Google Authenticator vs Proton Pass

Agent access

1. ai-native userPoint an agent at llms.txt or agent-oriented docs

   weight 2 · round drawn
   Google Authenticator—none0/10

   The axis applies to this product kind (peer products hold positive or none verdicts on this story), so lack of evidence for an applicable capability is "none", never "na". (na/none harmonized at arena bring-up — see pipeline/scripts/na-harmonize.ts.)

   ⚑ flag

   Proton Pass—none0/10

   No llms.txt or agent-oriented docs found; probes explicitly return 404 for llms.txt and docs.md endpoints, and no evidence mentions agent-readable documentation formats.

   • [probe] “PROBE llms.txt: HTTP 404 at https://proton.me/llms.txt”
   • [probe] “PROBE docs-md: HTTP 404 at https://proton.me/support/pass.md”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

2. ai-native userRun the product headlessly / in CI for automation

   weight 2 · round to Proton Pass
   Google Authenticator—none0/10

   The axis applies to this product kind (peer products hold positive or none verdicts on this story), so lack of evidence for an applicable capability is "none", never "na". (na/none harmonized at arena bring-up — see pipeline/scripts/na-harmonize.ts.)

   ⚑ flag

   Proton Pass~partialprobed6/10

   Proton Pass ships an official CLI documented as designed for scripts, deployments, and CI/CD pipelines, supporting CRUD on vaults and items — a clear headless/automation capability. However, evidence is limited to vendor blog docs with no independent/hands-on corroboration of CI usage, no details on authentication flow for non-interactive/headless environments, and no community validation of real-world CI deployment. Missing for 10: independent hands-on CI usage reports, details on non-interactive auth/session handling for automation, and broader ecosystem examples (e.g., GitHub Actions integration).

   • [claimed-docs] “enables you to securely retrieve secrets and other items across scripts, deployments, and continuous integration/ continuous delivery (CI/CD…”
   • [claimed-docs] “the CLI enables you to securely retrieve secrets and other items across scripts, deployments, and continuous integration/ continuous deliver…”
   • [claimed-docs] “View, create, update, and delete items including passwords, secure notes, credit cards, identities, WiFi entries, custom items, and stored S…”
   • [probe] “official CLI documented at https://proton.me/blog/proton-pass-cli”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

3. ai-native userConnect an agent via an official MCP server

   weight 3 · round drawn
   Google Authenticator—none0/10

   The axis applies to this product kind (peer products hold positive or none verdicts on this story), so lack of evidence for an applicable capability is "none", never "na". (na/none harmonized at arena bring-up — see pipeline/scripts/na-harmonize.ts.)

   ⚑ flag

   Proton Pass—none0/10

   The axis applies to this product kind (peer products hold positive or none verdicts on this story), so lack of evidence for an applicable capability is "none", never "na". (na/none harmonized at arena bring-up — see pipeline/scripts/na-harmonize.ts.)

   ⚑ flag

4. ai-native userUse an official CLI

   weight 2 · round to Proton Pass
   Google Authenticator—none0/10

   The axis applies to this product kind (peer products hold positive or none verdicts on this story), so lack of evidence for an applicable capability is "none", never "na". (na/none harmonized at arena bring-up — see pipeline/scripts/na-harmonize.ts.)

   ⚑ flag

   Proton Pass✓fullprobed7/10

   Proton Pass has an official CLI documented in a first-party blog post that supports CRUD on vaults and items (including SSH keys) and secret retrieval for scripts/CI/CD pipelines, which is directly relevant to AI-native/agentic automation workflows. Missing for 10: independent/hands-on corroboration of the CLI's reliability, no mention of AI-agent-specific integrations or MCP-style tooling, and no detail on scripting API depth or language bindings.

   • [claimed-docs] “enables you to securely retrieve secrets and other items across scripts, deployments, and continuous integration/ continuous delivery (CI/CD…”
   • [claimed-docs] “the CLI enables you to securely retrieve secrets and other items across scripts, deployments, and continuous integration/ continuous deliver…”
   • [claimed-docs] “View, create, update, and delete items including passwords, secure notes, credit cards, identities, WiFi entries, custom items, and stored S…”
   • [probe] “official CLI documented at https://proton.me/blog/proton-pass-cli”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

5. ai-native userDrive the product through a documented public API

   weight 3 · round to Proton Pass
   Google Authenticator—none0/10

   The axis applies to this product kind (peer products hold positive or none verdicts on this story), so lack of evidence for an applicable capability is "none", never "na". (na/none harmonized at arena bring-up — see pipeline/scripts/na-harmonize.ts.)

   ⚑ flag

   Proton Pass~partialprobed5/10

   Proton Pass offers a CLI for CRUD operations on vaults and items (passwords, notes, SSH keys, etc.) usable in scripts/CI pipelines, which provides programmatic access, but this is a CLI wrapper rather than a documented public REST/GraphQL API with SDKs, and llms.txt/docs.md probes both 404. missing for 10: a formal public API specification (REST/GraphQL/SDK), API reference docs, and independent developer corroboration of programmatic/agentic use beyond the CLI.

   • [claimed-docs] “enables you to securely retrieve secrets and other items across scripts, deployments, and continuous integration/ continuous delivery (CI/CD…”
   • [claimed-docs] “Create, read, update, and delete vaults”
   • [claimed-docs] “the CLI enables you to securely retrieve secrets and other items across scripts, deployments, and continuous integration/ continuous deliver…”
   • [claimed-docs] “View, create, update, and delete items including passwords, secure notes, credit cards, identities, WiFi entries, custom items, and stored S…”
   • [probe] “PROBE llms.txt: HTTP 404 at https://proton.me/llms.txt”
   • [probe] “PROBE docs-md: HTTP 404 at https://proton.me/support/pass.md”
   • [probe] “official CLI documented at https://proton.me/blog/proton-pass-cli”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

6. ai-native userIssue scoped/least-privilege API credentials for an agent

   weight 2 · round drawn
   Google Authenticator—none0/10

   The axis applies to this product kind (peer products hold positive or none verdicts on this story), so lack of evidence for an applicable capability is "none", never "na". (na/none harmonized at arena bring-up — see pipeline/scripts/na-harmonize.ts.)

   ⚑ flag

   Proton Pass—none0/10

   Proton Pass CLI supports retrieving secrets/items for CI/CD and vault-level CRUD, but there is no evidence of issuing scoped or least-privilege API credentials/tokens specifically for an AI agent (e.g., fine-grained scopes, agent-specific permission tiers). Vaults provide organizational grouping, not credential scoping mechanisms for automated agents.

   • [claimed-docs] “enables you to securely retrieve secrets and other items across scripts, deployments, and continuous integration/ continuous delivery (CI/CD…”
   • [claimed-docs] “Create, read, update, and delete vaults”
   • [claimed-docs] “the CLI enables you to securely retrieve secrets and other items across scripts, deployments, and continuous integration/ continuous deliver…”
   • [claimed-docs] “View, create, update, and delete items including passwords, secure notes, credit cards, identities, WiFi entries, custom items, and stored S…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

7. ai-native userBuild against official SDKs

   weight 2 · round drawn
   Google Authenticator—none0/10

   The axis applies to this product kind (peer products hold positive or none verdicts on this story), so lack of evidence for an applicable capability is "none", never "na". (na/none harmonized at arena bring-up — see pipeline/scripts/na-harmonize.ts.)

   ⚑ flag

   Proton Pass—none0/10

   Evidence shows only a CLI tool for secrets retrieval in CI/CD pipelines, not a developer SDK for building applications; no mention of SDKs, API libraries, or language bindings for programmatic integration exists in the evidence pack.

   ⚑ flag

Agentic features

1. ai-native userSet up automations that run autonomously in the background

   weight 2 · round drawn
   Google Authenticator—none0/10

   The axis applies to this product kind (peer products hold positive or none verdicts on this story), so lack of evidence for an applicable capability is "none", never "na". (na/none harmonized at arena bring-up — see pipeline/scripts/na-harmonize.ts.)

   ⚑ flag

   Proton Pass—none0/10

   The axis applies to this product kind (peer products hold positive or none verdicts on this story), so lack of evidence for an applicable capability is "none", never "na". (na/none harmonized at arena bring-up — see pipeline/scripts/na-harmonize.ts.)

   ⚑ flag

2. ai-native userOperate the product with natural-language commands

   weight 2 · round drawn
   Google Authenticator—none0/10

   The axis applies to this product kind (peer products hold positive or none verdicts on this story), so lack of evidence for an applicable capability is "none", never "na". (na/none harmonized at arena bring-up — see pipeline/scripts/na-harmonize.ts.)

   ⚑ flag

   Proton Pass—none0/10

   Proton Pass offers a CLI for scripted secret retrieval and CRUD operations, but there is no evidence of natural-language command support, AI assistant integration, or conversational interface anywhere in the docs or community discussion. Missing for 10: any NL command parsing, chat/AI interface, or agentic natural-language control.

   ⚑ flag

Api quality

1. ai-native userRely on versioned APIs with a documented deprecation policy

   weight 2 · round drawn
   Google Authenticator—none0/10

   The axis applies to this product kind (peer products hold positive or none verdicts on this story), so lack of evidence for an applicable capability is "none", never "na". (na/none harmonized at arena bring-up — see pipeline/scripts/na-harmonize.ts.)

   ⚑ flag

   Proton Pass—none0/10

   The axis applies to this product kind (peer products hold positive or none verdicts on this story), so lack of evidence for an applicable capability is "none", never "na". (na/none harmonized at arena bring-up — see pipeline/scripts/na-harmonize.ts.)

   ⚑ flag

1. ai-native userPerform bulk operations across many items at once

   weight 2 · round to Proton Pass
   Google Authenticator—none0/10

   The axis applies to this product kind (peer products hold positive or none verdicts on this story), so lack of evidence for an applicable capability is "none", never "na". (na/none harmonized at arena bring-up — see pipeline/scripts/na-harmonize.ts.)

   ⚑ flag

   Proton Pass~partialclaimed5/10

   The official CLI supports scripted CRUD on vaults and items (passwords, notes, SSH keys, etc.) which could be used to script bulk operations, and the import/export tools allow migrating many items at once. However, there is no documented explicit 'bulk edit/delete/tag' feature or batch API, and no community evidence of anyone actually scripting bulk operations at scale. Missing for 10: dedicated bulk-action API/UI, documented batch limits, and independent confirmation of large-scale scripted use.

   • [claimed-docs] “enables you to securely retrieve secrets and other items across scripts, deployments, and continuous integration/ continuous delivery (CI/CD…”
   • [claimed-docs] “the CLI enables you to securely retrieve secrets and other items across scripts, deployments, and continuous integration/ continuous deliver…”
   • [claimed-docs] “View, create, update, and delete items including passwords, secure notes, credit cards, identities, WiFi entries, custom items, and stored S…”
   • [claimed-docs] “Create, read, update, and delete vaults”
   • [claimed-docs] “With our import tool, you can migrate passwords and other items from most major password managers in just a few minutes.”
   • [claimed-docs] “You have three options for export: 1. A ZIP file containing a PGP-encrypted JSON file 2. An unencrypted ZIP file 3. A CSV file”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

1. ai-native userDo everything through the API that I can do in the UI

   weight 2 · round to Proton Pass
   Google Authenticator—none0/10

   The axis applies to this product kind (peer products hold positive or none verdicts on this story), so lack of evidence for an applicable capability is "none", never "na". (na/none harmonized at arena bring-up — see pipeline/scripts/na-harmonize.ts.)

   ⚑ flag

   Proton Pass~partialprobed5/10

   Proton Pass ships a CLI/API that supports CRUD on vaults and items (passwords, notes, cards, identities, SSH keys, custom items), enabling scripted/CI access similar to core UI functions. However, there's no evidence the CLI/API exposes other UI capabilities like vault sharing, TOTP generation, Pass Monitor/Sentinel checks, alias management, or emergency access. Missing for 10: API coverage for sharing, TOTP/2FA, monitoring, aliases, emergency access, and any independent confirmation of API completeness.

   • [claimed-docs] “enables you to securely retrieve secrets and other items across scripts, deployments, and continuous integration/ continuous delivery (CI/CD…”
   • [claimed-docs] “Create, read, update, and delete vaults”
   • [claimed-docs] “the CLI enables you to securely retrieve secrets and other items across scripts, deployments, and continuous integration/ continuous deliver…”
   • [claimed-docs] “View, create, update, and delete items including passwords, secure notes, credit cards, identities, WiFi entries, custom items, and stored S…”
   • [probe] “official CLI documented at https://proton.me/blog/proton-pass-cli”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

2. ai-native userExport all of my data in open formats and leave

   weight 3 · round to Proton Pass
   Google Authenticator!disputedcontradicted3/10

   Docs show a QR-code based transfer/export feature for moving codes between devices (docs-3, docs-11, comm-9, comm-18), but this is a proprietary re-import-only format tied to Google Authenticator itself, not an open, portable format usable elsewhere. Community evidence explicitly contradicts any 'open format export' claim: users report Google 'makes it stupendously difficult to just get a simple text export to a file' and that 'Google Authenticator does not allow you to include your codes in your backup, even when it's encrypted,' with data tied to a Google Account that can vanish if banned. Missing for 10: any documented open/standard export format (e.g., plain TOTP URI list, CSV, encrypted portable file), and evidence of true account-independent data portability.

   • [claimed-docs] “On your old device, create a QR code... On your new device, tap Scan QR code”
   • [claimed-docs] “To manually transfer Authenticator codes to a new device, you need: Your old device with Google Authenticator codes”
   • [community] “Storing it in the google cloud doesn't satisfy me. I just simply want the codes under my control... google still makes it stupendously diffi…”
   • [community] “Google Authenticator does not allow you to include your codes in your backup, even when it's encrypted. So due to Google Authenticator, losi…”
   • [community] “Google Authenticator already has a QR-Code based very easy export procedure, I just backup my GAuth to my spare phone and tablet. It feels s…”
   • [community] “Google Authenticator has a feature to allow export of all saved codes into one QR code for re-import into Google Authenticator running on an…”
   • [community] “If Google ever decides to kick you out of your account, Authenticator data will be gone. Google has done this on several occasions in the pa…”
   • [community] “Imagine your google account getting deleted cuz you got banned from Google and the suddenly you lose all your 2FA secrets cuz they are part …”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Proton Pass✓fullclaimed7/10

   Proton Pass supports data export in multiple open, portable formats (unencrypted ZIP, CSV, PGP-encrypted JSON) allowing users to leave with their data, and also offers an import tool for migrating in from other managers. Missing for 10: independent hands-on verification of export completeness/fidelity, and no evidence of bulk API/CLI-based export for programmatic 'leave' workflows beyond CLI CRUD operations.

   • [claimed-docs] “If you want to use your passwords elsewhere or create a separate hardcopy, you can easily export your data from Proton Pass.”
   • [claimed-docs] “You have three options for export: 1. A ZIP file containing a PGP-encrypted JSON file 2. An unencrypted ZIP file 3. A CSV file”
   • [claimed-docs] “With our import tool, you can migrate passwords and other items from most major password managers in just a few minutes.”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

3. ai-native userRead the product's source under an open license

   weight 2 · round to Proton Pass
   Google Authenticator~partialclaimed4/10

   The official GitHub repo (google/google-authenticator) publicly hosts source for HOTP/TOTP implementations across platforms and a PAM module, suggesting some source is open, but the evidence never states an explicit open-source license nor confirms the current mobile app's source is included/maintained there. missing for 10: explicit license text (e.g., Apache 2.0) confirmation, evidence the current Android/iOS app source (not just legacy PAM/CLI code) is published, and any independent corroboration of license terms.

   • [github] “These implementations support the HMAC-Based One-time Password (HOTP) algorithm specified in RFC 4226 and the Time-based One-time Password (…”
   • [github] “The Google Authenticator project includes implementations of one-time passcode generators for several mobile platforms.”
   • [github] “Pluggable Authentication Module, aka PAM.”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Proton Pass~partialcommunity5/10

   Community evidence confirms Proton Pass client apps are open source on GitHub (protonpass org), but users note this covers only the clients, not the full product/server-side, and there was confusion over whether it was truly open-sourced. No first-party docs in the pack mention a license or open-source repo at all. Missing for 10: official documentation citing the open-source license, confirmation that server/backend code is open, and clarity on license terms.

   • [community] “It seems only the clients are open source? https://github.com/orgs/protonpass/repositories”
   • [community] “Am I correct in believing that they haven't open-sourced Proton Pass yet?... Their official announcement post says it's now open source, how…”
   • [community] “Please note that we do have encrypted notes... And it is open source: https://github.com/protonpass”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

4. ai-native userSelf-host the core product

   weight 3 · round drawn
   Google Authenticator—none0/10

   Google Authenticator's core mobile app is closed-source and tied to Google account infrastructure for sync (docs-1, docs-4); the only open-source artifacts on GitHub are OTP-generator libraries and a PAM module, not the actual app users run, and there's no documented way to self-host the core product. Community threads reinforce this, complaining about lack of control over codes and dependency on Google's cloud (comm-6, comm-7, comm-12).

   • [claimed-docs] “With Google Authenticator, you can synchronize your verification codes across all your devices, simply by signing in to your Google Account.”
   • [claimed-docs] “When you sign in to your Google Account within Google Authenticator on a new device, your codes are automatically synced to this device.”
   • [github] “These implementations support the HMAC-Based One-time Password (HOTP) algorithm specified in RFC 4226 and the Time-based One-time Password (…”
   • [github] “Pluggable Authentication Module, aka PAM.”
   • [community] “Storing it in the google cloud doesn't satisfy me. I just simply want the codes under my control... google still makes it stupendously diffi…”
   • [community] “If Google ever decides to kick you out of your account, Authenticator data will be gone. Google has done this on several occasions in the pa…”
   • [community] “Imagine your google account getting deleted cuz you got banned from Google and the suddenly you lose all your 2FA secrets cuz they are part …”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Proton Pass—none0/10

   No evidence anywhere in the docs pack of a self-hosted server option; Proton Pass is offered only as a hosted SaaS with client apps, and community comments confirm only the client apps are open source while the backend/server is closed ('only the clients are open source').

   • [community] “It seems only the clients are open source? https://github.com/orgs/protonpass/repositories”
   • [community] “Am I correct in believing that they haven't open-sourced Proton Pass yet?... Their official announcement post says it's now open source, how…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

Storage

1. everyday userThe app stores passkeys and signs me into websites and apps with them, not just TOTP codes

   weight 3 · round to Proton Pass
   Google Authenticator—none0/10

   All evidence describes Google Authenticator solely as a TOTP/HOTP code generator with cloud sync of codes; there is no mention of passkey storage or passkey-based sign-in anywhere in the docs, GitHub description, or community discussion.

   • [github] “These implementations support the HMAC-Based One-time Password (HOTP) algorithm specified in RFC 4226 and the Time-based One-time Password (…”
   • [claimed-docs] “With Google Authenticator, you can synchronize your verification codes across all your devices, simply by signing in to your Google Account.”
   • [claimed-docs] “When you sign in to your Google Account within Google Authenticator on a new device, your codes are automatically synced to this device.”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Proton Pass~partialclaimed6/10

   Docs confirm Proton Pass supports passkeys for passwordless authentication and separately supports TOTP code generation, indicating both capabilities coexist rather than TOTP-only. However, there is no detailed description of the sign-in autofill flow for passkeys or independent/hands-on confirmation that passkey sign-in works reliably across sites/apps. Missing for 10: hands-on/community validation of passkey autofill and sign-in success, cross-platform passkey sync confirmation, and detail on browser/app integration for passkey use.

   • [claimed-docs] “Passkeys allow you to authenticate yourself for online accounts without using passwords or passphrases.”
   • [claimed-docs] “Proton Pass can securely generate TOTP codes for websites that you have saved login details for.”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

Sync

1. power userMy passkeys sync across ecosystems — iOS, Android, Windows, Linux, browsers — instead of being locked to one platform vendor

   weight 2 · round to Proton Pass
   Google Authenticator—none0/10

   The axis applies to this product kind (peer products hold positive or none verdicts on this story), so lack of evidence for an applicable capability is "none", never "na". (na/none harmonized at arena bring-up — see pipeline/scripts/na-harmonize.ts.)

   ⚑ flag

   Proton Pass~partialcommunity4/10

   Proton Pass confirms passkey support (proton-pass-docs-8) and offers apps across iOS, Android, browsers, and a desktop app (with offline access per proton-pass-docs-9), implying cross-platform sync of vault items including passkeys. However, there's no explicit documentation confirming passkeys specifically sync across all platforms (vs. just being stored), and community comments note desktop app limitations/lack thereof at the time (proton-pass-comm-2, proton-pass-comm-14), raising doubt about full ecosystem parity. Missing for 10: explicit cross-platform passkey sync confirmation, Linux/Windows native app evidence beyond browser extensions, and independent hands-on verification that passkeys created on one platform are usable on another.

   • [claimed-docs] “Passkeys allow you to authenticate yourself for online accounts without using passwords or passphrases.”
   • [claimed-docs] “You don’t need to do anything to access Proton Pass offline. Everything in your vaults is accessible whether you’re connected to the interne…”
   • [community] “If you are paying for Pass Plus or Proton Unlimited then you have integrated 2FA/TOTP which Bitwarden also makes you pay for... And no deskt…”
   • [community] “Pity it's only available on iOS and Android as apps and as browser extensions elsewhere. I would've been interested to check out a desktop p…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

Export

1. power userExport all my TOTP secrets in an open, readable format and leave for another app whenever I choose — no lock-in

   weight 3 · round to Proton Pass
   Google Authenticator!disputedcontradicted3/10

   Docs and community posts confirm a QR-code 'export' exists, but it is a proprietary migration QR built for transferring to another Google Authenticator instance, not an open/readable text format, and users explicitly report Google 'makes it stupendously difficult to just get a simple text export to a file' and that codes cannot be included in backups. This directly contradicts the story's requirement of an open, readable, portable export for switching apps freely. Missing for 10: an official plain-text/otpauth-URI export, documented compatibility with third-party apps, and confirmation the QR format is standardized/open rather than proprietary.

   • [claimed-docs] “On your old device, create a QR code... On your new device, tap Scan QR code”
   • [claimed-docs] “To manually transfer Authenticator codes to a new device, you need: Your old device with Google Authenticator codes”
   • [community] “Google Authenticator already has a QR-Code based very easy export procedure, I just backup my GAuth to my spare phone and tablet. It feels s…”
   • [community] “Google Authenticator has a feature to allow export of all saved codes into one QR code for re-import into Google Authenticator running on an…”
   • [community] “Storing it in the google cloud doesn't satisfy me. I just simply want the codes under my control... google still makes it stupendously diffi…”
   • [community] “Google Authenticator does not allow you to include your codes in your backup, even when it's encrypted. So due to Google Authenticator, losi…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Proton Pass~partialclaimed5/10

   Proton Pass docs confirm a general data-export feature with multiple output options (PGP-encrypted ZIP, unencrypted ZIP, CSV), which supports the 'open, readable format' portability need, but no evidence explicitly confirms that TOTP secrets/seeds specifically are included in these exports (as opposed to being locked to Proton's own TOTP display). No community or hands-on report verifies successful TOTP secret export and re-import elsewhere. missing for 10: explicit confirmation that TOTP seeds are included in CSV/JSON export, independent verification that exported TOTP secrets can be imported into another app.

   • [claimed-docs] “If you want to use your passwords elsewhere or create a separate hardcopy, you can easily export your data from Proton Pass.”
   • [claimed-docs] “You have three options for export: 1. A ZIP file containing a PGP-encrypted JSON file 2. An unencrypted ZIP file 3. A CSV file”
   • [claimed-docs] “Proton Pass can securely generate TOTP codes for websites that you have saved login details for.”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

Import

1. power userImport tokens in bulk from other authenticator apps instead of re-enrolling every account by hand

   weight 2 · round to Proton Pass
   Google Authenticator—none0/10

   Evidence only covers transferring/syncing Google Authenticator codes between devices running Google Authenticator itself (QR export/import, Google Account sync), not bulk import of tokens originating in other authenticator apps (e.g., Authy, Microsoft Authenticator). No documentation or community report describes cross-app bulk import.

   • [claimed-docs] “On your old device, create a QR code... On your new device, tap Scan QR code”
   • [claimed-docs] “When you sign in to your Google Account within Google Authenticator on a new device, your codes are automatically synced to this device.”
   • [claimed-docs] “To manually transfer Authenticator codes to a new device, you need: Your old device with Google Authenticator codes”
   • [community] “Google Authenticator has a feature to allow export of all saved codes into one QR code for re-import into Google Authenticator running on an…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Proton Pass~partialclaimed4/10

   Proton Pass documents a general import tool that migrates passwords and other items from most major password managers, and it can generate TOTP codes for saved logins, but there is no explicit evidence of bulk import specifically from dedicated authenticator apps or of preserving TOTP secrets during that import process. missing for 10: explicit documentation of bulk TOTP import from authenticator apps, confirmation that the import tool carries over 2FA secrets rather than just passwords, independent or hands-on confirmation of successful token migration.

   • [claimed-docs] “With our import tool, you can migrate passwords and other items from most major password managers in just a few minutes.”
   • [claimed-docs] “Unlike other password managers, Proton Pass uses end-to-end encryption on every field you fill for the items you create (usernames, website …”
   • [claimed-docs] “Proton Pass can securely generate TOTP codes for websites that you have saved login details for.”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

Migration

1. everyday userMoving to a new phone transfers all my tokens in one guided step

   weight 2 · round to Proton Pass
   Google Authenticator!disputedcontradicted4/10

   Google's own docs describe a guided one-step transfer via signing into a Google Account (auto-sync) or scanning a QR export code between old/new devices, which matches the story closely. However, multiple hands-on community reports concretely contradict this working reliably in practice—users report app upgrades wiping all tokens, phone replacements losing TOTP keys despite expecting sync/backup, and account bans erasing synced codes entirely. missing for 10: independent verification that the guided transfer works consistently without data loss, and resolution of documented upgrade/sync failures.

   • [claimed-docs] “On your old device, create a QR code... On your new device, tap Scan QR code”
   • [claimed-docs] “When you sign in to your Google Account within Google Authenticator on a new device, your codes are automatically synced to this device.”
   • [community] “I recently had a broken phone replaced and had depended on a backup to have my TOTP keys on my new phone. It was not a part of the phone bac…”
   • [community] “Don't upgrade! I just had this unpleasant experience and warned everyone... Warning: Google Authenticator upgrade loses all accounts.”
   • [community] “Every time I upgraded to a new iOS 7 beta, it wiped my Google Authenticator account tokens... I can't log in to my CampBX account anymore.”
   • [community] “Imagine your google account getting deleted cuz you got banned from Google and the suddenly you lose all your 2FA secrets cuz they are part …”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Proton Pass~partialclaimed3/10

   Proton Pass stores TOTP secrets in E2E-encrypted vaults that sync via the cloud (docs-5, docs-9, docs-16), which implies that logging into a new phone would pull down existing 2FA tokens, but no evidence explicitly documents a guided 'new device setup' or migration wizard for phones. The only explicit migration flows described are import/export between different password manager products (docs-3, docs-4, docs-11), not device-to-device transfer. missing for 10: explicit documentation of a phone-to-phone onboarding/migration step, confirmation that TOTP tokens sync automatically without manual re-entry, and any hands-on account of switching phones.

   • [claimed-docs] “Proton Pass can securely generate TOTP codes for websites that you have saved login details for.”
   • [claimed-docs] “You don’t need to do anything to access Proton Pass offline. Everything in your vaults is accessible whether you’re connected to the interne…”
   • [claimed-docs] “Vaults can be used to organize items — in the example above, we have a vault for personal items and one for work items.”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

1. ai-native userChoose where my data is stored (region/residency)

   weight 2 · round drawn
   Google Authenticator—none0/10

   The axis applies to this product kind (peer products hold positive or none verdicts on this story), so lack of evidence for an applicable capability is "none", never "na". (na/none harmonized at arena bring-up — see pipeline/scripts/na-harmonize.ts.)

   ⚑ flag

   Proton Pass—none0/10

   No evidence pack item mentions data residency, regional data storage options, or any control over where user data is physically stored; Proton Pass docs cover encryption, vaults, CLI, and export but not region selection. Missing for 10: any documentation of data residency/region choice, EU-only or multi-region storage options, or admin controls for data location.

   ⚑ flag

2. ai-native userPrevent my data from being used to train AI models

   weight 3 · round to Proton Pass
   Google Authenticator—none0/10

   The axis applies to this product kind (peer products hold positive or none verdicts on this story), so lack of evidence for an applicable capability is "none", never "na". (na/none harmonized at arena bring-up — see pipeline/scripts/na-harmonize.ts.)

   ⚑ flag

   Proton Pass~partialclaimed4/10

   Proton Pass's end-to-end encryption of all vault fields (docs-10) structurally means Proton cannot access plaintext user data, which would prevent it from being used to train AI models, but there is no explicit policy statement addressing AI training data use. Missing for 10: an explicit privacy policy or documentation statement about AI training opt-out/data usage, and independent confirmation of this claim.

   • [claimed-docs] “Unlike other password managers, Proton Pass uses end-to-end encryption on every field you fill for the items you create (usernames, website …”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

3. ai-native userControl data retention and deletion

   weight 2 · round to Proton Pass
   Google Authenticator~partialcommunity4/10

   Google Authenticator lets users delete individual codes (swipe to delete), edit/reassign codes, and use the app without a Google account (avoiding cloud retention entirely), giving some control over what data is stored and removed. However, there is no documented account-level 'delete all my data' or data-export-to-file control, and community reports describe difficulty exporting/backing up codes and total data loss if a Google account is banned or deleted, undermining full user control over retention. missing for 10: explicit data export/portability controls, account-wide deletion/retention settings, and confirmation that deleting codes removes them from Google's backend, not just the local view.

   • [claimed-docs] “To delete an Authenticator code on Android, swipe right on any code to show the delete option.”
   • [claimed-docs] “When you first open the app, tap Use without an account.”
   • [claimed-docs] “For additional protection, you can turn on Privacy Screen in Google Authenticator. This requires a verification from your device, like a PIN…”
   • [community] “Storing it in the google cloud doesn't satisfy me. I just simply want the codes under my control... google still makes it stupendously diffi…”
   • [community] “Google Authenticator does not allow you to include your codes in your backup, even when it's encrypted. So due to Google Authenticator, losi…”
   • [community] “Imagine your google account getting deleted cuz you got banned from Google and the suddenly you lose all your 2FA secrets cuz they are part …”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Proton Pass~partialclaimed5/10

   Docs show users can create/read/update/delete vaults and items via the CLI/app, and can export or migrate data before deleting it, giving concrete control over stored data. However there is no explicit documentation on account-level data retention policies, deletion timelines, or how long Proton retains deleted data, which is central to a full 'control retention and deletion' story. Missing for 10: explicit retention-period/account-deletion policy documentation, independent confirmation that deleted data is purged.

   • [claimed-docs] “Create, read, update, and delete vaults”
   • [claimed-docs] “View, create, update, and delete items including passwords, secure notes, credit cards, identities, WiFi entries, custom items, and stored S…”
   • [claimed-docs] “If you want to use your passwords elsewhere or create a separate hardcopy, you can easily export your data from Proton Pass.”
   • [claimed-docs] “You have three options for export: 1. A ZIP file containing a PGP-encrypted JSON file 2. An unencrypted ZIP file 3. A CSV file”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

4. ai-native userOpt out of telemetry and usage tracking

   weight 2 · round to Proton Pass
   Google Authenticator—none0/10

   The axis applies to this product kind (peer products hold positive or none verdicts on this story), so lack of evidence for an applicable capability is "none", never "na". (na/none harmonized at arena bring-up — see pipeline/scripts/na-harmonize.ts.)

   ⚑ flag

   Proton Pass~partialcommunity4/10

   Community evidence confirms telemetry exists in the browser extension and can be disabled, but only via Proton account settings, not directly within the extension itself, indicating a real but limited opt-out mechanism (proton-pass-comm-13). No first-party documentation from Proton Pass describes a formal telemetry/opt-out policy or setting. missing for 10: official docs on telemetry settings, in-extension opt-out toggle, confirmation of no tracking by default.

   • [community] “There's still nothing about the telemetry in the browser extension?... telemetry data is anonymous, but it's always sent to the remote endpo…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

App lock

1. everyday userThe app itself locks behind biometrics or a PIN, so a borrowed phone doesn't expose my codes

   weight 2 · round to Google Authenticator
   Google Authenticator✓fullclaimed8/10

   Google's own docs describe a 'Privacy Screen' feature requiring PIN, pattern, or biometric verification before the app can be used, directly matching the story. No community evidence contradicts this specific lock-screen feature (complaints focus on sync/backup, not app-lock). Missing for 10: independent hands-on confirmation of the Privacy Screen feature working reliably across devices.

   • [claimed-docs] “For additional protection, you can turn on Privacy Screen in Google Authenticator. This requires a verification from your device, like a PIN…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Proton Pass—none0/10

   No evidence pack item mentions app-level biometric or PIN lock for Proton Pass; the closest related items cover offline vault access, 2FA/TOTP generation, and encryption, but none address a lock screen or app-level authentication gate. Missing for 10: any mention of biometric unlock, app PIN lock, or auto-lock timeout feature.

   ⚑ flag

Audits

1. security engineerThe vendor publishes independent security audits of the app and its sync protocol

   weight 2 · round drawn
   Google Authenticator—none0/10

   No evidence of any independent security audit of the app or its cloud sync protocol; a notable 2023 independent security researcher analysis found the sync data was unencrypted, but no formal published audit exists in the evidence pack, only community complaints about sync/backup reliability and trust concerns.

   ⚑ flag

   Proton Pass—none0/10

   No evidence of any independent third-party security audit report, pentest, or audit of the sync protocol; evidence only covers feature docs (encryption claims, Sentinel, Monitor) and open-source status debates in community threads. Community comments even question whether the client is fully open source, but no audit report is cited or linked anywhere.

   ⚑ flag

Monitoring

1. power userThe app warns me when a service I use is breached or a stored credential is weak, reused, or exposed

   weight 2 · round to Proton Pass
   Google Authenticator—none0/10

   The axis applies to this product kind (peer products hold positive or none verdicts on this story), so lack of evidence for an applicable capability is "none", never "na". (na/none harmonized at arena bring-up — see pipeline/scripts/na-harmonize.ts.)

   ⚑ flag

   Proton Pass✓fullclaimed8/10

   Pass Monitor explicitly scans the dark web for credential leaks (breach detection), checks password health (weak/reused detection), and flags accounts missing 2FA, directly matching the story; this is documented as a core built-in feature rather than a third-party tool. Missing for 10: independent hands-on verification of Pass Monitor's accuracy/coverage and detail on exposed-credential alerting granularity beyond docs claims.

   • [claimed-docs] “Pass Monitor is a security feature in Proton Pass that scans the dark web for credential leaks, checks on the health of your passwords, and …”
   • [claimed-docs] “Pass Monitor is a security feature in Proton Pass that scans the dark web for credential leaks, checks on the health of your passwords, and …”
   • [claimed-docs] “Proton Sentinel uses AI and human analysis to make it much harder for an attacker to take over your account.”
   • [claimed-docs] “Proton Sentinel is an advanced account protection program that provides maximum security for those who need it. It mitigates security threat…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

Push

1. it adminPush-based sign-in includes phishing defenses — number matching, location context, and admin-enforced MFA policies

   weight 2 · round drawn
   Google Authenticator—none0/10

   The axis applies to this product kind (peer products hold positive or none verdicts on this story), so lack of evidence for an applicable capability is "none", never "na". (na/none harmonized at arena bring-up — see pipeline/scripts/na-harmonize.ts.)

   ⚑ flag

   Proton Pass—none0/10

   The axis applies to this product kind (peer products hold positive or none verdicts on this story), so lack of evidence for an applicable capability is "none", never "na". (na/none harmonized at arena bring-up — see pipeline/scripts/na-harmonize.ts.)

   ⚑ flag

Server

1. it adminSelf-host the sync server on my own infrastructure and keep every secret inside my perimeter

   weight 2 · round drawn
   Google Authenticator—none0/10

   The axis applies to this product kind (peer products hold positive or none verdicts on this story), so lack of evidence for an applicable capability is "none", never "na". (na/none harmonized at arena bring-up — see pipeline/scripts/na-harmonize.ts.)

   ⚑ flag

   Proton Pass—none0/10

   The axis applies to this product kind (peer products hold positive or none verdicts on this story), so lack of evidence for an applicable capability is "none", never "na". (na/none harmonized at arena bring-up — see pipeline/scripts/na-harmonize.ts.)

   ⚑ flag

Source

1. security engineerThe client apps are open source, so the code handling my seeds can be inspected and community-reviewed

   weight 2 · round to Proton Pass
   Google Authenticator~partialclaimed4/10

   The GitHub repo (google/google-authenticator) documents open-source implementations of HOTP/TOTP and a PAM module, giving some basis for code review, but the evidence pack has no confirmation that the current shipped Android/iOS apps (which now handle cloud sync of seeds) actually correspond to this repo or receive active community review. missing for 10: evidence that the live mobile app source matches the published repo, evidence of active maintenance/community audits of the seed-handling code, and independent confirmation of code correctness.

   • [github] “These implementations support the HMAC-Based One-time Password (HOTP) algorithm specified in RFC 4226 and the Time-based One-time Password (…”
   • [github] “The Google Authenticator project includes implementations of one-time passcode generators for several mobile platforms.”
   • [github] “Pluggable Authentication Module, aka PAM.”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Proton Pass~partialcommunity6/10

   Community evidence confirms Proton Pass clients are open source with a public GitHub repo (github.com/protonpass), directly supporting inspectability of the code handling secrets. However, other community comments show confusion/skepticism about finding or verifying this ('haven't been able to find the repository', 'it seems only the clients are open source'), and there's no first-party doc in the pack explicitly stating open-source status or citing security audits. Missing for 10: first-party documentation confirming open-source licensing/repo, evidence of independent security audits or community code review of the seed-handling logic, and clarity on scope (client-only vs. broader).

   • [community] “Please note that we do have encrypted notes... And it is open source: https://github.com/protonpass”
   • [community] “It seems only the clients are open source? https://github.com/orgs/protonpass/repositories”
   • [community] “Am I correct in believing that they haven't open-sourced Proton Pass yet?... Their official announcement post says it's now open source, how…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

Automation

1. ai-native userAn agent can fetch a current TOTP code programmatically — via CLI or API — to complete a 2FA login inside an automated workflow

   weight 2 · round to Proton Pass
   Google Authenticator—none0/10

   Google Authenticator is a mobile/PAM app with no documented CLI or API for programmatic TOTP retrieval; evidence only covers manual app UI actions (sync, QR export, editing codes) and community complaints about backup/sync issues, none of which show agent-accessible code fetching.

   ⚑ flag

   Proton Pass~partialprobed4/10

   Proton Pass ships an official CLI documented for scripting/CI-CD use that can 'securely retrieve secrets and other items' (docs-1/14) and lists item types it can read (docs-15), but TOTP/2FA codes are not explicitly named among the retrievable item types, and no docs or community evidence confirm a CLI/API command that outputs a live TOTP code for use in an automated login flow. missing for 10: explicit CLI/API command or output field for TOTP codes, hands-on confirmation of an agent successfully pulling a 2FA code programmatically.

   • [claimed-docs] “enables you to securely retrieve secrets and other items across scripts, deployments, and continuous integration/ continuous delivery (CI/CD…”
   • [claimed-docs] “the CLI enables you to securely retrieve secrets and other items across scripts, deployments, and continuous integration/ continuous deliver…”
   • [claimed-docs] “View, create, update, and delete items including passwords, secure notes, credit cards, identities, WiFi entries, custom items, and stored S…”
   • [claimed-docs] “Proton Pass can securely generate TOTP codes for websites that you have saved login details for.”
   • [probe] “official CLI documented at https://proton.me/blog/proton-pass-cli”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

2. ai-native userExpose the vault through a local programmatic endpoint an agent can query for codes and secrets without screen-scraping the app

   weight 1 · round to Proton Pass
   Google Authenticator—none0/10

   The axis applies to this product kind (peer products hold positive or none verdicts on this story), so lack of evidence for an applicable capability is "none", never "na". (na/none harmonized at arena bring-up — see pipeline/scripts/na-harmonize.ts.)

   ⚑ flag

   Proton Pass~partialprobed6/10

   Proton Pass ships an official CLI that allows secure programmatic retrieval of secrets, passwords, SSH keys, and other items across scripts and CI/CD pipelines, which functions as a local endpoint an agent could query instead of screen-scraping the app. However, the docs don't explicitly confirm TOTP/2FA code retrieval via the CLI (2FA generation is only described in the app itself), and there is no mention of an agent-specific or MCP-style interface, nor independent hands-on verification of CLI use by AI agents. Missing for 10: explicit CLI support for TOTP code retrieval, agent/MCP-oriented interface documentation, independent corroboration of CLI usage in agentic workflows.

   • [claimed-docs] “enables you to securely retrieve secrets and other items across scripts, deployments, and continuous integration/ continuous delivery (CI/CD…”
   • [claimed-docs] “the CLI enables you to securely retrieve secrets and other items across scripts, deployments, and continuous integration/ continuous deliver…”
   • [claimed-docs] “View, create, update, and delete items including passwords, secure notes, credit cards, identities, WiFi entries, custom items, and stored S…”
   • [claimed-docs] “Proton Pass can securely generate TOTP codes for websites that you have saved login details for.”
   • [probe] “official CLI documented at https://proton.me/blog/proton-pass-cli”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

Browser

1. everyday userA browser extension autofills my TOTP codes and passkeys during login instead of making me retype them

   weight 2 · round to Proton Pass
   Google Authenticator—none0/10

   The axis applies to this product kind (peer products hold positive or none verdicts on this story), so lack of evidence for an applicable capability is "none", never "na". (na/none harmonized at arena bring-up — see pipeline/scripts/na-harmonize.ts.)

   ⚑ flag

   Proton Pass✓fullcommunity8/10

   Docs confirm TOTP code generation for saved logins and passkey support, and community evidence from an actual user confirms the browser extension autofills TOTP/2FA smoothly ('Proton Pass is my default for all 2FA. I love the browser extension, so easy and sleek'). Passkey autofill is documented but not independently corroborated with hands-on testing. Missing for 10: independent hands-on confirmation of passkey autofill specifically, and more detail on passkey UX in the extension.

   • [claimed-docs] “Proton Pass can securely generate TOTP codes for websites that you have saved login details for.”
   • [claimed-docs] “Passkeys allow you to authenticate yourself for online accounts without using passwords or passphrases.”
   • [community] “I've been a Proton Unlimited subscriber... Proton Pass is my default for all 2FA. I love the browser extension, so easy and sleek.”
   • [community] “If you are paying for Pass Plus or Proton Unlimited then you have integrated 2FA/TOTP which Bitwarden also makes you pay for... And no deskt…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

Desktop

1. power userA first-class desktop app gives me codes and vault access on my computer, not just on mobile

   weight 2 · round to Proton Pass
   Google Authenticator—none0/10

   No evidence of a desktop application; Google Authenticator is documented and discussed only as a mobile app with QR-based transfer/sync between phones, not a desktop client or vault.

   • [claimed-docs] “With Google Authenticator, you can synchronize your verification codes across all your devices, simply by signing in to your Google Account.”
   • [claimed-docs] “On your old device, create a QR code... On your new device, tap Scan QR code”
   • [github] “The Google Authenticator project includes implementations of one-time passcode generators for several mobile platforms.”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Proton Pass!disputedcontradicted5/10

   Proton's own support docs describe a dedicated desktop app with offline vault access and TOTP code generation (docs-9, docs-16, docs-5), suggesting a first-class desktop experience. However, community hands-on reports explicitly state there was no desktop app for Proton Pass ('And no desktop app for proton pass, maybe some day though?' and 'Pity it's only available on iOS and Android as apps and as browser extensions elsewhere'), directly contradicting the vendor's desktop-app documentation. Missing for 10: independent corroboration that the desktop app actually exists and works as described, and resolution of the timeline discrepancy between docs and community reports.

   • [claimed-docs] “You don’t need to do anything to access Proton Pass offline. Everything in your vaults is accessible whether you’re connected to the interne…”
   • [claimed-docs] “Vaults can be used to organize items — in the example above, we have a vault for personal items and one for work items.”
   • [claimed-docs] “Proton Pass can securely generate TOTP codes for websites that you have saved login details for.”
   • [community] “If you are paying for Pass Plus or Proton Unlimited then you have integrated 2FA/TOTP which Bitwarden also makes you pay for... And no deskt…”
   • [community] “Pity it's only available on iOS and Android as apps and as browser extensions elsewhere. I would've been interested to check out a desktop p…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

Watch

1. everyday userRead my codes from my smartwatch without pulling out my phone

   weight 1 · round drawn
   Google Authenticator—none0/10

   The axis applies to this product kind (peer products hold positive or none verdicts on this story), so lack of evidence for an applicable capability is "none", never "na". (na/none harmonized at arena bring-up — see pipeline/scripts/na-harmonize.ts.)

   ⚑ flag

   Proton Pass—none0/10

   No evidence of a smartwatch app, watch companion, or complication for viewing TOTP codes; evidence only covers mobile, browser extension, and CLI surfaces, with community notes even lamenting lack of a desktop app. Missing for 10: any smartwatch app/companion, watch complication, or documentation of viewing codes without the phone.

   • [claimed-docs] “Proton Pass can securely generate TOTP codes for websites that you have saved login details for.”
   • [community] “Pity it's only available on iOS and Android as apps and as browser extensions elsewhere. I would've been interested to check out a desktop p…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

Backup

1. security engineerBackups are end-to-end encrypted with a key the vendor never holds, and the encryption design is documented

   weight 3 · round to Proton Pass
   Google Authenticator—none0/10

   Docs only describe syncing codes via a Google Account (google-authenticator-docs-1,4) with no mention of end-to-end encryption or a vendor-blind key, and community reports explicitly note that storing codes in 'google cloud doesn't satisfy me' and that losing access to the Google account means losing all 2FA data, implying no such E2E encryption exists.

   • [claimed-docs] “With Google Authenticator, you can synchronize your verification codes across all your devices, simply by signing in to your Google Account.”
   • [claimed-docs] “When you sign in to your Google Account within Google Authenticator on a new device, your codes are automatically synced to this device.”
   • [community] “Storing it in the google cloud doesn't satisfy me. I just simply want the codes under my control... google still makes it stupendously diffi…”
   • [community] “If Google ever decides to kick you out of your account, Authenticator data will be gone. Google has done this on several occasions in the pa…”
   • [community] “Imagine your google account getting deleted cuz you got banned from Google and the suddenly you lose all your 2FA secrets cuz they are part …”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Proton Pass~partialclaimed5/10

   Proton Pass documents that all vault data is end-to-end encrypted (docs-10) and offers a PGP-encrypted export option that could serve as a backup (docs-11), implying the vendor cannot read backed-up data. However, there is no dedicated 'backup' feature documentation (only export/import), and no detailed cryptographic architecture whitepaper or independent audit is cited to substantiate the zero-knowledge key design in depth. missing for 10: dedicated backup-feature docs, detailed encryption architecture/whitepaper, independent security audit confirming vendor never holds keys

   • [claimed-docs] “Unlike other password managers, Proton Pass uses end-to-end encryption on every field you fill for the items you create (usernames, website …”
   • [claimed-docs] “You have three options for export: 1. A ZIP file containing a PGP-encrypted JSON file 2. An unencrypted ZIP file 3. A CSV file”
   • [claimed-docs] “Vaults can be used to organize items — in the example above, we have a vault for personal items and one for work items.”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

Multi device

1. everyday userMy tokens are available on my phone, tablet, and computer at the same time, kept in sync automatically

   weight 2 · round drawn
   Google Authenticator~partialcommunity5/10

   Google's docs confirm automatic cross-device sync via Google Account sign-in, works offline, and supports multiple accounts (docs-1,4,5,10), but Authenticator is a mobile-only app with no native desktop/computer client, so the 'computer' leg of the story is unsupported. Community reports also cite historical sync/backup failures and account-loss risk tying codes to a Google Account (comm-1, comm-7, comm-12, comm-13), showing real caveats even if not disproving the current sync feature outright. Missing for 10: a computer/desktop client, independent hands-on confirmation the modern sync feature works reliably across all device types without data loss.

   • [claimed-docs] “With Google Authenticator, you can synchronize your verification codes across all your devices, simply by signing in to your Google Account.”
   • [claimed-docs] “When you sign in to your Google Account within Google Authenticator on a new device, your codes are automatically synced to this device.”
   • [claimed-docs] “Authenticator can sync codes for multiple Google Accounts and display them from the same mobile device.”
   • [claimed-docs] “You can still generate codes without an internet connection or mobile service.”
   • [community] “I recently had a broken phone replaced and had depended on a backup to have my TOTP keys on my new phone. It was not a part of the phone bac…”
   • [community] “If Google ever decides to kick you out of your account, Authenticator data will be gone. Google has done this on several occasions in the pa…”
   • [community] “Imagine your google account getting deleted cuz you got banned from Google and the suddenly you lose all your 2FA secrets cuz they are part …”
   • [community] “Don't upgrade! I just had this unpleasant experience and warned everyone... Warning: Google Authenticator upgrade loses all accounts.”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Proton Pass~partialcommunity5/10

   Docs confirm cross-platform clients (mobile apps, browser extensions, and a desktop app referenced in the desktop-app guide) and offline access that presumably reconciles when back online, implying cloud sync of vault items including TOTP tokens. However, no first-party documentation explicitly describes the sync mechanism or guarantees real-time multi-device consistency, and community comments note a historical lack of a desktop app and inconsistent browser-extension availability (e.g., Firefox ESR incompatibility), suggesting platform coverage has been uneven over time. Missing for 10: explicit sync/consistency documentation, independent verification that sync is truly automatic and near-instant across phone/tablet/computer.

   • [claimed-docs] “You don’t need to do anything to access Proton Pass offline. Everything in your vaults is accessible whether you’re connected to the interne…”
   • [claimed-docs] “Proton Pass can securely generate TOTP codes for websites that you have saved login details for.”
   • [community] “If you are paying for Pass Plus or Proton Unlimited then you have integrated 2FA/TOTP which Bitwarden also makes you pay for... And no deskt…”
   • [community] “Pity it's only available on iOS and Android as apps and as browser extensions elsewhere. I would've been interested to check out a desktop p…”
   • [community] “Can't use the Firefox extension, FF 102 ESR is apparently too old”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

Recovery

1. everyday userLosing my phone doesn't lose my accounts — a documented recovery path restores my tokens on a new device

   weight 3 · round to Proton Pass
   Google Authenticator!disputedcontradicted5/10

   Google's own docs describe two documented recovery paths — signing into your Google Account to auto-sync codes across devices, or scanning a QR-code export to transfer codes to a new device (google-authenticator-docs-1/3/4/11) — which is exactly the story's ask. However, multiple hands-on community reports concretely contradict reliability of this recovery: users report app upgrades wiping all tokens with no recovery (comm-13, comm-14), phone backups explicitly excluding Authenticator data (comm-1, comm-8), and losing all codes permanently if the tied Google Account is banned/deleted (comm-7, comm-12). Missing for 10: independent verification that account-sync recovery works consistently across real device-loss scenarios, and resolution of the backup-exclusion/account-ban failure modes.

   • [claimed-docs] “With Google Authenticator, you can synchronize your verification codes across all your devices, simply by signing in to your Google Account.”
   • [claimed-docs] “On your old device, create a QR code... On your new device, tap Scan QR code”
   • [claimed-docs] “When you sign in to your Google Account within Google Authenticator on a new device, your codes are automatically synced to this device.”
   • [claimed-docs] “To manually transfer Authenticator codes to a new device, you need: Your old device with Google Authenticator codes”
   • [community] “I recently had a broken phone replaced and had depended on a backup to have my TOTP keys on my new phone. It was not a part of the phone bac…”
   • [community] “Does that mean one can use adb to backup Google Authenticator's data as well? Last time I tried, the app data was explicitly marked as exclu…”
   • [community] “Don't upgrade! I just had this unpleasant experience and warned everyone... Warning: Google Authenticator upgrade loses all accounts.”
   • [community] “Every time I upgraded to a new iOS 7 beta, it wiped my Google Authenticator account tokens... I can't log in to my CampBX account anymore.”
   • [community] “If Google ever decides to kick you out of your account, Authenticator data will be gone. Google has done this on several occasions in the pa…”
   • [community] “Imagine your google account getting deleted cuz you got banned from Google and the suddenly you lose all your 2FA secrets cuz they are part …”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Proton Pass~partialclaimed4/10

   Proton Pass stores TOTP codes and other secrets inside end-to-end encrypted vaults that live on Proton's servers (docs-5, docs-10), and offers export (docs-4/11) and Emergency Access (docs-20) features that could serve as backup/recovery mechanisms, implying data isn't lost with a device. However, there is no explicit documentation in the pack describing a dedicated 'lost phone / new device' recovery flow, account recovery phrase, or step-by-step restoration of 2FA tokens after device loss. Missing for 10: explicit account-recovery/recovery-phrase documentation, explicit cross-device sync confirmation, and a stated process for restoring TOTP secrets specifically after losing a device.

   • [claimed-docs] “Proton Pass can securely generate TOTP codes for websites that you have saved login details for.”
   • [claimed-docs] “Unlike other password managers, Proton Pass uses end-to-end encryption on every field you fill for the items you create (usernames, website …”
   • [claimed-docs] “If you want to use your passwords elsewhere or create a separate hardcopy, you can easily export your data from Proton Pass.”
   • [claimed-docs] “You have three options for export: 1. A ZIP file containing a PGP-encrypted JSON file 2. An unencrypted ZIP file 3. A CSV file”
   • [claimed-docs] “Emergency Access”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

Automation

1. ai-native userAn agent can create and update vault entries — seeding new TOTP secrets, storing credentials — through documented programmatic surfaces

   weight 2 · round to Proton Pass
   Google Authenticator—none0/10

   The axis applies to this product kind (peer products hold positive or none verdicts on this story), so lack of evidence for an applicable capability is "none", never "na". (na/none harmonized at arena bring-up — see pipeline/scripts/na-harmonize.ts.)

   ⚑ flag

   Proton Pass~partialprobed6/10

   Proton Pass CLI documentation shows programmatic create/read/update/delete of items (including passwords, secure notes, SSH keys) and vaults, which an agent could invoke via scripts. However, there's no explicit mention of TOTP secret seeding via the CLI, and no dedicated agent/AI integration or API/SDK beyond the CLI is documented, and no independent confirmation of these CLI capabilities working reliably. Missing for 10: explicit TOTP-seeding support via CLI, broader API/SDK for agents, and independent hands-on verification of programmatic write operations.

   • [claimed-docs] “Create, read, update, and delete vaults”
   • [claimed-docs] “View, create, update, and delete items including passwords, secure notes, credit cards, identities, WiFi entries, custom items, and stored S…”
   • [claimed-docs] “the CLI enables you to securely retrieve secrets and other items across scripts, deployments, and continuous integration/ continuous deliver…”
   • [probe] “official CLI documented at https://proton.me/blog/proton-pass-cli”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

Policy

1. it adminEnforce org-wide policies — require app lock, restrict export, mandate strong master credentials — across every member's app

   weight 1 · round drawn
   Google Authenticator—none0/10

   The axis applies to this product kind (peer products hold positive or none verdicts on this story), so lack of evidence for an applicable capability is "none", never "na". (na/none harmonized at arena bring-up — see pipeline/scripts/na-harmonize.ts.)

   ⚑ flag

   Proton Pass—none0/10

   No evidence of org-wide admin policy controls (enforced app lock, export restrictions, mandated master password strength) for organization members; docs cover vaults, CLI, export, 2FA, sharing but nothing about admin-enforced policies across a team.

   ⚑ flag

Sharing

1. it adminMy team can share TOTP-protected logins through shared vaults or collections with per-member access control

   weight 2 · round to Proton Pass
   Google Authenticator—none0/10

   The axis applies to this product kind (peer products hold positive or none verdicts on this story), so lack of evidence for an applicable capability is "none", never "na". (na/none harmonized at arena bring-up — see pipeline/scripts/na-harmonize.ts.)

   ⚑ flag

   Proton Pass~partialclaimed5/10

   Evidence confirms Proton Pass supports TOTP/2FA generation for saved logins (docs-5) and secure vault sharing plus vault-based organization of items (docs-16, docs-17), which together imply TOTP items can be shared via vaults. However, there is no documentation of granular per-member access control (roles/permissions) or 'collections' as a distinct sharing unit, and no team-admin console evidence for managing member access levels within shared vaults. Missing for 10: explicit permission-level (viewer/editor/admin) documentation for shared vaults, evidence of 'collections' as an admin feature, and any IT-admin console showing per-member access management.

   • [claimed-docs] “Proton Pass can securely generate TOTP codes for websites that you have saved login details for.”
   • [claimed-docs] “Vaults can be used to organize items — in the example above, we have a vault for personal items and one for work items.”
   • [claimed-docs] “Secure vault sharing”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

Enrollment

1. everyday userScan a QR code and immediately start generating TOTP codes for a new account

   weight 3 · round to Google Authenticator
   Google Authenticator✓fullclaimed8/10

   Docs and GitHub evidence confirm the app scans QR codes to add accounts and generates RFC 6238 TOTP codes, including offline (docs-3, docs-10, gh-1). Community feedback criticizes backup/sync/loss issues, not the basic scan-and-generate flow, so the core story is undisputed. Missing for 10: independent hands-on confirmation of the exact scan-to-first-code experience and no first-party UX walkthrough beyond support docs.

   • [claimed-docs] “On your old device, create a QR code... On your new device, tap Scan QR code”
   • [claimed-docs] “You can still generate codes without an internet connection or mobile service.”
   • [github] “These implementations support the HMAC-Based One-time Password (HOTP) algorithm specified in RFC 4226 and the Time-based One-time Password (…”
   • [github] “The Google Authenticator project includes implementations of one-time passcode generators for several mobile platforms.”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Proton Pass~partialcommunity5/10

   Docs confirm Proton Pass generates TOTP codes for saved logins (proton-pass-docs-5) and community reports use it as their default 2FA tool (proton-pass-comm-12), but no evidence explicitly describes scanning a QR code to add a new TOTP secret and instantly getting codes. Missing for 10: explicit QR-code scanning workflow documentation, mobile camera scan support evidence, and independent hands-on confirmation of the scan-to-code flow.

   • [claimed-docs] “Proton Pass can securely generate TOTP codes for websites that you have saved login details for.”
   • [community] “I've been a Proton Unlimited subscriber... Proton Pass is my default for all 2FA. I love the browser extension, so easy and sleek.”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

Offline

1. power userCodes generate fully offline — no network, no vendor account required just to see my TOTP codes

   weight 2 · round to Google Authenticator
   Google Authenticator✓fullclaimed8/10

   Docs explicitly state you can 'Use without an account' at setup and that codes generate 'without an internet connection or mobile service,' confirming fully offline, account-free TOTP generation (core RFC 6238 implementation per GitHub). Community discussion focuses on backup/sync/account-loss risks, not on offline generation failing, so no contradiction of this specific axis. Missing for 10: independent hands-on confirmation specifically testing offline-without-account code generation.

   • [claimed-docs] “When you first open the app, tap Use without an account.”
   • [claimed-docs] “You can still generate codes without an internet connection or mobile service.”
   • [github] “These implementations support the HMAC-Based One-time Password (HOTP) algorithm specified in RFC 4226 and the Time-based One-time Password (…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Proton Pass—none0/10

   Proton Pass is fundamentally an account-based, encrypted-vault service — using it at all requires creating and logging into a Proton account, and TOTP codes are stored as fields within account-synced vaults. Evidence only shows that once logged in, offline access to already-synced vaults works (proton-pass-docs-9), but nothing supports generating/viewing TOTP codes without ever creating or authenticating a vendor account, which the story explicitly requires.

   • [claimed-docs] “You don’t need to do anything to access Proton Pass offline. Everything in your vaults is accessible whether you’re connected to the interne…”
   • [claimed-docs] “Proton Pass can securely generate TOTP codes for websites that you have saved login details for.”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

Organization

1. power userKeep dozens of tokens organized — search, folders or groups, and service icons — so the right code is always two taps away

   weight 2 · round to Proton Pass
   Google Authenticator—none0/10

   Evidence only shows basic manual reordering (drag-to-reorder), swipe-to-edit/delete, and username/account editing — there is no mention of search, folders/groups, or service icons for organizing many tokens. missing for 10: search functionality, folder/group organization, service icons, any at-scale organization feature for dozens of tokens.

   • [claimed-docs] “To edit your Authenticator code on Android, swipe left on any code to show the edit option.”
   • [claimed-docs] “To organize your Authenticator codes, touch and hold any code, then drag to reorder to a desired location.”
   • [claimed-docs] “To delete an Authenticator code on Android, swipe right on any code to show the delete option.”
   • [claimed-docs] “To edit your Authenticator code on Android, swipe left on any code to show the edit option. You can update the username for the code or chan…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Proton Pass~partialcommunity4/10

   Proton Pass supports TOTP generation tied to saved logins and vaults for organizing items into groups (e.g., personal vs. work), but there is no evidence of search functionality or service icons, and a community report explicitly notes the browser popup overlay was inadequate for managing hundreds of logins, suggesting scaling friction for power users. Missing for 10: dedicated TOTP search/filter feature, service icon display, and evidence of smooth navigation across dozens of tokens.

   • [claimed-docs] “Proton Pass can securely generate TOTP codes for websites that you have saved login details for.”
   • [claimed-docs] “Vaults can be used to organize items — in the example above, we have a vault for personal items and one for work items.”
   • [community] “Would like to see web/desktop clients for this. When I used it recently I found the unexpandable pop-up overlay in the browser to not be ade…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

Variants

1. power userNon-standard tokens work too — Steam Guard, HOTP counters, custom periods and digit lengths

   weight 2 · round to Google Authenticator
   Google Authenticator~partialclaimed3/10

   The GitHub docs confirm the underlying library supports HOTP (RFC 4226) and TOTP (RFC 6238) algorithms, giving some basis for HOTP counter support, but there is no evidence anywhere in the pack that the consumer app exposes Steam Guard mode, custom periods, or custom digit lengths — the mobile app UI evidence only shows scanning QR codes, editing username, and deleting entries. missing for 10: Steam Guard token support, custom period configuration, custom digit-length configuration, and any UI/setting for manual HOTP counter entry.

   • [github] “These implementations support the HMAC-Based One-time Password (HOTP) algorithm specified in RFC 4226 and the Time-based One-time Password (…”
   • [github] “The Google Authenticator project includes implementations of one-time passcode generators for several mobile platforms.”
   • [claimed-docs] “To edit your Authenticator code on Android, swipe left on any code to show the edit option.”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   Proton Pass—none0/10

   Evidence only confirms basic TOTP code generation for saved logins; no mention of Steam Guard tokens, HOTP counters, or custom period/digit length support anywhere in the docs or community discussion. Missing for 10: any documentation of Steam Guard support, HOTP counter-based tokens, or custom TOTP period/digit configuration.

   • [claimed-docs] “Proton Pass can securely generate TOTP codes for websites that you have saved login details for.”

   proof ↗⚑ flag