YubiKey vs SoloKeys Solo 2

Agent access

1. ai-native userPoint an agent at llms.txt or agent-oriented docs

   weight 2 · round drawn
   YubiKey—none0/10

   Direct probes confirm no llms.txt or agent-oriented docs exist on any Yubico domain (404s across docs.yubico.com, developers.yubico.com, www.yubico.com), and no MCP endpoint resolves; documentation is human-oriented HTML only.

   • [probe] “PROBE llms.txt: HTTP 404 at https://docs.yubico.com/llms.txt”
   • [probe] “PROBE docs-md: HTTP 404 at https://docs.yubico.com/.md”
   • [probe] “PROBE runtime negative (recorded 2026-09-15): Yubico publishes no llms.txt on any host — https://docs.yubico.com/llms.txt answers HTTP 404 (…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   SoloKeys Solo 2—none0/10

   Explicit probes confirm docs.solokeys.dev has no llms.txt (404) and no openapi/markdown-alternative endpoints; the only llms.txt found is a generic Shopify shopping-agent file unrelated to technical/product documentation, so there is no agent-oriented documentation to point an AI agent at.

   • [probe] “PROBE llms.txt: HTTP 404 at https://docs.solokeys.dev/llms.txt”
   • [probe] “PROBE docs-md: HTTP 404 at https://docs.solokeys.dev/.md”
   • [probe] “PROBE openapi: all candidate paths 404 (https://docs.solokeys.dev/openapi.json, https://docs.solokeys.dev/swagger.json, https://docs.solokey…”
   • [probe] “PROBE runtime (recorded 2026-09-15): solokeys.com serves an llms.txt ('# Agent Instructions — SoloKeys'), but it is Shopify's platform-gener…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

2. ai-native userRun the product headlessly / in CI for automation

   weight 2 · round to YubiKey
   YubiKey~partialprobed4/10

   Yubico ships scriptable tooling (ykman CLI, python-fido2 SDK) that can configure/query keys programmatically in scripts or CI pipelines, and a fleet REST API for enterprise management — but the core authentication function inherently requires physical touch/user presence, which cannot be automated headlessly. Missing for 10: any documented way to perform actual FIDO2/PIV/OATH authentication or signing operations without a human touch event, explicit CI/automation guidance, and evidence of true headless operation for the security-critical path (only configuration/management is scriptable).

   • [claimed-docs] “Configure your YubiKey via the command line.”
   • [claimed-docs] “FIDO2 also requires user presence (a touch on your YubiKey) for cryptographic operations, and can optionally enforce user verification (PIN …”
   • [probe] “PROBE runtime (recorded 2026-09-15): Yubico's official ykman CLI installs keylessly from public registries and identifies itself — `uvx --fr…”
   • [probe] “PROBE runtime (recorded 2026-09-15): the YubiEnterprise 'YubiKey as a Service' REST API documentation is live and public at console.yubico.c…”
   • [probe] “PROBE runtime (recorded 2026-09-15): Yubico's python-fido2 SDK resolves on the public PyPI registry (fido2 2.2.1), alongside yubikey-manager…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   SoloKeys Solo 2—none0/10

   Solo 2 is a physical security key requiring human touch confirmation for every action, and while a CLI exists (solo2 list, admin commands), there's no documented support for headless/CI automation; a runtime probe shows the official CLI is bit-rotted (ImportError, incompatible fido2 dependency) with no firmware release in 4 years, further undermining any automation use case.

   • [claimed-docs] “When prompted, touch the capacitive sensor on your Solo 2 to confirm.”
   • [github] “solo2 list # list connected devices (alias: solo2 ls)”
   • [probe] “PROBE runtime negative (recorded 2026-09-15): the official Solo CLI has bit-rotted — `uvx --from solo-python solo version` fails with 'Impor…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

3. ai-native userUse an official CLI

   weight 2 · round to YubiKey
   YubiKey~partialprobed6/10

   YubiKey ships an official CLI (ykman/yubikey-manager) for device configuration, verified installable via pip/uvx and Homebrew with scriptable device management, but this is a hardware-configuration tool, not an AI-agentic CLI designed for LLM/agent workflows — there's no evidence of AI-native features like structured output for agents, agent-oriented docs, or MCP integration. missing for 10: evidence of AI-agent-oriented usage patterns, structured/machine-readable output tailored for agentic consumption, and any llms.txt/MCP support (explicitly absent per probes).

   • [claimed-docs] “Configure your YubiKey via the command line.”
   • [probe] “official CLI documented at https://developers.yubico.com/yubikey-manager/”
   • [probe] “PROBE runtime (recorded 2026-09-15): Yubico's official ykman CLI installs keylessly from public registries and identifies itself — `uvx --fr…”
   • [probe] “PROBE runtime negative (recorded 2026-09-15): Yubico publishes no llms.txt on any host — https://docs.yubico.com/llms.txt answers HTTP 404 (…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   SoloKeys Solo 2!disputedcontradicted3/10

   GitHub docs show an official `solo2` CLI with scriptable commands (list, admin set led, monitor, wipe) suitable for automation, but a runtime probe found the official Solo CLI (solo-python) actually fails to run due to a dependency ImportError, and no Solo 2 firmware release has shipped in 4 years despite ongoing CI commits — concretely contradicting the claim of a working, maintained official CLI. Missing for 10: evidence of AI-agent-specific CLI usage/documentation, confirmation the solo2 (Rust) CLI itself runs cleanly, and independent corroboration beyond the vendor's own repo.

   • [github] “solo2 app admin set led 007f7f 00007f # set led to teal (idle) / blue (active) - use 000000 to turn the led off”
   • [github] “solo2 list # list connected devices (alias: solo2 ls)”
   • [claimed-docs] “solo monitor <serial-port>”
   • [claimed-docs] “You can "wipe" a device using `fido2-token -R`”
   • [probe] “PROBE runtime negative (recorded 2026-09-15): the official Solo CLI has bit-rotted — `uvx --from solo-python solo version` fails with 'Impor…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

4. ai-native userDrive the product through a documented public API

   weight 3 · round to YubiKey
   YubiKey~partialprobed5/10

   YubiKey exposes genuine programmatic interfaces — the ykman CLI, python-fido2 SDK, PKCS#11/PIV/OpenPGP libraries, and platform SDKs (Android/iOS/.NET) — that let a developer or automated agent drive the device (yubikey-docs-4, yubikey-probe-rt-1, yubikey-probe-rt-3, yubikey-docs-8, yubikey-docs-19). There is also a separate REST API for YubiEnterprise fleet management (yubikey-probe-rt-2). However, there is no unified public REST/OpenAPI spec for the core device (probe-3 confirms 404s), and no AI-agent-oriented discovery layer like llms.txt or MCP (yubikey-probe-1, yubikey-probe-rt-4). Missing for 10: a documented OpenAPI/REST spec for core device operations, and any llms.txt/MCP support for AI-agent consumption.

   • [claimed-docs] “Configure your YubiKey via the command line.”
   • [probe] “PROBE runtime (recorded 2026-09-15): Yubico's official ykman CLI installs keylessly from public registries and identifies itself — `uvx --fr…”
   • [probe] “PROBE runtime (recorded 2026-09-15): the YubiEnterprise 'YubiKey as a Service' REST API documentation is live and public at console.yubico.c…”
   • [probe] “PROBE runtime (recorded 2026-09-15): Yubico's python-fido2 SDK resolves on the public PyPI registry (fido2 2.2.1), alongside yubikey-manager…”
   • [claimed-docs] “It enables RSA or ECC sign/encrypt operations using a private key stored on a smartcard (such as the YubiKey), through common interfaces lik…”
   • [claimed-docs] “The SDK allows you to integrate the YubiKey and its applications into your .NET-based application or library.”
   • [probe] “PROBE openapi: all candidate paths 404 (https://docs.yubico.com/openapi.json, https://docs.yubico.com/swagger.json, https://docs.yubico.com/…”
   • [probe] “PROBE runtime negative (recorded 2026-09-15): Yubico publishes no llms.txt on any host — https://docs.yubico.com/llms.txt answers HTTP 404 (…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   SoloKeys Solo 2—none0/10

   Solo 2 exposes a hardware CLI (solo2 app/list) and standard protocols like FIDO2/PIV/OpenPGP, but there is no documented public REST/programmatic API for AI-driven control, and probes confirm no OpenAPI spec or llms.txt exists (404s) while the closest thing to an SDK (solo-python CLI) is reported bit-rotted and broken via ImportError. No evidence of a working, documented API surface an AI agent could drive.

   • [probe] “PROBE openapi: all candidate paths 404 (https://docs.solokeys.dev/openapi.json, https://docs.solokeys.dev/swagger.json, https://docs.solokey…”
   • [probe] “PROBE llms.txt: HTTP 404 at https://docs.solokeys.dev/llms.txt”
   • [probe] “PROBE runtime negative (recorded 2026-09-15): the official Solo CLI has bit-rotted — `uvx --from solo-python solo version` fails with 'Impor…”
   • [probe] “PROBE runtime (recorded 2026-09-15): solokeys.com serves an llms.txt ('# Agent Instructions — SoloKeys'), but it is Shopify's platform-gener…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

5. ai-native userBuild against official SDKs

   weight 2 · round to YubiKey
   YubiKey✓fullprobed8/10

   Yubico publishes and maintains a broad set of official SDKs (python-fido2, java-webauthn-server, .NET SDK, YubiKit Android/iOS, ykman CLI) with dedicated docs, and runtime probes confirm these packages are live and installable from public registries (PyPI, Homebrew) rather than just claimed in docs. This gives developers, including AI-native builders, real programmatic building blocks for passkeys/FIDO2/PIV integration. Missing for 10: no AI-agent-specific SDK examples or agent-oriented tooling, and no independent (non-Yubico) hands-on validation of SDK developer experience.

   • [claimed-docs] “Provides library functionality for communicating with a FIDO device over USB as well as verifying attestation and assertion signatures.”
   • [claimed-docs] “The SDK allows you to integrate the YubiKey and its applications into your .NET-based application or library.”
   • [claimed-docs] “YubiKit is an Android library provided by Yubico to enable YubiKey support in Android apps. Both USB and NFC-enabled YubiKeys are supported.”
   • [claimed-docs] “The library supports NFC-enabled YubiKeys and provides the APIs to request an OTP (Yubico OTP or HOTP) from the NFC YubiKeys using a NFC-ena…”
   • [probe] “PROBE runtime (recorded 2026-09-15): Yubico's official ykman CLI installs keylessly from public registries and identifies itself — `uvx --fr…”
   • [probe] “PROBE runtime (recorded 2026-09-15): Yubico's python-fido2 SDK resolves on the public PyPI registry (fido2 2.2.1), alongside yubikey-manager…”
   • [claimed-docs] “Provides implementations of the Relying Party operations required for a server to support Web Authentication, including passkey authenticati…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   SoloKeys Solo 2—none0/10

   Evidence shows firmware-build tooling (Rust/cargo builds, solo2 CLI, customization docs) rather than an official SDK for third-party/AI-native application development, and the one CLI tool cited is reported bit-rotted and broken in 2026 (ImportError, no releases in 4 years). No client library, API reference, or SDK package is documented for developers to build against.

   • [claimed-docs] “To build, develop and debug the firmware for the STM32L432.”
   • [claimed-docs] “rustup target install thumbv8m.main-none-eabi cargo install flip-link cargo install cargo-binutils cargo install probe-rs-tools”
   • [github] “On a **Hacker** key you can build and flash your own firmware.”
   • [probe] “PROBE runtime negative (recorded 2026-09-15): the official Solo CLI has bit-rotted — `uvx --from solo-python solo version` fails with 'Impor…”
   • [probe] “PROBE openapi: all candidate paths 404 (https://docs.solokeys.dev/openapi.json, https://docs.solokeys.dev/swagger.json, https://docs.solokey…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

Api quality

1. ai-native userDownload a machine-readable API spec (OpenAPI or equivalent)

   weight 2 · round drawn
   YubiKey—none0/10

   Explicit probes for OpenAPI/Swagger specs at docs.yubico.com and developers.yubico.com all returned 404s, and no llms.txt or machine-readable API spec was found anywhere in Yubico's domains. While a YubiEnterprise REST API console exists, there is no evidence it is exposed as a downloadable OpenAPI/machine-readable spec.

   • [probe] “PROBE openapi: all candidate paths 404 (https://docs.yubico.com/openapi.json, https://docs.yubico.com/swagger.json, https://docs.yubico.com/…”
   • [probe] “PROBE runtime negative (recorded 2026-09-15): Yubico publishes no llms.txt on any host — https://docs.yubico.com/llms.txt answers HTTP 404 (…”
   • [probe] “PROBE runtime (recorded 2026-09-15): the YubiEnterprise 'YubiKey as a Service' REST API documentation is live and public at console.yubico.c…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   SoloKeys Solo 2—none0/10

   SoloKeys is a hardware security key with a CLI and firmware documentation, not an API/web service; a machine-readable OpenAPI spec would be a fair thing to ask for if it exposed a network API, but probes explicitly show no OpenAPI/swagger spec exists at any candidate path and no llms.txt for the technical docs.

   • [probe] “PROBE openapi: all candidate paths 404 (https://docs.solokeys.dev/openapi.json, https://docs.solokeys.dev/swagger.json, https://docs.solokey…”
   • [probe] “PROBE llms.txt: HTTP 404 at https://docs.solokeys.dev/llms.txt”
   • [probe] “PROBE runtime (recorded 2026-09-15): solokeys.com serves an llms.txt ('# Agent Instructions — SoloKeys'), but it is Shopify's platform-gener…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

1. ai-native userPerform bulk operations across many items at once

   weight 2 · round to YubiKey
   YubiKey~partialprobed4/10

   Yubico exposes a scriptable CLI (ykman) and a YubiEnterprise fleet-management REST API that could be used to configure or manage many keys programmatically, hinting at bulk-capable automation, but no docs explicitly describe a bulk/batch operation (e.g., configuring N keys or revoking many credentials in one call). Missing for 10: explicit bulk-operation API/CLI documentation, batch examples, and independent confirmation that many items can be processed in one automated action.

   • [probe] “PROBE runtime (recorded 2026-09-15): Yubico's official ykman CLI installs keylessly from public registries and identifies itself — `uvx --fr…”
   • [probe] “PROBE runtime (recorded 2026-09-15): the YubiEnterprise 'YubiKey as a Service' REST API documentation is live and public at console.yubico.c…”
   • [claimed-docs] “Configure your YubiKey via the command line.”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   SoloKeys Solo 2—none0/10

   The axis applies to this product kind (peer products hold positive or none verdicts on this story), so lack of evidence for an applicable capability is "none", never "na". (na/none harmonized at arena bring-up — see pipeline/scripts/na-harmonize.ts.)

   ⚑ flag

Openpgp

1. developerKeep OpenPGP keys on the device and use them for git commit signing and encrypted email

   weight 2 · round to YubiKey
   YubiKey✓fullcommunity7/10

   Yubico's own docs describe OpenPGP support with RSA/ECC sign/encrypt operations using a private key stored on the YubiKey smartcard (yubikey-docs-9, yubikey-docs-26), and independent community testimony confirms real-world use of YubiKey's GPG smartcard functionality (contrasted with competitors lacking it) (yubikey-comm-14, yubikey-comm-15). This covers the underlying capability for git commit signing (via GPG) and encrypted email (via OpenPGP), though neither specific workflow (git config, email client integration) is explicitly documented in the pack. Missing for 10: explicit git commit-signing walkthrough/documentation, explicit encrypted-email (e.g., Enigmail/Thunderbird) setup guide, and more first-party depth beyond the general OpenPGP overview.

   • [claimed-docs] “OpenPGP is an open standard for signing and encrypting. It enables RSA or ECC sign/encrypt operations using a private key stored on a smartc…”
   • [claimed-docs] “It enables RSA or ECC sign/encrypt operations using a private key stored on a smartcard (such as YubiKeys), through common interfaces like P…”
   • [community] “So far, Yubikeys are the only ones I've found that support both FIDO2/WebAuthn as well as GPG smart card functionality for use with pass(1).…”
   • [community] “Unfortunately SoloKey doesn't work as an OpenPGP smart card, which means it's not a real substitute for a Yubikey.”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   SoloKeys Solo 2!disputedcontradicted3/10

   The GitHub README lists OpenPGP as a supported protocol (solokeys-gh-1, solokeys-gh-8), which would enable git commit signing and encrypted email use cases, but community comments directly contradict this — users report 'it doesn't do OpenPGP' and 'I'm really hoping they bring GPG to the Solokey... but I'm starting to lose confidence' (solokeys-comm-2, solokeys-comm-4). There is no first-party documentation walking through GPG key generation, git signing setup, or email encryption workflows, and no independent hands-on confirmation that OpenPGP actually works on shipped hardware. Missing for 10: verified working OpenPGP applet on shipped Solo 2 units, official docs for GPG/git-signing setup, and independent confirmation resolving the community's contradicting reports.

   • [github] “It's a USB+NFC device that protects your accounts with passkeys/WebAuthn, and also speaks OATH (TOTP/HOTP), PIV, and OpenPGP.”
   • [github] “also speaks OATH (TOTP/HOTP), PIV, and OpenPGP”
   • [community] “Nice, I'd love this as an open source yubikey replacement. But it doesn't do OpenPGP, I rely on that way too much sadly... If they add that …”
   • [community] “I'm really hoping they bring GPG to the Solokey V1, but I'm starting to lose confidence”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

Otp

1. power userThe key covers legacy one-time-password schemes — TOTP/HOTP slots or challenge-response — for services that still lack WebAuthn

   weight 2 · round to YubiKey
   YubiKey✓fullcommunity8/10

   YubiKey natively supports OATH TOTP/HOTP slots (with secrets stored in the secure element) and Yubico OTP/challenge-response via the OTP application, documented and manageable via ykman/Yubico Authenticator, covering legacy services without WebAuthn. Community evidence corroborates real-world use of these legacy modes alongside FIDO2. Missing for 10: independent hands-on walkthrough of setting up HOTP/TOTP slots or challenge-response specifically, and more detail on slot capacity/limits.

   • [claimed-docs] “the shared secrets are stored and processed in the YubiKey's secure element”
   • [claimed-docs] “No client software needed. The OTP is just a string. If you can send a password, you can send an OTP.”
   • [claimed-docs] “The library supports NFC-enabled YubiKeys and provides the APIs to request an OTP (Yubico OTP or HOTP) from the NFC YubiKeys using a NFC-ena…”
   • [claimed-docs] “Configure your YubiKey via the command line.”
   • [community] “So far, Yubikeys are the only ones I've found that support both FIDO2/WebAuthn as well as GPG smart card functionality for use with pass(1).…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   SoloKeys Solo 2✓fullprobed6/10

   GitHub docs explicitly state Solo 2 speaks OATH (TOTP/HOTP) in addition to FIDO2/WebAuthn, PIV, and OpenPGP, directly supporting legacy OTP slot functionality. However, missing for 10: no CLI/setup walkthrough for configuring TOTP/HOTP slots, no independent hands-on confirmation the OATH applet works reliably, and a runtime probe shows the official Solo CLI has bit-rotted (import errors) and firmware hasn't been updated in years, raising doubts about current usability.

   • [github] “It's a USB+NFC device that protects your accounts with passkeys/WebAuthn, and also speaks OATH (TOTP/HOTP), PIV, and OpenPGP.”
   • [github] “also speaks OATH (TOTP/HOTP), PIV, and OpenPGP”
   • [probe] “PROBE runtime negative (recorded 2026-09-15): the official Solo CLI has bit-rotted — `uvx --from solo-python solo version` fails with 'Impor…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

Piv

1. it adminThe key acts as a PIV smart card for certificate-based login — workstation sign-in, VPN, and code signing with keys that never leave the device

   weight 2 · round to YubiKey
   YubiKey✓fullcommunity7/10

   Docs confirm PIV smart-card functionality (PKCS#11 sign/encrypt with on-device RSA/ECC keys, non-exportable, with attestation to prove device-generated keys), and community independently corroborates real-world PIV smart-card use (yubikey-comm-16, yubikey-comm-14). This covers certificate-based login and code-signing capability, though the workstation-login and VPN integration flows themselves aren't explicitly documented in this pack. Missing for 10: explicit docs/screenshots of Windows/macOS smart-card workstation sign-in setup, VPN client PIV integration guides, and a dedicated code-signing walkthrough.

   • [claimed-docs] “It enables RSA or ECC sign/encrypt operations using a private key stored on a smartcard (such as the YubiKey), through common interfaces lik…”
   • [claimed-docs] “The concept of attestation is used to show that a certain asymmetric key has been generated on device and not imported.”
   • [claimed-docs] “This certificate should be used for the purpose of verifying that the key was generated in device.”
   • [community] “Also, yubikey works as a PIV smartcard.”
   • [community] “So far, Yubikeys are the only ones I've found that support both FIDO2/WebAuthn as well as GPG smart card functionality for use with pass(1).…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   SoloKeys Solo 2~partialprobed4/10

   GitHub docs confirm Solo 2 'speaks... PIV' alongside FIDO2/OATH/OpenPGP, supporting the core claim that certificate-based smart-card auth is possible, but there is no vendor documentation on PIV provisioning, workstation/VPN sign-in setup, or code-signing workflows, and a runtime probe shows the official CLI is bit-rotted and firmware hasn't shipped a release in 4 years, raising doubt about current enterprise usability. Missing for 10: PIV certificate enrollment/management docs, workstation/VPN sign-in integration guides, code-signing workflow evidence, and confirmation the PIV applet still functions with current tooling.

   • [github] “It's a USB+NFC device that protects your accounts with passkeys/WebAuthn, and also speaks OATH (TOTP/HOTP), PIV, and OpenPGP.”
   • [github] “also speaks OATH (TOTP/HOTP), PIV, and OpenPGP”
   • [probe] “PROBE runtime negative (recorded 2026-09-15): the official Solo CLI has bit-rotted — `uvx --from solo-python solo version` fails with 'Impor…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

Ssh

1. developerMy SSH keys can be hardware-backed on the device — via FIDO2 sk-ssh keys, PIV, or OpenPGP — so server access requires a physical touch

   weight 2 · round to YubiKey
   YubiKey✓fullcommunity9/10

   Yubico documents all three hardware-backed SSH paths: FIDO2 sk-ssh keys generated on-device with OpenSSH (private key never leaves hardware, touch required per operation), PIV smartcard usage via PKCS#11 for sign/encrypt with SSH, and OpenPGP smartcard keys for SSH auth. Community corroboration confirms FIDO2/PIV/OpenPGP smartcard functionality and touch-to-sign is genuinely enforced (not remotely bypassable). Missing for 10: no independent hands-on benchmark of ed25519 sk-ssh key generation end-to-end, and some community friction noted around PIN/touch UX onboarding.

   • [claimed-docs] “FIDO2 security keys, such as the YubiKey, strengthen SSH security by ensuring your private SSH keys never leave the hardware security key.”
   • [claimed-docs] “FIDO2 also requires user presence (a touch on your YubiKey) for cryptographic operations, and can optionally enforce user verification (PIN …”
   • [claimed-docs] “It enables RSA or ECC sign/encrypt operations using a private key stored on a smartcard (such as the YubiKey), through common interfaces lik…”
   • [claimed-docs] “OpenPGP is an open standard for signing and encrypting. It enables RSA or ECC sign/encrypt operations using a private key stored on a smartc…”
   • [claimed-docs] “you can generate the private key directly on the hardware, where it cannot be exported or extracted”
   • [claimed-docs] “This guide shows how to generate and use SSH keys directly on your FIDO2 security key with OpenSSH.”
   • [community] “So far, Yubikeys are the only ones I've found that support both FIDO2/WebAuthn as well as GPG smart card functionality for use with pass(1).…”
   • [community] “Also, yubikey works as a PIV smartcard.”
   • [community] “The whole point of this touch to sign is that it can't be hacked remotely :) and you can just turn it off for most modes.”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   SoloKeys Solo 2!disputedcontradicted4/10

   GitHub docs assert the device 'speaks OATH (TOTP/HOTP), PIV, and OpenPGP' alongside its core FIDO2/WebAuthn support, which would in principle back sk-ssh (FIDO2), PIV, and GPG-based SSH keys — but a community commenter on the same Solo2 announcement explicitly states 'it doesn't do OpenPGP,' and an independent runtime probe shows the official solo-python CLI is broken (ImportError with current python-fido2) and firmware hasn't shipped since 2022, casting doubt that these advertised protocols are actually usable today for SSH auth. Missing for 10: explicit sk-ssh/PIV/OpenPGP SSH-key setup documentation, working current CLI/firmware evidence, and resolution of the OpenPGP support contradiction.

   • [github] “It's a USB+NFC device that protects your accounts with passkeys/WebAuthn, and also speaks OATH (TOTP/HOTP), PIV, and OpenPGP.”
   • [github] “also speaks OATH (TOTP/HOTP), PIV, and OpenPGP”
   • [community] “Nice, I'd love this as an open source yubikey replacement. But it doesn't do OpenPGP, I rely on that way too much sadly... If they add that …”
   • [probe] “PROBE runtime negative (recorded 2026-09-15): the official Solo CLI has bit-rotted — `uvx --from solo-python solo version` fails with 'Impor…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

Agent audit

1. ai-native userAn agent can read a key's state programmatically — serial, firmware version, enabled applications, stored credentials — to audit security posture across a fleet

   weight 2 · round to YubiKey
   YubiKey✓fullprobed8/10

   Yubico's official ykman CLI (and underlying python-fido2/yubikey-manager libraries) exposes exactly this data programmatically: serial number, firmware version, enabled applications, PIN/PIV/OATH/OTP slot state, all scriptable without a client GUI — confirmed both in docs (docs-4, docs-15/25) and a keyless runtime probe showing full scriptable device management (probe-rt-1) plus SDK availability on PyPI (probe-rt-3). An agent can shell out to ykman on each key to build a fleet audit, though Yubico provides no built-in cross-fleet aggregation/reporting endpoint (the YubiEnterprise API in probe-rt-2 covers shipping/inventory, not live security-posture state). Missing for 10: a native fleet-wide audit/reporting API or dashboard aggregating multiple keys' state, and independent hands-on confirmation of scripting this across many devices at scale.

   • [claimed-docs] “Configure your YubiKey via the command line.”
   • [claimed-docs] “The quickest and most convenient way to determine your device's firmware version is to use either the Yubico Authenticator ... or ykman”
   • [claimed-docs] “The quickest and most convenient way to determine your device's firmware version is to use either the Yubico Authenticator with its intuitiv…”
   • [probe] “official CLI documented at https://developers.yubico.com/yubikey-manager/”
   • [probe] “PROBE runtime (recorded 2026-09-15): Yubico's official ykman CLI installs keylessly from public registries and identifies itself — `uvx --fr…”
   • [probe] “PROBE runtime (recorded 2026-09-15): Yubico's python-fido2 SDK resolves on the public PyPI registry (fido2 2.2.1), alongside yubikey-manager…”
   • [probe] “PROBE runtime (recorded 2026-09-15): the YubiEnterprise 'YubiKey as a Service' REST API documentation is live and public at console.yubico.c…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   SoloKeys Solo 2~partialprobed3/10

   The Solo 2 CLI exposes some device-state commands (`solo2 list` for connected devices/serials, `solo2 app admin ...` for config) suggesting basic programmatic querying, but there is no evidence of commands to enumerate firmware version, enabled applications, or stored credentials for fleet auditing. A runtime probe also shows the official Python CLI tooling (solo-python) is broken due to dependency incompatibility, undermining reliability of programmatic access. missing for 10: documented API/CLI output for firmware version and enabled-app enumeration, credential enumeration, a working/maintained CLI tool, any structured/machine-readable output format for fleet-scale auditing.

   • [github] “solo2 list # list connected devices (alias: solo2 ls)”
   • [github] “solo2 app admin set led 007f7f 00007f # set led to teal (idle) / blue (active) - use 000000 to turn the led off”
   • [probe] “PROBE runtime negative (recorded 2026-09-15): the official Solo CLI has bit-rotted — `uvx --from solo-python solo version` fails with 'Impor…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

Attestation

1. security engineerVerify device attestation at registration to enforce that only genuine, approved key models are enrolled

   weight 2 · round to YubiKey
   YubiKey✓fullprobed8/10

   YubiKey documents PIV attestation explicitly: certificates prove a key was generated on-device (not imported), and python-fido2 provides library support for 'verifying attestation and assertion signatures,' enabling backend registration flows to reject non-genuine or imported keys. This directly supports enforcing genuine device enrollment at registration time. Missing for 10: no independent/hands-on validation of attestation-based enrollment enforcement in production, and no explicit vendor-model allowlisting guide beyond the raw attestation cert mechanism.

   • [claimed-docs] “The concept of attestation is used to show that a certain asymmetric key has been generated on device and not imported.”
   • [claimed-docs] “This certificate should be used for the purpose of verifying that the key was generated in device.”
   • [claimed-docs] “Provides library functionality for communicating with a FIDO device over USB as well as verifying attestation and assertion signatures.”
   • [probe] “PROBE runtime (recorded 2026-09-15): Yubico's python-fido2 SDK resolves on the public PyPI registry (fido2 2.2.1), alongside yubikey-manager…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   SoloKeys Solo 2~partialclaimed3/10

   The docs confirm Solo 2 ships with a factory attestation key and even allow customizing/generating your own attestation key pair for bulk deployment, implying WebAuthn/FIDO2 attestation is present in principle. However there is no documentation of a FIDO Alliance MDS listing, stable AAGUID, or any RP-side verification workflow that a security engineer could use to confirm the device model at registration — and the ability to swap the attestation key yourself could actually undermine trust in a fixed identity. missing for 10: MDS/AAGUID metadata for RP verification, documented attestation-cert chain details, guidance for enterprises on enforcing genuine-model checks, independent confirmation that registration-time attestation works as expected.

   • [claimed-docs] “If you don't want to use the default attestation key that Solo builds with, you can create your own and program it.”
   • [claimed-docs] “Now to generate & sign the attestation key pair that will go on your device, or maybe 100,000 devices :)”
   • [github] “It's a USB+NFC device that protects your accounts with passkeys/WebAuthn, and also speaks OATH (TOTP/HOTP), PIV, and OpenPGP.”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

Cli

1. developerConfigure and manage the key from an official CLI — enable applications, set PINs, manage slots, read device state — scriptably

   weight 3 · round to YubiKey
   YubiKey✓fullprobed9/10

   ykman is Yubico's official CLI for configuring YubiKeys — enabling/disabling applications, setting PINs, managing PIV/OATH/OTP slots, and reading device/firmware state — and is documented and verified installable/scriptable via pip/Homebrew/uvx in runtime probes. Independent community mentions corroborate real-world use of ykman-adjacent workflows (e.g., PIN enrollment via CLI/GUI tools). Missing for 10: no independent hands-on developer review specifically praising ykman's scripting ergonomics beyond install verification.

   • [claimed-docs] “Configure your YubiKey via the command line.”
   • [claimed-docs] “The quickest and most convenient way to determine your device's firmware version is to use either the Yubico Authenticator ... or ykman”
   • [probe] “official CLI documented at https://developers.yubico.com/yubikey-manager/”
   • [probe] “PROBE runtime (recorded 2026-09-15): Yubico's official ykman CLI installs keylessly from public registries and identifies itself — `uvx --fr…”
   • [community] “This part can be frustrating for a novice adopting security keys. The key works out of the box without PIN. If you didn't come across the ri…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   SoloKeys Solo 2!disputedcontradicted3/10

   Docs and GitHub show a `solo2` CLI with some admin commands (`solo2 list`, `solo2 app admin set led`, firmware `update`) but no documented commands for setting PINs or managing slots, and reading device state relies on generic third-party `fido2-token` rather than a Solo-specific command. A runtime probe found the official Solo CLI (solo-python) actually fails to even run (`ImportError: cannot import name CTAP1`) due to incompatibility with current fido2 2.x, and firmware hasn't been released in 4 years — concrete evidence the tooling has bit-rotted rather than delivering the claimed scriptable management. missing for 10: working PIN-setting command, slot management, device-state reporting, and a CLI that runs without import errors on current dependencies.

   • [github] “solo2 app admin set led 007f7f 00007f # set led to teal (idle) / blue (active) - use 000000 to turn the led off”
   • [github] “solo2 list # list connected devices (alias: solo2 ls)”
   • [claimed-docs] “You can "wipe" a device using `fido2-token -R`”
   • [probe] “PROBE runtime negative (recorded 2026-09-15): the official Solo CLI has bit-rotted — `uvx --from solo-python solo version` fails with 'Impor…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

Sdks

1. developerOfficial SDKs let me integrate the key into my own desktop and mobile apps

   weight 2 · round to YubiKey
   YubiKey✓fullprobed8/10

   Yubico provides official desktop SDK (.NET SDK, yubikey-manager), Android (YubiKit) and iOS (yubikit-ios) mobile SDKs, plus python-fido2 and java-webauthn-server libraries, all documented and confirmed live on package registries. missing for 10: independent third-party developer testimonials on ease of SDK integration, and no official cross-platform (e.g. Flutter/React Native) SDK is mentioned.

   • [claimed-docs] “Yubico has developed a range of mobile SDKs, such as for iOS and Android, and also desktop SDKs to enable developers to rapidly integrate ha…”
   • [claimed-docs] “The SDK allows you to integrate the YubiKey and its applications into your .NET-based application or library.”
   • [claimed-docs] “YubiKit is an Android library provided by Yubico to enable YubiKey support in Android apps. Both USB and NFC-enabled YubiKeys are supported.”
   • [claimed-docs] “The library supports NFC-enabled YubiKeys and provides the APIs to request an OTP (Yubico OTP or HOTP) from the NFC YubiKeys using a NFC-ena…”
   • [claimed-docs] “Provides library functionality for communicating with a FIDO device over USB as well as verifying attestation and assertion signatures.”
   • [probe] “PROBE runtime (recorded 2026-09-15): Yubico's official ykman CLI installs keylessly from public registries and identifies itself — `uvx --fr…”
   • [probe] “PROBE runtime (recorded 2026-09-15): Yubico's python-fido2 SDK resolves on the public PyPI registry (fido2 2.2.1), alongside yubikey-manager…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   SoloKeys Solo 2—none0/10

   Evidence shows only a device-management CLI (solo2 app admin/list) and firmware-building/customization tooling for the key itself, not any SDK for embedding the key into third-party desktop or mobile applications. The runtime probe even shows the existing Solo Python CLI is broken/bit-rotted, and no library/SDK for app integration is documented anywhere in the pack.

   • [github] “solo2 app admin set led 007f7f 00007f # set led to teal (idle) / blue (active) - use 000000 to turn the led off”
   • [github] “solo2 list # list connected devices (alias: solo2 ls)”
   • [claimed-docs] “To build, develop and debug the firmware for the STM32L432.”
   • [probe] “PROBE runtime negative (recorded 2026-09-15): the official Solo CLI has bit-rotted — `uvx --from solo-python solo version` fails with 'Impor…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

Agent approval

1. ai-native userRequire a physical key touch as the human-approval step for sensitive automated or agent-initiated actions

   weight 1 · round to YubiKey
   YubiKey~partialprobed4/10

   YubiKey's FIDO2/WebAuthn and SSH implementations require a physical touch for every cryptographic operation, and SDKs like python-fido2, PKCS#11, and yubikey-manager expose this as a programmable building block that could be wired into an agent approval flow, but there is no evidence of any actual AI-agent or automation-approval integration built on this. missing for 10: any documented agent-framework integration, a sample workflow gating an AI or agent action behind YubiKey touch, or a third-party report of this pattern in use.

   • [claimed-docs] “FIDO2 also requires user presence (a touch on your YubiKey) for cryptographic operations, and can optionally enforce user verification (PIN …”
   • [claimed-docs] “you can generate the private key directly on the hardware, where it cannot be exported or extracted”
   • [claimed-docs] “This guide shows how to generate and use SSH keys directly on your FIDO2 security key with OpenSSH.”
   • [probe] “PROBE runtime (recorded 2026-09-15): Yubico's python-fido2 SDK resolves on the public PyPI registry (fido2 2.2.1), alongside yubikey-manager…”
   • [community] “The whole point of this touch to sign is that it can't be hacked remotely :) and you can just turn it off for most modes.”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   SoloKeys Solo 2~partialprobed3/10

   Solo 2 documents a generic touch-to-confirm step for WebAuthn/FIDO2 authentication (solokeys-docs-1), which could theoretically gate any human-in-the-loop confirmation, but there is no evidence tying this to AI-agent-initiated action approval flows, agentic tool integrations, or any AI-native ecosystem support. Additionally, runtime evidence shows the official CLI is broken/bit-rotted and firmware hasn't shipped in 4 years, raising doubts about active ecosystem maintenance. Missing for 10: any documentation or integration example of using Solo 2 touch confirmation as an approval gate for AI/agent workflows, evidence of SDK/API hooks for agent tooling, and independent confirmation of this use case.

   • [claimed-docs] “When prompted, touch the capacitive sensor on your Solo 2 to confirm.”
   • [probe] “PROBE runtime negative (recorded 2026-09-15): the official Solo CLI has bit-rotted — `uvx --from solo-python solo version` fails with 'Impor…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

Compatibility

1. power userThe key works across my operating systems and browsers, with a published compatibility catalog of supported services

   weight 2 · round to YubiKey
   YubiKey~partialcommunity5/10

   Docs show broad standards-based compatibility (FIDO2/WebAuthn, PIV, OpenPGP, OTP, SSH) and SDKs for iOS, Android, .NET, and desktop, implying cross-OS/browser support, and community posts confirm real-world use across GPG/PIV/SSH/WebAuthn workflows. However, there is no evidence of a published, browsable compatibility catalog listing specific supported services/websites or a browser support matrix as the story requests. Missing for 10: an explicit 'works with' directory of supported services/sites, and a documented OS/browser compatibility matrix beyond protocol-level claims.

   • [claimed-docs] “the WebAuthn API enables servers to register and authenticate users using public key cryptography instead of a password”
   • [claimed-docs] “this guide will provide all the necessary technical knowledge required to adopt passkeys into your application”
   • [claimed-docs] “The SDK allows you to integrate the YubiKey and its applications into your .NET-based application or library.”
   • [claimed-docs] “YubiKit is an Android library provided by Yubico to enable YubiKey support in Android apps. Both USB and NFC-enabled YubiKeys are supported.”
   • [claimed-docs] “The library supports NFC-enabled YubiKeys and provides the APIs to request an OTP (Yubico OTP or HOTP) from the NFC YubiKeys using a NFC-ena…”
   • [community] “So far, Yubikeys are the only ones I've found that support both FIDO2/WebAuthn as well as GPG smart card functionality for use with pass(1).…”
   • [community] “Also, yubikey works as a PIV smartcard.”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   SoloKeys Solo 2~partialprobed3/10

   Solo 2 claims broad compatibility (any USB port, no drivers, FIDO2/passkey standard, NFC for Android/iOS, OATH/PIV/OpenPGP) but there is no published compatibility catalog listing specific supported services/sites, and a runtime probe shows the official CLI tooling has bit-rotted and firmware hasn't been updated in years, raising doubts about maintained cross-platform support. Missing for 10: a published service/site compatibility list, browser-specific compatibility documentation, and evidence the tooling/firmware is actively maintained to keep pace with OS/browser changes.

   • [claimed-docs] “Passkeys are replacing passwords across the web. Solo 2 supports the passkey standard — except yours stays on your key. Not their cloud.”
   • [claimed-docs] “Insert your Solo 2 into any USB port. No software or drivers required.”
   • [claimed-docs] “Everything in Solo 2 plus NFC tap-to-authenticate for compatible Android and iOS devices.”
   • [github] “It's a USB+NFC device that protects your accounts with passkeys/WebAuthn, and also speaks OATH (TOTP/HOTP), PIV, and OpenPGP.”
   • [probe] “PROBE runtime negative (recorded 2026-09-15): the official Solo CLI has bit-rotted — `uvx --from solo-python solo version` fails with 'Impor…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

Recovery

1. security engineerThe vendor documents a credible lockout-recovery strategy — registering a backup key, and what is and is not recoverable if a key is lost

   weight 3 · round drawn
   YubiKey—none0/10

   The evidence pack contains no vendor documentation describing a lockout-recovery strategy (e.g., backup key enrollment guidance, what's recoverable vs. not). Community threads instead highlight the opposite experience — users must manually track and re-register every account per lost key with no central mechanism (yubikey-comm-7), and lost/compromised keys require full manual replacement across all enrolled services (yubikey-comm-2, yubikey-comm-6) — indicating this is an unaddressed gap rather than a documented workflow.

   • [community] “I have redundant keys for backup access. But I have no idea which accounts I used the lost key for, in order to log into them one by one to …”
   • [community] “I think the most annoying part of this is that you cannot just replace a YubiKey. You need to manually go through each account and replace t…”
   • [community] “They really should [issue replacements]. The recovery of the one secret the device is supposed to keep is catastrophic. Sure, the recovery i…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   SoloKeys Solo 2—none0/10

   No evidence in the pack discusses backup key enrollment, multi-key registration strategies, or what is/isn't recoverable if a Solo 2 is lost — documentation covers setup, building, and CLI usage but never addresses lockout/recovery planning.

   ⚑ flag

Setup

1. power userFirst-time setup is guided — clear instructions or a setup app walk me through registering the key with my accounts

   weight 2 · round to SoloKeys Solo 2
   YubiKey!disputedcontradicted4/10

   Yubico ships an official 'Yubico Authenticator' app described as an 'intuitive and easy-to-use GUI interface' and provides technical guides for SSH/PGP/PIV/FIDO setup, but these are protocol-specific developer docs, not an end-to-end enrollment wizard for registering a key with personal accounts. A hands-on community report (yubikey-comm-13) describes exactly the opposite of guided onboarding: a new user enrolled keys without setting a PIN because the right guidance wasn't surfaced, then had to unenroll everywhere, set a PIN, and re-enroll — a concrete documented setup failure for a power user. Missing for 10: a dedicated first-run setup app/wizard walking users through registering with common accounts (Google, GitHub, etc.), and independent corroboration that such guidance works smoothly in practice.

   • [claimed-docs] “The quickest and most convenient way to determine your device's firmware version is to use either the Yubico Authenticator ... or ykman”
   • [claimed-docs] “The quickest and most convenient way to determine your device's firmware version is to use either the Yubico Authenticator with its intuitiv…”
   • [community] “This part can be frustrating for a novice adopting security keys. The key works out of the box without PIN. If you didn't come across the ri…”
   • [claimed-docs] “This guide shows how to generate and use SSH keys directly on your FIDO2 security key with OpenSSH.”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   SoloKeys Solo 2~partialprobed3/10

   Docs mention simple plug-and-play basics ('insert into USB port, no software required', 'touch sensor to confirm') but there is no evidence of a dedicated setup app or step-by-step account-registration walkthrough; the FIDO2 side of onboarding is essentially per-website. Additionally, a runtime probe shows the official companion CLI is bit-rotted (import errors) and firmware hasn't been updated in years, undermining confidence in any first-time-setup tooling. Missing for 10: a documented onboarding wizard/app, account-registration walkthrough for accounts, working companion CLI/tooling.

   • [claimed-docs] “When prompted, touch the capacitive sensor on your Solo 2 to confirm.”
   • [claimed-docs] “Insert your Solo 2 into any USB port. No software or drivers required.”
   • [probe] “PROBE runtime negative (recorded 2026-09-15): the official Solo CLI has bit-rotted — `uvx --from solo-python solo version` fails with 'Impor…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

Source

1. security engineerThe firmware is open source or independently audited, so I don't have to take the vendor's word for what runs on the device

   weight 2 · round to SoloKeys Solo 2
   YubiKey—none0/10

   Yubico documentation and community evidence describe YubiKey firmware as closed and non-upgradable ('proprietary smartcard', 'not being able to flash firmware is a feature'), with no mention of open-sourcing or third-party firmware audits anywhere in the evidence pack; no vendor claim or independent report of open/audited firmware exists to evaluate.

   • [community] “YubiKey Firmware is Not Upgradable... So, Yubico is providing free replacements, right? I have a handful of these Yubikeys…”
   • [community] “Not being able to flash the firmware is a feature, not a bug :) Its the fundamental reason I won't buy NitroHSM because of the unknown-unkno…”
   • [community] “Yubico hardware [is] more compact and less bulky than anything else out there... Yubico software [has an] extensive featureset with more con…”
   • [community] “A Yubikey is just a proprietary smartcard with a bunch of apps installed and some HID emulation (pretending to be a keyboard, which you like…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   SoloKeys Solo 2✓fullprobed8/10

   The Solo 2 firmware is openly published on GitHub, buildable from source, and the 'Hacker' variant explicitly supports flashing custom firmware, letting anyone inspect and verify what runs on the device; this is corroborated by community commentary confirming 'it's open source firmware, not open source hardware.' Updates are also SHA-256 verified before flashing, adding transparency to the update process. missing for 10: no formal independent third-party security audit is cited, and runtime evidence shows the firmware/tooling has not been updated since 2022, raising questions about ongoing maintenance of the open codebase.

   • [github] “Solo 2 Hacker — the same hardware, unlocked. Flash your own firmware, experiment with new features, and learn how a security key works end t…”
   • [github] “On a **Hacker** key you can build and flash your own firmware.”
   • [github] “`update` downloads the signed release, **verifies its SHA-256**, and flashes it.”
   • [community] “This is an LPC55S69. So it's open source firmware, not open source hardware.”
   • [probe] “PROBE runtime negative (recorded 2026-09-15): the official Solo CLI has bit-rotted — `uvx --from solo-python solo version` fails with 'Impor…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

Updates

1. security engineerThe vendor has a clear firmware update and vulnerability-response story — advisories, affected-model lookup, and how fixes reach devices

   weight 2 · round to YubiKey
   YubiKey!disputedcontradicted4/10

   Docs show only a firmware-version lookup tool (ykman/Authenticator) with no official advisory page, CVE list, or affected-model lookup in the evidence pack, and community reports confirm YubiKey firmware is not field-upgradable — vulnerability response instead relies on ad-hoc device replacement (comm-3, comm-5, comm-8) which posters describe as inconsistent and manual (comm-2, comm-4, comm-6), directly undercutting any 'clear fix pipeline' claim. missing for 10: published security-advisory index, affected-model/serial lookup tool, documented recall/replacement SLA, and any firmware-update delivery mechanism.

   • [claimed-docs] “The quickest and most convenient way to determine your device's firmware version is to use either the Yubico Authenticator ... or ykman”
   • [claimed-docs] “The quickest and most convenient way to determine your device's firmware version is to use either the Yubico Authenticator with its intuitiv…”
   • [community] “YubiKey Firmware is Not Upgradable... So, Yubico is providing free replacements, right? I have a handful of these Yubikeys…”
   • [community] “Previously when their Yubikey 4's were found to be susceptible to the ROCA vulnerability, they issued replacements for any customers who had…”
   • [community] “Not being able to flash the firmware is a feature, not a bug :) Its the fundamental reason I won't buy NitroHSM because of the unknown-unkno…”
   • [community] “I think the most annoying part of this is that you cannot just replace a YubiKey. You need to manually go through each account and replace t…”
   • [community] “Don't have high hopes for this but I just requested a replacement device through their support system as the offered mitigations are not som…”
   • [community] “They really should [issue replacements]. The recovery of the one secret the device is supposed to keep is catastrophic. Sure, the recovery i…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   SoloKeys Solo 2!disputedcontradicted3/10

   The GitHub docs describe a signed, SHA-256-verified update mechanism (solokeys-gh-2), but there is no evidence of published security advisories or an affected-model lookup, and a runtime probe shows the official CLI is bit-rotted (ImportError against current fido2 lib) and no firmware release has shipped in ~4 years despite ongoing dependency commits — directly undercutting the claim that fixes reliably reach devices. missing for 10: security advisory feed/CVE list, affected-model/version lookup tool, evidence of recent firmware releases actually reaching users, working update tooling.

   • [github] “`update` downloads the signed release, **verifies its SHA-256**, and flashes it.”
   • [probe] “PROBE runtime negative (recorded 2026-09-15): the official Solo CLI has bit-rotted — `uvx --from solo-python solo version` fails with 'Impor…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

Agent provisioning

1. ai-native userAn agent can drive key provisioning end to end — ordering, assignment, pre-registration — through documented enterprise APIs instead of a human-only console

   weight 2 · round to YubiKey
   YubiKey~partialprobed5/10

   Yubico's YubiEnterprise 'YubiKey as a Service' REST API is documented and publicly live (console.yubico.com/apidocs/), providing a programmatic surface for fleet delivery, inventory, and shipment management that an agent could call instead of a human-only console. However, the evidence pack gives no detail on specific endpoints for ordering, assignment, or pre-registration workflows, no sample agent integration, and no independent confirmation of end-to-end automation success. Missing for 10: detailed API endpoint documentation for order/assign/pre-register flows, evidence of actual agent-driven automation, and independent corroboration of the API's completeness.

   • [probe] “PROBE runtime (recorded 2026-09-15): the YubiEnterprise 'YubiKey as a Service' REST API documentation is live and public at console.yubico.c…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   SoloKeys Solo 2—none0/10

   There is no evidence of any enterprise/fleet management API for ordering, assignment, or pre-registration of keys — the CLI is a local hardware management tool (list, flash, LED), and probe evidence shows no OpenAPI/API docs exist and the CLI itself is bit-rotted. This is a consumer/hacker hardware key product with no enterprise provisioning system at all.

   • [probe] “PROBE openapi: all candidate paths 404 (https://docs.solokeys.dev/openapi.json, https://docs.solokeys.dev/swagger.json, https://docs.solokey…”
   • [probe] “PROBE runtime negative (recorded 2026-09-15): the official Solo CLI has bit-rotted — `uvx --from solo-python solo version` fails with 'Impor…”
   • [github] “solo2 list # list connected devices (alias: solo2 ls)”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

Delivery

1. it adminAn enterprise delivery service ships keys directly to distributed employees, driven by an API or console rather than manual logistics

   weight 2 · round to YubiKey
   YubiKey~partialprobed6/10

   Yubico's YubiEnterprise 'YubiKey as a Service' REST API is documented and live at console.yubico.com/apidocs/, described as the programmatic surface for fleet delivery, inventory, and shipment management — directly matching the API/console-driven distribution story. However, this rests on a single probe citation with no deeper documentation of the shipping workflow itself, no case studies, and no independent corroboration that enterprises use it this way in practice. Missing for 10: detailed docs on shipment/delivery mechanics, customer/independent confirmation of the service in use, and console UI evidence beyond the API doc existing.

   • [probe] “PROBE runtime (recorded 2026-09-15): the YubiEnterprise 'YubiKey as a Service' REST API documentation is live and public at console.yubico.c…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   SoloKeys Solo 2—none0/10

   No evidence of any enterprise provisioning/shipping API, console, or fleet-deployment logistics integration; SoloKeys is a consumer hardware key sold via a Shopify store with no fleet-management tooling documented, and CLI/API evidence is limited to device-local admin commands and firmware building. Probes even show bit-rot in the CLI and no API/OpenAPI documentation exists.

   • [probe] “PROBE openapi: all candidate paths 404 (https://docs.solokeys.dev/openapi.json, https://docs.solokeys.dev/swagger.json, https://docs.solokey…”
   • [probe] “PROBE runtime negative (recorded 2026-09-15): the official Solo CLI has bit-rotted — `uvx --from solo-python solo version` fails with 'Impor…”
   • [claimed-docs] “Pack of colored cases for Solo 2”
   • [github] “solo2 list # list connected devices (alias: solo2 ls)”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

Idp

1. it adminThe key integrates with my identity provider — Okta, Entra ID, Google Workspace — and I can enforce policies requiring hardware-key authentication

   weight 2 · round drawn
   YubiKey—none0/10

   The evidence pack covers YubiKey's general FIDO2/WebAuthn/passkey protocol support and a fleet-management API (YubiEnterprise) for shipment/inventory, but contains no mention of specific IdP integrations (Okta, Entra ID, Google Workspace) or of admin-configurable policies enforcing hardware-key-only authentication. Since IdP integration and policy enforcement are a fair and expected axis for an enterprise MFA hardware vendor, absence of evidence means 'none' rather than 'na'. Missing for 10: documented Okta/Entra ID/Google Workspace integration guides, admin policy/enforcement console features, and any independent confirmation these integrations work in practice.

   • [probe] “PROBE runtime (recorded 2026-09-15): the YubiEnterprise 'YubiKey as a Service' REST API documentation is live and public at console.yubico.c…”
   • [claimed-docs] “the WebAuthn API enables servers to register and authenticate users using public key cryptography instead of a password”
   • [claimed-docs] “YubiKey — strongest hardware-backed passkey”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   SoloKeys Solo 2—none0/10

   No evidence anywhere in the pack mentions IdP integrations (Okta, Entra ID, Google Workspace), fleet enrollment/management tools, or policy enforcement for hardware-key authentication; evidence only covers WebAuthn/FIDO2 protocol support, firmware building, and hardware details. This is a plausible axis for a security key vendor (many competitors offer admin/fleet consoles), but SoloKeys shows nothing to support it.

   ⚑ flag

Provisioning

1. it adminProvision keys across an organization at scale — pre-registration, bulk configuration, and lifecycle tracking of issued keys

   weight 3 · round to YubiKey
   YubiKey~partialprobed6/10

   Yubico documents ykman for scriptable bulk device configuration (PIN/PIV/OATH/OTP setup) and a live YubiEnterprise 'YubiKey as a Service' REST API covering fleet delivery, inventory, and shipment management, plus PIV attestation to verify keys were hardware-generated — together these map to pre-registration, bulk config, and some lifecycle tracking. Missing for 10: detailed enterprise lifecycle-tracking dashboard docs, independent/customer case studies of at-scale deployment, and clearer documentation tying pre-registration workflows directly to the API rather than inferring from an apidocs page title.

   • [probe] “PROBE runtime (recorded 2026-09-15): Yubico's official ykman CLI installs keylessly from public registries and identifies itself — `uvx --fr…”
   • [probe] “PROBE runtime (recorded 2026-09-15): the YubiEnterprise 'YubiKey as a Service' REST API documentation is live and public at console.yubico.c…”
   • [claimed-docs] “The concept of attestation is used to show that a certain asymmetric key has been generated on device and not imported.”
   • [claimed-docs] “This certificate should be used for the purpose of verifying that the key was generated in device.”
   • [claimed-docs] “Configure your YubiKey via the command line.”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   SoloKeys Solo 2—none0/10

   Evidence covers individual key setup, CLI device listing/config (`solo2 list`, `admin set led`), and custom attestation-key generation, with one offhand mention of building attestation keys 'for maybe 100,000 devices'—but there is no documented bulk-enrollment workflow, admin console, pre-registration pipeline, or lifecycle/issuance tracking system for organizations. Runtime probes further show the official CLI is broken (ImportError) and no firmware has shipped in 4 years, undercutting any claim of active enterprise tooling.

   • [claimed-docs] “Now to generate & sign the attestation key pair that will go on your device, or maybe 100,000 devices :)”
   • [github] “solo2 list # list connected devices (alias: solo2 ls)”
   • [github] “solo2 app admin set led 007f7f 00007f # set led to teal (idle) / blue (active) - use 000000 to turn the led off”
   • [probe] “PROBE runtime negative (recorded 2026-09-15): the official Solo CLI has bit-rotted — `uvx --from solo-python solo version` fails with 'Impor…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

Certifications

1. it adminCertified models exist for regulated environments — FIPS 140 validated or Common Criteria certified — with documented durability (water/crush resistance)

   weight 2 · round drawn
   YubiKey—none0/10

   The evidence pack contains no mention of FIPS 140 validation, Common Criteria certification, or documented durability/water/crush resistance testing for any YubiKey model. While this axis clearly applies to a hardware security key product aimed at regulated environments, none of the docs, community, or probe items address certification status or physical durability specs, so there is nothing to credit.

   ⚑ flag

   SoloKeys Solo 2—none0/10

   No evidence of FIPS 140 validation or Common Criteria certification anywhere in the pack; only a community comment mentions 'water resistant' informally (solokeys-comm-7), and another comment casts doubt on tamper-resistance claims (solokeys-comm-1). No documented crush resistance or regulated-environment certification exists.

   • [community] “Solo v2 is much more robust, water resistant, has stronger NFC & reversible usb plug. The micro is a NXP LPC55S6x with extra security featur…”
   • [community] “I'm still curious how the key is tamper resistent when filling it with transparent epoxy... it should be fairly easy to remove the epoxy and…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

Connectors

1. power userThe lineup covers my ports and carry style — USB-C and USB-A models, keychain and low-profile nano form factors

   weight 2 · round drawn
   YubiKey—none0/10

   The evidence pack contains no documentation or community confirmation of specific YubiKey form factors (USB-C, USB-A, keychain, nano) — only general docs about protocols/SDKs and community comments about size/bulkiness in vague terms (e.g., yubikey-comm-9 says 'more compact and less bulky' without specifics). Missing for 10: explicit product-line documentation of USB-A/USB-C variants, nano/keychain form factors, and any independent confirmation of the lineup breadth.

   ⚑ flag

   SoloKeys Solo 2—none0/10

   Evidence shows Solo 2 exists as a security key with NFC variant and generic USB port compatibility, and community comments mention a 'reversible USB-A'/'reversible usb plug', but there is no evidence of a broader lineup with distinct USB-C vs USB-A SKUs or keychain vs low-profile nano form factors — only a single case/color accessory line is mentioned.

   • [claimed-docs] “Insert your Solo 2 into any USB port. No software or drivers required.”
   • [claimed-docs] “Everything in Solo 2 plus NFC tap-to-authenticate for compatible Android and iOS devices.”
   • [community] “"Reversible USB-A" now there's a feature I wish we'd see more often!”
   • [community] “Solo v2 is much more robust, water resistant, has stronger NFC & reversible usb plug. The micro is a NXP LPC55S6x with extra security featur…”
   • [claimed-docs] “Pack of colored cases for Solo 2”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

Nfc

1. power userTap the key on my phone over NFC to authenticate in mobile browsers and apps

   weight 2 · round to SoloKeys Solo 2
   YubiKey~partialclaimed6/10

   Yubico's own SDK docs confirm NFC support for both Android (yubikit-android supports USB and NFC-enabled YubiKeys) and iOS (yubikit-ios provides NFC OTP requests), and YubiKey's core FIDO2/WebAuthn/passkey stack (docs-27, docs-14, docs-16) is the basis for authenticating in mobile browsers/apps, but the evidence is SDK/developer-facing rather than an end-user confirmation that a stock mobile browser/app tap-to-auth flow just works. missing for 10: an explicit first-party or hands-on claim that end-users can tap NFC on a phone in a mobile browser (not just app SDK) to authenticate, and independent/community corroboration of real-world NFC mobile browser use.

   • [claimed-docs] “YubiKit is an Android library provided by Yubico to enable YubiKey support in Android apps. Both USB and NFC-enabled YubiKeys are supported.”
   • [claimed-docs] “The library supports NFC-enabled YubiKeys and provides the APIs to request an OTP (Yubico OTP or HOTP) from the NFC YubiKeys using a NFC-ena…”
   • [claimed-docs] “YubiKey — strongest hardware-backed passkey”
   • [claimed-docs] “Passkeys are the long awaited replacement for passwords.”
   • [claimed-docs] “the WebAuthn API enables servers to register and authenticate users using public key cryptography instead of a password”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   SoloKeys Solo 2✓fullclaimed7/10

   SoloKeys explicitly markets NFC tap-to-authenticate for compatible Android and iOS devices as a feature of Solo 2, supporting WebAuthn/passkeys which work across mobile browsers/apps. Missing for 10: no independent hands-on confirmation of NFC mobile browser/app compatibility, and community discussion focuses on other aspects (tamper resistance, OpenPGP) rather than validating NFC mobile use.

   • [claimed-docs] “Everything in Solo 2 plus NFC tap-to-authenticate for compatible Android and iOS devices.”
   • [claimed-docs] “Passkeys are replacing passwords across the web. Solo 2 supports the passkey standard — except yours stays on your key. Not their cloud.”
   • [github] “It's a USB+NFC device that protects your accounts with passkeys/WebAuthn, and also speaks OATH (TOTP/HOTP), PIV, and OpenPGP.”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

1. ai-native userDo everything through the API that I can do in the UI

   weight 2 · round to YubiKey
   YubiKey~partialprobed6/10

   Yubico's ykman CLI is documented as functionally interchangeable with the Yubico Authenticator GUI for core device configuration (enabling applications, PINs, PIV/OATH/OTP slots, firmware info), and the YubiEnterprise REST API covers fleet-management tasks that would otherwise be done via console UI, giving real API/CLI parity for administrative workflows. However there's no evidence of a unified, fully-documented API surface covering every consumer-facing UI action (e.g., newer Authenticator app credential-management screens), and no llms.txt/MCP endpoint exists for agent discovery of these surfaces. Missing for 10: comprehensive mapping of every UI feature to an API/CLI equivalent, and agent-discoverable API documentation (llms.txt/MCP/OpenAPI all return 404).

   • [probe] “PROBE runtime (recorded 2026-09-15): Yubico's official ykman CLI installs keylessly from public registries and identifies itself — `uvx --fr…”
   • [probe] “PROBE runtime (recorded 2026-09-15): the YubiEnterprise 'YubiKey as a Service' REST API documentation is live and public at console.yubico.c…”
   • [claimed-docs] “The quickest and most convenient way to determine your device's firmware version is to use either the Yubico Authenticator ... or ykman”
   • [claimed-docs] “The quickest and most convenient way to determine your device's firmware version is to use either the Yubico Authenticator with its intuitiv…”
   • [probe] “PROBE runtime negative (recorded 2026-09-15): Yubico publishes no llms.txt on any host — https://docs.yubico.com/llms.txt answers HTTP 404 (…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   SoloKeys Solo 2—none0/10

   The axis applies to this product kind (peer products hold positive or none verdicts on this story), so lack of evidence for an applicable capability is "none", never "na". (na/none harmonized at arena bring-up — see pipeline/scripts/na-harmonize.ts.)

   ⚑ flag

2. ai-native userExport all of my data in open formats and leave

   weight 3 · round drawn
   YubiKey—none0/10

   YubiKey's core design explicitly prevents exporting the data it stores — private keys are generated on-device and 'cannot be exported or extracted' (yubikey-docs-23), and SSH/FIDO2 docs stress private keys 'never leave the hardware' (yubikey-docs-5). There is no vendor or community evidence of any open-format bulk data export/portability path; the product's security model is fundamentally opposed to this story.

   • [claimed-docs] “you can generate the private key directly on the hardware, where it cannot be exported or extracted”
   • [claimed-docs] “FIDO2 security keys, such as the YubiKey, strengthen SSH security by ensuring your private SSH keys never leave the hardware security key.”
   • [claimed-docs] “the shared secrets are stored and processed in the YubiKey's secure element”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   SoloKeys Solo 2—none0/10

   The evidence pack shows Solo 2 supports open standards (WebAuthn, OATH, PIV, OpenPGP) and lets users customize/replace the attestation key or wipe the device, but there is no documentation of any way to export stored credentials/private key material in open formats to migrate elsewhere — by design, FIDO2/PIV/OpenPGP keys generated on-device are non-extractable. missing for 10: any documented data-export/migration path, evidence of extractable key material, or open-format backup/portability tooling.

   • [claimed-docs] “You can "wipe" a device using `fido2-token -R`”
   • [github] “It's a USB+NFC device that protects your accounts with passkeys/WebAuthn, and also speaks OATH (TOTP/HOTP), PIV, and OpenPGP.”
   • [claimed-docs] “If you don't want to use the default attestation key that Solo builds with, you can create your own and program it.”
   • [claimed-docs] “Now to generate & sign the attestation key pair that will go on your device, or maybe 100,000 devices :)”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

3. ai-native userRead the product's source under an open license

   weight 2 · round to SoloKeys Solo 2
   YubiKey—none0/10

   YubiKey is closed hardware/firmware — community evidence explicitly notes it is 'a proprietary smartcard' and that Yubico 'does not permit firmware flashing,' with no vendor claim or evidence of the core product's source being published under an open license. Some client SDKs/CLIs (python-fido2, ykman) are open-source, but that is tooling around the product, not the product's own source.

   • [community] “A Yubikey is just a proprietary smartcard with a bunch of apps installed and some HID emulation (pretending to be a keyboard, which you like…”
   • [community] “Yubico hardware [is] more compact and less bulky than anything else out there... Yubico software [has an] extensive featureset with more con…”
   • [community] “YubiKey Firmware is Not Upgradable... So, Yubico is providing free replacements, right? I have a handful of these Yubikeys…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   SoloKeys Solo 2✓fullcommunity8/10

   The firmware source is hosted openly on GitHub (solokeys/solo2), with build instructions, hackable firmware flashing, and even a dedicated 'Hacker' key edition explicitly for reading/modifying source and firmware end-to-end. Community confirms firmware is open source (though hardware/chip is not), corroborating the licensing model. Missing for 10: no explicit license file/name cited, and no independent audit of license terms beyond community mention that firmware (not hardware) is open.

   • [github] “Solo 2 Hacker — the same hardware, unlocked. Flash your own firmware, experiment with new features, and learn how a security key works end t…”
   • [github] “On a **Hacker** key you can build and flash your own firmware.”
   • [github] “It's a USB+NFC device that protects your accounts with passkeys/WebAuthn, and also speaks OATH (TOTP/HOTP), PIV, and OpenPGP.”
   • [claimed-docs] “To build, develop and debug the firmware for the STM32L432.”
   • [community] “This is an LPC55S69. So it's open source firmware, not open source hardware.”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

4. ai-native userSelf-host the core product

   weight 3 · round to SoloKeys Solo 2
   YubiKey—none0/10

   The axis applies to this product kind (peer products hold positive or none verdicts on this story), so lack of evidence for an applicable capability is "none", never "na". (na/none harmonized at arena bring-up — see pipeline/scripts/na-harmonize.ts.)

   ⚑ flag

   SoloKeys Solo 2~partialprobed5/10

   The Solo 2 'Hacker' edition ships with fully open-source firmware that users can build, flash, and customize themselves (own attestation keys, own firmware, full toolchain via Rust/cargo), which is the closest analogue to 'self-hosting' for a hardware security key — no cloud dependency by design. However, runtime evidence shows the surrounding tooling has bit-rotted (solo-python CLI fails on current fido2 libs) and no firmware release has shipped in 4 years, undermining confidence that self-building/self-hosting the core product is currently practical. Missing for 10: a working, up-to-date official build/flash pipeline, and independent confirmation that a user can successfully self-build current firmware today.

   • [github] “Solo 2 Hacker — the same hardware, unlocked. Flash your own firmware, experiment with new features, and learn how a security key works end t…”
   • [github] “On a **Hacker** key you can build and flash your own firmware.”
   • [claimed-docs] “If you don't want to use the default attestation key that Solo builds with, you can create your own and program it.”
   • [claimed-docs] “To build, develop and debug the firmware for the STM32L432.”
   • [claimed-docs] “rustup target install thumbv8m.main-none-eabi cargo install flip-link cargo install cargo-binutils cargo install probe-rs-tools”
   • [claimed-docs] “cargo build --release --features board-lpcxpresso55,develop”
   • [probe] “PROBE runtime negative (recorded 2026-09-15): the official Solo CLI has bit-rotted — `uvx --from solo-python solo version` fails with 'Impor…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

1. ai-native userControl data retention and deletion

   weight 2 · round to SoloKeys Solo 2
   YubiKey—none0/10

   The axis applies to this product kind (peer products hold positive or none verdicts on this story), so lack of evidence for an applicable capability is "none", never "na". (na/none harmonized at arena bring-up — see pipeline/scripts/na-harmonize.ts.)

   ⚑ flag

   SoloKeys Solo 2~partialclaimed4/10

   Evidence shows credentials are stored only on-device rather than in a vendor cloud (solokeys-docs-2), and a device wipe is possible via the third-party `fido2-token -R` command (solokeys-docs-10), giving users some control over deletion. However, this is not a first-party, documented retention/deletion feature — it's a generic FIDO2 tool tip buried in a GitHub releases page, with no official SoloKeys documentation on data retention policy or granular per-credential deletion. Missing for 10: native SoloKeys CLI/tool for credential management and wipe, official retention policy documentation, and independent confirmation the wipe command works reliably.

   • [claimed-docs] “Passkeys are replacing passwords across the web. Solo 2 supports the passkey standard — except yours stays on your key. Not their cloud.”
   • [claimed-docs] “You can "wipe" a device using `fido2-token -R`”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

2. ai-native userOpt out of telemetry and usage tracking

   weight 2 · round to SoloKeys Solo 2
   YubiKey—none0/10

   The evidence pack covers YubiKey's hardware authentication, SDKs, and CLI tooling, but contains no mention of telemetry collection or any opt-out/privacy-control setting for Yubico software (ykman, Yubico Authenticator, or the YubiEnterprise console). Since companion software and cloud services could plausibly include telemetry, the axis applies, but there's no evidence of a telemetry opt-out feature.

   ⚑ flag

   SoloKeys Solo 2~partialclaimed3/10

   Solo 2 is explicitly marketed as working entirely locally ('stays on your key, not their cloud', no software/drivers required), which implies no cloud usage-tracking to opt out of, but there is no explicit telemetry policy, settings, or opt-out control documented for the CLI/companion tooling. missing for 10: explicit telemetry/privacy policy statement, any opt-out toggle or setting, confirmation that the solo2 CLI/companion app sends no usage analytics.

   • [claimed-docs] “Passkeys are replacing passwords across the web. Solo 2 supports the passkey standard — except yours stays on your key. Not their cloud.”
   • [claimed-docs] “No more sticky notes. No more forgotten passwords. No more texts with six digit codes.”
   • [claimed-docs] “Insert your Solo 2 into any USB port. No software or drivers required.”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

Credential management

1. power userList and delete the passkeys stored on my key and know its credential capacity before it fills up

   weight 2 · round to YubiKey
   YubiKey~partialprobed4/10

   Yubico's ykman CLI/GUI (docs-4, probe-rt-1) provides broad scriptable device management (PIV/OATH/OTP slots, PINs, device info) and firmware/version info tools (docs-15/25), suggesting some credential-management capability exists, but no evidence explicitly confirms listing/deleting FIDO2 passkey credentials or showing passkey storage capacity/limits. Community threads discuss losing track of which accounts a key is enrolled in (yubikey-comm-7) rather than a management UI. Missing for 10: explicit documentation of a 'list/delete FIDO2 credentials' command, and disclosure of the discrete passkey slot capacity/limit warning.

   • [claimed-docs] “Configure your YubiKey via the command line.”
   • [probe] “PROBE runtime (recorded 2026-09-15): Yubico's official ykman CLI installs keylessly from public registries and identifies itself — `uvx --fr…”
   • [claimed-docs] “The quickest and most convenient way to determine your device's firmware version is to use either the Yubico Authenticator ... or ykman”
   • [community] “I have redundant keys for backup access. But I have no idea which accounts I used the lost key for, in order to log into them one by one to …”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   SoloKeys Solo 2—none0/10

   No evidence describes per-passkey listing, deletion, or credential-capacity reporting; the only related CLI ops shown are `solo2 list` (lists connected devices, not credentials) and `fido2-token -R` (wipes the entire key, not selective deletion). Additionally, a runtime probe shows the official CLI is now broken (ImportError against modern fido2 libs), further undermining any credential-management workflow.

   • [github] “solo2 list # list connected devices (alias: solo2 ls)”
   • [claimed-docs] “You can "wipe" a device using `fido2-token -R`”
   • [probe] “PROBE runtime negative (recorded 2026-09-15): the official Solo CLI has bit-rotted — `uvx --from solo-python solo version` fails with 'Impor…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

Fido2

1. security engineerThe key stores discoverable FIDO2 credentials (resident keys / device-bound passkeys) so users can sign in to WebAuthn services without typing a username

   weight 3 · round to YubiKey
   YubiKey✓fullcommunity8/10

   YubiKey firmware 5+ and CTAP2 support discoverable/resident credentials for passwordless, usernameless passkey sign-in, backed by Yubico's own passkey docs, WebAuthn docs, python-fido2/java-webauthn-server SDKs, and marketing explicitly calling it 'strongest hardware-backed passkey', plus community confirmation of FIDO2/WebAuthn support alongside other smartcard apps. Missing for 10: no independent hands-on test specifically confirming resident-key/discoverable-credential storage limits or usernameless login flow success in the wild.

   • [claimed-docs] “YubiKey 5.8 is here — hardware signing, CTAP 2.3, and smoother passkey UX.”
   • [claimed-docs] “Passkeys are the long awaited replacement for passwords.”
   • [claimed-docs] “the WebAuthn API enables servers to register and authenticate users using public key cryptography instead of a password”
   • [claimed-docs] “this guide will provide all the necessary technical knowledge required to adopt passkeys into your application”
   • [claimed-docs] “YubiKey — strongest hardware-backed passkey”
   • [claimed-docs] “Provides library functionality for communicating with a FIDO device over USB as well as verifying attestation and assertion signatures.”
   • [claimed-docs] “Provides implementations of the Relying Party operations required for a server to support Web Authentication, including passkey authenticati…”
   • [community] “So far, Yubikeys are the only ones I've found that support both FIDO2/WebAuthn as well as GPG smart card functionality for use with pass(1).…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   SoloKeys Solo 2✓fullclaimed7/10

   Solo 2 is marketed explicitly as a passkey/WebAuthn security key that stores credentials on-device rather than in a cloud, and general FIDO2 passkey support inherently implies discoverable/resident credentials for usernameless sign-in ([solokeys-docs-2], [solokeys-docs-9], [solokeys-gh-1]). Missing for 10: explicit documentation of resident-key storage limits/technical FIDO2 conformance details, and independent hands-on confirmation of a usernameless login flow (only marketing copy corroborates this).

   • [claimed-docs] “Passkeys are replacing passwords across the web. Solo 2 supports the passkey standard — except yours stays on your key. Not their cloud.”
   • [claimed-docs] “No more sticky notes. No more forgotten passwords. No more texts with six digit codes.”
   • [github] “It's a USB+NFC device that protects your accounts with passkeys/WebAuthn, and also speaks OATH (TOTP/HOTP), PIV, and OpenPGP.”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

2. power userThe key works as a WebAuthn/U2F second factor across the major services I already use — Google, GitHub, Microsoft, password managers

   weight 2 · round to YubiKey
   YubiKey✓fullcommunity8/10

   YubiKey's core product design centers on FIDO2/WebAuthn and U2F as documented protocols, and community evidence corroborates that these keys function as WebAuthn/FIDO2 authenticators and PIV/GPG smartcards in real-world use across services. The docs describe passkey/WebAuthn support generically rather than confirming each specific service, but WebAuthn is a standard so this is a reasonable cross-service claim; independent community posts (yubikey-comm-14, yubikey-comm-16) reinforce broad protocol compatibility in practice. missing for 10: explicit named confirmation/citations for Google, GitHub, Microsoft, and specific password manager integrations rather than generic standard-protocol docs.

   • [claimed-docs] “the WebAuthn API enables servers to register and authenticate users using public key cryptography instead of a password”
   • [claimed-docs] “Passkeys are the long awaited replacement for passwords.”
   • [claimed-docs] “YubiKey — strongest hardware-backed passkey”
   • [community] “So far, Yubikeys are the only ones I've found that support both FIDO2/WebAuthn as well as GPG smart card functionality for use with pass(1).…”
   • [community] “Also, yubikey works as a PIV smartcard.”
   • [claimed-docs] “FIDO2 also requires user presence (a touch on your YubiKey) for cryptographic operations, and can optionally enforce user verification (PIN …”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   SoloKeys Solo 2~partialprobed6/10

   Solo 2 is a standard WebAuthn/FIDO2/U2F device that would work with any relying party supporting those standards (Google, GitHub, Microsoft, many password managers), and vendor docs confirm FIDO2/passkey and U2F-style support plus broad protocol coverage (OATH, PIV, OpenPGP). However there is no explicit first-party or independent testing evidence confirming compatibility with each named service, and a runtime probe shows the companion CLI tooling has bit-rotted with no firmware update in 4 years, raising doubts about ongoing maintenance/compatibility. Missing for 10: explicit per-service (Google/GitHub/Microsoft/password manager) compatibility confirmation, independent hands-on verification across these services, and evidence of active firmware maintenance to keep pace with protocol changes.

   • [claimed-docs] “Passkeys are replacing passwords across the web. Solo 2 supports the passkey standard — except yours stays on your key. Not their cloud.”
   • [github] “It's a USB+NFC device that protects your accounts with passkeys/WebAuthn, and also speaks OATH (TOTP/HOTP), PIV, and OpenPGP.”
   • [claimed-docs] “When prompted, touch the capacitive sensor on your Solo 2 to confirm.”
   • [probe] “PROBE runtime negative (recorded 2026-09-15): the official Solo CLI has bit-rotted — `uvx --from solo-python solo version` fails with 'Impor…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

User verification

1. security engineerThe key supports on-device user verification — a FIDO2 PIN or built-in biometric — so a stolen key alone cannot authenticate

   weight 2 · round to YubiKey
   YubiKey✓fullcommunity8/10

   Docs explicitly confirm FIDO2 supports optional PIN-based user verification in addition to touch/presence (yubikey-docs-6), and community evidence corroborates PIN enrollment is a real, if sometimes overlooked, setup step (yubikey-comm-13). This directly matches on-device verification (PIN) preventing a stolen key alone from authenticating; biometric variants exist on Bio series keys but aren't explicitly documented here. Missing for 10: explicit mention of built-in biometric/fingerprint verification and independent hands-on confirmation of PIN enforcement blocking a stolen key.

   • [claimed-docs] “FIDO2 also requires user presence (a touch on your YubiKey) for cryptographic operations, and can optionally enforce user verification (PIN …”
   • [community] “This part can be frustrating for a novice adopting security keys. The key works out of the box without PIN. If you didn't come across the ri…”

   proof ↗⚑ flag

   SoloKeys Solo 2—none0/10

   Evidence only shows a capacitive touch sensor for user presence confirmation (solokeys-docs-1), which is a presence test, not FIDO2 user verification via PIN or biometric. No documentation or community evidence mentions a settable FIDO2 PIN or biometric sensor on Solo 2, so the specific 'stolen key alone cannot authenticate' verification story is unevidenced.

   • [claimed-docs] “When prompted, touch the capacitive sensor on your Solo 2 to confirm.”
   • [github] “It's a USB+NFC device that protects your accounts with passkeys/WebAuthn, and also speaks OATH (TOTP/HOTP), PIV, and OpenPGP.”
   • [claimed-docs] “Everything in Solo 2 plus NFC tap-to-authenticate for compatible Android and iOS devices.”

   proof ↗⚑ flag