”
   • [community] “I will also never forgive Authy for removing desktop support with near immediate deprecation and no way to export off their platform. I will…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   1Password~partialclaimed4/10

   1Password documents a general export feature to move data to another app ([1password-docs-15]), and TOTP/OTP storage is documented ([1password-docs-20]), but no evidence specifies that TOTP secrets are included in the export or that the export format is an open, readable standard (e.g., otpauth:// URIs or plain text) rather than 1Password's proprietary 1PUX format. Missing for 10: explicit confirmation that TOTP secrets are exportable, evidence of an open/readable export format, and independent/hands-on corroboration of successful migration of OTP secrets to another app.

   • [claimed-docs] “You can export your information from the 1Password apps if you want to move it to a different app.”
   • [claimed-docs] “Learn how to use 1Password to store and quickly access your one-time passwords when you turn on two-step verification for a website.”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

Import

1. power userImport tokens in bulk from other authenticator apps instead of re-enrolling every account by hand

   weight 2 · round to 1Password
   Authy—none0/10

   Evidence shows Authy lets users add individual accounts via QR code capture (authy-docs-12) but nothing indicates a bulk import feature that pulls multiple existing tokens/accounts from other authenticator apps at once. Community evidence instead focuses on Authy making it hard to export data out, which is the opposite direction from what the story asks about.

   • [claimed-docs] “Easily capture 2FA QR codes from Facebook, Amazon, Google, Microsoft, Dropbox and many more.”
   • [community] “Authy makes it hard to migrate away. Anyone know how to get the seed of the 2FA codes? Is there really no export option?”
   • [community] “I just migrated off of Authy last week... Never liked it but they make it extremely difficult to export your data. Twilio really doesn't wan…”
   • [community] “They intentionally make it really hard to migrate your data off their app under the premise of 'security'. Now they are EOL'ing desktop apps…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   1Password~partialclaimed4/10

   1Password documents general import from other apps/browsers via CSV and the newer Credential Exchange standard on iOS 26+, and it supports storing one-time passwords, but no evidence explicitly confirms bulk import of authenticator/OTP tokens specifically from other authenticator apps (e.g., Google Authenticator, Authy) rather than just passwords/logins. Missing for 10: explicit documentation of OTP-specific bulk import/migration flow from named authenticator apps, and any hands-on/community confirmation that OTP secrets survive the CSV or Credential Exchange import.

   • [claimed-docs] “You can import data into 1Password from many different browsers and applications, including applications that export data in the comma-separ…”
   • [claimed-docs] “If you use 1Password on iOS or iPadOS 26 or later, you can import data directly from apps that support the Credential Exchange standard.”
   • [claimed-docs] “Learn how to transfer your passwords and other information from other applications into 1Password.”
   • [claimed-docs] “Learn how to use 1Password to store and quickly access your one-time passwords when you turn on two-step verification for a website.”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

Migration

1. everyday userMoving to a new phone transfers all my tokens in one guided step

   weight 2 · round to Authy
   Authy✓fullcommunity7/10

   Authy's own docs describe encrypted cloud backup, multi-device sync, and 'add new device with SMS/voice/existing device approval' as the guided path to move 2FA tokens to a new phone, which directly matches this story (authy-docs-3,4,5,10). Community comments about difficulty exporting data are about moving to a *different app*, not the in-ecosystem new-phone transfer, so they don't contradict this specific flow. Missing for 10: independent/hands-on confirmation that the new-phone restore process itself is smooth and single-step (most community friction reports concern cross-app export, not device-to-device transfer).

   • [claimed-docs] “Sync 2FA across mobile and tablet.”
   • [claimed-docs] “On any device. Your phone, tablet, even your Apple Watch.”
   • [claimed-docs] “Use our backup feature incase you lose your phone. We encrypt your data, and only decrypt on the devices using a password only you know.”
   • [claimed-docs] “Add new devices with SMS, voice or existing device approval.”
   • [community] “I started using Authy long ago because it supports multiple devices and isn't linked to any other account (Google/Microsoft).”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   1Password—none0/10

   The evidence pack covers CLI/SDK/Connect integrations, browser passkeys, import/export from other apps, and OTP storage, but nothing describes a guided 'move to new phone' flow that automatically transfers all tokens/OTPs in one step. Cloud sync via account sign-in is 1Password's usual mechanism, but no citation confirms this specific onboarding experience or that it covers OTP/token migration seamlessly.

   ⚑ flag

1. ai-native userChoose where my data is stored (region/residency)

   weight 2 · round drawn
   Authy—none0/10

   The axis applies to this product kind (peer products hold positive or none verdicts on this story), so lack of evidence for an applicable capability is "none", never "na". (na/none harmonized at arena bring-up — see pipeline/scripts/na-harmonize.ts.)

   ⚑ flag

   1Password—none0/10

   No evidence pack item mentions data residency, regional storage options, or the ability to choose where a vault/account's data is physically stored; 1Password's architecture appears to be a single managed cloud service without documented regional selection. Missing for 10: any documentation of region/residency selection, EU/US data center choice, or self-hosted storage location controls.

   ⚑ flag

2. ai-native userPrevent my data from being used to train AI models

   weight 3 · round drawn
   Authy—none0/10

   The axis applies to this product kind (peer products hold positive or none verdicts on this story), so lack of evidence for an applicable capability is "none", never "na". (na/none harmonized at arena bring-up — see pipeline/scripts/na-harmonize.ts.)

   ⚑ flag

   1Password—none0/10

   No evidence in the pack addresses any policy, setting, or documentation about opting out of or preventing data use for AI model training; the pack covers CLI/SDK/Connect/SSH/passkeys but nothing about AI training data usage or opt-outs.

   ⚑ flag

3. ai-native userControl data retention and deletion

   weight 2 · round drawn
   Authy—none0/10

   No documentation shows Authy giving users control over data retention/export/deletion; instead multiple independent reports describe Twilio deliberately blocking data export ('no export option', 'extremely difficult to export your data') and forcing convoluted workarounds to extract keys, the opposite of user-controlled retention/deletion.

   • [community] “Authy makes it hard to migrate away. Anyone know how to get the seed of the 2FA codes? Is there really no export option?”
   • [community] “I just migrated off of Authy last week... Never liked it but they make it extremely difficult to export your data. Twilio really doesn't wan…”
   • [community] “They intentionally make it really hard to migrate your data off their app under the premise of 'security'. Now they are EOL'ing desktop apps…”
   • [community] “After a lot of trouble, I was able to extract my private keys from Authy by installing their deprecated Chrome extension and using some hack…”
   • [community] “Note how insane the Authy export instructions are: 'Paste in a bunch of code to an Electron app running Authy in debug mode to dump the toke…”
   • [community] “I will also never forgive Authy for removing desktop support with near immediate deprecation and no way to export off their platform. I will…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   1Password—none0/10

   The pack shows data export/import and an MCP design that avoids returning secrets to agents, but there is no evidence of explicit controls for data retention policies or deletion (e.g., audit-log retention settings, vault/item purge, GDPR-style deletion) tailored to AI-native workflows. missing for 10: retention policy controls, explicit deletion/purge mechanisms for AI-consumed data, documentation tying these to AI agent use.

   ⚑ flag

4. ai-native userOpt out of telemetry and usage tracking

   weight 2 · round drawn
   Authy—none0/10

   The axis applies to this product kind (peer products hold positive or none verdicts on this story), so lack of evidence for an applicable capability is "none", never "na". (na/none harmonized at arena bring-up — see pipeline/scripts/na-harmonize.ts.)

   ⚑ flag

   1Password—none0/10

   No evidence pack item addresses telemetry/usage-tracking opt-out settings or privacy controls for AI-native usage; all evidence covers unrelated features like CLI, SSH, SDKs, and password management. This is a fair axis for any product handling sensitive data, but no documentation or community evidence confirms or denies a telemetry opt-out option.

   ⚑ flag

App lock

1. everyday userThe app itself locks behind biometrics or a PIN, so a borrowed phone doesn't expose my codes

   weight 2 · round to Authy
   Authy✓fullcommunity8/10

   Twilio's official docs claim TouchID, PIN, and password protection guarding access to 2FA tokens, and a community user independently corroborates using Face ID to lock the entire app on their phone. This directly matches the story of biometric/PIN app-lock preventing exposure on a borrowed phone. Missing for 10: more independent hands-on verification of PIN-specific lock behavior and no detail on lockout/failure edge cases.

   • [claimed-docs] “Use TouchID, PIN protection and passwords to protect access to your 2FA tokens.”
   • [community] “I use Authy with Face ID protecting the entire app on my phone... they'd still need the 2FA codes from my phone [even if password manager co…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   1Password—none0/10

   The evidence pack only covers CLI/SDK sign-in via system authentication (Touch ID/Windows Hello) for developer tooling, not the everyday consumer app's biometric/PIN lock screen protecting saved logins or OTP codes on a borrowed phone. No documentation or community evidence in the pack describes the mobile/desktop app requiring biometrics or PIN to unlock and view items like one-time passwords.

   ⚑ flag

Audits

1. security engineerThe vendor publishes independent security audits of the app and its sync protocol

   weight 2 · round drawn
   Authy—none0/10

   The evidence pack contains no vendor claim of independent third-party security audits of the app or its sync protocol; documentation focuses on feature descriptions (SDKs, sync, backup) with no audit reports or security whitepapers cited. Community evidence discusses a data breach and a slow-to-fix vulnerability, but these do not substitute for published audit evidence and there's no vendor claim to dispute.

   ⚑ flag

   1Password—none0/10

   No evidence in the pack references independent third-party security audits, pen-test reports, or cryptographic protocol reviews of 1Password's app or sync protocol (e.g., no mention of the publicly known white paper audits by NCC Group/etc.). All citations cover CLI, SDKs, SSH, passkeys, and general product docs, none addressing audit publication.

   ⚑ flag

Monitoring

1. power userThe app warns me when a service I use is breached or a stored credential is weak, reused, or exposed

   weight 2 · round to 1Password
   Authy—none0/10

   No evidence Authy monitors for breached services, weak/reused/exposed credentials, or provides any security-posture alerts; evidence only covers 2FA sync, backup, device management, and separate breach news about Authy itself (not a feature it offers users).

   ⚑ flag

   1Password✓fullclaimed8/10

   Watchtower explicitly flags breaches, weak passwords, duplicate/reused items, and other security problems across saved items, directly matching the story's requirements, and it's surfaced natively in the app/browser extension (also flagging passkey-upgrade opportunities). Missing for 10: independent hands-on verification of Watchtower's breach-detection accuracy/coverage beyond vendor docs.

   • [claimed-docs] “Watchtower tells you about breaches, weak passwords, duplicate items, and other security problems with the items you have saved in 1Password…”
   • [claimed-docs] “opening Watchtower in 1Password, which now flags all of your existing logins that could be updated with a passkey”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

Push

1. it adminPush-based sign-in includes phishing defenses — number matching, location context, and admin-enforced MFA policies

   weight 2 · round drawn
   Authy—none0/10

   Evidence only shows generic Push and Silent Device Approval support (authy-docs-2, authy-docs-15) with no mention of number matching, location context, or admin-enforced MFA policy controls; the Authy API itself is also noted as deprecated for new integrations (authy-probe-rt-1). Missing for 10: any documentation of number matching, location-based risk signals, or admin policy enforcement for push sign-in.

   • [claimed-docs] “Quickly verify users via SMS, Passkeys, Silent Network Auth, Voice, WhatsApp, TOTP, Push, Silent Device Approval, and Email.”
   • [claimed-docs] “Push and Silent Device Approval (iOS, Android, Web)”
   • [probe] “PROBE runtime (recorded 2026-09-15): Twilio's own docs page carries the deprecation notice verbatim — 'The Authy API is now closed to new cu…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   1Password—none0/10

   The axis applies to this product kind (peer products hold positive or none verdicts on this story), so lack of evidence for an applicable capability is "none", never "na". (na/none harmonized at arena bring-up — see pipeline/scripts/na-harmonize.ts.)

   ⚑ flag

Server

1. it adminSelf-host the sync server on my own infrastructure and keep every secret inside my perimeter

   weight 2 · round to 1Password
   Authy—none0/10

   The axis applies to this product kind (peer products hold positive or none verdicts on this story), so lack of evidence for an applicable capability is "none", never "na". (na/none harmonized at arena bring-up — see pipeline/scripts/na-harmonize.ts.)

   ⚑ flag

   1Password!disputedcontradicted4/10

   1Password markets a 'Connect Server' that can be deployed in a company's own infrastructure to access items via REST API (docs-4), which sounds like partial self-hosting, but this is only a caching/access layer in front of 1Password's cloud vaults, not a full self-hosted sync server. Community evidence directly contradicts the idea that secrets can stay entirely within an admin's perimeter: users note 1Password has 'no local vault storage' anymore and ask the vendor to 'continue support for local, non-cloud-based vault files' (comm-7, comm-8), confirming that the cloud remains the source of truth. Missing for 10: any documented on-prem deployment of the full sync/vault backend, migration guide for self-hosted secret storage, or evidence that Connect Server operates without 1Password's cloud.

   • [claimed-docs] “1Password Connect Servers allow you to securely access your 1Password items and vaults in your company's apps and cloud infrastructure using…”
   • [community] “Use a tiny portion of that to continue support for local, non-cloud-based vault files please.”
   • [community] “Except they have already started to diminish what used to make 1P great. We now get no native apps, no local vault storage, no upfront payme…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

Source

1. security engineerThe client apps are open source, so the code handling my seeds can be inspected and community-reviewed

   weight 2 · round drawn
   Authy—none0/10

   There is no evidence Authy's client apps are open source; evidence instead shows closed, proprietary apps with deliberately obstructed export/migration paths and hacky reverse-engineering required to extract seeds. This directly contradicts the premise of community-reviewable open-source code handling seeds.

   • [community] “Authy makes it hard to migrate away. Anyone know how to get the seed of the 2FA codes? Is there really no export option?”
   • [community] “I just migrated off of Authy last week... Never liked it but they make it extremely difficult to export your data. Twilio really doesn't wan…”
   • [community] “They intentionally make it really hard to migrate your data off their app under the premise of 'security'. Now they are EOL'ing desktop apps…”
   • [community] “After a lot of trouble, I was able to extract my private keys from Authy by installing their deprecated Chrome extension and using some hack…”
   • [community] “Note how insane the Authy export instructions are: 'Paste in a bunch of code to an Electron app running Authy in debug mode to dump the toke…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   1Password—none0/10

   No evidence in the pack indicates 1Password's client apps are open source or available for community code review; all citations describe closed commercial SDKs, CLI, Connect servers, and browser extension features without any open-source licensing or public repository claims for the core vault/client apps themselves. missing for 10: any statement of open-source licensing for 1Password clients, a public source repository for the desktop/mobile/browser apps, or third-party audit citing open code review.

   ⚑ flag

Automation

1. ai-native userAn agent can fetch a current TOTP code programmatically — via CLI or API — to complete a 2FA login inside an automated workflow

   weight 2 · round to 1Password
   Authy—none0/10

   Authy is a consumer authenticator app; there is no documented CLI/API for a user or agent to programmatically fetch their own current TOTP code, and Twilio's docs confirm the Authy API is deprecated and closed to new customers with no successor for this use case. Community evidence further shows Authy intentionally blocks exporting secrets/codes, requiring hacky workarounds (deprecated Chrome extension, debug-mode Electron hacks) rather than any supported programmatic access.

   • [probe] “PROBE runtime (recorded 2026-09-15): Twilio's own docs page carries the deprecation notice verbatim — 'The Authy API is now closed to new cu…”
   • [community] “Authy makes it hard to migrate away. Anyone know how to get the seed of the 2FA codes? Is there really no export option?”
   • [community] “I just migrated off of Authy last week... Never liked it but they make it extremely difficult to export your data. Twilio really doesn't wan…”
   • [community] “After a lot of trouble, I was able to extract my private keys from Authy by installing their deprecated Chrome extension and using some hack…”
   • [community] “Note how insane the Authy export instructions are: 'Paste in a bunch of code to an Electron app running Authy in debug mode to dump the toke…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   1Password~partialprobed4/10

   1Password docs confirm OTP storage/lookup in the app (docs-20, docs-24, docs-19) and a general-purpose CLI/SDK for programmatic item access (docs-1, docs-2, docs-26, probe-rt-3), which together imply an agent could retrieve a TOTP field via CLI, but no evidence explicitly documents a TOTP-specific command or API response format for pulling a live 2FA code in an automated workflow. missing for 10: explicit CLI/API documentation of TOTP field retrieval (e.g., a `--otp` flag or field type), and any example/community confirmation of an agent completing 2FA end-to-end.

   • [claimed-docs] “Learn how to use 1Password to store and quickly access your one-time passwords when you turn on two-step verification for a website.”
   • [claimed-docs] “Use 1Password on your Apple Watch to quickly look up information: credit card numbers and PINs, one-time passwords”
   • [claimed-docs] “Use 1Password on your Apple Watch to quickly look up information: credit card numbers and PINs, one-time passwords, bank account details, pa…”
   • [claimed-docs] “1Password CLI brings 1Password to your terminal. Learn how to install the CLI, then integrate it with your 1Password app and sign in with To…”
   • [claimed-docs] “op item list --vault Private”
   • [claimed-docs] “1Password SDKs allow you to build integrations that programmatically interact with 1Password using Go, JavaScript, or Python.”
   • [probe] “PROBE runtime (recorded 2026-09-15): the official op CLI is packaged in Homebrew as the 1password-cli cask ('Command-line interface for 1Pas…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

2. ai-native userExpose the vault through a local programmatic endpoint an agent can query for codes and secrets without screen-scraping the app

   weight 1 · round to 1Password
   Authy—none0/10

   No evidence Authy offers any local programmatic endpoint for agents to query codes/secrets; its API is closed to new customers and deprecated, and community reports describe the vault as deliberately hard to export via any means other than hacky manual extraction.

   • [probe] “PROBE runtime (recorded 2026-09-15): Twilio's own docs page carries the deprecation notice verbatim — 'The Authy API is now closed to new cu…”
   • [community] “After a lot of trouble, I was able to extract my private keys from Authy by installing their deprecated Chrome extension and using some hack…”
   • [community] “Note how insane the Authy export instructions are: 'Paste in a bunch of code to an Electron app running Authy in debug mode to dump the toke…”
   • [community] “I just migrated off of Authy last week... Never liked it but they make it extremely difficult to export your data. Twilio really doesn't wan…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   1Password✓fullprobed8/10

   The 1Password CLI (`op`) and SDKs/Connect Server provide a local, scriptable, programmatic interface (not screen-scraping) that returns items, secrets, and OTP codes directly, and this is corroborated by real-world packaging (Homebrew cask) confirming it's a genuine local endpoint agents can shell out to. Missing for 10: no direct hands-on evidence of an AI agent actually querying the CLI/Connect Server for codes, and the newer MCP server explicitly withholds raw secrets from the agent, so full 'codes and secrets' access is only fully realized via CLI/SDK, not MCP.

   • [claimed-docs] “1Password CLI brings 1Password to your terminal. Learn how to install the CLI, then integrate it with your 1Password app and sign in with To…”
   • [claimed-docs] “op item list --vault Private”
   • [claimed-docs] “Use the 1Password Credential Broker to give CI/CD and other machine workflows short-lived access to secrets, without managing service accoun…”
   • [claimed-docs] “1Password Connect Servers allow you to securely access your 1Password items and vaults in your company's apps and cloud infrastructure using…”
   • [claimed-docs] “1Password SDKs allow you to build integrations that programmatically interact with 1Password using Go, JavaScript, or Python.”
   • [probe] “official CLI documented at https://www.1password.dev/cli/get-started”
   • [probe] “PROBE runtime (recorded 2026-09-15): the official op CLI is packaged in Homebrew as the 1password-cli cask ('Command-line interface for 1Pas…”
   • [probe] “PROBE runtime (recorded 2026-09-15): 1Password's public docs MCP server at https://www.1password.dev/mcp completed a FULL keyless initialize…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

Browser

1. everyday userA browser extension autofills my TOTP codes and passkeys during login instead of making me retype them

   weight 2 · round to 1Password
   Authy—none0/10

   Evidence pack shows no current Authy browser extension for autofilling TOTP or passkeys; the only extension mentioned is a deprecated Chrome extension used via hacky workarounds to extract keys, not autofill. Authy's own product is a mobile/desktop authenticator app, and passkey support referenced is for Twilio Verify (a separate API product), not the Authy app/extension.

   • [community] “After a lot of trouble, I was able to extract my private keys from Authy by installing their deprecated Chrome extension and using some hack…”
   • [community] “Note how insane the Authy export instructions are: 'Paste in a bunch of code to an Electron app running Authy in debug mode to dump the toke…”
   • [claimed-docs] “Quickly verify users via SMS, Passkeys, Silent Network Auth, Voice, WhatsApp, TOTP, Push, Silent Device Approval, and Email.”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   1Password✓fullcommunity8/10

   Docs confirm browser extension autofills passkeys during sign-in and stores/retrieves one-time passwords (TOTP), covering both parts of the story, with community corroboration of browser extension quality and iframe-aware autofill behavior. Missing for 10: explicit first-party statement or hands-on demo showing TOTP codes specifically autofilled (rather than just 'stored/accessed') and independent confirmation of passkey autofill working reliably across sites.

   • [claimed-docs] “you can now create, manage, and sign in with passkeys on a growing number of websites and apps directly from the 1Password browser extension”
   • [claimed-docs] “You can use 1Password to save the passkeys you create for your accounts and sign in to websites with passkeys in your browser.”
   • [claimed-docs] “Learn how to use 1Password to store and quickly access your one-time passwords when you turn on two-step verification for a website.”
   • [claimed-docs] “1Password lets you easily sign in to sites, use suggested passwords, and find what you need – all without leaving your browser.”
   • [community] “1Password fills iframes based on their domain rather than the parents... In my opinion this is the right security model.”
   • [community] “Both the Fastmail and Privacy integrations have made 1Password a joy to use in the past few years. I've used premium BitWarden in the past, …”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

Desktop

1. power userA first-class desktop app gives me codes and vault access on my computer, not just on mobile

   weight 2 · round to 1Password
   Authy!disputedcontradicted4/10

   Twilio's docs list Authy as available on macOS, Windows, and Linux, suggesting first-class desktop apps, but hands-on community reports concretely contradict this, stating Authy is 'EOL'ing desktop apps' with 'near immediate deprecation' and no export path, leaving the desktop surface unreliable for power users. Missing for 10: no evidence of continued desktop app support with vault/code access, no independent confirmation the desktop client remains functional or maintained post-EOL announcement.

   • [claimed-docs] “It's available for iOS, Android, macOS, Windows, and Linux.”
   • [community] “They intentionally make it really hard to migrate your data off their app under the premise of 'security'. Now they are EOL'ing desktop apps…”
   • [community] “I will also never forgive Authy for removing desktop support with near immediate deprecation and no way to export off their platform. I will…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   1Password~partialcommunity5/10

   Evidence confirms a desktop 1Password app exists (CLI integrates with 'the 1Password app' via Touch ID/Windows Hello, and community references to the Electron-based desktop client) and that vault/OTP data is stored centrally and accessible from apps generally, but no evidence pack item explicitly documents desktop-specific vault UI or OTP display screens, and community notes flag desktop app quality concerns (Electron complaints, no native app comments). missing for 10: dedicated desktop-app feature docs (OTP display, vault browsing UI on Mac/Windows/Linux), first-party screenshots or hands-on confirmation of parity with mobile, and resolution of the Electron/native-app criticism.

   • [claimed-docs] “1Password CLI brings 1Password to your terminal. Learn how to install the CLI, then integrate it with your 1Password app and sign in with To…”
   • [claimed-docs] “Learn how to use 1Password to store and quickly access your one-time passwords when you turn on two-step verification for a website.”
   • [community] “Except they have already started to diminish what used to make 1P great. We now get no native apps, no local vault storage, no upfront payme…”
   • [community] “It would be nice to say goodbye to Electron, though... (referring to 1Password's desktop app).”
   • [community] “Mandatory 'No Linux client' comment :| Does anyone have any insight if this is a pure business decision or there's something holding them ba…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

Watch

1. everyday userRead my codes from my smartwatch without pulling out my phone

   weight 1 · round to 1Password
   Authy~partialprobed5/10

   Authy's own marketing page explicitly claims support on 'your phone, tablet, even your Apple Watch,' which directly matches the smartwatch-reading story, but this is a single first-party claim with no independent or hands-on confirmation of watch functionality (e.g., no community mention of using the watch app), and the API deprecation notice signals the product line is winding down. Missing for 10: independent/hands-on verification of the Apple Watch experience, detail on Wear OS or other smartwatch support, and confirmation the feature is still maintained post-deprecation.

   • [claimed-docs] “On any device. Your phone, tablet, even your Apple Watch.”
   • [claimed-docs] “Sync 2FA across mobile and tablet.”
   • [probe] “PROBE runtime (recorded 2026-09-15): Twilio's own docs page carries the deprecation notice verbatim — 'The Authy API is now closed to new cu…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   1Password✓fullclaimed8/10

   1Password explicitly documents Apple Watch support for quickly looking up saved information including one-time passwords, letting users read codes without pulling out their phone. This directly matches the story, though evidence is limited to Apple Watch (no mention of other smartwatch platforms like Wear OS) and lacks independent hands-on corroboration. Missing for 10: evidence of Android/Wear OS smartwatch support, independent user reviews confirming the watch OTP experience.

   • [claimed-docs] “Use 1Password on your Apple Watch to quickly look up information: credit card numbers and PINs, one-time passwords, bank account details, pa…”
   • [claimed-docs] “Use 1Password on your Apple Watch to quickly look up information: credit card numbers and PINs, one-time passwords”
   • [claimed-docs] “Learn how to use 1Password to store and quickly access your one-time passwords when you turn on two-step verification for a website.”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

Backup

1. security engineerBackups are end-to-end encrypted with a key the vendor never holds, and the encryption design is documented

   weight 3 · round to Authy
   Authy~partialcommunity4/10

   Authy's marketing page states backups are encrypted and 'only decrypt on the devices using a password only you know' (authy-docs-5), implying a vendor-can't-decrypt design, but there is no technical documentation of the encryption algorithm, key derivation, or threat model, and no independent audit confirming the vendor truly never holds the key. Community reports focus on account-takeover via device-add (authy-comm-15) and painful data export (authy-comm-13/14), not on breaking the underlying backup encryption, so this doesn't rise to a concrete dispute of the encryption claim itself. Missing for 10: a detailed whitepaper/spec of the E2E encryption scheme, key management details, and independent security audit or crypto review corroborating the zero-knowledge claim.

   • [claimed-docs] “Use our backup feature incase you lose your phone. We encrypt your data, and only decrypt on the devices using a password only you know.”
   • [community] “After a lot of trouble, I was able to extract my private keys from Authy by installing their deprecated Chrome extension and using some hack…”
   • [community] “Note how insane the Authy export instructions are: 'Paste in a bunch of code to an Electron app running Authy in debug mode to dump the toke…”
   • [community] “The Twilio exploit allowed the hackers to add a new device to existing Authy accounts. This allowed them to sync the keys between devices wi…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   1Password—none0/10

   The evidence pack contains no documentation of 1Password's end-to-end encryption architecture, Secret Key design, or zero-knowledge claims for vaults/backups — it only covers CLI/SDK/Connect/SSH tooling and unrelated community commentary on UX and pricing. Without any citation describing the encryption design or vendor-key-never-held guarantee, this axis is unevidenced.

   ⚑ flag

Multi device

1. everyday userMy tokens are available on my phone, tablet, and computer at the same time, kept in sync automatically

   weight 2 · round to 1Password
   Authy!disputedcontradicted4/10

   Docs and community confirm sync across phone/tablet (and even Apple Watch) works well and is a headline feature (authy-docs-3, authy-docs-4, authy-docs-16, authy-comm-1), but the 'computer' part of the story is directly contradicted: community reports Authy EOL'd its desktop apps, breaking the phone/tablet/computer parity the docs still describe (authy-comm-10, authy-comm-18). Missing for 10: confirmation that desktop/computer sync still functions today, and resolution of the desktop deprecation vs docs claim.

   • [claimed-docs] “Sync 2FA across mobile and tablet.”
   • [claimed-docs] “On any device. Your phone, tablet, even your Apple Watch.”
   • [claimed-docs] “It's available for iOS, Android, macOS, Windows, and Linux.”
   • [community] “I started using Authy long ago because it supports multiple devices and isn't linked to any other account (Google/Microsoft).”
   • [community] “They intentionally make it really hard to migrate your data off their app under the premise of 'security'. Now they are EOL'ing desktop apps…”
   • [community] “I will also never forgive Authy for removing desktop support with near immediate deprecation and no way to export off their platform. I will…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   1Password✓fullcommunity6/10

   Docs show 1Password stores and retrieves one-time-passwords (tokens) across the browser, Apple Watch, and other apps (docs-20, docs-19/24, docs-21), implying that the same vault (and thus tokens) is accessible from phone, tablet, and desktop, and a community comment confirms 'desktop and mobile work great' (comm-9), suggesting real-world cross-device consistency. However none of the evidence explicitly describes the automatic sync mechanism or confirms real-time consistency across all three device types simultaneously. Missing for 10: explicit documentation of the cloud-sync architecture ensuring instant multi-device consistency, and independent testing/benchmarks of sync latency or conflict handling.

   • [claimed-docs] “Learn how to use 1Password to store and quickly access your one-time passwords when you turn on two-step verification for a website.”
   • [claimed-docs] “Use 1Password on your Apple Watch to quickly look up information: credit card numbers and PINs, one-time passwords, bank account details, pa…”
   • [claimed-docs] “Use 1Password on your Apple Watch to quickly look up information: credit card numbers and PINs, one-time passwords”
   • [claimed-docs] “1Password lets you easily sign in to sites, use suggested passwords, and find what you need – all without leaving your browser.”
   • [community] “I've used 1password for years and so far haven't had any problem, all apps (desktop and mobile) work great, but I don't understand why they …”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

Recovery

1. everyday userLosing my phone doesn't lose my accounts — a documented recovery path restores my tokens on a new device

   weight 3 · round to Authy
   Authy✓fullcommunity7/10

   Authy's official docs describe an encrypted backup feature that restores 2FA tokens to a new device using a user-known password, plus multi-device sync and device management (authy-docs-3,4,5,8,10), and a community user confirms this recovery path works in practice after phone loss/SIM replacement (authy-comm-19). Some community friction exists around exporting data to competing apps, but that's a separate migration-away concern, not evidence the phone-loss recovery path itself fails. Missing for 10: a detailed first-party step-by-step restore walkthrough, and broader independent corroboration beyond a single community anecdote.

   • [claimed-docs] “Sync 2FA across mobile and tablet.”
   • [claimed-docs] “On any device. Your phone, tablet, even your Apple Watch.”
   • [claimed-docs] “Use our backup feature incase you lose your phone. We encrypt your data, and only decrypt on the devices using a password only you know.”
   • [claimed-docs] “View information, rename, and remove lost/stolen devices.”
   • [claimed-docs] “Add new devices with SMS, voice or existing device approval.”
   • [community] “I've been using Authy as a backup for 1Password's 2FA since in a worst-case scenario I can get a replacement SIM card and get back into my 1…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   1Password—none0/10

   The evidence pack covers 1Password's password/OTP storage, sync, import/export between apps, SSH/passkey features, and developer tooling, but contains no documentation of a lost-device recovery path (e.g., Emergency Kit, Secret Key re-enrollment, account recovery flow) that would restore an everyday user's tokens on a new device after losing their phone. Missing for 10: documented device-loss/account-recovery procedure, evidence of Secret Key or Emergency Kit restoration flow, any confirmation that OTPs specifically survive a lost-device scenario.

   ⚑ flag

Automation

1. ai-native userAn agent can create and update vault entries — seeding new TOTP secrets, storing credentials — through documented programmatic surfaces

   weight 2 · round to 1Password
   Authy!disputedcontradicted2/10

   Docs mention an SDK for 'the Authy API' to integrate 2FA, but Twilio's own docs page (probe) states the Authy API is closed to new customers and being deprecated with no new integrations, and multiple community reports confirm there is no supported way to programmatically seed, export, or update vault entries — users describe extreme difficulty or hacky workarounds to even extract secrets. This directly contradicts any claim of a documented programmatic surface for agent-driven vault creation/updates. Missing for 10: any current API/SDK for creating or updating TOTP vault entries, official export/import endpoints, and first-party agent integration examples.

   • [claimed-docs] “we provide an SDK for common web languages. If your language is supported, it's the fastest way to get started.”
   • [claimed-docs] “So you don't have to use the Authy API directly to integrate two-factor authentication into your app, we provide an SDK for common web langu…”
   • [probe] “PROBE runtime (recorded 2026-09-15): Twilio's own docs page carries the deprecation notice verbatim — 'The Authy API is now closed to new cu…”
   • [community] “Authy makes it hard to migrate away. Anyone know how to get the seed of the 2FA codes? Is there really no export option?”
   • [community] “I just migrated off of Authy last week... Never liked it but they make it extremely difficult to export your data. Twilio really doesn't wan…”
   • [community] “Note how insane the Authy export instructions are: 'Paste in a bunch of code to an Electron app running Authy in debug mode to dump the toke…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   1Password✓fullprobed7/10

   1Password documents multiple programmatic surfaces (CLI, SDKs in Go/JS/Python, Connect Servers REST API, Service Accounts) explicitly for 'Automate item management: Programmatically manage items in your 1Password account,' which covers creating and updating vault entries including credentials. These are official, well-documented interfaces suitable for agent-driven automation. Missing for 10: an explicit documented example/field reference for seeding TOTP secrets via these APIs, and independent/hands-on verification that write operations (create/update, not just read) work reliably in practice.

   • [claimed-docs] “Automate item management: Programmatically manage items in your 1Password account.”
   • [claimed-docs] “1Password SDKs allow you to build integrations that programmatically interact with 1Password using Go, JavaScript, or Python.”
   • [claimed-docs] “1Password Connect Servers allow you to securely access your 1Password items and vaults in your company's apps and cloud infrastructure using…”
   • [claimed-docs] “1Password Service Accounts help automate secrets management in your applications and infrastructure without the need to deploy additional se…”
   • [claimed-docs] “1Password CLI brings 1Password to your terminal. Learn how to install the CLI, then integrate it with your 1Password app and sign in with To…”
   • [probe] “PROBE runtime (recorded 2026-09-15): the official op CLI is packaged in Homebrew as the 1password-cli cask ('Command-line interface for 1Pas…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

Policy

1. it adminEnforce org-wide policies — require app lock, restrict export, mandate strong master credentials — across every member's app

   weight 1 · round drawn
   Authy—none0/10

   Authy's evidence pack shows only consumer-facing features (per-device PIN/TouchID lock, backup password, device management) with no mention of any organization/admin console, centralized policy enforcement, or IT-admin controls across a team of users. The product is also being deprecated in favor of Verify, with no admin management surface described anywhere.

   • [claimed-docs] “Use TouchID, PIN protection and passwords to protect access to your 2FA tokens.”
   • [claimed-docs] “View information, rename, and remove lost/stolen devices.”
   • [claimed-docs] “Disable future Authy app installations for improved security.”
   • [probe] “PROBE runtime (recorded 2026-09-15): Twilio's own docs page carries the deprecation notice verbatim — 'The Authy API is now closed to new cu…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   1Password—none0/10

   The evidence pack covers CLI/SDK developer tooling, personal password features, import/export, and community sentiment, but contains no documentation of admin console policies for enforcing app lock, restricting export, or mandating master password strength across an organization. This axis clearly applies to a business password manager, but no supporting evidence is present.

   ⚑ flag

Sharing

1. it adminMy team can share TOTP-protected logins through shared vaults or collections with per-member access control

   weight 2 · round drawn
   Authy—none0/10

   Authy is a personal authenticator app with no evidence of shared vaults, collections, or per-member access control for team/admin management; evidence only covers individual multi-device sync and backup features. Community evidence even highlights difficulty exporting/sharing data at all, reinforcing the lack of team-sharing capability.

   • [claimed-docs] “Sync 2FA across mobile and tablet.”
   • [claimed-docs] “Use our backup feature incase you lose your phone. We encrypt your data, and only decrypt on the devices using a password only you know.”
   • [community] “Authy makes it hard to migrate away. Anyone know how to get the seed of the 2FA codes? Is there really no export option?”
   • [community] “I just migrated off of Authy last week... Never liked it but they make it extremely difficult to export your data. Twilio really doesn't wan…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   1Password—none0/10

   The evidence pack covers 1Password's developer tooling (CLI, SDKs, Connect, SSH agent) and personal features (Watchtower, OTP storage, passkeys) but contains no mention of shared vaults, collections, group/per-member permissions, or admin controls for team sharing of TOTP items. Missing for 10: documentation of shared vaults/collections, per-member access control settings, or admin console screenshots showing granular sharing permissions for TOTP logins.

   • [claimed-docs] “Learn how to use 1Password to store and quickly access your one-time passwords when you turn on two-step verification for a website.”
   • [claimed-docs] “Watchtower tells you about breaches, weak passwords, duplicate items, and other security problems with the items you have saved in 1Password…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

Enrollment

1. everyday userScan a QR code and immediately start generating TOTP codes for a new account

   weight 3 · round to Authy
   Authy✓fullcommunity7/10

   Authy's own product page states it can capture 2FA QR codes from major providers and lists TOTP as a supported authentication method, directly matching the scan-and-generate story, and community comments confirm ongoing everyday use of the app for this purpose. Missing for 10: a first-person hands-on account of the exact scan-to-code flow and more detailed onboarding documentation beyond the marketing feature list.

   • [claimed-docs] “Easily capture 2FA QR codes from Facebook, Amazon, Google, Microsoft, Dropbox and many more.”
   • [claimed-docs] “TOTP (Authenticator Apps)”
   • [community] “I started using Authy long ago because it supports multiple devices and isn't linked to any other account (Google/Microsoft).”
   • [community] “I've been using Authy as a backup for 1Password's 2FA since in a worst-case scenario I can get a replacement SIM card and get back into my 1…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   1Password~partialclaimed4/10

   Docs confirm 1Password stores and generates one-time passwords for two-step verification (docs-20, docs-19/24), which implies TOTP support, but no evidence explicitly describes the QR-code scanning flow for adding a new TOTP account. Missing for 10: explicit documentation or screenshots of QR code scanning to add a new TOTP entry, and independent/hands-on confirmation of the immediate code-generation experience.

   • [claimed-docs] “Learn how to use 1Password to store and quickly access your one-time passwords when you turn on two-step verification for a website.”
   • [claimed-docs] “Use 1Password on your Apple Watch to quickly look up information: credit card numbers and PINs, one-time passwords, bank account details, pa…”
   • [claimed-docs] “Use 1Password on your Apple Watch to quickly look up information: credit card numbers and PINs, one-time passwords”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

Offline

1. power userCodes generate fully offline — no network, no vendor account required just to see my TOTP codes

   weight 2 · round to Authy
   Authy!disputedcontradicted4/10

   Authy's own docs claim codes can be viewed without internet ('access secured websites without internet access on your phone'), but the product fundamentally requires creating a Twilio/Authy account tied to a phone number before any TOTP codes can be generated or viewed, and codes are further gated behind an app password — directly contradicting the 'no vendor account required' part of the story. Community evidence confirms this account-centric architecture (phone-number-as-username, multi-device sync tied to account, extraction of underlying seeds required hacky workarounds via a deprecated debug mode rather than a supported offline export).

   • [claimed-docs] “You can still access secured websites without internet access on your phone.”
   • [community] “I started using Authy long ago because it supports multiple devices and isn't linked to any other account (Google/Microsoft).”
   • [community] “This doesn't scare me because in Authy you also set a password which without you cannot access the codes. The phone number here just acts as…”
   • [community] “After a lot of trouble, I was able to extract my private keys from Authy by installing their deprecated Chrome extension and using some hack…”
   • [community] “Note how insane the Authy export instructions are: 'Paste in a bunch of code to an Electron app running Authy in debug mode to dump the toke…”
   • [community] “services with Authy-integrated MFA (like Twitch) are 'managed' by Authy so it can regenerate the secret on the fly; your previously extracte…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   1Password!disputedcontradicted3/10

   1Password does store and display OTP codes (docs-20, docs-24), but the product fundamentally requires a 1Password account/subscription and cloud-synced vault to unlock and view items — community evidence explicitly states 1Password has moved away from local, non-cloud vault storage ('no native apps, no local vault storage... The VC rot has already set in'), directly contradicting the 'no vendor account required' claim. Missing for 10: any first-party or independent confirmation of a fully offline mode with no account signup/sync dependency, and no evidence disputes this gap.

   • [claimed-docs] “Learn how to use 1Password to store and quickly access your one-time passwords when you turn on two-step verification for a website.”
   • [claimed-docs] “Use 1Password on your Apple Watch to quickly look up information: credit card numbers and PINs, one-time passwords”
   • [community] “My 1Password installation is grandfathered from a time when it was just a standalone app, without subscription. Will it just stop working on…”
   • [community] “Use a tiny portion of that to continue support for local, non-cloud-based vault files please.”
   • [community] “Except they have already started to diminish what used to make 1P great. We now get no native apps, no local vault storage, no upfront payme…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

Organization

1. power userKeep dozens of tokens organized — search, folders or groups, and service icons — so the right code is always two taps away

   weight 2 · round to 1Password
   Authy—none0/10

   Evidence shows only basic token/QR capture (service icons implied) with no mention of search or folder/group organization; a community user explicitly complains 'can't we please have alphabetization?' indicating the app lacks even simple sorting, let alone search/folders for power users managing dozens of tokens.

   • [claimed-docs] “Easily capture 2FA QR codes from Facebook, Amazon, Google, Microsoft, Dropbox and many more.”
   • [community] “My guess is that most of the people who worked on Authy have fallen by the wayside after the Twilio acquisition. It's annoying every time I …”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   1Password~partialclaimed3/10

   Docs confirm 1Password stores and quickly surfaces one-time passwords (including via Apple Watch) and flags login issues via Watchtower, but the pack provides no evidence of folder/tag/group organization, dedicated search, or service icons for TOTP entries specifically. missing for 10: explicit search functionality, folder/tag/group organization for TOTP items, service icon display for OTP entries, independent hands-on validation of organizing many tokens.

   • [claimed-docs] “Learn how to use 1Password to store and quickly access your one-time passwords when you turn on two-step verification for a website.”
   • [claimed-docs] “Use 1Password on your Apple Watch to quickly look up information: credit card numbers and PINs, one-time passwords, bank account details, pa…”
   • [claimed-docs] “Use 1Password on your Apple Watch to quickly look up information: credit card numbers and PINs, one-time passwords”
   • [claimed-docs] “Watchtower tells you about breaches, weak passwords, duplicate items, and other security problems with the items you have saved in 1Password…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

Variants

1. power userNon-standard tokens work too — Steam Guard, HOTP counters, custom periods and digit lengths

   weight 2 · round drawn
   Authy—none0/10

   No evidence anywhere in the pack mentions Steam Guard support, HOTP counter-based tokens, or custom period/digit configurations; documentation only references standard TOTP and QR-code capture from mainstream services. Absence of evidence for this applicable power-user axis yields 'none'.

   ⚑ flag

   1Password—none0/10

   The evidence only confirms basic one-time password storage (docs-20, docs-19) but contains no mention of Steam Guard tokens, HOTP counter-based codes, or custom period/digit-length TOTP support. Missing for 10: any documentation of Steam Guard support, HOTP counter handling, or custom period/digit configuration.

   ⚑ flag