Authy vs Proton Pass

Agent access

1. ai-native userPoint an agent at llms.txt or agent-oriented docs

   weight 2 · round drawn
   Authy—none0/10

   The axis applies to this product kind (peer products hold positive or none verdicts on this story), so lack of evidence for an applicable capability is "none", never "na". (na/none harmonized at arena bring-up — see pipeline/scripts/na-harmonize.ts.)

   ⚑ flag

   Proton Pass—none0/10

   No llms.txt or agent-oriented docs found; probes explicitly return 404 for llms.txt and docs.md endpoints, and no evidence mentions agent-readable documentation formats.

   • [probe] “PROBE llms.txt: HTTP 404 at https://proton.me/llms.txt”
   • [probe] “PROBE docs-md: HTTP 404 at https://proton.me/support/pass.md”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

2. ai-native userRun the product headlessly / in CI for automation

   weight 2 · round to Proton Pass
   Authy—none0/10

   The axis applies to this product kind (peer products hold positive or none verdicts on this story), so lack of evidence for an applicable capability is "none", never "na". (na/none harmonized at arena bring-up — see pipeline/scripts/na-harmonize.ts.)

   ⚑ flag

   Proton Pass~partialprobed6/10

   Proton Pass ships an official CLI documented as designed for scripts, deployments, and CI/CD pipelines, supporting CRUD on vaults and items — a clear headless/automation capability. However, evidence is limited to vendor blog docs with no independent/hands-on corroboration of CI usage, no details on authentication flow for non-interactive/headless environments, and no community validation of real-world CI deployment. Missing for 10: independent hands-on CI usage reports, details on non-interactive auth/session handling for automation, and broader ecosystem examples (e.g., GitHub Actions integration).

   • [claimed-docs] “enables you to securely retrieve secrets and other items across scripts, deployments, and continuous integration/ continuous delivery (CI/CD…”
   • [claimed-docs] “the CLI enables you to securely retrieve secrets and other items across scripts, deployments, and continuous integration/ continuous deliver…”
   • [claimed-docs] “View, create, update, and delete items including passwords, secure notes, credit cards, identities, WiFi entries, custom items, and stored S…”
   • [probe] “official CLI documented at https://proton.me/blog/proton-pass-cli”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

3. ai-native userConnect an agent via an official MCP server

   weight 3 · round drawn
   Authy—none0/10

   The axis applies to this product kind (peer products hold positive or none verdicts on this story), so lack of evidence for an applicable capability is "none", never "na". (na/none harmonized at arena bring-up — see pipeline/scripts/na-harmonize.ts.)

   ⚑ flag

   Proton Pass—none0/10

   The axis applies to this product kind (peer products hold positive or none verdicts on this story), so lack of evidence for an applicable capability is "none", never "na". (na/none harmonized at arena bring-up — see pipeline/scripts/na-harmonize.ts.)

   ⚑ flag

4. ai-native userUse an official CLI

   weight 2 · round to Proton Pass
   Authy—none0/10

   The axis applies to this product kind (peer products hold positive or none verdicts on this story), so lack of evidence for an applicable capability is "none", never "na". (na/none harmonized at arena bring-up — see pipeline/scripts/na-harmonize.ts.)

   ⚑ flag

   Proton Pass✓fullprobed7/10

   Proton Pass has an official CLI documented in a first-party blog post that supports CRUD on vaults and items (including SSH keys) and secret retrieval for scripts/CI/CD pipelines, which is directly relevant to AI-native/agentic automation workflows. Missing for 10: independent/hands-on corroboration of the CLI's reliability, no mention of AI-agent-specific integrations or MCP-style tooling, and no detail on scripting API depth or language bindings.

   • [claimed-docs] “enables you to securely retrieve secrets and other items across scripts, deployments, and continuous integration/ continuous delivery (CI/CD…”
   • [claimed-docs] “the CLI enables you to securely retrieve secrets and other items across scripts, deployments, and continuous integration/ continuous deliver…”
   • [claimed-docs] “View, create, update, and delete items including passwords, secure notes, credit cards, identities, WiFi entries, custom items, and stored S…”
   • [probe] “official CLI documented at https://proton.me/blog/proton-pass-cli”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

5. ai-native userDrive the product through a documented public API

   weight 3 · round to Proton Pass
   Authy!disputedcontradicted2/10

   Twilio's own docs describe an SDK/API for integrating Authy (authy-docs-1, authy-docs-13), but a direct probe of the same page shows the Authy API is deprecated and 'closed to new customers' with 'no programmatic surface remains open to new integrations' (authy-probe-rt-1), meaning an AI-native user cannot actually drive Authy via a documented public API today. Missing for 10: an open, actively maintained public API for new integrations, migration path documentation usable by AI agents, and independent confirmation of working programmatic access.

   • [claimed-docs] “we provide an SDK for common web languages. If your language is supported, it's the fastest way to get started.”
   • [claimed-docs] “So you don't have to use the Authy API directly to integrate two-factor authentication into your app, we provide an SDK for common web langu…”
   • [probe] “PROBE runtime (recorded 2026-09-15): Twilio's own docs page carries the deprecation notice verbatim — 'The Authy API is now closed to new cu…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Proton Pass~partialprobed5/10

   Proton Pass offers a CLI for CRUD operations on vaults and items (passwords, notes, SSH keys, etc.) usable in scripts/CI pipelines, which provides programmatic access, but this is a CLI wrapper rather than a documented public REST/GraphQL API with SDKs, and llms.txt/docs.md probes both 404. missing for 10: a formal public API specification (REST/GraphQL/SDK), API reference docs, and independent developer corroboration of programmatic/agentic use beyond the CLI.

   • [claimed-docs] “enables you to securely retrieve secrets and other items across scripts, deployments, and continuous integration/ continuous delivery (CI/CD…”
   • [claimed-docs] “Create, read, update, and delete vaults”
   • [claimed-docs] “the CLI enables you to securely retrieve secrets and other items across scripts, deployments, and continuous integration/ continuous deliver…”
   • [claimed-docs] “View, create, update, and delete items including passwords, secure notes, credit cards, identities, WiFi entries, custom items, and stored S…”
   • [probe] “PROBE llms.txt: HTTP 404 at https://proton.me/llms.txt”
   • [probe] “PROBE docs-md: HTTP 404 at https://proton.me/support/pass.md”
   • [probe] “official CLI documented at https://proton.me/blog/proton-pass-cli”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

6. ai-native userIssue scoped/least-privilege API credentials for an agent

   weight 2 · round drawn
   Authy—none0/10

   The axis applies to this product kind (peer products hold positive or none verdicts on this story), so lack of evidence for an applicable capability is "none", never "na". (na/none harmonized at arena bring-up — see pipeline/scripts/na-harmonize.ts.)

   ⚑ flag

   Proton Pass—none0/10

   Proton Pass CLI supports retrieving secrets/items for CI/CD and vault-level CRUD, but there is no evidence of issuing scoped or least-privilege API credentials/tokens specifically for an AI agent (e.g., fine-grained scopes, agent-specific permission tiers). Vaults provide organizational grouping, not credential scoping mechanisms for automated agents.

   • [claimed-docs] “enables you to securely retrieve secrets and other items across scripts, deployments, and continuous integration/ continuous delivery (CI/CD…”
   • [claimed-docs] “Create, read, update, and delete vaults”
   • [claimed-docs] “the CLI enables you to securely retrieve secrets and other items across scripts, deployments, and continuous integration/ continuous deliver…”
   • [claimed-docs] “View, create, update, and delete items including passwords, secure notes, credit cards, identities, WiFi entries, custom items, and stored S…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

7. ai-native userBuild against official SDKs

   weight 2 · round to Authy
   Authy!disputedcontradicted3/10

   Twilio's docs claim official SDKs for common web languages to integrate Authy 2FA (authy-docs-1, authy-docs-13), but the same docs page also states the Authy API is closed to new customers and being deprecated in favor of Verify v2, meaning no new AI-native integration can actually be built against it. Missing for 10: evidence of an actively maintained, open-to-new-customers SDK, and any agentic/AI-specific tooling or examples.

   • [claimed-docs] “we provide an SDK for common web languages. If your language is supported, it's the fastest way to get started.”
   • [claimed-docs] “So you don't have to use the Authy API directly to integrate two-factor authentication into your app, we provide an SDK for common web langu…”
   • [probe] “PROBE runtime (recorded 2026-09-15): Twilio's own docs page carries the deprecation notice verbatim — 'The Authy API is now closed to new cu…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Proton Pass—none0/10

   Evidence shows only a CLI tool for secrets retrieval in CI/CD pipelines, not a developer SDK for building applications; no mention of SDKs, API libraries, or language bindings for programmatic integration exists in the evidence pack.

   ⚑ flag

8. ai-native userSubscribe to events via webhooks

   weight 2 · round drawn
   Authy—none0/10

   No evidence of any webhook subscription capability in Authy's docs or community reports; the product's API is deprecated with no new programmatic integrations mentioned. This is a fair axis for an authentication/API platform, but no support is documented.

   • [claimed-docs] “we provide an SDK for common web languages. If your language is supported, it's the fastest way to get started.”
   • [probe] “PROBE runtime (recorded 2026-09-15): Twilio's own docs page carries the deprecation notice verbatim — 'The Authy API is now closed to new cu…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Proton Pass—none0/10

   No evidence of any webhook or event subscription mechanism; Proton Pass offers a CLI for CRUD operations but nothing about push/webhook notifications. Missing for 10: any webhook API, event subscription mechanism, or documentation referencing such a feature.

   ⚑ flag

Agentic features

1. ai-native userSet up automations that run autonomously in the background

   weight 2 · round drawn
   Authy—none0/10

   The axis applies to this product kind (peer products hold positive or none verdicts on this story), so lack of evidence for an applicable capability is "none", never "na". (na/none harmonized at arena bring-up — see pipeline/scripts/na-harmonize.ts.)

   ⚑ flag

   Proton Pass—none0/10

   The axis applies to this product kind (peer products hold positive or none verdicts on this story), so lack of evidence for an applicable capability is "none", never "na". (na/none harmonized at arena bring-up — see pipeline/scripts/na-harmonize.ts.)

   ⚑ flag

2. ai-native userOperate the product with natural-language commands

   weight 2 · round drawn
   Authy—none0/10

   The axis applies to this product kind (peer products hold positive or none verdicts on this story), so lack of evidence for an applicable capability is "none", never "na". (na/none harmonized at arena bring-up — see pipeline/scripts/na-harmonize.ts.)

   ⚑ flag

   Proton Pass—none0/10

   Proton Pass offers a CLI for scripted secret retrieval and CRUD operations, but there is no evidence of natural-language command support, AI assistant integration, or conversational interface anywhere in the docs or community discussion. Missing for 10: any NL command parsing, chat/AI interface, or agentic natural-language control.

   ⚑ flag

Api quality

1. ai-native userExplore an interactive API reference with runnable examples

   weight 2 · round drawn
   Authy—none0/10

   No evidence of an interactive API reference with runnable examples for Authy; docs pack only describes SDKs and app features, and the Authy API itself is now closed/deprecated in favor of Verify, with no mention of interactive docs or runnable code samples.

   • [claimed-docs] “we provide an SDK for common web languages. If your language is supported, it's the fastest way to get started.”
   • [claimed-docs] “So you don't have to use the Authy API directly to integrate two-factor authentication into your app, we provide an SDK for common web langu…”
   • [probe] “PROBE runtime (recorded 2026-09-15): Twilio's own docs page carries the deprecation notice verbatim — 'The Authy API is now closed to new cu…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Proton Pass—none0/10

   No evidence of an interactive API reference or runnable examples; documentation covers CLI usage and product features only, and probes for docs/llms.txt endpoints returned 404. Missing for 10: interactive API reference, runnable code examples, developer API docs portal.

   • [probe] “PROBE llms.txt: HTTP 404 at https://proton.me/llms.txt”
   • [probe] “PROBE docs-md: HTTP 404 at https://proton.me/support/pass.md”
   • [probe] “official CLI documented at https://proton.me/blog/proton-pass-cli”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

2. ai-native userDownload a machine-readable API spec (OpenAPI or equivalent)

   weight 2 · round drawn
   Authy—none0/10

   Evidence only mentions SDKs and API docs (Verify/Authy), with no mention of a downloadable OpenAPI/Swagger spec or other machine-readable API definition; the Authy API is also noted as deprecated with no new integrations possible.

   • [claimed-docs] “we provide an SDK for common web languages. If your language is supported, it's the fastest way to get started.”
   • [claimed-docs] “So you don't have to use the Authy API directly to integrate two-factor authentication into your app, we provide an SDK for common web langu…”
   • [probe] “PROBE runtime (recorded 2026-09-15): Twilio's own docs page carries the deprecation notice verbatim — 'The Authy API is now closed to new cu…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Proton Pass—none0/10

   No evidence of a machine-readable API spec (OpenAPI or similar); only a CLI tool for scripts/CI/CD is documented, and probes for llms.txt and docs-md endpoints both returned 404.

   • [probe] “PROBE llms.txt: HTTP 404 at https://proton.me/llms.txt”
   • [probe] “PROBE docs-md: HTTP 404 at https://proton.me/support/pass.md”
   • [claimed-docs] “enables you to securely retrieve secrets and other items across scripts, deployments, and continuous integration/ continuous delivery (CI/CD…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

3. ai-native userRely on versioned APIs with a documented deprecation policy

   weight 2 · round to Authy
   Authy~partialprobed4/10

   Twilio's docs do carry an explicit deprecation notice for the Authy API, stating it is closed to new customers and pointing to a migration guide toward Verify v2, which is a documented deprecation policy of sorts. However there is no evidence of a broader versioning scheme (e.g., v1/v2 semantics, changelogs, sunset timelines) beyond this one-time 'this API is dying' notice, and it applies to abandonment rather than an ongoing API lifecycle policy. missing for 10: evidence of a formal API versioning scheme, sunset/timeline commitments, changelog practices, and confirmation that Verify (the successor) itself has a documented deprecation policy.

   • [claimed-docs] “For more information about migration, see Migrating from Authy to Verify for SMS”
   • [probe] “PROBE runtime (recorded 2026-09-15): Twilio's own docs page carries the deprecation notice verbatim — 'The Authy API is now closed to new cu…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Proton Pass—none0/10

   The axis applies to this product kind (peer products hold positive or none verdicts on this story), so lack of evidence for an applicable capability is "none", never "na". (na/none harmonized at arena bring-up — see pipeline/scripts/na-harmonize.ts.)

   ⚑ flag

1. ai-native userPerform bulk operations across many items at once

   weight 2 · round to Proton Pass
   Authy—none0/10

   The axis applies to this product kind (peer products hold positive or none verdicts on this story), so lack of evidence for an applicable capability is "none", never "na". (na/none harmonized at arena bring-up — see pipeline/scripts/na-harmonize.ts.)

   ⚑ flag

   Proton Pass~partialclaimed5/10

   The official CLI supports scripted CRUD on vaults and items (passwords, notes, SSH keys, etc.) which could be used to script bulk operations, and the import/export tools allow migrating many items at once. However, there is no documented explicit 'bulk edit/delete/tag' feature or batch API, and no community evidence of anyone actually scripting bulk operations at scale. Missing for 10: dedicated bulk-action API/UI, documented batch limits, and independent confirmation of large-scale scripted use.

   • [claimed-docs] “enables you to securely retrieve secrets and other items across scripts, deployments, and continuous integration/ continuous delivery (CI/CD…”
   • [claimed-docs] “the CLI enables you to securely retrieve secrets and other items across scripts, deployments, and continuous integration/ continuous deliver…”
   • [claimed-docs] “View, create, update, and delete items including passwords, secure notes, credit cards, identities, WiFi entries, custom items, and stored S…”
   • [claimed-docs] “Create, read, update, and delete vaults”
   • [claimed-docs] “With our import tool, you can migrate passwords and other items from most major password managers in just a few minutes.”
   • [claimed-docs] “You have three options for export: 1. A ZIP file containing a PGP-encrypted JSON file 2. An unencrypted ZIP file 3. A CSV file”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

1. ai-native userDo everything through the API that I can do in the UI

   weight 2 · round to Proton Pass
   Authy—none0/10

   Authy's API (the Twilio Authy API) is explicitly deprecated and closed to new customers per Twilio's own docs, and community reports confirm there is no way to export/manage 2FA data programmatically outside the mobile/desktop UI—users describe hacky workarounds just to extract seeds. There is no evidence of a supported API that mirrors the app's UI capabilities (device management, backup, sync, disabling installs, etc.).

   • [probe] “PROBE runtime (recorded 2026-09-15): Twilio's own docs page carries the deprecation notice verbatim — 'The Authy API is now closed to new cu…”
   • [community] “Authy makes it hard to migrate away. Anyone know how to get the seed of the 2FA codes? Is there really no export option?”
   • [community] “I just migrated off of Authy last week... Never liked it but they make it extremely difficult to export your data. Twilio really doesn't wan…”
   • [community] “They intentionally make it really hard to migrate your data off their app under the premise of 'security'. Now they are EOL'ing desktop apps…”
   • [community] “Note how insane the Authy export instructions are: 'Paste in a bunch of code to an Electron app running Authy in debug mode to dump the toke…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Proton Pass~partialprobed5/10

   Proton Pass ships a CLI/API that supports CRUD on vaults and items (passwords, notes, cards, identities, SSH keys, custom items), enabling scripted/CI access similar to core UI functions. However, there's no evidence the CLI/API exposes other UI capabilities like vault sharing, TOTP generation, Pass Monitor/Sentinel checks, alias management, or emergency access. Missing for 10: API coverage for sharing, TOTP/2FA, monitoring, aliases, emergency access, and any independent confirmation of API completeness.

   • [claimed-docs] “enables you to securely retrieve secrets and other items across scripts, deployments, and continuous integration/ continuous delivery (CI/CD…”
   • [claimed-docs] “Create, read, update, and delete vaults”
   • [claimed-docs] “the CLI enables you to securely retrieve secrets and other items across scripts, deployments, and continuous integration/ continuous deliver…”
   • [claimed-docs] “View, create, update, and delete items including passwords, secure notes, credit cards, identities, WiFi entries, custom items, and stored S…”
   • [probe] “official CLI documented at https://proton.me/blog/proton-pass-cli”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

2. ai-native userExport all of my data in open formats and leave

   weight 3 · round to Proton Pass
   Authy!disputedcontradicted2/10

   Authy provides no official open-format export tool; community reports (authy-comm-3, authy-comm-4, authy-comm-10, authy-comm-18) describe deliberately obstructed migration, requiring hacky Electron debug-mode QR dumps (authy-comm-14) rather than any documented export feature, directly contradicting any implicit claim of open portability. missing for 10: any first-party documentation of a data export feature or open format, evidence of a supported 'leave the platform' workflow, and confirmation that TOTP seeds/secrets can be retrieved without workarounds.

   • [community] “Authy makes it hard to migrate away. Anyone know how to get the seed of the 2FA codes? Is there really no export option?”
   • [community] “I just migrated off of Authy last week... Never liked it but they make it extremely difficult to export your data. Twilio really doesn't wan…”
   • [community] “They intentionally make it really hard to migrate your data off their app under the premise of 'security'. Now they are EOL'ing desktop apps…”
   • [community] “Note how insane the Authy export instructions are: 'Paste in a bunch of code to an Electron app running Authy in debug mode to dump the toke…”
   • [community] “I will also never forgive Authy for removing desktop support with near immediate deprecation and no way to export off their platform. I will…”
   • [claimed-docs] “Use our backup feature incase you lose your phone. We encrypt your data, and only decrypt on the devices using a password only you know.”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Proton Pass✓fullclaimed7/10

   Proton Pass supports data export in multiple open, portable formats (unencrypted ZIP, CSV, PGP-encrypted JSON) allowing users to leave with their data, and also offers an import tool for migrating in from other managers. Missing for 10: independent hands-on verification of export completeness/fidelity, and no evidence of bulk API/CLI-based export for programmatic 'leave' workflows beyond CLI CRUD operations.

   • [claimed-docs] “If you want to use your passwords elsewhere or create a separate hardcopy, you can easily export your data from Proton Pass.”
   • [claimed-docs] “You have three options for export: 1. A ZIP file containing a PGP-encrypted JSON file 2. An unencrypted ZIP file 3. A CSV file”
   • [claimed-docs] “With our import tool, you can migrate passwords and other items from most major password managers in just a few minutes.”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

3. ai-native userRead the product's source under an open license

   weight 2 · round to Proton Pass
   Authy—none0/10

   The axis applies to this product kind (peer products hold positive or none verdicts on this story), so lack of evidence for an applicable capability is "none", never "na". (na/none harmonized at arena bring-up — see pipeline/scripts/na-harmonize.ts.)

   ⚑ flag

   Proton Pass~partialcommunity5/10

   Community evidence confirms Proton Pass client apps are open source on GitHub (protonpass org), but users note this covers only the clients, not the full product/server-side, and there was confusion over whether it was truly open-sourced. No first-party docs in the pack mention a license or open-source repo at all. Missing for 10: official documentation citing the open-source license, confirmation that server/backend code is open, and clarity on license terms.

   • [community] “It seems only the clients are open source? https://github.com/orgs/protonpass/repositories”
   • [community] “Am I correct in believing that they haven't open-sourced Proton Pass yet?... Their official announcement post says it's now open source, how…”
   • [community] “Please note that we do have encrypted notes... And it is open source: https://github.com/protonpass”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

4. ai-native userSelf-host the core product

   weight 3 · round drawn
   Authy—none0/10

   The axis applies to this product kind (peer products hold positive or none verdicts on this story), so lack of evidence for an applicable capability is "none", never "na". (na/none harmonized at arena bring-up — see pipeline/scripts/na-harmonize.ts.)

   ⚑ flag

   Proton Pass—none0/10

   No evidence anywhere in the docs pack of a self-hosted server option; Proton Pass is offered only as a hosted SaaS with client apps, and community comments confirm only the client apps are open source while the backend/server is closed ('only the clients are open source').

   • [community] “It seems only the clients are open source? https://github.com/orgs/protonpass/repositories”
   • [community] “Am I correct in believing that they haven't open-sourced Proton Pass yet?... Their official announcement post says it's now open source, how…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

Storage

1. everyday userThe app stores passkeys and signs me into websites and apps with them, not just TOTP codes

   weight 3 · round to Proton Pass
   Authy—none0/10

   Evidence only shows Twilio's separate Verify API service listing 'Passkeys' as one of many verification factors developers can integrate (authy-docs-2), not that the Authy consumer app itself stores user passkeys or lets users sign into websites/apps with them. All Authy app feature docs (docs-3 through docs-12) describe only TOTP/2FA sync, backups, and device management — no passkey storage or autofill capability is mentioned, and community evidence never discusses passkey sign-in via Authy.

   • [claimed-docs] “Quickly verify users via SMS, Passkeys, Silent Network Auth, Voice, WhatsApp, TOTP, Push, Silent Device Approval, and Email.”
   • [claimed-docs] “Sync 2FA across mobile and tablet.”
   • [claimed-docs] “Use TouchID, PIN protection and passwords to protect access to your 2FA tokens.”
   • [claimed-docs] “Easily capture 2FA QR codes from Facebook, Amazon, Google, Microsoft, Dropbox and many more.”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Proton Pass~partialclaimed6/10

   Docs confirm Proton Pass supports passkeys for passwordless authentication and separately supports TOTP code generation, indicating both capabilities coexist rather than TOTP-only. However, there is no detailed description of the sign-in autofill flow for passkeys or independent/hands-on confirmation that passkey sign-in works reliably across sites/apps. Missing for 10: hands-on/community validation of passkey autofill and sign-in success, cross-platform passkey sync confirmation, and detail on browser/app integration for passkey use.

   • [claimed-docs] “Passkeys allow you to authenticate yourself for online accounts without using passwords or passphrases.”
   • [claimed-docs] “Proton Pass can securely generate TOTP codes for websites that you have saved login details for.”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

Sync

1. power userMy passkeys sync across ecosystems — iOS, Android, Windows, Linux, browsers — instead of being locked to one platform vendor

   weight 2 · round to Proton Pass
   Authy—none0/10

   Authy's own docs describe syncing TOTP/2FA tokens across mobile/tablet devices (authy-docs-3, authy-docs-4), not passkeys; the only 'Passkeys' mention is in Twilio Verify API docs, which is a separate developer verification service, not evidence Authy itself stores or syncs WebAuthn passkeys across iOS/Android/Windows/Linux/browsers. No evidence shows Authy functioning as a cross-platform passkey manager.

   • [claimed-docs] “Quickly verify users via SMS, Passkeys, Silent Network Auth, Voice, WhatsApp, TOTP, Push, Silent Device Approval, and Email.”
   • [claimed-docs] “Sync 2FA across mobile and tablet.”
   • [claimed-docs] “On any device. Your phone, tablet, even your Apple Watch.”
   • [claimed-docs] “It's available for iOS, Android, macOS, Windows, and Linux.”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Proton Pass~partialcommunity4/10

   Proton Pass confirms passkey support (proton-pass-docs-8) and offers apps across iOS, Android, browsers, and a desktop app (with offline access per proton-pass-docs-9), implying cross-platform sync of vault items including passkeys. However, there's no explicit documentation confirming passkeys specifically sync across all platforms (vs. just being stored), and community comments note desktop app limitations/lack thereof at the time (proton-pass-comm-2, proton-pass-comm-14), raising doubt about full ecosystem parity. Missing for 10: explicit cross-platform passkey sync confirmation, Linux/Windows native app evidence beyond browser extensions, and independent hands-on verification that passkeys created on one platform are usable on another.

   • [claimed-docs] “Passkeys allow you to authenticate yourself for online accounts without using passwords or passphrases.”
   • [claimed-docs] “You don’t need to do anything to access Proton Pass offline. Everything in your vaults is accessible whether you’re connected to the interne…”
   • [community] “If you are paying for Pass Plus or Proton Unlimited then you have integrated 2FA/TOTP which Bitwarden also makes you pay for... And no deskt…”
   • [community] “Pity it's only available on iOS and Android as apps and as browser extensions elsewhere. I would've been interested to check out a desktop p…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

Export

1. power userExport all my TOTP secrets in an open, readable format and leave for another app whenever I choose — no lock-in

   weight 3 · round to Proton Pass
   Authy!disputedcontradicted2/10

   Authy provides no official export feature for TOTP secrets, and community reports (authy-comm-3, authy-comm-4, authy-comm-10, authy-comm-18) confirm the app deliberately blocks migration/export, with users resorting to hacky workarounds like extracting keys via a deprecated Chrome extension debug mode (authy-comm-13, authy-comm-14). Docs never claim an export feature exists — only backup/sync within Authy's own ecosystem (authy-docs-5, authy-docs-3). missing for 10: any documented open/standard export format, first-party export tool, official migration path preserving secrets, and evidence contradicting the well-documented lock-in behavior.

   • [claimed-docs] “Use our backup feature incase you lose your phone. We encrypt your data, and only decrypt on the devices using a password only you know.”
   • [community] “Authy makes it hard to migrate away. Anyone know how to get the seed of the 2FA codes? Is there really no export option?”
   • [community] “I just migrated off of Authy last week... Never liked it but they make it extremely difficult to export your data. Twilio really doesn't wan…”
   • [community] “They intentionally make it really hard to migrate your data off their app under the premise of 'security'. Now they are EOL'ing desktop apps…”
   • [community] “After a lot of trouble, I was able to extract my private keys from Authy by installing their deprecated Chrome extension and using some hack…”
   • [community] “Note how insane the Authy export instructions are: 'Paste in a bunch of code to an Electron app running Authy in debug mode to dump the toke…”
   • [community] “I will also never forgive Authy for removing desktop support with near immediate deprecation and no way to export off their platform. I will…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Proton Pass~partialclaimed5/10

   Proton Pass docs confirm a general data-export feature with multiple output options (PGP-encrypted ZIP, unencrypted ZIP, CSV), which supports the 'open, readable format' portability need, but no evidence explicitly confirms that TOTP secrets/seeds specifically are included in these exports (as opposed to being locked to Proton's own TOTP display). No community or hands-on report verifies successful TOTP secret export and re-import elsewhere. missing for 10: explicit confirmation that TOTP seeds are included in CSV/JSON export, independent verification that exported TOTP secrets can be imported into another app.

   • [claimed-docs] “If you want to use your passwords elsewhere or create a separate hardcopy, you can easily export your data from Proton Pass.”
   • [claimed-docs] “You have three options for export: 1. A ZIP file containing a PGP-encrypted JSON file 2. An unencrypted ZIP file 3. A CSV file”
   • [claimed-docs] “Proton Pass can securely generate TOTP codes for websites that you have saved login details for.”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

Import

1. power userImport tokens in bulk from other authenticator apps instead of re-enrolling every account by hand

   weight 2 · round to Proton Pass
   Authy—none0/10

   Evidence shows Authy lets users add individual accounts via QR code capture (authy-docs-12) but nothing indicates a bulk import feature that pulls multiple existing tokens/accounts from other authenticator apps at once. Community evidence instead focuses on Authy making it hard to export data out, which is the opposite direction from what the story asks about.

   • [claimed-docs] “Easily capture 2FA QR codes from Facebook, Amazon, Google, Microsoft, Dropbox and many more.”
   • [community] “Authy makes it hard to migrate away. Anyone know how to get the seed of the 2FA codes? Is there really no export option?”
   • [community] “I just migrated off of Authy last week... Never liked it but they make it extremely difficult to export your data. Twilio really doesn't wan…”
   • [community] “They intentionally make it really hard to migrate your data off their app under the premise of 'security'. Now they are EOL'ing desktop apps…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Proton Pass~partialclaimed4/10

   Proton Pass documents a general import tool that migrates passwords and other items from most major password managers, and it can generate TOTP codes for saved logins, but there is no explicit evidence of bulk import specifically from dedicated authenticator apps or of preserving TOTP secrets during that import process. missing for 10: explicit documentation of bulk TOTP import from authenticator apps, confirmation that the import tool carries over 2FA secrets rather than just passwords, independent or hands-on confirmation of successful token migration.

   • [claimed-docs] “With our import tool, you can migrate passwords and other items from most major password managers in just a few minutes.”
   • [claimed-docs] “Unlike other password managers, Proton Pass uses end-to-end encryption on every field you fill for the items you create (usernames, website …”
   • [claimed-docs] “Proton Pass can securely generate TOTP codes for websites that you have saved login details for.”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

Migration

1. everyday userMoving to a new phone transfers all my tokens in one guided step

   weight 2 · round to Authy
   Authy✓fullcommunity7/10

   Authy's own docs describe encrypted cloud backup, multi-device sync, and 'add new device with SMS/voice/existing device approval' as the guided path to move 2FA tokens to a new phone, which directly matches this story (authy-docs-3,4,5,10). Community comments about difficulty exporting data are about moving to a *different app*, not the in-ecosystem new-phone transfer, so they don't contradict this specific flow. Missing for 10: independent/hands-on confirmation that the new-phone restore process itself is smooth and single-step (most community friction reports concern cross-app export, not device-to-device transfer).

   • [claimed-docs] “Sync 2FA across mobile and tablet.”
   • [claimed-docs] “On any device. Your phone, tablet, even your Apple Watch.”
   • [claimed-docs] “Use our backup feature incase you lose your phone. We encrypt your data, and only decrypt on the devices using a password only you know.”
   • [claimed-docs] “Add new devices with SMS, voice or existing device approval.”
   • [community] “I started using Authy long ago because it supports multiple devices and isn't linked to any other account (Google/Microsoft).”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Proton Pass~partialclaimed3/10

   Proton Pass stores TOTP secrets in E2E-encrypted vaults that sync via the cloud (docs-5, docs-9, docs-16), which implies that logging into a new phone would pull down existing 2FA tokens, but no evidence explicitly documents a guided 'new device setup' or migration wizard for phones. The only explicit migration flows described are import/export between different password manager products (docs-3, docs-4, docs-11), not device-to-device transfer. missing for 10: explicit documentation of a phone-to-phone onboarding/migration step, confirmation that TOTP tokens sync automatically without manual re-entry, and any hands-on account of switching phones.

   • [claimed-docs] “Proton Pass can securely generate TOTP codes for websites that you have saved login details for.”
   • [claimed-docs] “You don’t need to do anything to access Proton Pass offline. Everything in your vaults is accessible whether you’re connected to the interne…”
   • [claimed-docs] “Vaults can be used to organize items — in the example above, we have a vault for personal items and one for work items.”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

1. ai-native userChoose where my data is stored (region/residency)

   weight 2 · round drawn
   Authy—none0/10

   The axis applies to this product kind (peer products hold positive or none verdicts on this story), so lack of evidence for an applicable capability is "none", never "na". (na/none harmonized at arena bring-up — see pipeline/scripts/na-harmonize.ts.)

   ⚑ flag

   Proton Pass—none0/10

   No evidence pack item mentions data residency, regional data storage options, or any control over where user data is physically stored; Proton Pass docs cover encryption, vaults, CLI, and export but not region selection. Missing for 10: any documentation of data residency/region choice, EU-only or multi-region storage options, or admin controls for data location.

   ⚑ flag

2. ai-native userPrevent my data from being used to train AI models

   weight 3 · round to Proton Pass
   Authy—none0/10

   The axis applies to this product kind (peer products hold positive or none verdicts on this story), so lack of evidence for an applicable capability is "none", never "na". (na/none harmonized at arena bring-up — see pipeline/scripts/na-harmonize.ts.)

   ⚑ flag

   Proton Pass~partialclaimed4/10

   Proton Pass's end-to-end encryption of all vault fields (docs-10) structurally means Proton cannot access plaintext user data, which would prevent it from being used to train AI models, but there is no explicit policy statement addressing AI training data use. Missing for 10: an explicit privacy policy or documentation statement about AI training opt-out/data usage, and independent confirmation of this claim.

   • [claimed-docs] “Unlike other password managers, Proton Pass uses end-to-end encryption on every field you fill for the items you create (usernames, website …”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

3. ai-native userControl data retention and deletion

   weight 2 · round to Proton Pass
   Authy—none0/10

   No documentation shows Authy giving users control over data retention/export/deletion; instead multiple independent reports describe Twilio deliberately blocking data export ('no export option', 'extremely difficult to export your data') and forcing convoluted workarounds to extract keys, the opposite of user-controlled retention/deletion.

   • [community] “Authy makes it hard to migrate away. Anyone know how to get the seed of the 2FA codes? Is there really no export option?”
   • [community] “I just migrated off of Authy last week... Never liked it but they make it extremely difficult to export your data. Twilio really doesn't wan…”
   • [community] “They intentionally make it really hard to migrate your data off their app under the premise of 'security'. Now they are EOL'ing desktop apps…”
   • [community] “After a lot of trouble, I was able to extract my private keys from Authy by installing their deprecated Chrome extension and using some hack…”
   • [community] “Note how insane the Authy export instructions are: 'Paste in a bunch of code to an Electron app running Authy in debug mode to dump the toke…”
   • [community] “I will also never forgive Authy for removing desktop support with near immediate deprecation and no way to export off their platform. I will…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Proton Pass~partialclaimed5/10

   Docs show users can create/read/update/delete vaults and items via the CLI/app, and can export or migrate data before deleting it, giving concrete control over stored data. However there is no explicit documentation on account-level data retention policies, deletion timelines, or how long Proton retains deleted data, which is central to a full 'control retention and deletion' story. Missing for 10: explicit retention-period/account-deletion policy documentation, independent confirmation that deleted data is purged.

   • [claimed-docs] “Create, read, update, and delete vaults”
   • [claimed-docs] “View, create, update, and delete items including passwords, secure notes, credit cards, identities, WiFi entries, custom items, and stored S…”
   • [claimed-docs] “If you want to use your passwords elsewhere or create a separate hardcopy, you can easily export your data from Proton Pass.”
   • [claimed-docs] “You have three options for export: 1. A ZIP file containing a PGP-encrypted JSON file 2. An unencrypted ZIP file 3. A CSV file”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

4. ai-native userOpt out of telemetry and usage tracking

   weight 2 · round to Proton Pass
   Authy—none0/10

   The axis applies to this product kind (peer products hold positive or none verdicts on this story), so lack of evidence for an applicable capability is "none", never "na". (na/none harmonized at arena bring-up — see pipeline/scripts/na-harmonize.ts.)

   ⚑ flag

   Proton Pass~partialcommunity4/10

   Community evidence confirms telemetry exists in the browser extension and can be disabled, but only via Proton account settings, not directly within the extension itself, indicating a real but limited opt-out mechanism (proton-pass-comm-13). No first-party documentation from Proton Pass describes a formal telemetry/opt-out policy or setting. missing for 10: official docs on telemetry settings, in-extension opt-out toggle, confirmation of no tracking by default.

   • [community] “There's still nothing about the telemetry in the browser extension?... telemetry data is anonymous, but it's always sent to the remote endpo…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

App lock

1. everyday userThe app itself locks behind biometrics or a PIN, so a borrowed phone doesn't expose my codes

   weight 2 · round to Authy
   Authy✓fullcommunity8/10

   Twilio's official docs claim TouchID, PIN, and password protection guarding access to 2FA tokens, and a community user independently corroborates using Face ID to lock the entire app on their phone. This directly matches the story of biometric/PIN app-lock preventing exposure on a borrowed phone. Missing for 10: more independent hands-on verification of PIN-specific lock behavior and no detail on lockout/failure edge cases.

   • [claimed-docs] “Use TouchID, PIN protection and passwords to protect access to your 2FA tokens.”
   • [community] “I use Authy with Face ID protecting the entire app on my phone... they'd still need the 2FA codes from my phone [even if password manager co…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Proton Pass—none0/10

   No evidence pack item mentions app-level biometric or PIN lock for Proton Pass; the closest related items cover offline vault access, 2FA/TOTP generation, and encryption, but none address a lock screen or app-level authentication gate. Missing for 10: any mention of biometric unlock, app PIN lock, or auto-lock timeout feature.

   ⚑ flag

Audits

1. security engineerThe vendor publishes independent security audits of the app and its sync protocol

   weight 2 · round drawn
   Authy—none0/10

   The evidence pack contains no vendor claim of independent third-party security audits of the app or its sync protocol; documentation focuses on feature descriptions (SDKs, sync, backup) with no audit reports or security whitepapers cited. Community evidence discusses a data breach and a slow-to-fix vulnerability, but these do not substitute for published audit evidence and there's no vendor claim to dispute.

   ⚑ flag

   Proton Pass—none0/10

   No evidence of any independent third-party security audit report, pentest, or audit of the sync protocol; evidence only covers feature docs (encryption claims, Sentinel, Monitor) and open-source status debates in community threads. Community comments even question whether the client is fully open source, but no audit report is cited or linked anywhere.

   ⚑ flag

Monitoring

1. power userThe app warns me when a service I use is breached or a stored credential is weak, reused, or exposed

   weight 2 · round to Proton Pass
   Authy—none0/10

   No evidence Authy monitors for breached services, weak/reused/exposed credentials, or provides any security-posture alerts; evidence only covers 2FA sync, backup, device management, and separate breach news about Authy itself (not a feature it offers users).

   ⚑ flag

   Proton Pass✓fullclaimed8/10

   Pass Monitor explicitly scans the dark web for credential leaks (breach detection), checks password health (weak/reused detection), and flags accounts missing 2FA, directly matching the story; this is documented as a core built-in feature rather than a third-party tool. Missing for 10: independent hands-on verification of Pass Monitor's accuracy/coverage and detail on exposed-credential alerting granularity beyond docs claims.

   • [claimed-docs] “Pass Monitor is a security feature in Proton Pass that scans the dark web for credential leaks, checks on the health of your passwords, and …”
   • [claimed-docs] “Pass Monitor is a security feature in Proton Pass that scans the dark web for credential leaks, checks on the health of your passwords, and …”
   • [claimed-docs] “Proton Sentinel uses AI and human analysis to make it much harder for an attacker to take over your account.”
   • [claimed-docs] “Proton Sentinel is an advanced account protection program that provides maximum security for those who need it. It mitigates security threat…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

Push

1. it adminPush-based sign-in includes phishing defenses — number matching, location context, and admin-enforced MFA policies

   weight 2 · round drawn
   Authy—none0/10

   Evidence only shows generic Push and Silent Device Approval support (authy-docs-2, authy-docs-15) with no mention of number matching, location context, or admin-enforced MFA policy controls; the Authy API itself is also noted as deprecated for new integrations (authy-probe-rt-1). Missing for 10: any documentation of number matching, location-based risk signals, or admin policy enforcement for push sign-in.

   • [claimed-docs] “Quickly verify users via SMS, Passkeys, Silent Network Auth, Voice, WhatsApp, TOTP, Push, Silent Device Approval, and Email.”
   • [claimed-docs] “Push and Silent Device Approval (iOS, Android, Web)”
   • [probe] “PROBE runtime (recorded 2026-09-15): Twilio's own docs page carries the deprecation notice verbatim — 'The Authy API is now closed to new cu…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Proton Pass—none0/10

   The axis applies to this product kind (peer products hold positive or none verdicts on this story), so lack of evidence for an applicable capability is "none", never "na". (na/none harmonized at arena bring-up — see pipeline/scripts/na-harmonize.ts.)

   ⚑ flag

Server

1. it adminSelf-host the sync server on my own infrastructure and keep every secret inside my perimeter

   weight 2 · round drawn
   Authy—none0/10

   The axis applies to this product kind (peer products hold positive or none verdicts on this story), so lack of evidence for an applicable capability is "none", never "na". (na/none harmonized at arena bring-up — see pipeline/scripts/na-harmonize.ts.)

   ⚑ flag

   Proton Pass—none0/10

   The axis applies to this product kind (peer products hold positive or none verdicts on this story), so lack of evidence for an applicable capability is "none", never "na". (na/none harmonized at arena bring-up — see pipeline/scripts/na-harmonize.ts.)

   ⚑ flag

Source

1. security engineerThe client apps are open source, so the code handling my seeds can be inspected and community-reviewed

   weight 2 · round to Proton Pass
   Authy—none0/10

   There is no evidence Authy's client apps are open source; evidence instead shows closed, proprietary apps with deliberately obstructed export/migration paths and hacky reverse-engineering required to extract seeds. This directly contradicts the premise of community-reviewable open-source code handling seeds.

   • [community] “Authy makes it hard to migrate away. Anyone know how to get the seed of the 2FA codes? Is there really no export option?”
   • [community] “I just migrated off of Authy last week... Never liked it but they make it extremely difficult to export your data. Twilio really doesn't wan…”
   • [community] “They intentionally make it really hard to migrate your data off their app under the premise of 'security'. Now they are EOL'ing desktop apps…”
   • [community] “After a lot of trouble, I was able to extract my private keys from Authy by installing their deprecated Chrome extension and using some hack…”
   • [community] “Note how insane the Authy export instructions are: 'Paste in a bunch of code to an Electron app running Authy in debug mode to dump the toke…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Proton Pass~partialcommunity6/10

   Community evidence confirms Proton Pass clients are open source with a public GitHub repo (github.com/protonpass), directly supporting inspectability of the code handling secrets. However, other community comments show confusion/skepticism about finding or verifying this ('haven't been able to find the repository', 'it seems only the clients are open source'), and there's no first-party doc in the pack explicitly stating open-source status or citing security audits. Missing for 10: first-party documentation confirming open-source licensing/repo, evidence of independent security audits or community code review of the seed-handling logic, and clarity on scope (client-only vs. broader).

   • [community] “Please note that we do have encrypted notes... And it is open source: https://github.com/protonpass”
   • [community] “It seems only the clients are open source? https://github.com/orgs/protonpass/repositories”
   • [community] “Am I correct in believing that they haven't open-sourced Proton Pass yet?... Their official announcement post says it's now open source, how…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

Automation

1. ai-native userAn agent can fetch a current TOTP code programmatically — via CLI or API — to complete a 2FA login inside an automated workflow

   weight 2 · round to Proton Pass
   Authy—none0/10

   Authy is a consumer authenticator app; there is no documented CLI/API for a user or agent to programmatically fetch their own current TOTP code, and Twilio's docs confirm the Authy API is deprecated and closed to new customers with no successor for this use case. Community evidence further shows Authy intentionally blocks exporting secrets/codes, requiring hacky workarounds (deprecated Chrome extension, debug-mode Electron hacks) rather than any supported programmatic access.

   • [probe] “PROBE runtime (recorded 2026-09-15): Twilio's own docs page carries the deprecation notice verbatim — 'The Authy API is now closed to new cu…”
   • [community] “Authy makes it hard to migrate away. Anyone know how to get the seed of the 2FA codes? Is there really no export option?”
   • [community] “I just migrated off of Authy last week... Never liked it but they make it extremely difficult to export your data. Twilio really doesn't wan…”
   • [community] “After a lot of trouble, I was able to extract my private keys from Authy by installing their deprecated Chrome extension and using some hack…”
   • [community] “Note how insane the Authy export instructions are: 'Paste in a bunch of code to an Electron app running Authy in debug mode to dump the toke…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Proton Pass~partialprobed4/10

   Proton Pass ships an official CLI documented for scripting/CI-CD use that can 'securely retrieve secrets and other items' (docs-1/14) and lists item types it can read (docs-15), but TOTP/2FA codes are not explicitly named among the retrievable item types, and no docs or community evidence confirm a CLI/API command that outputs a live TOTP code for use in an automated login flow. missing for 10: explicit CLI/API command or output field for TOTP codes, hands-on confirmation of an agent successfully pulling a 2FA code programmatically.

   • [claimed-docs] “enables you to securely retrieve secrets and other items across scripts, deployments, and continuous integration/ continuous delivery (CI/CD…”
   • [claimed-docs] “the CLI enables you to securely retrieve secrets and other items across scripts, deployments, and continuous integration/ continuous deliver…”
   • [claimed-docs] “View, create, update, and delete items including passwords, secure notes, credit cards, identities, WiFi entries, custom items, and stored S…”
   • [claimed-docs] “Proton Pass can securely generate TOTP codes for websites that you have saved login details for.”
   • [probe] “official CLI documented at https://proton.me/blog/proton-pass-cli”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

2. ai-native userExpose the vault through a local programmatic endpoint an agent can query for codes and secrets without screen-scraping the app

   weight 1 · round to Proton Pass
   Authy—none0/10

   No evidence Authy offers any local programmatic endpoint for agents to query codes/secrets; its API is closed to new customers and deprecated, and community reports describe the vault as deliberately hard to export via any means other than hacky manual extraction.

   • [probe] “PROBE runtime (recorded 2026-09-15): Twilio's own docs page carries the deprecation notice verbatim — 'The Authy API is now closed to new cu…”
   • [community] “After a lot of trouble, I was able to extract my private keys from Authy by installing their deprecated Chrome extension and using some hack…”
   • [community] “Note how insane the Authy export instructions are: 'Paste in a bunch of code to an Electron app running Authy in debug mode to dump the toke…”
   • [community] “I just migrated off of Authy last week... Never liked it but they make it extremely difficult to export your data. Twilio really doesn't wan…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Proton Pass~partialprobed6/10

   Proton Pass ships an official CLI that allows secure programmatic retrieval of secrets, passwords, SSH keys, and other items across scripts and CI/CD pipelines, which functions as a local endpoint an agent could query instead of screen-scraping the app. However, the docs don't explicitly confirm TOTP/2FA code retrieval via the CLI (2FA generation is only described in the app itself), and there is no mention of an agent-specific or MCP-style interface, nor independent hands-on verification of CLI use by AI agents. Missing for 10: explicit CLI support for TOTP code retrieval, agent/MCP-oriented interface documentation, independent corroboration of CLI usage in agentic workflows.

   • [claimed-docs] “enables you to securely retrieve secrets and other items across scripts, deployments, and continuous integration/ continuous delivery (CI/CD…”
   • [claimed-docs] “the CLI enables you to securely retrieve secrets and other items across scripts, deployments, and continuous integration/ continuous deliver…”
   • [claimed-docs] “View, create, update, and delete items including passwords, secure notes, credit cards, identities, WiFi entries, custom items, and stored S…”
   • [claimed-docs] “Proton Pass can securely generate TOTP codes for websites that you have saved login details for.”
   • [probe] “official CLI documented at https://proton.me/blog/proton-pass-cli”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

Browser

1. everyday userA browser extension autofills my TOTP codes and passkeys during login instead of making me retype them

   weight 2 · round to Proton Pass
   Authy—none0/10

   Evidence pack shows no current Authy browser extension for autofilling TOTP or passkeys; the only extension mentioned is a deprecated Chrome extension used via hacky workarounds to extract keys, not autofill. Authy's own product is a mobile/desktop authenticator app, and passkey support referenced is for Twilio Verify (a separate API product), not the Authy app/extension.

   • [community] “After a lot of trouble, I was able to extract my private keys from Authy by installing their deprecated Chrome extension and using some hack…”
   • [community] “Note how insane the Authy export instructions are: 'Paste in a bunch of code to an Electron app running Authy in debug mode to dump the toke…”
   • [claimed-docs] “Quickly verify users via SMS, Passkeys, Silent Network Auth, Voice, WhatsApp, TOTP, Push, Silent Device Approval, and Email.”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Proton Pass✓fullcommunity8/10

   Docs confirm TOTP code generation for saved logins and passkey support, and community evidence from an actual user confirms the browser extension autofills TOTP/2FA smoothly ('Proton Pass is my default for all 2FA. I love the browser extension, so easy and sleek'). Passkey autofill is documented but not independently corroborated with hands-on testing. Missing for 10: independent hands-on confirmation of passkey autofill specifically, and more detail on passkey UX in the extension.

   • [claimed-docs] “Proton Pass can securely generate TOTP codes for websites that you have saved login details for.”
   • [claimed-docs] “Passkeys allow you to authenticate yourself for online accounts without using passwords or passphrases.”
   • [community] “I've been a Proton Unlimited subscriber... Proton Pass is my default for all 2FA. I love the browser extension, so easy and sleek.”
   • [community] “If you are paying for Pass Plus or Proton Unlimited then you have integrated 2FA/TOTP which Bitwarden also makes you pay for... And no deskt…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

Desktop

1. power userA first-class desktop app gives me codes and vault access on my computer, not just on mobile

   weight 2 · round to Proton Pass
   Authy!disputedcontradicted4/10

   Twilio's docs list Authy as available on macOS, Windows, and Linux, suggesting first-class desktop apps, but hands-on community reports concretely contradict this, stating Authy is 'EOL'ing desktop apps' with 'near immediate deprecation' and no export path, leaving the desktop surface unreliable for power users. Missing for 10: no evidence of continued desktop app support with vault/code access, no independent confirmation the desktop client remains functional or maintained post-EOL announcement.

   • [claimed-docs] “It's available for iOS, Android, macOS, Windows, and Linux.”
   • [community] “They intentionally make it really hard to migrate your data off their app under the premise of 'security'. Now they are EOL'ing desktop apps…”
   • [community] “I will also never forgive Authy for removing desktop support with near immediate deprecation and no way to export off their platform. I will…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Proton Pass!disputedcontradicted5/10

   Proton's own support docs describe a dedicated desktop app with offline vault access and TOTP code generation (docs-9, docs-16, docs-5), suggesting a first-class desktop experience. However, community hands-on reports explicitly state there was no desktop app for Proton Pass ('And no desktop app for proton pass, maybe some day though?' and 'Pity it's only available on iOS and Android as apps and as browser extensions elsewhere'), directly contradicting the vendor's desktop-app documentation. Missing for 10: independent corroboration that the desktop app actually exists and works as described, and resolution of the timeline discrepancy between docs and community reports.

   • [claimed-docs] “You don’t need to do anything to access Proton Pass offline. Everything in your vaults is accessible whether you’re connected to the interne…”
   • [claimed-docs] “Vaults can be used to organize items — in the example above, we have a vault for personal items and one for work items.”
   • [claimed-docs] “Proton Pass can securely generate TOTP codes for websites that you have saved login details for.”
   • [community] “If you are paying for Pass Plus or Proton Unlimited then you have integrated 2FA/TOTP which Bitwarden also makes you pay for... And no deskt…”
   • [community] “Pity it's only available on iOS and Android as apps and as browser extensions elsewhere. I would've been interested to check out a desktop p…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

Watch

1. everyday userRead my codes from my smartwatch without pulling out my phone

   weight 1 · round to Authy
   Authy~partialprobed5/10

   Authy's own marketing page explicitly claims support on 'your phone, tablet, even your Apple Watch,' which directly matches the smartwatch-reading story, but this is a single first-party claim with no independent or hands-on confirmation of watch functionality (e.g., no community mention of using the watch app), and the API deprecation notice signals the product line is winding down. Missing for 10: independent/hands-on verification of the Apple Watch experience, detail on Wear OS or other smartwatch support, and confirmation the feature is still maintained post-deprecation.

   • [claimed-docs] “On any device. Your phone, tablet, even your Apple Watch.”
   • [claimed-docs] “Sync 2FA across mobile and tablet.”
   • [probe] “PROBE runtime (recorded 2026-09-15): Twilio's own docs page carries the deprecation notice verbatim — 'The Authy API is now closed to new cu…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Proton Pass—none0/10

   No evidence of a smartwatch app, watch companion, or complication for viewing TOTP codes; evidence only covers mobile, browser extension, and CLI surfaces, with community notes even lamenting lack of a desktop app. Missing for 10: any smartwatch app/companion, watch complication, or documentation of viewing codes without the phone.

   • [claimed-docs] “Proton Pass can securely generate TOTP codes for websites that you have saved login details for.”
   • [community] “Pity it's only available on iOS and Android as apps and as browser extensions elsewhere. I would've been interested to check out a desktop p…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

Backup

1. security engineerBackups are end-to-end encrypted with a key the vendor never holds, and the encryption design is documented

   weight 3 · round to Proton Pass
   Authy~partialcommunity4/10

   Authy's marketing page states backups are encrypted and 'only decrypt on the devices using a password only you know' (authy-docs-5), implying a vendor-can't-decrypt design, but there is no technical documentation of the encryption algorithm, key derivation, or threat model, and no independent audit confirming the vendor truly never holds the key. Community reports focus on account-takeover via device-add (authy-comm-15) and painful data export (authy-comm-13/14), not on breaking the underlying backup encryption, so this doesn't rise to a concrete dispute of the encryption claim itself. Missing for 10: a detailed whitepaper/spec of the E2E encryption scheme, key management details, and independent security audit or crypto review corroborating the zero-knowledge claim.

   • [claimed-docs] “Use our backup feature incase you lose your phone. We encrypt your data, and only decrypt on the devices using a password only you know.”
   • [community] “After a lot of trouble, I was able to extract my private keys from Authy by installing their deprecated Chrome extension and using some hack…”
   • [community] “Note how insane the Authy export instructions are: 'Paste in a bunch of code to an Electron app running Authy in debug mode to dump the toke…”
   • [community] “The Twilio exploit allowed the hackers to add a new device to existing Authy accounts. This allowed them to sync the keys between devices wi…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Proton Pass~partialclaimed5/10

   Proton Pass documents that all vault data is end-to-end encrypted (docs-10) and offers a PGP-encrypted export option that could serve as a backup (docs-11), implying the vendor cannot read backed-up data. However, there is no dedicated 'backup' feature documentation (only export/import), and no detailed cryptographic architecture whitepaper or independent audit is cited to substantiate the zero-knowledge key design in depth. missing for 10: dedicated backup-feature docs, detailed encryption architecture/whitepaper, independent security audit confirming vendor never holds keys

   • [claimed-docs] “Unlike other password managers, Proton Pass uses end-to-end encryption on every field you fill for the items you create (usernames, website …”
   • [claimed-docs] “You have three options for export: 1. A ZIP file containing a PGP-encrypted JSON file 2. An unencrypted ZIP file 3. A CSV file”
   • [claimed-docs] “Vaults can be used to organize items — in the example above, we have a vault for personal items and one for work items.”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

Multi device

1. everyday userMy tokens are available on my phone, tablet, and computer at the same time, kept in sync automatically

   weight 2 · round to Proton Pass
   Authy!disputedcontradicted4/10

   Docs and community confirm sync across phone/tablet (and even Apple Watch) works well and is a headline feature (authy-docs-3, authy-docs-4, authy-docs-16, authy-comm-1), but the 'computer' part of the story is directly contradicted: community reports Authy EOL'd its desktop apps, breaking the phone/tablet/computer parity the docs still describe (authy-comm-10, authy-comm-18). Missing for 10: confirmation that desktop/computer sync still functions today, and resolution of the desktop deprecation vs docs claim.

   • [claimed-docs] “Sync 2FA across mobile and tablet.”
   • [claimed-docs] “On any device. Your phone, tablet, even your Apple Watch.”
   • [claimed-docs] “It's available for iOS, Android, macOS, Windows, and Linux.”
   • [community] “I started using Authy long ago because it supports multiple devices and isn't linked to any other account (Google/Microsoft).”
   • [community] “They intentionally make it really hard to migrate your data off their app under the premise of 'security'. Now they are EOL'ing desktop apps…”
   • [community] “I will also never forgive Authy for removing desktop support with near immediate deprecation and no way to export off their platform. I will…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Proton Pass~partialcommunity5/10

   Docs confirm cross-platform clients (mobile apps, browser extensions, and a desktop app referenced in the desktop-app guide) and offline access that presumably reconciles when back online, implying cloud sync of vault items including TOTP tokens. However, no first-party documentation explicitly describes the sync mechanism or guarantees real-time multi-device consistency, and community comments note a historical lack of a desktop app and inconsistent browser-extension availability (e.g., Firefox ESR incompatibility), suggesting platform coverage has been uneven over time. Missing for 10: explicit sync/consistency documentation, independent verification that sync is truly automatic and near-instant across phone/tablet/computer.

   • [claimed-docs] “You don’t need to do anything to access Proton Pass offline. Everything in your vaults is accessible whether you’re connected to the interne…”
   • [claimed-docs] “Proton Pass can securely generate TOTP codes for websites that you have saved login details for.”
   • [community] “If you are paying for Pass Plus or Proton Unlimited then you have integrated 2FA/TOTP which Bitwarden also makes you pay for... And no deskt…”
   • [community] “Pity it's only available on iOS and Android as apps and as browser extensions elsewhere. I would've been interested to check out a desktop p…”
   • [community] “Can't use the Firefox extension, FF 102 ESR is apparently too old”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

Recovery

1. everyday userLosing my phone doesn't lose my accounts — a documented recovery path restores my tokens on a new device

   weight 3 · round to Authy
   Authy✓fullcommunity7/10

   Authy's official docs describe an encrypted backup feature that restores 2FA tokens to a new device using a user-known password, plus multi-device sync and device management (authy-docs-3,4,5,8,10), and a community user confirms this recovery path works in practice after phone loss/SIM replacement (authy-comm-19). Some community friction exists around exporting data to competing apps, but that's a separate migration-away concern, not evidence the phone-loss recovery path itself fails. Missing for 10: a detailed first-party step-by-step restore walkthrough, and broader independent corroboration beyond a single community anecdote.

   • [claimed-docs] “Sync 2FA across mobile and tablet.”
   • [claimed-docs] “On any device. Your phone, tablet, even your Apple Watch.”
   • [claimed-docs] “Use our backup feature incase you lose your phone. We encrypt your data, and only decrypt on the devices using a password only you know.”
   • [claimed-docs] “View information, rename, and remove lost/stolen devices.”
   • [claimed-docs] “Add new devices with SMS, voice or existing device approval.”
   • [community] “I've been using Authy as a backup for 1Password's 2FA since in a worst-case scenario I can get a replacement SIM card and get back into my 1…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Proton Pass~partialclaimed4/10

   Proton Pass stores TOTP codes and other secrets inside end-to-end encrypted vaults that live on Proton's servers (docs-5, docs-10), and offers export (docs-4/11) and Emergency Access (docs-20) features that could serve as backup/recovery mechanisms, implying data isn't lost with a device. However, there is no explicit documentation in the pack describing a dedicated 'lost phone / new device' recovery flow, account recovery phrase, or step-by-step restoration of 2FA tokens after device loss. Missing for 10: explicit account-recovery/recovery-phrase documentation, explicit cross-device sync confirmation, and a stated process for restoring TOTP secrets specifically after losing a device.

   • [claimed-docs] “Proton Pass can securely generate TOTP codes for websites that you have saved login details for.”
   • [claimed-docs] “Unlike other password managers, Proton Pass uses end-to-end encryption on every field you fill for the items you create (usernames, website …”
   • [claimed-docs] “If you want to use your passwords elsewhere or create a separate hardcopy, you can easily export your data from Proton Pass.”
   • [claimed-docs] “You have three options for export: 1. A ZIP file containing a PGP-encrypted JSON file 2. An unencrypted ZIP file 3. A CSV file”
   • [claimed-docs] “Emergency Access”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

Automation

1. ai-native userAn agent can create and update vault entries — seeding new TOTP secrets, storing credentials — through documented programmatic surfaces

   weight 2 · round to Proton Pass
   Authy!disputedcontradicted2/10

   Docs mention an SDK for 'the Authy API' to integrate 2FA, but Twilio's own docs page (probe) states the Authy API is closed to new customers and being deprecated with no new integrations, and multiple community reports confirm there is no supported way to programmatically seed, export, or update vault entries — users describe extreme difficulty or hacky workarounds to even extract secrets. This directly contradicts any claim of a documented programmatic surface for agent-driven vault creation/updates. Missing for 10: any current API/SDK for creating or updating TOTP vault entries, official export/import endpoints, and first-party agent integration examples.

   • [claimed-docs] “we provide an SDK for common web languages. If your language is supported, it's the fastest way to get started.”
   • [claimed-docs] “So you don't have to use the Authy API directly to integrate two-factor authentication into your app, we provide an SDK for common web langu…”
   • [probe] “PROBE runtime (recorded 2026-09-15): Twilio's own docs page carries the deprecation notice verbatim — 'The Authy API is now closed to new cu…”
   • [community] “Authy makes it hard to migrate away. Anyone know how to get the seed of the 2FA codes? Is there really no export option?”
   • [community] “I just migrated off of Authy last week... Never liked it but they make it extremely difficult to export your data. Twilio really doesn't wan…”
   • [community] “Note how insane the Authy export instructions are: 'Paste in a bunch of code to an Electron app running Authy in debug mode to dump the toke…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Proton Pass~partialprobed6/10

   Proton Pass CLI documentation shows programmatic create/read/update/delete of items (including passwords, secure notes, SSH keys) and vaults, which an agent could invoke via scripts. However, there's no explicit mention of TOTP secret seeding via the CLI, and no dedicated agent/AI integration or API/SDK beyond the CLI is documented, and no independent confirmation of these CLI capabilities working reliably. Missing for 10: explicit TOTP-seeding support via CLI, broader API/SDK for agents, and independent hands-on verification of programmatic write operations.

   • [claimed-docs] “Create, read, update, and delete vaults”
   • [claimed-docs] “View, create, update, and delete items including passwords, secure notes, credit cards, identities, WiFi entries, custom items, and stored S…”
   • [claimed-docs] “the CLI enables you to securely retrieve secrets and other items across scripts, deployments, and continuous integration/ continuous deliver…”
   • [probe] “official CLI documented at https://proton.me/blog/proton-pass-cli”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

Policy

1. it adminEnforce org-wide policies — require app lock, restrict export, mandate strong master credentials — across every member's app

   weight 1 · round drawn
   Authy—none0/10

   Authy's evidence pack shows only consumer-facing features (per-device PIN/TouchID lock, backup password, device management) with no mention of any organization/admin console, centralized policy enforcement, or IT-admin controls across a team of users. The product is also being deprecated in favor of Verify, with no admin management surface described anywhere.

   • [claimed-docs] “Use TouchID, PIN protection and passwords to protect access to your 2FA tokens.”
   • [claimed-docs] “View information, rename, and remove lost/stolen devices.”
   • [claimed-docs] “Disable future Authy app installations for improved security.”
   • [probe] “PROBE runtime (recorded 2026-09-15): Twilio's own docs page carries the deprecation notice verbatim — 'The Authy API is now closed to new cu…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Proton Pass—none0/10

   No evidence of org-wide admin policy controls (enforced app lock, export restrictions, mandated master password strength) for organization members; docs cover vaults, CLI, export, 2FA, sharing but nothing about admin-enforced policies across a team.

   ⚑ flag

Sharing

1. it adminMy team can share TOTP-protected logins through shared vaults or collections with per-member access control

   weight 2 · round to Proton Pass
   Authy—none0/10

   Authy is a personal authenticator app with no evidence of shared vaults, collections, or per-member access control for team/admin management; evidence only covers individual multi-device sync and backup features. Community evidence even highlights difficulty exporting/sharing data at all, reinforcing the lack of team-sharing capability.

   • [claimed-docs] “Sync 2FA across mobile and tablet.”
   • [claimed-docs] “Use our backup feature incase you lose your phone. We encrypt your data, and only decrypt on the devices using a password only you know.”
   • [community] “Authy makes it hard to migrate away. Anyone know how to get the seed of the 2FA codes? Is there really no export option?”
   • [community] “I just migrated off of Authy last week... Never liked it but they make it extremely difficult to export your data. Twilio really doesn't wan…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Proton Pass~partialclaimed5/10

   Evidence confirms Proton Pass supports TOTP/2FA generation for saved logins (docs-5) and secure vault sharing plus vault-based organization of items (docs-16, docs-17), which together imply TOTP items can be shared via vaults. However, there is no documentation of granular per-member access control (roles/permissions) or 'collections' as a distinct sharing unit, and no team-admin console evidence for managing member access levels within shared vaults. Missing for 10: explicit permission-level (viewer/editor/admin) documentation for shared vaults, evidence of 'collections' as an admin feature, and any IT-admin console showing per-member access management.

   • [claimed-docs] “Proton Pass can securely generate TOTP codes for websites that you have saved login details for.”
   • [claimed-docs] “Vaults can be used to organize items — in the example above, we have a vault for personal items and one for work items.”
   • [claimed-docs] “Secure vault sharing”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

Enrollment

1. everyday userScan a QR code and immediately start generating TOTP codes for a new account

   weight 3 · round to Authy
   Authy✓fullcommunity7/10

   Authy's own product page states it can capture 2FA QR codes from major providers and lists TOTP as a supported authentication method, directly matching the scan-and-generate story, and community comments confirm ongoing everyday use of the app for this purpose. Missing for 10: a first-person hands-on account of the exact scan-to-code flow and more detailed onboarding documentation beyond the marketing feature list.

   • [claimed-docs] “Easily capture 2FA QR codes from Facebook, Amazon, Google, Microsoft, Dropbox and many more.”
   • [claimed-docs] “TOTP (Authenticator Apps)”
   • [community] “I started using Authy long ago because it supports multiple devices and isn't linked to any other account (Google/Microsoft).”
   • [community] “I've been using Authy as a backup for 1Password's 2FA since in a worst-case scenario I can get a replacement SIM card and get back into my 1…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Proton Pass~partialcommunity5/10

   Docs confirm Proton Pass generates TOTP codes for saved logins (proton-pass-docs-5) and community reports use it as their default 2FA tool (proton-pass-comm-12), but no evidence explicitly describes scanning a QR code to add a new TOTP secret and instantly getting codes. Missing for 10: explicit QR-code scanning workflow documentation, mobile camera scan support evidence, and independent hands-on confirmation of the scan-to-code flow.

   • [claimed-docs] “Proton Pass can securely generate TOTP codes for websites that you have saved login details for.”
   • [community] “I've been a Proton Unlimited subscriber... Proton Pass is my default for all 2FA. I love the browser extension, so easy and sleek.”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

Offline

1. power userCodes generate fully offline — no network, no vendor account required just to see my TOTP codes

   weight 2 · round to Authy
   Authy!disputedcontradicted4/10

   Authy's own docs claim codes can be viewed without internet ('access secured websites without internet access on your phone'), but the product fundamentally requires creating a Twilio/Authy account tied to a phone number before any TOTP codes can be generated or viewed, and codes are further gated behind an app password — directly contradicting the 'no vendor account required' part of the story. Community evidence confirms this account-centric architecture (phone-number-as-username, multi-device sync tied to account, extraction of underlying seeds required hacky workarounds via a deprecated debug mode rather than a supported offline export).

   • [claimed-docs] “You can still access secured websites without internet access on your phone.”
   • [community] “I started using Authy long ago because it supports multiple devices and isn't linked to any other account (Google/Microsoft).”
   • [community] “This doesn't scare me because in Authy you also set a password which without you cannot access the codes. The phone number here just acts as…”
   • [community] “After a lot of trouble, I was able to extract my private keys from Authy by installing their deprecated Chrome extension and using some hack…”
   • [community] “Note how insane the Authy export instructions are: 'Paste in a bunch of code to an Electron app running Authy in debug mode to dump the toke…”
   • [community] “services with Authy-integrated MFA (like Twitch) are 'managed' by Authy so it can regenerate the secret on the fly; your previously extracte…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Proton Pass—none0/10

   Proton Pass is fundamentally an account-based, encrypted-vault service — using it at all requires creating and logging into a Proton account, and TOTP codes are stored as fields within account-synced vaults. Evidence only shows that once logged in, offline access to already-synced vaults works (proton-pass-docs-9), but nothing supports generating/viewing TOTP codes without ever creating or authenticating a vendor account, which the story explicitly requires.

   • [claimed-docs] “You don’t need to do anything to access Proton Pass offline. Everything in your vaults is accessible whether you’re connected to the interne…”
   • [claimed-docs] “Proton Pass can securely generate TOTP codes for websites that you have saved login details for.”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

Organization

1. power userKeep dozens of tokens organized — search, folders or groups, and service icons — so the right code is always two taps away

   weight 2 · round to Proton Pass
   Authy—none0/10

   Evidence shows only basic token/QR capture (service icons implied) with no mention of search or folder/group organization; a community user explicitly complains 'can't we please have alphabetization?' indicating the app lacks even simple sorting, let alone search/folders for power users managing dozens of tokens.

   • [claimed-docs] “Easily capture 2FA QR codes from Facebook, Amazon, Google, Microsoft, Dropbox and many more.”
   • [community] “My guess is that most of the people who worked on Authy have fallen by the wayside after the Twilio acquisition. It's annoying every time I …”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Proton Pass~partialcommunity4/10

   Proton Pass supports TOTP generation tied to saved logins and vaults for organizing items into groups (e.g., personal vs. work), but there is no evidence of search functionality or service icons, and a community report explicitly notes the browser popup overlay was inadequate for managing hundreds of logins, suggesting scaling friction for power users. Missing for 10: dedicated TOTP search/filter feature, service icon display, and evidence of smooth navigation across dozens of tokens.

   • [claimed-docs] “Proton Pass can securely generate TOTP codes for websites that you have saved login details for.”
   • [claimed-docs] “Vaults can be used to organize items — in the example above, we have a vault for personal items and one for work items.”
   • [community] “Would like to see web/desktop clients for this. When I used it recently I found the unexpandable pop-up overlay in the browser to not be ade…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

Variants

1. power userNon-standard tokens work too — Steam Guard, HOTP counters, custom periods and digit lengths

   weight 2 · round drawn
   Authy—none0/10

   No evidence anywhere in the pack mentions Steam Guard support, HOTP counter-based tokens, or custom period/digit configurations; documentation only references standard TOTP and QR-code capture from mainstream services. Absence of evidence for this applicable power-user axis yields 'none'.

   ⚑ flag

   Proton Pass—none0/10

   Evidence only confirms basic TOTP code generation for saved logins; no mention of Steam Guard tokens, HOTP counters, or custom period/digit length support anywhere in the docs or community discussion. Missing for 10: any documentation of Steam Guard support, HOTP counter-based tokens, or custom TOTP period/digit configuration.

   • [claimed-docs] “Proton Pass can securely generate TOTP codes for websites that you have saved login details for.”

   proof ↗⚑ flag