Bitwarden vs Proton Pass

Agent access

1. ai-native userPoint an agent at llms.txt or agent-oriented docs

   weight 2 · round to Bitwarden
   Bitwarden✓fullprobed9/10

   Bitwarden serves a live llms.txt at bitwarden.com/llms.txt (HTTP 200) with structured content, and help pages ship real per-page markdown mirrors (e.g., cli.md) confirming genuine agent-oriented documentation rather than a stub. This is directly confirmed by runtime probes, not just claims. Missing for 10: no independent third-party corroboration of an agent actually consuming these docs end-to-end in a workflow.

   • [probe] “PROBE llms.txt: HTTP 200 at https://bitwarden.com/llms.txt # Bitwarden > The most trusted open source password manager for passwords, passk…”
   • [probe] “PROBE runtime (recorded 2026-09-15): bitwarden.com serves a live llms.txt ('# Bitwarden — The most trusted open source password manager...')…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Proton Pass—none0/10

   No llms.txt or agent-oriented docs found; probes explicitly return 404 for llms.txt and docs.md endpoints, and no evidence mentions agent-readable documentation formats.

   • [probe] “PROBE llms.txt: HTTP 404 at https://proton.me/llms.txt”
   • [probe] “PROBE docs-md: HTTP 404 at https://proton.me/support/pass.md”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

2. ai-native userRun the product headlessly / in CI for automation

   weight 2 · round to Bitwarden
   Bitwarden✓fullprobed8/10

   Bitwarden ships an official CLI with API-key authentication explicitly documented as suitable for automated workflows/CI, plus a Public API for org automation and a headless 'bw serve' mode confirmed at runtime. missing for 10: no CI-specific tutorial/example pipeline (e.g., GitHub Actions) in evidence, and one community report notes CLI 'bw list' unexpectedly dumping plaintext secrets, a minor safety caveat for automation use.

   • [claimed-docs] “The Bitwarden command-line interface (CLI) is a powerful, fully-featured tool for accessing and managing your vault.”
   • [claimed-docs] “Using the personal API key for CLI authentication is suitable for automated workflows, for providing access to an external appli”
   • [claimed-docs] “The Bitwarden Public API provides organizations a suite of tools for managing members, collections, groups, event logs, and policies.”
   • [probe] “PROBE runtime (recorded 2026-09-15): the official bw CLI installs keylessly from npm (@bitwarden/cli, registry latest 2026.8.0) and prints i…”
   • [community] “I had a really bad experience with the bitwarden cli. I ran 'bw list', assuming it would list names, but it listed everything including pass…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Proton Pass~partialprobed6/10

   Proton Pass ships an official CLI documented as designed for scripts, deployments, and CI/CD pipelines, supporting CRUD on vaults and items — a clear headless/automation capability. However, evidence is limited to vendor blog docs with no independent/hands-on corroboration of CI usage, no details on authentication flow for non-interactive/headless environments, and no community validation of real-world CI deployment. Missing for 10: independent hands-on CI usage reports, details on non-interactive auth/session handling for automation, and broader ecosystem examples (e.g., GitHub Actions integration).

   • [claimed-docs] “enables you to securely retrieve secrets and other items across scripts, deployments, and continuous integration/ continuous delivery (CI/CD…”
   • [claimed-docs] “the CLI enables you to securely retrieve secrets and other items across scripts, deployments, and continuous integration/ continuous deliver…”
   • [claimed-docs] “View, create, update, and delete items including passwords, secure notes, credit cards, identities, WiFi entries, custom items, and stored S…”
   • [probe] “official CLI documented at https://proton.me/blog/proton-pass-cli”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

3. ai-native userConnect an agent via an official MCP server

   weight 3 · round to Bitwarden
   Bitwarden✓fullprobed9/10

   Bitwarden ships a first-party, GPL-3.0 MCP server (bitwarden/mcp-server) published to npm, and a runtime probe confirms it completes a full stdio handshake, showing it works as documented rather than just being an announcement. Missing for 10: independent third-party review of the MCP server's tool set/security beyond the vendor probe.

   • [probe] “official MCP server documented at https://github.com/bitwarden/mcp-server”
   • [probe] “PROBE runtime (recorded 2026-09-15): Bitwarden's OFFICIAL MCP server completed a FULL keyless stdio initialize handshake — `npx -y @bitwarde…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Proton Pass—none0/10

   The axis applies to this product kind (peer products hold positive or none verdicts on this story), so lack of evidence for an applicable capability is "none", never "na". (na/none harmonized at arena bring-up — see pipeline/scripts/na-harmonize.ts.)

   ⚑ flag

4. ai-native userUse an official CLI

   weight 2 · round to Bitwarden
   Bitwarden✓fullprobed9/10

   Bitwarden ships a documented, fully-featured official CLI (bw) with vault management, API key auth for automated workflows, and a runtime-verified 'bw serve' mode exposing a local REST API well-suited to agentic/AI use. missing for 10: independent third-party benchmarking of agent integration quality beyond one community anecdote about plaintext output behavior.

   • [claimed-docs] “The Bitwarden command-line interface (CLI) is a powerful, fully-featured tool for accessing and managing your vault.”
   • [claimed-docs] “Using the personal API key for CLI authentication is suitable for automated workflows, for providing access to an external appli”
   • [probe] “official CLI documented at https://bitwarden.com/help/cli/”
   • [probe] “PROBE runtime (recorded 2026-09-15): the official bw CLI installs keylessly from npm (@bitwarden/cli, registry latest 2026.8.0) and prints i…”
   • [community] “I had a really bad experience with the bitwarden cli. I ran 'bw list', assuming it would list names, but it listed everything including pass…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Proton Pass✓fullprobed7/10

   Proton Pass has an official CLI documented in a first-party blog post that supports CRUD on vaults and items (including SSH keys) and secret retrieval for scripts/CI/CD pipelines, which is directly relevant to AI-native/agentic automation workflows. Missing for 10: independent/hands-on corroboration of the CLI's reliability, no mention of AI-agent-specific integrations or MCP-style tooling, and no detail on scripting API depth or language bindings.

   • [claimed-docs] “enables you to securely retrieve secrets and other items across scripts, deployments, and continuous integration/ continuous delivery (CI/CD…”
   • [claimed-docs] “the CLI enables you to securely retrieve secrets and other items across scripts, deployments, and continuous integration/ continuous deliver…”
   • [claimed-docs] “View, create, update, and delete items including passwords, secure notes, credit cards, identities, WiFi entries, custom items, and stored S…”
   • [probe] “official CLI documented at https://proton.me/blog/proton-pass-cli”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

5. ai-native userDrive the product through a documented public API

   weight 3 · round to Bitwarden
   Bitwarden✓fullprobed8/10

   Bitwarden documents a Public API for organization management (bitwarden-docs-8), a personal API key for automated/programmatic access (bitwarden-docs-9), and a full-featured CLI (bitwarden-docs-7, bitwarden-probe-4) with a documented `bw serve` REST mode enabling agent-driven vault access (bitwarden-probe-rt-1); this constitutes a documented public API surface an AI-native user could drive. missing for 10: a public OpenAPI/swagger spec resolves 404 on probed endpoints (bitwarden-probe-2), and one community report flags a CLI safety/UX issue (bitwarden-comm-13) showing rough edges in automation ergonomics.

   • [claimed-docs] “The Bitwarden command-line interface (CLI) is a powerful, fully-featured tool for accessing and managing your vault.”
   • [claimed-docs] “The Bitwarden Public API provides organizations a suite of tools for managing members, collections, groups, event logs, and policies.”
   • [claimed-docs] “Using the personal API key for CLI authentication is suitable for automated workflows, for providing access to an external appli”
   • [probe] “PROBE runtime (recorded 2026-09-15): the official bw CLI installs keylessly from npm (@bitwarden/cli, registry latest 2026.8.0) and prints i…”
   • [probe] “PROBE openapi: all candidate paths 404 (https://bitwarden.com/openapi.json, https://bitwarden.com/swagger.json, https://bitwarden.com/api/op…”
   • [community] “I had a really bad experience with the bitwarden cli. I ran 'bw list', assuming it would list names, but it listed everything including pass…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Proton Pass~partialprobed5/10

   Proton Pass offers a CLI for CRUD operations on vaults and items (passwords, notes, SSH keys, etc.) usable in scripts/CI pipelines, which provides programmatic access, but this is a CLI wrapper rather than a documented public REST/GraphQL API with SDKs, and llms.txt/docs.md probes both 404. missing for 10: a formal public API specification (REST/GraphQL/SDK), API reference docs, and independent developer corroboration of programmatic/agentic use beyond the CLI.

   • [claimed-docs] “enables you to securely retrieve secrets and other items across scripts, deployments, and continuous integration/ continuous delivery (CI/CD…”
   • [claimed-docs] “Create, read, update, and delete vaults”
   • [claimed-docs] “the CLI enables you to securely retrieve secrets and other items across scripts, deployments, and continuous integration/ continuous deliver…”
   • [claimed-docs] “View, create, update, and delete items including passwords, secure notes, credit cards, identities, WiFi entries, custom items, and stored S…”
   • [probe] “PROBE llms.txt: HTTP 404 at https://proton.me/llms.txt”
   • [probe] “PROBE docs-md: HTTP 404 at https://proton.me/support/pass.md”
   • [probe] “official CLI documented at https://proton.me/blog/proton-pass-cli”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

6. ai-native userIssue scoped/least-privilege API credentials for an agent

   weight 2 · round to Bitwarden
   Bitwarden~partialprobed4/10

   Bitwarden documents a personal API key for CLI/automated workflows and a Public API/CLI (including `bw serve` and an official MCP server) that an agent could use, but there's no evidence of fine-grained, least-privilege scoping (e.g., read-only, per-item, or per-collection API keys) — the personal API key and CLI access appear to grant broad vault access rather than scoped permissions, and a hands-on report shows `bw list` dumping full plaintext secrets rather than a restricted subset. missing for 10: documented scoped/restricted API key types, per-agent permission grants, or evidence that MCP/CLI access can be limited to specific vault items rather than the whole vault.

   • [claimed-docs] “Using the personal API key for CLI authentication is suitable for automated workflows, for providing access to an external appli”
   • [claimed-docs] “The Bitwarden Public API provides organizations a suite of tools for managing members, collections, groups, event logs, and policies.”
   • [probe] “PROBE runtime (recorded 2026-09-15): the official bw CLI installs keylessly from npm (@bitwarden/cli, registry latest 2026.8.0) and prints i…”
   • [probe] “PROBE runtime (recorded 2026-09-15): Bitwarden's OFFICIAL MCP server completed a FULL keyless stdio initialize handshake — `npx -y @bitwarde…”
   • [community] “I had a really bad experience with the bitwarden cli. I ran 'bw list', assuming it would list names, but it listed everything including pass…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Proton Pass—none0/10

   Proton Pass CLI supports retrieving secrets/items for CI/CD and vault-level CRUD, but there is no evidence of issuing scoped or least-privilege API credentials/tokens specifically for an AI agent (e.g., fine-grained scopes, agent-specific permission tiers). Vaults provide organizational grouping, not credential scoping mechanisms for automated agents.

   • [claimed-docs] “enables you to securely retrieve secrets and other items across scripts, deployments, and continuous integration/ continuous delivery (CI/CD…”
   • [claimed-docs] “Create, read, update, and delete vaults”
   • [claimed-docs] “the CLI enables you to securely retrieve secrets and other items across scripts, deployments, and continuous integration/ continuous deliver…”
   • [claimed-docs] “View, create, update, and delete items including passwords, secure notes, credit cards, identities, WiFi entries, custom items, and stored S…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

7. ai-native userBuild against official SDKs

   weight 2 · round to Bitwarden
   Bitwarden~partialprobed4/10

   Evidence shows Bitwarden exposes a Public API, CLI, personal API keys for automation, and an official MCP server (all of which an AI-native builder could integrate against), but there is no evidence of a dedicated, language-specific 'official SDK' (e.g., a bitwarden/sdk repo) and the OpenAPI/swagger spec probes all returned 404, suggesting no machine-readable API contract is published. missing for 10: explicit official SDK repositories/language bindings, published OpenAPI spec, independent developer corroboration of SDK usage.

   • [claimed-docs] “The Bitwarden command-line interface (CLI) is a powerful, fully-featured tool for accessing and managing your vault.”
   • [claimed-docs] “The Bitwarden Public API provides organizations a suite of tools for managing members, collections, groups, event logs, and policies.”
   • [claimed-docs] “Using the personal API key for CLI authentication is suitable for automated workflows, for providing access to an external appli”
   • [probe] “PROBE openapi: all candidate paths 404 (https://bitwarden.com/openapi.json, https://bitwarden.com/swagger.json, https://bitwarden.com/api/op…”
   • [probe] “official MCP server documented at https://github.com/bitwarden/mcp-server”
   • [probe] “PROBE runtime (recorded 2026-09-15): Bitwarden's OFFICIAL MCP server completed a FULL keyless stdio initialize handshake — `npx -y @bitwarde…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Proton Pass—none0/10

   Evidence shows only a CLI tool for secrets retrieval in CI/CD pipelines, not a developer SDK for building applications; no mention of SDKs, API libraries, or language bindings for programmatic integration exists in the evidence pack.

   ⚑ flag

8. ai-native userSubscribe to events via webhooks

   weight 2 · round drawn
   Bitwarden—none0/10

   Bitwarden's evidence covers event logs via the Public API and a CLI/MCP server for vault access, but nothing describes webhook subscriptions for events—no documented webhook endpoints, registration API, or push-event mechanism.

   ⚑ flag

   Proton Pass—none0/10

   No evidence of any webhook or event subscription mechanism; Proton Pass offers a CLI for CRUD operations but nothing about push/webhook notifications. Missing for 10: any webhook API, event subscription mechanism, or documentation referencing such a feature.

   ⚑ flag

Agentic features

1. ai-native userGet AI-generated insights and suggestions from my data inside the product

   weight 2 · round drawn
   Bitwarden—none0/10

   Bitwarden is a password/secrets manager; there is no evidence of any AI-generated insights or suggestions derived from the user's vault data (e.g., no AI-driven analysis, summarization, or recommendations beyond static, non-AI vault health reports). The MCP server and CLI enable agents to query vault data but do not themselves generate AI insights within the product.

   • [claimed-docs] “Vault health reports can help you evaluate the security of your Bitwarden individual or organization vault... Reports... are run locally on …”
   • [claimed-docs] “Vault health reports can help you evaluate the security of your Bitwarden individual or organization vault. Reports, such as the Reused Pass…”
   • [probe] “PROBE runtime (recorded 2026-09-15): the official bw CLI installs keylessly from npm (@bitwarden/cli, registry latest 2026.8.0) and prints i…”
   • [probe] “PROBE runtime (recorded 2026-09-15): Bitwarden's OFFICIAL MCP server completed a FULL keyless stdio initialize handshake — `npx -y @bitwarde…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Proton Pass—none0/10

   Evidence only covers password/vault management, monitoring, and Sentinel's fraud-detection AI for account security — none of this provides AI-generated insights or suggestions derived from the user's stored data (e.g., summarization, pattern detection, recommendations beyond breach/weak-password alerts). No feature described as generating insights or suggestions from the data itself.

   ⚑ flag

2. ai-native userSet up automations that run autonomously in the background

   weight 2 · round drawn
   Bitwarden—none0/10

   Bitwarden offers CLI/API/MCP server access that agents could use, but there is no evidence of a mechanism for setting up autonomous, scheduled, or background-running automations (e.g., triggers, workflows, cron-like jobs) — it only provides interfaces for on-demand vault access. missing for 10: any documented scheduling/trigger/workflow automation feature, evidence of background/autonomous execution, or vendor claims of persistent automation setup.

   • [claimed-docs] “The Bitwarden command-line interface (CLI) is a powerful, fully-featured tool for accessing and managing your vault.”
   • [claimed-docs] “Using the personal API key for CLI authentication is suitable for automated workflows, for providing access to an external appli”
   • [probe] “PROBE runtime (recorded 2026-09-15): the official bw CLI installs keylessly from npm (@bitwarden/cli, registry latest 2026.8.0) and prints i…”
   • [probe] “PROBE runtime (recorded 2026-09-15): Bitwarden's OFFICIAL MCP server completed a FULL keyless stdio initialize handshake — `npx -y @bitwarde…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Proton Pass—none0/10

   The axis applies to this product kind (peer products hold positive or none verdicts on this story), so lack of evidence for an applicable capability is "none", never "na". (na/none harmonized at arena bring-up — see pipeline/scripts/na-harmonize.ts.)

   ⚑ flag

3. ai-native userOperate the product with natural-language commands

   weight 2 · round to Bitwarden
   Bitwarden✓fullprobed8/10

   Bitwarden ships an official MCP server (bitwarden/mcp-server) that completed a live stdio handshake, letting AI agents/assistants issue natural-language commands to manage the vault, backed by a full-featured CLI and llms.txt for AI-friendly docs. Missing for 10: no independent hands-on demonstration of a natural-language command actually retrieving/creating vault items via the MCP server, and community feedback flags CLI output risks (e.g., plaintext dumps) that complicate safe agentic use.

   • [probe] “official MCP server documented at https://github.com/bitwarden/mcp-server”
   • [probe] “PROBE runtime (recorded 2026-09-15): Bitwarden's OFFICIAL MCP server completed a FULL keyless stdio initialize handshake — `npx -y @bitwarde…”
   • [claimed-docs] “The Bitwarden command-line interface (CLI) is a powerful, fully-featured tool for accessing and managing your vault.”
   • [probe] “PROBE runtime (recorded 2026-09-15): the official bw CLI installs keylessly from npm (@bitwarden/cli, registry latest 2026.8.0) and prints i…”
   • [probe] “PROBE llms.txt: HTTP 200 at https://bitwarden.com/llms.txt # Bitwarden > The most trusted open source password manager for passwords, passk…”
   • [community] “I had a really bad experience with the bitwarden cli. I ran 'bw list', assuming it would list names, but it listed everything including pass…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Proton Pass—none0/10

   Proton Pass offers a CLI for scripted secret retrieval and CRUD operations, but there is no evidence of natural-language command support, AI assistant integration, or conversational interface anywhere in the docs or community discussion. Missing for 10: any NL command parsing, chat/AI interface, or agentic natural-language control.

   ⚑ flag

Api quality

1. ai-native userExplore an interactive API reference with runnable examples

   weight 2 · round drawn
   Bitwarden—none0/10

   Bitwarden documents a Public API for org management (bitwarden-docs-8) but there is no evidence of an interactive API reference with runnable examples (e.g., Swagger/OpenAPI explorer); a direct probe for openapi.json/swagger.json endpoints returned 404 on all candidate paths (bitwarden-probe-2), indicating no such interactive reference is exposed.

   • [claimed-docs] “The Bitwarden Public API provides organizations a suite of tools for managing members, collections, groups, event logs, and policies.”
   • [probe] “PROBE openapi: all candidate paths 404 (https://bitwarden.com/openapi.json, https://bitwarden.com/swagger.json, https://bitwarden.com/api/op…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Proton Pass—none0/10

   No evidence of an interactive API reference or runnable examples; documentation covers CLI usage and product features only, and probes for docs/llms.txt endpoints returned 404. Missing for 10: interactive API reference, runnable code examples, developer API docs portal.

   • [probe] “PROBE llms.txt: HTTP 404 at https://proton.me/llms.txt”
   • [probe] “PROBE docs-md: HTTP 404 at https://proton.me/support/pass.md”
   • [probe] “official CLI documented at https://proton.me/blog/proton-pass-cli”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

2. ai-native userDownload a machine-readable API spec (OpenAPI or equivalent)

   weight 2 · round drawn
   Bitwarden—none0/10

   Bitwarden documents a Public API and CLI, but a probe for common OpenAPI/Swagger spec URLs (openapi.json, swagger.json, .well-known/openapi.json) all returned 404, and no evidence pack item shows a downloadable machine-readable API spec. Missing for 10: any documented OpenAPI/Swagger file, spec download link, or API reference generator output.

   • [claimed-docs] “The Bitwarden Public API provides organizations a suite of tools for managing members, collections, groups, event logs, and policies.”
   • [claimed-docs] “Using the personal API key for CLI authentication is suitable for automated workflows, for providing access to an external appli”
   • [probe] “PROBE openapi: all candidate paths 404 (https://bitwarden.com/openapi.json, https://bitwarden.com/swagger.json, https://bitwarden.com/api/op…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Proton Pass—none0/10

   No evidence of a machine-readable API spec (OpenAPI or similar); only a CLI tool for scripts/CI/CD is documented, and probes for llms.txt and docs-md endpoints both returned 404.

   • [probe] “PROBE llms.txt: HTTP 404 at https://proton.me/llms.txt”
   • [probe] “PROBE docs-md: HTTP 404 at https://proton.me/support/pass.md”
   • [claimed-docs] “enables you to securely retrieve secrets and other items across scripts, deployments, and continuous integration/ continuous delivery (CI/CD…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

3. ai-native userRely on versioned APIs with a documented deprecation policy

   weight 2 · round drawn
   Bitwarden—none0/10

   Bitwarden documents a Public API and CLI/personal API key access, but there is no evidence of API versioning scheme or a documented deprecation policy; probes for an OpenAPI spec (bitwarden-probe-2) all returned 404s, and no docs mention version headers, breaking-change policy, or sunset timelines.

   • [claimed-docs] “The Bitwarden Public API provides organizations a suite of tools for managing members, collections, groups, event logs, and policies.”
   • [claimed-docs] “Using the personal API key for CLI authentication is suitable for automated workflows, for providing access to an external appli”
   • [probe] “PROBE openapi: all candidate paths 404 (https://bitwarden.com/openapi.json, https://bitwarden.com/swagger.json, https://bitwarden.com/api/op…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Proton Pass—none0/10

   The axis applies to this product kind (peer products hold positive or none verdicts on this story), so lack of evidence for an applicable capability is "none", never "na". (na/none harmonized at arena bring-up — see pipeline/scripts/na-harmonize.ts.)

   ⚑ flag

1. ai-native userPerform bulk operations across many items at once

   weight 2 · round to Bitwarden
   Bitwarden~partialcommunity6/10

   The CLI (bw list/create/edit/delete) and Public API expose scriptable, item-level access that can be chained for bulk operations, and import/export functions handle whole-vault bulk transfers of many items at once; community evidence (bw list dumping the entire vault) confirms bulk read actually works. However, there is no first-party documentation of a dedicated bulk-edit/bulk-tag/bulk-delete command or batch endpoint — bulk operations require the user to script them themselves rather than a built-in bulk API. Missing for 10: documented native bulk-update/bulk-delete commands, batch API endpoints for many items, and independent hands-on confirmation of large-scale automated edits succeeding.

   • [claimed-docs] “The Bitwarden command-line interface (CLI) is a powerful, fully-featured tool for accessing and managing your vault.”
   • [claimed-docs] “The Bitwarden Public API provides organizations a suite of tools for managing members, collections, groups, event logs, and policies.”
   • [claimed-docs] “Using the personal API key for CLI authentication is suitable for automated workflows, for providing access to an external appli”
   • [claimed-docs] “Export your vault data, including logins and notes, to back up important information or transfer to a new Bitwarden vault.”
   • [claimed-docs] “Import logins and data from different password managers, other Bitwarden vaults, or encrypted exports to instantly transfer your information…”
   • [community] “I had a really bad experience with the bitwarden cli. I ran 'bw list', assuming it would list names, but it listed everything including pass…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Proton Pass~partialclaimed5/10

   The official CLI supports scripted CRUD on vaults and items (passwords, notes, SSH keys, etc.) which could be used to script bulk operations, and the import/export tools allow migrating many items at once. However, there is no documented explicit 'bulk edit/delete/tag' feature or batch API, and no community evidence of anyone actually scripting bulk operations at scale. Missing for 10: dedicated bulk-action API/UI, documented batch limits, and independent confirmation of large-scale scripted use.

   • [claimed-docs] “enables you to securely retrieve secrets and other items across scripts, deployments, and continuous integration/ continuous delivery (CI/CD…”
   • [claimed-docs] “the CLI enables you to securely retrieve secrets and other items across scripts, deployments, and continuous integration/ continuous deliver…”
   • [claimed-docs] “View, create, update, and delete items including passwords, secure notes, credit cards, identities, WiFi entries, custom items, and stored S…”
   • [claimed-docs] “Create, read, update, and delete vaults”
   • [claimed-docs] “With our import tool, you can migrate passwords and other items from most major password managers in just a few minutes.”
   • [claimed-docs] “You have three options for export: 1. A ZIP file containing a PGP-encrypted JSON file 2. An unencrypted ZIP file 3. A CSV file”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

1. ai-native userDo everything through the API that I can do in the UI

   weight 2 · round to Bitwarden
   Bitwarden~partialprobed6/10

   Bitwarden ships a fully-featured CLI and a Vault Management API (`bw serve`) covering item/vault CRUD, TOTP retrieval, and org management via a Public API and personal API key for automated workflows, giving strong but not fully documented parity with the UI. There's no explicit vendor claim or evidence that every UI feature (e.g., passkey autofill, browser-context auto-fill, vault health reports) is exposed via API/CLI, and a hands-on report shows the CLI's `bw list` behaves differently than expected (dumping all secrets) rather than mirroring UI workflows cleanly. missing for 10: explicit API/CLI equivalents for passkey autofill and browser-based auto-fill, API access to vault health reports, and a documented feature-parity statement.

   • [claimed-docs] “The Bitwarden command-line interface (CLI) is a powerful, fully-featured tool for accessing and managing your vault.”
   • [claimed-docs] “The Bitwarden Public API provides organizations a suite of tools for managing members, collections, groups, event logs, and policies.”
   • [claimed-docs] “Using the personal API key for CLI authentication is suitable for automated workflows, for providing access to an external appli”
   • [probe] “PROBE runtime (recorded 2026-09-15): the official bw CLI installs keylessly from npm (@bitwarden/cli, registry latest 2026.8.0) and prints i…”
   • [community] “I had a really bad experience with the bitwarden cli. I ran 'bw list', assuming it would list names, but it listed everything including pass…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Proton Pass~partialprobed5/10

   Proton Pass ships a CLI/API that supports CRUD on vaults and items (passwords, notes, cards, identities, SSH keys, custom items), enabling scripted/CI access similar to core UI functions. However, there's no evidence the CLI/API exposes other UI capabilities like vault sharing, TOTP generation, Pass Monitor/Sentinel checks, alias management, or emergency access. Missing for 10: API coverage for sharing, TOTP/2FA, monitoring, aliases, emergency access, and any independent confirmation of API completeness.

   • [claimed-docs] “enables you to securely retrieve secrets and other items across scripts, deployments, and continuous integration/ continuous delivery (CI/CD…”
   • [claimed-docs] “Create, read, update, and delete vaults”
   • [claimed-docs] “the CLI enables you to securely retrieve secrets and other items across scripts, deployments, and continuous integration/ continuous deliver…”
   • [claimed-docs] “View, create, update, and delete items including passwords, secure notes, credit cards, identities, WiFi entries, custom items, and stored S…”
   • [probe] “official CLI documented at https://proton.me/blog/proton-pass-cli”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

2. ai-native userExport all of my data in open formats and leave

   weight 3 · round to Bitwarden
   Bitwarden✓fullclaimed9/10

   Bitwarden's docs explicitly support exporting full vault data (logins, notes) for backup or transfer, plus separate authenticator/TOTP export in open formats (JSON), and CLI/API access for automated bulk export. This directly satisfies the 'export all data in open formats and leave' story with strong first-party documentation. Missing for 10: no independent/hands-on confirmation of export format fidelity or completeness verification by a third party.

   • [claimed-docs] “Export your vault data, including logins and notes, to back up important information or transfer to a new Bitwarden vault.”
   • [claimed-docs] “Export your vault data, including logins and notes, to back up important information or transfer to a new Bitwarden vault”
   • [claimed-docs] “Google Authenticator (QR code): Import from Google Authenticator using a QR code... LastPass (JSON): Import a LastPass Authenticator account…”
   • [claimed-docs] “Google Authenticator (QR code): Import from Google Authenticator using a QR code... LastPass (JSON): Import a LastPass Authenticator account…”
   • [claimed-docs] “The Bitwarden command-line interface (CLI) is a powerful, fully-featured tool for accessing and managing your vault.”
   • [claimed-docs] “Import logins and data from different password managers, other Bitwarden vaults, or encrypted exports to instantly transfer your information…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Proton Pass✓fullclaimed7/10

   Proton Pass supports data export in multiple open, portable formats (unencrypted ZIP, CSV, PGP-encrypted JSON) allowing users to leave with their data, and also offers an import tool for migrating in from other managers. Missing for 10: independent hands-on verification of export completeness/fidelity, and no evidence of bulk API/CLI-based export for programmatic 'leave' workflows beyond CLI CRUD operations.

   • [claimed-docs] “If you want to use your passwords elsewhere or create a separate hardcopy, you can easily export your data from Proton Pass.”
   • [claimed-docs] “You have three options for export: 1. A ZIP file containing a PGP-encrypted JSON file 2. An unencrypted ZIP file 3. A CSV file”
   • [claimed-docs] “With our import tool, you can migrate passwords and other items from most major password managers in just a few minutes.”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

3. ai-native userRead the product's source under an open license

   weight 2 · round to Bitwarden
   Bitwarden~partialprobed6/10

   Community evidence and the MCP server repo confirm Bitwarden ships components under open licenses (e.g., bitwarden/mcp-server is GPL-3.0) and is broadly known/marketed as 'the most trusted open source password manager,' and users cite valuing its open client source. However, the same evidence documents a real controversy where Bitwarden relicensed its SDK away from a fully open license, only reversing course after backlash — a concrete counter-example to unconditional openness. missing for 10: explicit license file/repo evidence for the core vault clients, resolution details confirming all components are now uniformly open-licensed, independent audit confirming no remaining non-open components.

   • [probe] “PROBE runtime (recorded 2026-09-15): Bitwarden's OFFICIAL MCP server completed a FULL keyless stdio initialize handshake — `npx -y @bitwarde…”
   • [community] “Props for them to step in the right direction, it wasn’t obvious at all for a few days what they would do (re: SDK relicensing controversy).”
   • [community] “Thank you to Bitwarden for relicensing back to Free/Open License... I no longer recommend Bitwarden for normal people because the built-in p…”
   • [community] “I’m relieved... I hope they realized that being FOSS is their moat... I’m still not sure how I feel about them now. Trust in the company has…”
   • [community] “I use BitWarden because I'd never trust a password manager with closed source clients... Needless to say I move to the next ethical e2ee pas…”
   • [probe] “PROBE llms.txt: HTTP 200 at https://bitwarden.com/llms.txt # Bitwarden > The most trusted open source password manager for passwords, passk…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Proton Pass~partialcommunity5/10

   Community evidence confirms Proton Pass client apps are open source on GitHub (protonpass org), but users note this covers only the clients, not the full product/server-side, and there was confusion over whether it was truly open-sourced. No first-party docs in the pack mention a license or open-source repo at all. Missing for 10: official documentation citing the open-source license, confirmation that server/backend code is open, and clarity on license terms.

   • [community] “It seems only the clients are open source? https://github.com/orgs/protonpass/repositories”
   • [community] “Am I correct in believing that they haven't open-sourced Proton Pass yet?... Their official announcement post says it's now open source, how…”
   • [community] “Please note that we do have encrypted notes... And it is open source: https://github.com/protonpass”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

4. ai-native userSelf-host the core product

   weight 3 · round to Bitwarden
   Bitwarden✓fullprobed9/10

   Bitwarden provides official, well-documented on-premise/self-hosting instructions for Linux servers, and it is open-source, aligning strongly with an AI-native user's openness needs. missing for 10: independent hands-on verification of self-hosted deployment specifically (evidence is docs-only, not community confirmation of self-hosting success).

   • [claimed-docs] “This article will walk you through the procedure to install and deploy Bitwarden to your own Linux server.”
   • [probe] “PROBE llms.txt: HTTP 200 at https://bitwarden.com/llms.txt # Bitwarden > The most trusted open source password manager for passwords, passk…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Proton Pass—none0/10

   No evidence anywhere in the docs pack of a self-hosted server option; Proton Pass is offered only as a hosted SaaS with client apps, and community comments confirm only the client apps are open source while the backend/server is closed ('only the clients are open source').

   • [community] “It seems only the clients are open source? https://github.com/orgs/protonpass/repositories”
   • [community] “Am I correct in believing that they haven't open-sourced Proton Pass yet?... Their official announcement post says it's now open source, how…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

Storage

1. everyday userThe app stores passkeys and signs me into websites and apps with them, not just TOTP codes

   weight 3 · round to Bitwarden
   Bitwarden✓fullclaimed8/10

   Bitwarden documents storing passkeys in the vault and using the browser extension or mobile apps to autofill/sign in with them across websites and apps, going beyond TOTP-only support (bitwarden-docs-4), which aligns directly with the story's requirement of passkey-based sign-in, not just TOTP codes. Missing for 10: independent/hands-on user reports specifically confirming passkey sign-in reliability (community evidence only discusses TOTP/autofill issues, not passkeys) and detail on cross-platform (desktop app) passkey support beyond browser/mobile.

   • [claimed-docs] “Save passkeys in your Bitwarden vault and use the browser extension or mobile apps to autofill them across the apps and websites you use eve…”
   • [claimed-docs] “it automatically produces the time-based one-time passwords (TOTPs), six-digit codes using SHA-1 that rotate every 30 seconds”
   • [claimed-docs] “Connect Authenticator with Password Manager to sync your verification codes. Once activated, the Bitwarden apps stay synchronized with any c…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Proton Pass~partialclaimed6/10

   Docs confirm Proton Pass supports passkeys for passwordless authentication and separately supports TOTP code generation, indicating both capabilities coexist rather than TOTP-only. However, there is no detailed description of the sign-in autofill flow for passkeys or independent/hands-on confirmation that passkey sign-in works reliably across sites/apps. Missing for 10: hands-on/community validation of passkey autofill and sign-in success, cross-platform passkey sync confirmation, and detail on browser/app integration for passkey use.

   • [claimed-docs] “Passkeys allow you to authenticate yourself for online accounts without using passwords or passphrases.”
   • [claimed-docs] “Proton Pass can securely generate TOTP codes for websites that you have saved login details for.”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

Sync

1. power userMy passkeys sync across ecosystems — iOS, Android, Windows, Linux, browsers — instead of being locked to one platform vendor

   weight 2 · round to Bitwarden
   Bitwarden~partialclaimed6/10

   Bitwarden explicitly stores passkeys in the vault and lets the browser extension and mobile apps autofill them across apps and sites, which is the platform-agnostic model (unlike Apple/Google's device-locked passkey sync) [bitwarden-docs-4]. However, the docs only call out browser extension and mobile apps, not desktop apps on Windows/Linux specifically, and there's no independent hands-on confirmation of passkey sync working seamlessly across all five named platforms. Missing for 10: explicit desktop (Windows/Linux) passkey autofill documentation, and independent/community verification of cross-platform passkey sync reliability.

   • [claimed-docs] “Save passkeys in your Bitwarden vault and use the browser extension or mobile apps to autofill them across the apps and websites you use eve…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Proton Pass~partialcommunity4/10

   Proton Pass confirms passkey support (proton-pass-docs-8) and offers apps across iOS, Android, browsers, and a desktop app (with offline access per proton-pass-docs-9), implying cross-platform sync of vault items including passkeys. However, there's no explicit documentation confirming passkeys specifically sync across all platforms (vs. just being stored), and community comments note desktop app limitations/lack thereof at the time (proton-pass-comm-2, proton-pass-comm-14), raising doubt about full ecosystem parity. Missing for 10: explicit cross-platform passkey sync confirmation, Linux/Windows native app evidence beyond browser extensions, and independent hands-on verification that passkeys created on one platform are usable on another.

   • [claimed-docs] “Passkeys allow you to authenticate yourself for online accounts without using passwords or passphrases.”
   • [claimed-docs] “You don’t need to do anything to access Proton Pass offline. Everything in your vaults is accessible whether you’re connected to the interne…”
   • [community] “If you are paying for Pass Plus or Proton Unlimited then you have integrated 2FA/TOTP which Bitwarden also makes you pay for... And no deskt…”
   • [community] “Pity it's only available on iOS and Android as apps and as browser extensions elsewhere. I would've been interested to check out a desktop p…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

Export

1. power userExport all my TOTP secrets in an open, readable format and leave for another app whenever I choose — no lock-in

   weight 3 · round to Proton Pass
   Bitwarden~partialclaimed4/10

   Bitwarden documents a general vault export (JSON/CSV) for 'logins and notes' and back-up/transfer purposes, but the evidence never explicitly confirms that TOTP secrets are included in that export or specifies an open, human-readable format for them — only import paths for other authenticators (Google Authenticator QR, LastPass JSON, 2FAS) are detailed, which is the opposite direction (lock-in mitigation on entry, not exit). Missing for 10: explicit confirmation that TOTP seeds are present in the standard export file, documentation of the exact readable TOTP export format, and any independent/hands-on verification that exported TOTP secrets can be reimported elsewhere.

   • [claimed-docs] “Export your vault data, including logins and notes, to back up important information or transfer to a new Bitwarden vault.”
   • [claimed-docs] “Export your vault data, including logins and notes, to back up important information or transfer to a new Bitwarden vault”
   • [claimed-docs] “Google Authenticator (QR code): Import from Google Authenticator using a QR code... LastPass (JSON): Import a LastPass Authenticator account…”
   • [claimed-docs] “Google Authenticator (QR code): Import from Google Authenticator using a QR code... LastPass (JSON): Import a LastPass Authenticator account…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Proton Pass~partialclaimed5/10

   Proton Pass docs confirm a general data-export feature with multiple output options (PGP-encrypted ZIP, unencrypted ZIP, CSV), which supports the 'open, readable format' portability need, but no evidence explicitly confirms that TOTP secrets/seeds specifically are included in these exports (as opposed to being locked to Proton's own TOTP display). No community or hands-on report verifies successful TOTP secret export and re-import elsewhere. missing for 10: explicit confirmation that TOTP seeds are included in CSV/JSON export, independent verification that exported TOTP secrets can be imported into another app.

   • [claimed-docs] “If you want to use your passwords elsewhere or create a separate hardcopy, you can easily export your data from Proton Pass.”
   • [claimed-docs] “You have three options for export: 1. A ZIP file containing a PGP-encrypted JSON file 2. An unencrypted ZIP file 3. A CSV file”
   • [claimed-docs] “Proton Pass can securely generate TOTP codes for websites that you have saved login details for.”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

Import

1. power userImport tokens in bulk from other authenticator apps instead of re-enrolling every account by hand

   weight 2 · round to Bitwarden
   Bitwarden✓fullclaimed8/10

   Bitwarden's official docs explicitly support bulk import of TOTP/authenticator tokens from Google Authenticator (QR), LastPass Authenticator (JSON), and 2FAS (.2fas) backups, directly enabling power users to migrate accounts without re-enrolling each one by hand. This is a first-party, documented dedicated import flow, not a workaround. missing for 10: independent hands-on confirmation of the bulk import UX working smoothly, and coverage of additional popular authenticator export formats (e.g., Authy, Microsoft Authenticator).

   • [claimed-docs] “Google Authenticator (QR code): Import from Google Authenticator using a QR code... LastPass (JSON): Import a LastPass Authenticator account…”
   • [claimed-docs] “Google Authenticator (QR code): Import from Google Authenticator using a QR code... LastPass (JSON): Import a LastPass Authenticator account…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Proton Pass~partialclaimed4/10

   Proton Pass documents a general import tool that migrates passwords and other items from most major password managers, and it can generate TOTP codes for saved logins, but there is no explicit evidence of bulk import specifically from dedicated authenticator apps or of preserving TOTP secrets during that import process. missing for 10: explicit documentation of bulk TOTP import from authenticator apps, confirmation that the import tool carries over 2FA secrets rather than just passwords, independent or hands-on confirmation of successful token migration.

   • [claimed-docs] “With our import tool, you can migrate passwords and other items from most major password managers in just a few minutes.”
   • [claimed-docs] “Unlike other password managers, Proton Pass uses end-to-end encryption on every field you fill for the items you create (usernames, website …”
   • [claimed-docs] “Proton Pass can securely generate TOTP codes for websites that you have saved login details for.”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

Migration

1. everyday userMoving to a new phone transfers all my tokens in one guided step

   weight 2 · round to Bitwarden
   Bitwarden~partialcommunity6/10

   Bitwarden's cloud vault syncs logins, passkeys, and TOTP codes across devices automatically (docs-1, docs-2, docs-4), so logging into a new phone with the same account would pull in tokens without manual export/import — effectively delivering the outcome. However, no evidence describes a dedicated 'guided' new-device setup wizard, and one community report (bitwarden-comm-9) describes lost generated data tied to connectivity issues, raising reliability caveats for a seamless one-step transfer. Missing for 10: documented guided device-migration flow/wizard, and independent hands-on confirmation that TOTP/passkeys transfer flawlessly to a new phone.

   • [claimed-docs] “it automatically produces the time-based one-time passwords (TOTPs), six-digit codes using SHA-1 that rotate every 30 seconds”
   • [claimed-docs] “Connect Authenticator with Password Manager to sync your verification codes. Once activated, the Bitwarden apps stay synchronized with any c…”
   • [claimed-docs] “Save passkeys in your Bitwarden vault and use the browser extension or mobile apps to autofill them across the apps and websites you use eve…”
   • [community] “I tried switching to Bitwarden and forced myself to live with it for 3 months. I gave up when it lost generated password. Apparently it is q…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Proton Pass~partialclaimed3/10

   Proton Pass stores TOTP secrets in E2E-encrypted vaults that sync via the cloud (docs-5, docs-9, docs-16), which implies that logging into a new phone would pull down existing 2FA tokens, but no evidence explicitly documents a guided 'new device setup' or migration wizard for phones. The only explicit migration flows described are import/export between different password manager products (docs-3, docs-4, docs-11), not device-to-device transfer. missing for 10: explicit documentation of a phone-to-phone onboarding/migration step, confirmation that TOTP tokens sync automatically without manual re-entry, and any hands-on account of switching phones.

   • [claimed-docs] “Proton Pass can securely generate TOTP codes for websites that you have saved login details for.”
   • [claimed-docs] “You don’t need to do anything to access Proton Pass offline. Everything in your vaults is accessible whether you’re connected to the interne…”
   • [claimed-docs] “Vaults can be used to organize items — in the example above, we have a vault for personal items and one for work items.”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

1. ai-native userChoose where my data is stored (region/residency)

   weight 2 · round drawn
   Bitwarden—none0/10

   No evidence pack item mentions data residency, region selection, or self-hosting for regional compliance beyond a generic on-premise Linux install guide, which does not address choosing a storage region. Missing for 10: any documentation of region/data-residency selection (e.g., EU vs US data centers), enterprise residency options, or explicit control over where vault data is stored.

   ⚑ flag

   Proton Pass—none0/10

   No evidence pack item mentions data residency, regional data storage options, or any control over where user data is physically stored; Proton Pass docs cover encryption, vaults, CLI, and export but not region selection. Missing for 10: any documentation of data residency/region choice, EU-only or multi-region storage options, or admin controls for data location.

   ⚑ flag

2. ai-native userPrevent my data from being used to train AI models

   weight 3 · round to Proton Pass
   Bitwarden—none0/10

   The evidence pack contains no documentation, policy statement, or setting from Bitwarden addressing whether vault data or user data is used to train AI models, nor any opt-out mechanism for such use. This is a fair privacy-posture question for a SaaS handling sensitive personal data, but nothing in the pack confirms or denies a stance, so it cannot be credited as delivered.

   ⚑ flag

   Proton Pass~partialclaimed4/10

   Proton Pass's end-to-end encryption of all vault fields (docs-10) structurally means Proton cannot access plaintext user data, which would prevent it from being used to train AI models, but there is no explicit policy statement addressing AI training data use. Missing for 10: an explicit privacy policy or documentation statement about AI training opt-out/data usage, and independent confirmation of this claim.

   • [claimed-docs] “Unlike other password managers, Proton Pass uses end-to-end encryption on every field you fill for the items you create (usernames, website …”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

3. ai-native userControl data retention and deletion

   weight 2 · round to Proton Pass
   Bitwarden~partialcommunity3/10

   Bitwarden docs show users can export their vault data (for backup or account transfer) and community evidence indicates an account-deletion path exists (export → delete account → recreate), but there is no dedicated, first-party documentation on data retention policies, granular deletion controls, or how these apply to AI/agent access (e.g., MCP server or CLI-served vault data). Missing for 10: explicit retention policy documentation, dedicated account/vault deletion docs, and clarity on data lifecycle when accessed via CLI/MCP for AI agents.

   • [claimed-docs] “Export your vault data, including logins and notes, to back up important information or transfer to a new Bitwarden vault.”
   • [claimed-docs] “Export your vault data, including logins and notes, to back up important information or transfer to a new Bitwarden vault”
   • [community] “BitWarden has lost the trust. There was a blocker bug on iOS, they went radio silent on follow-ups, and their fix suggestion was 'export dat…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Proton Pass~partialclaimed5/10

   Docs show users can create/read/update/delete vaults and items via the CLI/app, and can export or migrate data before deleting it, giving concrete control over stored data. However there is no explicit documentation on account-level data retention policies, deletion timelines, or how long Proton retains deleted data, which is central to a full 'control retention and deletion' story. Missing for 10: explicit retention-period/account-deletion policy documentation, independent confirmation that deleted data is purged.

   • [claimed-docs] “Create, read, update, and delete vaults”
   • [claimed-docs] “View, create, update, and delete items including passwords, secure notes, credit cards, identities, WiFi entries, custom items, and stored S…”
   • [claimed-docs] “If you want to use your passwords elsewhere or create a separate hardcopy, you can easily export your data from Proton Pass.”
   • [claimed-docs] “You have three options for export: 1. A ZIP file containing a PGP-encrypted JSON file 2. An unencrypted ZIP file 3. A CSV file”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

4. ai-native userOpt out of telemetry and usage tracking

   weight 2 · round to Proton Pass
   Bitwarden—none0/10

   The evidence pack contains no documentation, settings, or community reports describing a telemetry/usage-tracking opt-out control in Bitwarden clients, CLI, or self-hosted server. While the axis is fair to ask of any privacy-focused product, nothing here confirms such a toggle exists or how it works.

   ⚑ flag

   Proton Pass~partialcommunity4/10

   Community evidence confirms telemetry exists in the browser extension and can be disabled, but only via Proton account settings, not directly within the extension itself, indicating a real but limited opt-out mechanism (proton-pass-comm-13). No first-party documentation from Proton Pass describes a formal telemetry/opt-out policy or setting. missing for 10: official docs on telemetry settings, in-extension opt-out toggle, confirmation of no tracking by default.

   • [community] “There's still nothing about the telemetry in the browser extension?... telemetry data is anonymous, but it's always sent to the remote endpo…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

App lock

1. everyday userThe app itself locks behind biometrics or a PIN, so a borrowed phone doesn't expose my codes

   weight 2 · round to Bitwarden
   Bitwarden~partialcommunity3/10

   No official documentation in the evidence pack describes a PIN/biometric app-lock feature; the only signal is an indirect community comment implying fingerprint unlock already exists on some platforms but is missing on Linux, which weakly corroborates the capability without detailing scope or coverage. Missing for 10: first-party docs on biometric/PIN unlock, mobile-specific confirmation, and independent hands-on validation of the lock behavior.

   • [community] “Yeah it's nice and all but I wish they brought fingerprint auth to Linux already.”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Proton Pass—none0/10

   No evidence pack item mentions app-level biometric or PIN lock for Proton Pass; the closest related items cover offline vault access, 2FA/TOTP generation, and encryption, but none address a lock screen or app-level authentication gate. Missing for 10: any mention of biometric unlock, app PIN lock, or auto-lock timeout feature.

   ⚑ flag

Audits

1. security engineerThe vendor publishes independent security audits of the app and its sync protocol

   weight 2 · round drawn
   Bitwarden—none0/10

   No evidence pack items reference independent third-party security audits, penetration tests, or cryptographic/protocol reviews of Bitwarden's app or sync protocol; the pack only covers docs on features (TOTP, autofill, CLI, import/export) and community sentiment/complaints unrelated to audits. Missing for 10: published audit reports (e.g., Cure53), audit scope/dates, sync protocol review findings, remediation disclosures.

   ⚑ flag

   Proton Pass—none0/10

   No evidence of any independent third-party security audit report, pentest, or audit of the sync protocol; evidence only covers feature docs (encryption claims, Sentinel, Monitor) and open-source status debates in community threads. Community comments even question whether the client is fully open source, but no audit report is cited or linked anywhere.

   ⚑ flag

Monitoring

1. power userThe app warns me when a service I use is breached or a stored credential is weak, reused, or exposed

   weight 2 · round to Proton Pass
   Bitwarden~partialclaimed5/10

   Bitwarden's Vault Health Reports (docs-11/17) explicitly check for reused and weak passwords locally on the client, covering part of the story, but no evidence in the pack documents breach monitoring (e.g., known data-breach alerts) or an 'exposed passwords' check against breach databases. Missing for 10: evidence of breach/exposure alerts for compromised services, and any exposed-credential detection feature.

   • [claimed-docs] “Vault health reports can help you evaluate the security of your Bitwarden individual or organization vault... Reports... are run locally on …”
   • [claimed-docs] “Vault health reports can help you evaluate the security of your Bitwarden individual or organization vault. Reports, such as the Reused Pass…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Proton Pass✓fullclaimed8/10

   Pass Monitor explicitly scans the dark web for credential leaks (breach detection), checks password health (weak/reused detection), and flags accounts missing 2FA, directly matching the story; this is documented as a core built-in feature rather than a third-party tool. Missing for 10: independent hands-on verification of Pass Monitor's accuracy/coverage and detail on exposed-credential alerting granularity beyond docs claims.

   • [claimed-docs] “Pass Monitor is a security feature in Proton Pass that scans the dark web for credential leaks, checks on the health of your passwords, and …”
   • [claimed-docs] “Pass Monitor is a security feature in Proton Pass that scans the dark web for credential leaks, checks on the health of your passwords, and …”
   • [claimed-docs] “Proton Sentinel uses AI and human analysis to make it much harder for an attacker to take over your account.”
   • [claimed-docs] “Proton Sentinel is an advanced account protection program that provides maximum security for those who need it. It mitigates security threat…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

Push

1. it adminPush-based sign-in includes phishing defenses — number matching, location context, and admin-enforced MFA policies

   weight 2 · round drawn
   Bitwarden—none0/10

   The axis applies to this product kind (peer products hold positive or none verdicts on this story), so lack of evidence for an applicable capability is "none", never "na". (na/none harmonized at arena bring-up — see pipeline/scripts/na-harmonize.ts.)

   ⚑ flag

   Proton Pass—none0/10

   The axis applies to this product kind (peer products hold positive or none verdicts on this story), so lack of evidence for an applicable capability is "none", never "na". (na/none harmonized at arena bring-up — see pipeline/scripts/na-harmonize.ts.)

   ⚑ flag

Server

1. it adminSelf-host the sync server on my own infrastructure and keep every secret inside my perimeter

   weight 2 · round to Bitwarden
   Bitwarden✓fullclaimed8/10

   Bitwarden provides official documentation for installing and deploying the self-hosted server on a Linux server, keeping vault data on the admin's own infrastructure — the core of this story. Missing for 10: independent hands-on verification of a real-world self-hosted deployment and details on ongoing maintenance/upgrade complexity for self-hosted instances.

   • [claimed-docs] “This article will walk you through the procedure to install and deploy Bitwarden to your own Linux server.”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Proton Pass—none0/10

   The axis applies to this product kind (peer products hold positive or none verdicts on this story), so lack of evidence for an applicable capability is "none", never "na". (na/none harmonized at arena bring-up — see pipeline/scripts/na-harmonize.ts.)

   ⚑ flag

Source

1. security engineerThe client apps are open source, so the code handling my seeds can be inspected and community-reviewed

   weight 2 · round drawn
   Bitwarden~partialprobed6/10

   Bitwarden markets itself as 'the most trusted open source password manager' and community members explicitly cite open-source clients as the reason they trust it with secrets (bitwarden-probe-1, bitwarden-comm-15). However, the evidence also documents a real controversy where SDK code (used by clients) was briefly relicensed away from a fully open license before being reverted after community pressure, which shows scrutiny worked but also that openness has not always been airtight (bitwarden-comm-1, bitwarden-comm-3, bitwarden-comm-4). Missing for 10: direct links to client-app GitHub repos, explicit confirmation that seed/TOTP-handling code specifically is open and audited, and independent third-party code audits corroborating the open-source claim.

   • [probe] “PROBE llms.txt: HTTP 200 at https://bitwarden.com/llms.txt # Bitwarden > The most trusted open source password manager for passwords, passk…”
   • [community] “I use BitWarden because I'd never trust a password manager with closed source clients... Needless to say I move to the next ethical e2ee pas…”
   • [community] “Props for them to step in the right direction, it wasn’t obvious at all for a few days what they would do (re: SDK relicensing controversy).”
   • [community] “Thank you to Bitwarden for relicensing back to Free/Open License... I no longer recommend Bitwarden for normal people because the built-in p…”
   • [community] “I’m relieved... I hope they realized that being FOSS is their moat... I’m still not sure how I feel about them now. Trust in the company has…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Proton Pass~partialcommunity6/10

   Community evidence confirms Proton Pass clients are open source with a public GitHub repo (github.com/protonpass), directly supporting inspectability of the code handling secrets. However, other community comments show confusion/skepticism about finding or verifying this ('haven't been able to find the repository', 'it seems only the clients are open source'), and there's no first-party doc in the pack explicitly stating open-source status or citing security audits. Missing for 10: first-party documentation confirming open-source licensing/repo, evidence of independent security audits or community code review of the seed-handling logic, and clarity on scope (client-only vs. broader).

   • [community] “Please note that we do have encrypted notes... And it is open source: https://github.com/protonpass”
   • [community] “It seems only the clients are open source? https://github.com/orgs/protonpass/repositories”
   • [community] “Am I correct in believing that they haven't open-sourced Proton Pass yet?... Their official announcement post says it's now open source, how…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

Automation

1. ai-native userAn agent can fetch a current TOTP code programmatically — via CLI or API — to complete a 2FA login inside an automated workflow

   weight 2 · round to Bitwarden
   Bitwarden✓fullprobed8/10

   Bitwarden's integrated authenticator generates TOTP codes (bitwarden-docs-1) and the CLI is documented as a full vault-management tool suitable for automated workflows via personal API key (bitwarden-docs-7, bitwarden-docs-9); runtime probes confirm 'bw serve' exposes a local REST Vault Management API and an official MCP server completes a full handshake, both surfaces an agent could use to fetch TOTP codes programmatically (bitwarden-probe-rt-1, bitwarden-probe-rt-2). Hands-on community evidence independently corroborates that 'bw list' actually returns current TOTP codes in plaintext, confirming the CLI does return live TOTP data (bitwarden-comm-13). Missing for 10: explicit documentation naming a dedicated 'get totp' command/API endpoint and a clean (non-complaint) hands-on workflow example.

   • [claimed-docs] “it automatically produces the time-based one-time passwords (TOTPs), six-digit codes using SHA-1 that rotate every 30 seconds”
   • [claimed-docs] “The Bitwarden command-line interface (CLI) is a powerful, fully-featured tool for accessing and managing your vault.”
   • [claimed-docs] “Using the personal API key for CLI authentication is suitable for automated workflows, for providing access to an external appli”
   • [probe] “PROBE runtime (recorded 2026-09-15): the official bw CLI installs keylessly from npm (@bitwarden/cli, registry latest 2026.8.0) and prints i…”
   • [probe] “PROBE runtime (recorded 2026-09-15): Bitwarden's OFFICIAL MCP server completed a FULL keyless stdio initialize handshake — `npx -y @bitwarde…”
   • [community] “I had a really bad experience with the bitwarden cli. I ran 'bw list', assuming it would list names, but it listed everything including pass…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Proton Pass~partialprobed4/10

   Proton Pass ships an official CLI documented for scripting/CI-CD use that can 'securely retrieve secrets and other items' (docs-1/14) and lists item types it can read (docs-15), but TOTP/2FA codes are not explicitly named among the retrievable item types, and no docs or community evidence confirm a CLI/API command that outputs a live TOTP code for use in an automated login flow. missing for 10: explicit CLI/API command or output field for TOTP codes, hands-on confirmation of an agent successfully pulling a 2FA code programmatically.

   • [claimed-docs] “enables you to securely retrieve secrets and other items across scripts, deployments, and continuous integration/ continuous delivery (CI/CD…”
   • [claimed-docs] “the CLI enables you to securely retrieve secrets and other items across scripts, deployments, and continuous integration/ continuous deliver…”
   • [claimed-docs] “View, create, update, and delete items including passwords, secure notes, credit cards, identities, WiFi entries, custom items, and stored S…”
   • [claimed-docs] “Proton Pass can securely generate TOTP codes for websites that you have saved login details for.”
   • [probe] “official CLI documented at https://proton.me/blog/proton-pass-cli”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

2. ai-native userExpose the vault through a local programmatic endpoint an agent can query for codes and secrets without screen-scraping the app

   weight 1 · round to Bitwarden
   Bitwarden✓fullprobed8/10

   Bitwarden's CLI supports a documented `bw serve` mode exposing the vault as a local RESTful API, and Bitwarden ships an official MCP server (bitwarden/mcp-server) that completed a live stdio handshake, both giving agents programmatic access to vault items and TOTP codes without screen-scraping. missing for 10: no independent hands-on validation of `bw serve` specifically for TOTP retrieval by an agent, and no broader third-party corroboration beyond the vendor-run probes.

   • [probe] “PROBE runtime (recorded 2026-09-15): the official bw CLI installs keylessly from npm (@bitwarden/cli, registry latest 2026.8.0) and prints i…”
   • [probe] “PROBE runtime (recorded 2026-09-15): Bitwarden's OFFICIAL MCP server completed a FULL keyless stdio initialize handshake — `npx -y @bitwarde…”
   • [probe] “official MCP server documented at https://github.com/bitwarden/mcp-server”
   • [claimed-docs] “The Bitwarden command-line interface (CLI) is a powerful, fully-featured tool for accessing and managing your vault.”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Proton Pass~partialprobed6/10

   Proton Pass ships an official CLI that allows secure programmatic retrieval of secrets, passwords, SSH keys, and other items across scripts and CI/CD pipelines, which functions as a local endpoint an agent could query instead of screen-scraping the app. However, the docs don't explicitly confirm TOTP/2FA code retrieval via the CLI (2FA generation is only described in the app itself), and there is no mention of an agent-specific or MCP-style interface, nor independent hands-on verification of CLI use by AI agents. Missing for 10: explicit CLI support for TOTP code retrieval, agent/MCP-oriented interface documentation, independent corroboration of CLI usage in agentic workflows.

   • [claimed-docs] “enables you to securely retrieve secrets and other items across scripts, deployments, and continuous integration/ continuous delivery (CI/CD…”
   • [claimed-docs] “the CLI enables you to securely retrieve secrets and other items across scripts, deployments, and continuous integration/ continuous deliver…”
   • [claimed-docs] “View, create, update, and delete items including passwords, secure notes, credit cards, identities, WiFi entries, custom items, and stored S…”
   • [claimed-docs] “Proton Pass can securely generate TOTP codes for websites that you have saved login details for.”
   • [probe] “official CLI documented at https://proton.me/blog/proton-pass-cli”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

Browser

1. everyday userA browser extension autofills my TOTP codes and passkeys during login instead of making me retype them

   weight 2 · round drawn
   Bitwarden✓fullcommunity8/10

   Docs confirm browser extension autofills matching credentials on login pages (docs-12), autofills stored passkeys across apps/websites (docs-4), and generates/syncs TOTP codes (docs-1, docs-2) which are surfaced during autofill in the extension. One community mention notes TOTP setup friction, but no concrete evidence contradicts the core autofill-of-TOTP/passkeys capability. Missing for 10: independent hands-on confirmation specifically that TOTP codes (not just passwords/passkeys) are auto-filled into login forms without manual copy-paste.

   • [claimed-docs] “When you visit a website, the browser extension recognizes it and enters matching credentials from your vault into the login fields.”
   • [claimed-docs] “Save passkeys in your Bitwarden vault and use the browser extension or mobile apps to autofill them across the apps and websites you use eve…”
   • [claimed-docs] “it automatically produces the time-based one-time passwords (TOTPs), six-digit codes using SHA-1 that rotate every 30 seconds”
   • [claimed-docs] “Connect Authenticator with Password Manager to sync your verification codes. Once activated, the Bitwarden apps stay synchronized with any c…”
   • [community] “I always enjoyed the value that Bitwarden provides: free to use, password generator, and a vault to keep other texts. But somehow I never go…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Proton Pass✓fullcommunity8/10

   Docs confirm TOTP code generation for saved logins and passkey support, and community evidence from an actual user confirms the browser extension autofills TOTP/2FA smoothly ('Proton Pass is my default for all 2FA. I love the browser extension, so easy and sleek'). Passkey autofill is documented but not independently corroborated with hands-on testing. Missing for 10: independent hands-on confirmation of passkey autofill specifically, and more detail on passkey UX in the extension.

   • [claimed-docs] “Proton Pass can securely generate TOTP codes for websites that you have saved login details for.”
   • [claimed-docs] “Passkeys allow you to authenticate yourself for online accounts without using passwords or passphrases.”
   • [community] “I've been a Proton Unlimited subscriber... Proton Pass is my default for all 2FA. I love the browser extension, so easy and sleek.”
   • [community] “If you are paying for Pass Plus or Proton Unlimited then you have integrated 2FA/TOTP which Bitwarden also makes you pay for... And no deskt…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

Desktop

1. power userA first-class desktop app gives me codes and vault access on my computer, not just on mobile

   weight 2 · round to Bitwarden
   Bitwarden~partialprobed5/10

   Evidence confirms TOTP codes sync across 'Bitwarden apps' and vault access is available via browser extension and CLI on a computer, implying desktop-class access, but no citation explicitly documents a native desktop application (GUI) separate from the browser extension/CLI. Missing for 10: explicit desktop app documentation, screenshots/feature parity claims, and independent confirmation that a first-class desktop GUI (not just extension/CLI) exists and works well.

   • [claimed-docs] “it automatically produces the time-based one-time passwords (TOTPs), six-digit codes using SHA-1 that rotate every 30 seconds”
   • [claimed-docs] “Connect Authenticator with Password Manager to sync your verification codes. Once activated, the Bitwarden apps stay synchronized with any c…”
   • [claimed-docs] “The Bitwarden command-line interface (CLI) is a powerful, fully-featured tool for accessing and managing your vault.”
   • [claimed-docs] “When you visit a website, the browser extension recognizes it and enters matching credentials from your vault into the login fields.”
   • [probe] “PROBE runtime (recorded 2026-09-15): the official bw CLI installs keylessly from npm (@bitwarden/cli, registry latest 2026.8.0) and prints i…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Proton Pass!disputedcontradicted5/10

   Proton's own support docs describe a dedicated desktop app with offline vault access and TOTP code generation (docs-9, docs-16, docs-5), suggesting a first-class desktop experience. However, community hands-on reports explicitly state there was no desktop app for Proton Pass ('And no desktop app for proton pass, maybe some day though?' and 'Pity it's only available on iOS and Android as apps and as browser extensions elsewhere'), directly contradicting the vendor's desktop-app documentation. Missing for 10: independent corroboration that the desktop app actually exists and works as described, and resolution of the timeline discrepancy between docs and community reports.

   • [claimed-docs] “You don’t need to do anything to access Proton Pass offline. Everything in your vaults is accessible whether you’re connected to the interne…”
   • [claimed-docs] “Vaults can be used to organize items — in the example above, we have a vault for personal items and one for work items.”
   • [claimed-docs] “Proton Pass can securely generate TOTP codes for websites that you have saved login details for.”
   • [community] “If you are paying for Pass Plus or Proton Unlimited then you have integrated 2FA/TOTP which Bitwarden also makes you pay for... And no deskt…”
   • [community] “Pity it's only available on iOS and Android as apps and as browser extensions elsewhere. I would've been interested to check out a desktop p…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

Watch

1. everyday userRead my codes from my smartwatch without pulling out my phone

   weight 1 · round drawn
   Bitwarden—none0/10

   The evidence pack covers TOTP generation, syncing, browser extension, CLI, and API features, but contains no mention of a smartwatch app, Wear OS/watchOS companion, or any glanceable code display for wearables. This is a fair capability question for a password manager with a built-in authenticator, but no evidence shows it is delivered.

   ⚑ flag

   Proton Pass—none0/10

   No evidence of a smartwatch app, watch companion, or complication for viewing TOTP codes; evidence only covers mobile, browser extension, and CLI surfaces, with community notes even lamenting lack of a desktop app. Missing for 10: any smartwatch app/companion, watch complication, or documentation of viewing codes without the phone.

   • [claimed-docs] “Proton Pass can securely generate TOTP codes for websites that you have saved login details for.”
   • [community] “Pity it's only available on iOS and Android as apps and as browser extensions elsewhere. I would've been interested to check out a desktop p…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

Backup

1. security engineerBackups are end-to-end encrypted with a key the vendor never holds, and the encryption design is documented

   weight 3 · round to Proton Pass
   Bitwarden~partialclaimed4/10

   Docs confirm Bitwarden supports vault export/import and mention an 'encrypted exports' option (bitwarden-docs-5, bitwarden-docs-6, bitwarden-docs-16), implying some backups can be encrypted, but no evidence pack item documents the underlying encryption design, key derivation, or explicitly states the vendor cannot access backup contents. missing for 10: a linked security whitepaper or architecture doc describing zero-knowledge key management for exports, explicit vendor-can't-decrypt-backups statement, and independent verification of the encrypted export format.

   • [claimed-docs] “Export your vault data, including logins and notes, to back up important information or transfer to a new Bitwarden vault.”
   • [claimed-docs] “Import logins and data from different password managers, other Bitwarden vaults, or encrypted exports to instantly transfer your information…”
   • [claimed-docs] “Export your vault data, including logins and notes, to back up important information or transfer to a new Bitwarden vault”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Proton Pass~partialclaimed5/10

   Proton Pass documents that all vault data is end-to-end encrypted (docs-10) and offers a PGP-encrypted export option that could serve as a backup (docs-11), implying the vendor cannot read backed-up data. However, there is no dedicated 'backup' feature documentation (only export/import), and no detailed cryptographic architecture whitepaper or independent audit is cited to substantiate the zero-knowledge key design in depth. missing for 10: dedicated backup-feature docs, detailed encryption architecture/whitepaper, independent security audit confirming vendor never holds keys

   • [claimed-docs] “Unlike other password managers, Proton Pass uses end-to-end encryption on every field you fill for the items you create (usernames, website …”
   • [claimed-docs] “You have three options for export: 1. A ZIP file containing a PGP-encrypted JSON file 2. An unencrypted ZIP file 3. A CSV file”
   • [claimed-docs] “Vaults can be used to organize items — in the example above, we have a vault for personal items and one for work items.”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

Multi device

1. everyday userMy tokens are available on my phone, tablet, and computer at the same time, kept in sync automatically

   weight 2 · round to Proton Pass
   Bitwarden!disputedcontradicted6/10

   Bitwarden's docs describe cloud-based vault sync (TOTP codes staying synchronized across apps, passkeys usable across browser extension and mobile apps, auto-fill working consistently) which underlies cross-device availability of stored items (bitwarden-docs-2, bitwarden-docs-4, bitwarden-docs-12). However, a hands-on community report describes losing a generated password due to sync failures on bad connections, calling it 'quite common' (bitwarden-comm-9), directly contradicting the claim of seamless automatic sync. missing for 10: independent verification of reliable real-time sync across phone/tablet/computer simultaneously, and resolution/acknowledgment of the reported data-loss-on-sync issue.

   • [claimed-docs] “Connect Authenticator with Password Manager to sync your verification codes. Once activated, the Bitwarden apps stay synchronized with any c…”
   • [claimed-docs] “Save passkeys in your Bitwarden vault and use the browser extension or mobile apps to autofill them across the apps and websites you use eve…”
   • [claimed-docs] “When you visit a website, the browser extension recognizes it and enters matching credentials from your vault into the login fields.”
   • [community] “I tried switching to Bitwarden and forced myself to live with it for 3 months. I gave up when it lost generated password. Apparently it is q…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Proton Pass~partialcommunity5/10

   Docs confirm cross-platform clients (mobile apps, browser extensions, and a desktop app referenced in the desktop-app guide) and offline access that presumably reconciles when back online, implying cloud sync of vault items including TOTP tokens. However, no first-party documentation explicitly describes the sync mechanism or guarantees real-time multi-device consistency, and community comments note a historical lack of a desktop app and inconsistent browser-extension availability (e.g., Firefox ESR incompatibility), suggesting platform coverage has been uneven over time. Missing for 10: explicit sync/consistency documentation, independent verification that sync is truly automatic and near-instant across phone/tablet/computer.

   • [claimed-docs] “You don’t need to do anything to access Proton Pass offline. Everything in your vaults is accessible whether you’re connected to the interne…”
   • [claimed-docs] “Proton Pass can securely generate TOTP codes for websites that you have saved login details for.”
   • [community] “If you are paying for Pass Plus or Proton Unlimited then you have integrated 2FA/TOTP which Bitwarden also makes you pay for... And no deskt…”
   • [community] “Pity it's only available on iOS and Android as apps and as browser extensions elsewhere. I would've been interested to check out a desktop p…”
   • [community] “Can't use the Firefox extension, FF 102 ESR is apparently too old”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

Recovery

1. everyday userLosing my phone doesn't lose my accounts — a documented recovery path restores my tokens on a new device

   weight 3 · round to Bitwarden
   Bitwarden~partialcommunity6/10

   Bitwarden's docs show that TOTP codes are synced across the Bitwarden apps (docs-2) and that vault data (including logins) can be exported/imported to restore to a new install (docs-5, docs-6), which together give a de facto path to recover accounts/tokens on a new device after losing a phone. However there is no explicit 'lost my phone' recovery guide, and community reports mention TOTP/sync reliability problems (bitwarden-comm-12, bitwarden-comm-9) that add real-world caveats. Missing for 10: a dedicated 'device loss/account recovery' doc, evidence of automatic cloud vault sync restoring a fresh install without manual export/import, and confirmation that community-reported sync/TOTP glitches don't block this flow.

   • [claimed-docs] “Connect Authenticator with Password Manager to sync your verification codes. Once activated, the Bitwarden apps stay synchronized with any c…”
   • [claimed-docs] “Export your vault data, including logins and notes, to back up important information or transfer to a new Bitwarden vault.”
   • [claimed-docs] “Import logins and data from different password managers, other Bitwarden vaults, or encrypted exports to instantly transfer your information…”
   • [community] “I always enjoyed the value that Bitwarden provides: free to use, password generator, and a vault to keep other texts. But somehow I never go…”
   • [community] “I tried switching to Bitwarden and forced myself to live with it for 3 months. I gave up when it lost generated password. Apparently it is q…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Proton Pass~partialclaimed4/10

   Proton Pass stores TOTP codes and other secrets inside end-to-end encrypted vaults that live on Proton's servers (docs-5, docs-10), and offers export (docs-4/11) and Emergency Access (docs-20) features that could serve as backup/recovery mechanisms, implying data isn't lost with a device. However, there is no explicit documentation in the pack describing a dedicated 'lost phone / new device' recovery flow, account recovery phrase, or step-by-step restoration of 2FA tokens after device loss. Missing for 10: explicit account-recovery/recovery-phrase documentation, explicit cross-device sync confirmation, and a stated process for restoring TOTP secrets specifically after losing a device.

   • [claimed-docs] “Proton Pass can securely generate TOTP codes for websites that you have saved login details for.”
   • [claimed-docs] “Unlike other password managers, Proton Pass uses end-to-end encryption on every field you fill for the items you create (usernames, website …”
   • [claimed-docs] “If you want to use your passwords elsewhere or create a separate hardcopy, you can easily export your data from Proton Pass.”
   • [claimed-docs] “You have three options for export: 1. A ZIP file containing a PGP-encrypted JSON file 2. An unencrypted ZIP file 3. A CSV file”
   • [claimed-docs] “Emergency Access”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

Automation

1. ai-native userAn agent can create and update vault entries — seeding new TOTP secrets, storing credentials — through documented programmatic surfaces

   weight 2 · round to Bitwarden
   Bitwarden✓fullprobed7/10

   Bitwarden documents multiple programmatic surfaces for vault management — the fully-featured CLI (which supports create/edit item operations and a `bw serve` mode exposing a local REST API for TOTP/items), a personal API key explicitly recommended for 'automated workflows' and 'external applications,' and an official first-party MCP server that completed a live stdio handshake, giving agents a documented path to create and update vault entries including TOTP secrets. Missing for 10: an explicit doc/code example showing the exact CLI/API call syntax for adding a TOTP field to a new item, and independent (non-vendor) confirmation that an agent successfully created/updated entries end-to-end via these surfaces.

   • [claimed-docs] “The Bitwarden command-line interface (CLI) is a powerful, fully-featured tool for accessing and managing your vault.”
   • [claimed-docs] “Using the personal API key for CLI authentication is suitable for automated workflows, for providing access to an external appli”
   • [probe] “official CLI documented at https://bitwarden.com/help/cli/”
   • [probe] “PROBE runtime (recorded 2026-09-15): the official bw CLI installs keylessly from npm (@bitwarden/cli, registry latest 2026.8.0) and prints i…”
   • [probe] “PROBE runtime (recorded 2026-09-15): Bitwarden's OFFICIAL MCP server completed a FULL keyless stdio initialize handshake — `npx -y @bitwarde…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Proton Pass~partialprobed6/10

   Proton Pass CLI documentation shows programmatic create/read/update/delete of items (including passwords, secure notes, SSH keys) and vaults, which an agent could invoke via scripts. However, there's no explicit mention of TOTP secret seeding via the CLI, and no dedicated agent/AI integration or API/SDK beyond the CLI is documented, and no independent confirmation of these CLI capabilities working reliably. Missing for 10: explicit TOTP-seeding support via CLI, broader API/SDK for agents, and independent hands-on verification of programmatic write operations.

   • [claimed-docs] “Create, read, update, and delete vaults”
   • [claimed-docs] “View, create, update, and delete items including passwords, secure notes, credit cards, identities, WiFi entries, custom items, and stored S…”
   • [claimed-docs] “the CLI enables you to securely retrieve secrets and other items across scripts, deployments, and continuous integration/ continuous deliver…”
   • [probe] “official CLI documented at https://proton.me/blog/proton-pass-cli”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

Policy

1. it adminEnforce org-wide policies — require app lock, restrict export, mandate strong master credentials — across every member's app

   weight 1 · round to Bitwarden
   Bitwarden~partialclaimed3/10

   The evidence only shows that Bitwarden's Public API lets organizations manage 'members, collections, groups, event logs, and policies,' implying policy management exists, but there is no documentation shown for specific policies like app-lock enforcement, export restriction, or master-password strength requirements. Missing for 10: explicit documentation of individual policy types (master password strength, disable personal vault export, require app lock/timeout), admin console UI screenshots or workflow, and any hands-on confirmation that these policies are enforced across all members' apps.

   • [claimed-docs] “The Bitwarden Public API provides organizations a suite of tools for managing members, collections, groups, event logs, and policies.”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Proton Pass—none0/10

   No evidence of org-wide admin policy controls (enforced app lock, export restrictions, mandated master password strength) for organization members; docs cover vaults, CLI, export, 2FA, sharing but nothing about admin-enforced policies across a team.

   ⚑ flag

Sharing

1. it adminMy team can share TOTP-protected logins through shared vaults or collections with per-member access control

   weight 2 · round to Bitwarden
   Bitwarden~partialcommunity6/10

   Bitwarden's docs confirm built-in TOTP generation/sync (bitwarden-docs-1, bitwarden-docs-2) and its Public API supports managing organization members, collections, and groups (bitwarden-docs-8), and a real-world team user cites 'safer account sharing, including 2FA' as a killer feature (bitwarden-comm-8). However, the evidence pack lacks explicit documentation tying TOTP fields to collection-level per-member permissions/access control, so the granular sharing mechanics aren't directly evidenced. Missing for 10: dedicated docs on collection permission levels (view/edit/manage) applied to TOTP-containing items, and independent confirmation of this exact workflow.

   • [claimed-docs] “it automatically produces the time-based one-time passwords (TOTPs), six-digit codes using SHA-1 that rotate every 30 seconds”
   • [claimed-docs] “Connect Authenticator with Password Manager to sync your verification codes. Once activated, the Bitwarden apps stay synchronized with any c…”
   • [claimed-docs] “The Bitwarden Public API provides organizations a suite of tools for managing members, collections, groups, event logs, and policies.”
   • [community] “We use BitWarden at work, paying $3600/year. Their product is great for teams... The killer feature for me has been safer account sharing, i…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Proton Pass~partialclaimed5/10

   Evidence confirms Proton Pass supports TOTP/2FA generation for saved logins (docs-5) and secure vault sharing plus vault-based organization of items (docs-16, docs-17), which together imply TOTP items can be shared via vaults. However, there is no documentation of granular per-member access control (roles/permissions) or 'collections' as a distinct sharing unit, and no team-admin console evidence for managing member access levels within shared vaults. Missing for 10: explicit permission-level (viewer/editor/admin) documentation for shared vaults, evidence of 'collections' as an admin feature, and any IT-admin console showing per-member access management.

   • [claimed-docs] “Proton Pass can securely generate TOTP codes for websites that you have saved login details for.”
   • [claimed-docs] “Vaults can be used to organize items — in the example above, we have a vault for personal items and one for work items.”
   • [claimed-docs] “Secure vault sharing”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

Enrollment

1. everyday userScan a QR code and immediately start generating TOTP codes for a new account

   weight 3 · round to Bitwarden
   Bitwarden~partialcommunity6/10

   Docs confirm Bitwarden's integrated authenticator automatically generates rotating TOTP codes once a key/QR is added to a login item (bitwarden-docs-1, bitwarden-docs-13), which covers the core capability, but the pack lacks explicit documentation of the actual camera-scan-QR flow for a brand-new account (only QR-based *import* from another authenticator app is documented, bitwarden-docs-3/14). One community report also describes difficulty getting TOTP working at all (bitwarden-comm-12), though it's anecdotal and not a concrete reproducible failure. missing for 10: explicit doc/screenshot of scanning a QR to add a brand-new TOTP secret (not import), and independent hands-on confirmation that codes generate immediately after scan.

   • [claimed-docs] “it automatically produces the time-based one-time passwords (TOTPs), six-digit codes using SHA-1 that rotate every 30 seconds”
   • [claimed-docs] “Let's start your Bitwarden browser extension journey by adding a new login item to your vault”
   • [claimed-docs] “Google Authenticator (QR code): Import from Google Authenticator using a QR code... LastPass (JSON): Import a LastPass Authenticator account…”
   • [community] “I always enjoyed the value that Bitwarden provides: free to use, password generator, and a vault to keep other texts. But somehow I never go…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Proton Pass~partialcommunity5/10

   Docs confirm Proton Pass generates TOTP codes for saved logins (proton-pass-docs-5) and community reports use it as their default 2FA tool (proton-pass-comm-12), but no evidence explicitly describes scanning a QR code to add a new TOTP secret and instantly getting codes. Missing for 10: explicit QR-code scanning workflow documentation, mobile camera scan support evidence, and independent hands-on confirmation of the scan-to-code flow.

   • [claimed-docs] “Proton Pass can securely generate TOTP codes for websites that you have saved login details for.”
   • [community] “I've been a Proton Unlimited subscriber... Proton Pass is my default for all 2FA. I love the browser extension, so easy and sleek.”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

Offline

1. power userCodes generate fully offline — no network, no vendor account required just to see my TOTP codes

   weight 2 · round drawn
   Bitwarden—none0/10

   Bitwarden's TOTP generation is tightly coupled to the vault: codes are stored and computed inside a Bitwarden vault item, which requires a Bitwarden account/vault (docs-1, docs-2) and typically syncs across the vendor's cloud infrastructure. No evidence describes a standalone, account-free offline TOTP mode; self-hosting (docs-10) still requires an account/server setup, not a vendor-free path. missing for 10: evidence of a no-account, no-vendor-server offline TOTP mode; confirmation that code generation works without ever creating/authenticating a Bitwarden account.

   • [claimed-docs] “it automatically produces the time-based one-time passwords (TOTPs), six-digit codes using SHA-1 that rotate every 30 seconds”
   • [claimed-docs] “Connect Authenticator with Password Manager to sync your verification codes. Once activated, the Bitwarden apps stay synchronized with any c…”
   • [claimed-docs] “This article will walk you through the procedure to install and deploy Bitwarden to your own Linux server.”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Proton Pass—none0/10

   Proton Pass is fundamentally an account-based, encrypted-vault service — using it at all requires creating and logging into a Proton account, and TOTP codes are stored as fields within account-synced vaults. Evidence only shows that once logged in, offline access to already-synced vaults works (proton-pass-docs-9), but nothing supports generating/viewing TOTP codes without ever creating or authenticating a vendor account, which the story explicitly requires.

   • [claimed-docs] “You don’t need to do anything to access Proton Pass offline. Everything in your vaults is accessible whether you’re connected to the interne…”
   • [claimed-docs] “Proton Pass can securely generate TOTP codes for websites that you have saved login details for.”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

Organization

1. power userKeep dozens of tokens organized — search, folders or groups, and service icons — so the right code is always two taps away

   weight 2 · round drawn
   Bitwarden~partialclaimed4/10

   Docs confirm Bitwarden generates and syncs TOTP codes across devices and lets users import/export authenticator data (bitwarden-docs-1, bitwarden-docs-2, bitwarden-docs-3), which supports storing many tokens, but nothing in the evidence pack speaks to search, folders/groups, or service icons specifically for TOTP entries — organization is only implied through the general vault (login) item structure. missing for 10: explicit documentation of folder/collection organization for TOTP items, search functionality across TOTP entries, and service icon display for stored codes.

   • [claimed-docs] “it automatically produces the time-based one-time passwords (TOTPs), six-digit codes using SHA-1 that rotate every 30 seconds”
   • [claimed-docs] “Connect Authenticator with Password Manager to sync your verification codes. Once activated, the Bitwarden apps stay synchronized with any c…”
   • [claimed-docs] “Google Authenticator (QR code): Import from Google Authenticator using a QR code... LastPass (JSON): Import a LastPass Authenticator account…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Proton Pass~partialcommunity4/10

   Proton Pass supports TOTP generation tied to saved logins and vaults for organizing items into groups (e.g., personal vs. work), but there is no evidence of search functionality or service icons, and a community report explicitly notes the browser popup overlay was inadequate for managing hundreds of logins, suggesting scaling friction for power users. Missing for 10: dedicated TOTP search/filter feature, service icon display, and evidence of smooth navigation across dozens of tokens.

   • [claimed-docs] “Proton Pass can securely generate TOTP codes for websites that you have saved login details for.”
   • [claimed-docs] “Vaults can be used to organize items — in the example above, we have a vault for personal items and one for work items.”
   • [community] “Would like to see web/desktop clients for this. When I used it recently I found the unexpandable pop-up overlay in the browser to not be ade…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

Variants

1. power userNon-standard tokens work too — Steam Guard, HOTP counters, custom periods and digit lengths

   weight 2 · round drawn
   Bitwarden—none0/10

   The evidence only describes Bitwarden's standard TOTP support (six-digit SHA-1 codes rotating every 30 seconds) with no mention of Steam Guard tokens, HOTP counters, or custom periods/digit lengths anywhere in the docs, community, or probe items.

   • [claimed-docs] “it automatically produces the time-based one-time passwords (TOTPs), six-digit codes using SHA-1 that rotate every 30 seconds”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Proton Pass—none0/10

   Evidence only confirms basic TOTP code generation for saved logins; no mention of Steam Guard tokens, HOTP counters, or custom period/digit length support anywhere in the docs or community discussion. Missing for 10: any documentation of Steam Guard support, HOTP counter-based tokens, or custom TOTP period/digit configuration.

   • [claimed-docs] “Proton Pass can securely generate TOTP codes for websites that you have saved login details for.”

   proof ↗⚑ flag