Rank #4 of 6 in Hardware Security Keys
Try itExperimental
See what an agent can do with SoloKeys Solo 2 before you ever sign up. Pick a story: recorded sessions replay real probe-harness transcripts; sandboxed self-drive sessions are designed and gated (docs/TRY-IT.md).
$uvx --from solo-python solo versionrecorded session — replayed, not liveVerified integrations
No integration evidence found in our corpus for this product yet — that means none was found, never that it doesn’t integrate.
By theme — the product's score on each story themeBy theme
Agenticness — how well agents can access and operate the productAgenticnessevidence →
How well agents can access and operate the product
Automation depth — how much of the product can run unattendedAutomation depthevidence →
How much of the product can run unattended
Beyond fido — what the key does beyond FIDO — PIV smart card, OpenPGP, OTP slots, hardware-backed SSHBeyond fidoevidence →
What the key does beyond FIDO — PIV smart card, OpenPGP, OTP slots, hardware-backed SSH
Developer tooling — building with and managing the key — CLIs, SDKs, attestationDeveloper toolingevidence →
Building with and managing the key — CLIs, SDKs, attestation
Ecosystem compat — where the key works — platforms, browsers, service compatibility catalogsEcosystem compatevidence →
Where the key works — platforms, browsers, service compatibility catalogs
Enrollment recovery — getting keys enrolled and surviving loss — setup flows, backup keys, lockout recoveryEnrollment recoveryevidence →
Getting keys enrolled and surviving loss — setup flows, backup keys, lockout recovery
Firmware openness — what runs on the device — open-source firmware, update policy, vulnerability responseFirmware opennessevidence →
What runs on the device — open-source firmware, update policy, vulnerability response
Fleet management — keys at organization scale — bulk provisioning, delivery services, IdP policiesFleet managementevidence →
Keys at organization scale — bulk provisioning, delivery services, IdP policies
Form factors — the physical lineup — NFC, USB-C/A, biometrics, certified and hardened modelsForm factorsevidence →
The physical lineup — NFC, USB-C/A, biometrics, certified and hardened models
Openness — open source, data portability, and self-hosting storiesOpennessevidence →
Open source, data portability, and self-hosting stories
Privacy posture — data-handling and privacy storiesPrivacy postureevidence →
Data-handling and privacy stories
Protocol coverage — FIDO2/WebAuthn depth — resident-key passkeys, user verification, credential managementProtocol coverageevidence →
FIDO2/WebAuthn depth — resident-key passkeys, user verification, credential management
Story verdicts — every judged story with its evidenceStory verdicts
Follow the green: where the map greys out is where SoloKeys Solo 2 stops today. ✓ full · ~ partial · ! disputed · — none · n/a not applicable.
Agenticness — how well agents can access and operate the productAgenticness
How well agents can access and operate the product
API surface
Drive the product through a documented public API
—0/10
Subscribe to events via webhooks
n/an/a
Build against official SDKs
—0/10
Issue scoped/least-privilege API credentials for an agent
n/an/a
Connect an agent via an official MCP server
n/an/a
Download a machine-readable API spec (OpenAPI or equivalent)
—0/10
Rely on versioned APIs with a documented deprecation policy
n/an/a
Test against a sandbox environment without touching production data
n/an/a
Explore an interactive API reference with runnable examples
n/an/a
Docs for agents
Point an agent at llms.txt or agent-oriented docs
—0/10
Agentic features
Delegate tasks to a built-in AI assistant inside the product
n/an/a
Operate the product with natural-language commands
n/an/a
Plug MCP servers into this product so it can use their tools
n/an/a
Get AI-generated insights and suggestions from my data inside the product
n/an/a
Set up automations that run autonomously in the background
n/an/a
Automation depth — how much of the product can run unattendedAutomation depth
How much of the product can run unattended
Beyond fido — what the key does beyond FIDO — PIV smart card, OpenPGP, OTP slots, hardware-backed SSHBeyond fido
What the key does beyond FIDO — PIV smart card, OpenPGP, OTP slots, hardware-backed SSH
Keep OpenPGP keys on the device and use them for git commit signing and encrypted email
!3/10
The key covers legacy one-time-password schemes — TOTP/HOTP slots or challenge-response — for services that still lack WebAuthn
✓6/10
The key acts as a PIV smart card for certificate-based login — workstation sign-in, VPN, and code signing with keys that never leave the device
~4/10
My SSH keys can be hardware-backed on the device — via FIDO2 sk-ssh keys, PIV, or OpenPGP — so server access requires a physical touch
!4/10
Developer tooling — building with and managing the key — CLIs, SDKs, attestationDeveloper tooling
Building with and managing the key — CLIs, SDKs, attestation
An agent can read a key's state programmatically — serial, firmware version, enabled applications, stored credentials — to audit security posture across a fleet
~3/10
Verify device attestation at registration to enforce that only genuine, approved key models are enrolled
~3/10
Configure and manage the key from an official CLI — enable applications, set PINs, manage slots, read device state — scriptably
!3/10
Official SDKs let me integrate the key into my own desktop and mobile apps
—0/10
Ecosystem compat — where the key works — platforms, browsers, service compatibility catalogsEcosystem compat
Where the key works — platforms, browsers, service compatibility catalogs
Enrollment recovery — getting keys enrolled and surviving loss — setup flows, backup keys, lockout recoveryEnrollment recovery
Getting keys enrolled and surviving loss — setup flows, backup keys, lockout recovery
Firmware openness — what runs on the device — open-source firmware, update policy, vulnerability responseFirmware openness
What runs on the device — open-source firmware, update policy, vulnerability response
Fleet management — keys at organization scale — bulk provisioning, delivery services, IdP policiesFleet management
Keys at organization scale — bulk provisioning, delivery services, IdP policies
An agent can drive key provisioning end to end — ordering, assignment, pre-registration — through documented enterprise APIs instead of a human-only console
—0/10
An enterprise delivery service ships keys directly to distributed employees, driven by an API or console rather than manual logistics
—0/10
The key integrates with my identity provider — Okta, Entra ID, Google Workspace — and I can enforce policies requiring hardware-key authentication
—–
Provision keys across an organization at scale — pre-registration, bulk configuration, and lifecycle tracking of issued keys
—0/10
Form factors — the physical lineup — NFC, USB-C/A, biometrics, certified and hardened modelsForm factors
The physical lineup — NFC, USB-C/A, biometrics, certified and hardened models
Certified models exist for regulated environments — FIPS 140 validated or Common Criteria certified — with documented durability (water/crush resistance)
—0/10
The lineup covers my ports and carry style — USB-C and USB-A models, keychain and low-profile nano form factors
—0/10
Tap the key on my phone over NFC to authenticate in mobile browsers and apps
✓7/10
Openness — open source, data portability, and self-hosting storiesOpenness
Open source, data portability, and self-hosting stories
Privacy posture — data-handling and privacy storiesPrivacy posture
Data-handling and privacy stories
Protocol coverage — FIDO2/WebAuthn depth — resident-key passkeys, user verification, credential managementProtocol coverage
FIDO2/WebAuthn depth — resident-key passkeys, user verification, credential management
Sorted by importance (agentic first) (high → low) · 54/54 stories · click a row’s chevron for the rationale and evidence
Drive the product through a documented public API G Agent access | ai-native user | Agenticness — how well agents can access and operate the productAgenticness | 3 | none | 0/10 | ||
Connect an agent via an official MCP server G Agent access | ai-native user | Agenticness — how well agents can access and operate the productAgenticness | 3 | n/a | untested | none yet | |
Delegate tasks to a built-in AI assistant inside the product G Agentic features | ai-native user | Agenticness — how well agents can access and operate the productAgenticness | 3 | n/a | untested | none yet | |
Plug MCP servers into this product so it can use their tools G Agent access | ai-native user | Agenticness — how well agents can access and operate the productAgenticness | 3 | n/a | untested | none yet | |
Use an official CLI G Agent access | ai-native user | Agenticness — how well agents can access and operate the productAgenticness | 2 | disputed | 3/10 | Dcontradicted | |
Build against official SDKs G Agent access | ai-native user | Agenticness — how well agents can access and operate the productAgenticness | 2 | none | 0/10 | ||
Download a machine-readable API spec (OpenAPI or equivalent) G Api quality | ai-native user | Agenticness — how well agents can access and operate the productAgenticness | 2 | none | 0/10 | ||
Explore an interactive API reference with runnable examples G Api quality | ai-native user | Agenticness — how well agents can access and operate the productAgenticness | 2 | n/a | 0/10 | ||
Point an agent at llms.txt or agent-oriented docs G Agent access | ai-native user | Agenticness — how well agents can access and operate the productAgenticness | 2 | none | 0/10 | ||
Run the product headlessly / in CI for automation G Agent access | ai-native user | Agenticness — how well agents can access and operate the productAgenticness | 2 | none | 0/10 | ||
Get AI-generated insights and suggestions from my data inside the product G Agentic features | ai-native user | Agenticness — how well agents can access and operate the productAgenticness | 2 | n/a | untested | none yet | |
Issue scoped/least-privilege API credentials for an agent G Agent access | ai-native user | Agenticness — how well agents can access and operate the productAgenticness | 2 | n/a | untested | none yet | |
Operate the product with natural-language commands G Agentic features | ai-native user | Agenticness — how well agents can access and operate the productAgenticness | 2 | n/a | untested | none yet | |
Rely on versioned APIs with a documented deprecation policy G Api quality | ai-native user | Agenticness — how well agents can access and operate the productAgenticness | 2 | n/a | untested | none yet | |
Set up automations that run autonomously in the background G Agentic features | ai-native user | Agenticness — how well agents can access and operate the productAgenticness | 2 | n/a | untested | none yet | |
Subscribe to events via webhooks G Agent access | ai-native user | Agenticness — how well agents can access and operate the productAgenticness | 2 | n/a | untested | none yet | |
Test against a sandbox environment without touching production data G Api quality | ai-native user | Agenticness — how well agents can access and operate the productAgenticness | 1 | n/a | untested | none yet | |
The key stores discoverable FIDO2 credentials (resident keys / device-bound passkeys) so users can sign in to WebAuthn services without typing a username Fido2 | security engineer | Protocol coverage — FIDO2/WebAuthn depth — resident-key passkeys, user verification, credential managementProtocol coverage | 3 | full | 7/10 | Cclaimed | |
Self-host the core product G | ai-native user | Openness — open source, data portability, and self-hosting storiesOpenness | 3 | partial | 5/10 | Tprobed | |
Configure and manage the key from an official CLI — enable applications, set PINs, manage slots, read device state — scriptably Cli | developer | Developer tooling — building with and managing the key — CLIs, SDKs, attestationDeveloper tooling | 3 | disputed | 3/10 | Dcontradicted | |
Export all of my data in open formats and leave G | ai-native user | Openness — open source, data portability, and self-hosting storiesOpenness | 3 | none | 0/10 | ||
Provision keys across an organization at scale — pre-registration, bulk configuration, and lifecycle tracking of issued keys Provisioning | it admin | Fleet management — keys at organization scale — bulk provisioning, delivery services, IdP policiesFleet management | 3 | none | 0/10 | ||
Define rules that trigger actions automatically on events G | ai-native user | Automation depth — how much of the product can run unattendedAutomation depth | 3 | n/a | untested | none yet | |
Prevent my data from being used to train AI models G | ai-native user | Privacy posture — data-handling and privacy storiesPrivacy posture | 3 | n/a | untested | none yet | |
The vendor documents a credible lockout-recovery strategy — registering a backup key, and what is and is not recoverable if a key is lost Recovery | security engineer | Enrollment recovery — getting keys enrolled and surviving loss — setup flows, backup keys, lockout recoveryEnrollment recovery | 3 | none | untested | none yet | |
Read the product's source under an open license G | ai-native user | Openness — open source, data portability, and self-hosting storiesOpenness | 2 | full | 8/10 | Xcommunity | |
The firmware is open source or independently audited, so I don't have to take the vendor's word for what runs on the device Source | security engineer | Firmware openness — what runs on the device — open-source firmware, update policy, vulnerability responseFirmware openness | 2 | full | 8/10 | Tprobed | |
Tap the key on my phone over NFC to authenticate in mobile browsers and apps Nfc | power user | Form factors — the physical lineup — NFC, USB-C/A, biometrics, certified and hardened modelsForm factors | 2 | full | 7/10 | Cclaimed | |
The key covers legacy one-time-password schemes — TOTP/HOTP slots or challenge-response — for services that still lack WebAuthn Otp | power user | Beyond fido — what the key does beyond FIDO — PIV smart card, OpenPGP, OTP slots, hardware-backed SSHBeyond fido | 2 | full | 6/10 | Tprobed | |
The key works as a WebAuthn/U2F second factor across the major services I already use — Google, GitHub, Microsoft, password managers Fido2 | power user | Protocol coverage — FIDO2/WebAuthn depth — resident-key passkeys, user verification, credential managementProtocol coverage | 2 | partial | 6/10 | Tprobed | |
Control data retention and deletion G | ai-native user | Privacy posture — data-handling and privacy storiesPrivacy posture | 2 | partial | 4/10 | Cclaimed | |
My SSH keys can be hardware-backed on the device — via FIDO2 sk-ssh keys, PIV, or OpenPGP — so server access requires a physical touch Ssh | developer | Beyond fido — what the key does beyond FIDO — PIV smart card, OpenPGP, OTP slots, hardware-backed SSHBeyond fido | 2 | disputed | 4/10 | Dcontradicted | |
The key acts as a PIV smart card for certificate-based login — workstation sign-in, VPN, and code signing with keys that never leave the device Piv | it admin | Beyond fido — what the key does beyond FIDO — PIV smart card, OpenPGP, OTP slots, hardware-backed SSHBeyond fido | 2 | partial | 4/10 | Tprobed | |
An agent can read a key's state programmatically — serial, firmware version, enabled applications, stored credentials — to audit security posture across a fleet Agent audit | ai-native user | Developer tooling — building with and managing the key — CLIs, SDKs, attestationDeveloper tooling | 2 | partial | 3/10 | Tprobed | |
First-time setup is guided — clear instructions or a setup app walk me through registering the key with my accounts Setup | power user | Enrollment recovery — getting keys enrolled and surviving loss — setup flows, backup keys, lockout recoveryEnrollment recovery | 2 | partial | 3/10 | Tprobed | |
Keep OpenPGP keys on the device and use them for git commit signing and encrypted email Openpgp | developer | Beyond fido — what the key does beyond FIDO — PIV smart card, OpenPGP, OTP slots, hardware-backed SSHBeyond fido | 2 | disputed | 3/10 | Dcontradicted | |
Opt out of telemetry and usage tracking G | ai-native user | Privacy posture — data-handling and privacy storiesPrivacy posture | 2 | partial | 3/10 | Cclaimed | |
The key works across my operating systems and browsers, with a published compatibility catalog of supported services Compatibility | power user | Ecosystem compat — where the key works — platforms, browsers, service compatibility catalogsEcosystem compat | 2 | partial | 3/10 | Tprobed | |
The vendor has a clear firmware update and vulnerability-response story — advisories, affected-model lookup, and how fixes reach devices Updates | security engineer | Firmware openness — what runs on the device — open-source firmware, update policy, vulnerability responseFirmware openness | 2 | disputed | 3/10 | Dcontradicted | |
Verify device attestation at registration to enforce that only genuine, approved key models are enrolled Attestation | security engineer | Developer tooling — building with and managing the key — CLIs, SDKs, attestationDeveloper tooling | 2 | partial | 3/10 | Cclaimed | |
An agent can drive key provisioning end to end — ordering, assignment, pre-registration — through documented enterprise APIs instead of a human-only console Agent provisioning | ai-native user | Fleet management — keys at organization scale — bulk provisioning, delivery services, IdP policiesFleet management | 2 | none | 0/10 | ||
An enterprise delivery service ships keys directly to distributed employees, driven by an API or console rather than manual logistics Delivery | it admin | Fleet management — keys at organization scale — bulk provisioning, delivery services, IdP policiesFleet management | 2 | none | 0/10 | ||
Certified models exist for regulated environments — FIPS 140 validated or Common Criteria certified — with documented durability (water/crush resistance) Certifications | it admin | Form factors — the physical lineup — NFC, USB-C/A, biometrics, certified and hardened modelsForm factors | 2 | none | 0/10 | ||
Choose where my data is stored (region/residency) G | ai-native user | Privacy posture — data-handling and privacy storiesPrivacy posture | 2 | n/a | 0/10 | ||
List and delete the passkeys stored on my key and know its credential capacity before it fills up Credential management | power user | Protocol coverage — FIDO2/WebAuthn depth — resident-key passkeys, user verification, credential managementProtocol coverage | 2 | none | 0/10 | ||
Official SDKs let me integrate the key into my own desktop and mobile apps Sdks | developer | Developer tooling — building with and managing the key — CLIs, SDKs, attestationDeveloper tooling | 2 | none | 0/10 | ||
The key supports on-device user verification — a FIDO2 PIN or built-in biometric — so a stolen key alone cannot authenticate User verification | security engineer | Protocol coverage — FIDO2/WebAuthn depth — resident-key passkeys, user verification, credential managementProtocol coverage | 2 | none | 0/10 | ||
The lineup covers my ports and carry style — USB-C and USB-A models, keychain and low-profile nano form factors Connectors | power user | Form factors — the physical lineup — NFC, USB-C/A, biometrics, certified and hardened modelsForm factors | 2 | none | 0/10 | ||
Do everything through the API that I can do in the UI G | ai-native user | Openness — open source, data portability, and self-hosting storiesOpenness | 2 | none | untested | none yet | |
Perform bulk operations across many items at once G | ai-native user | Automation depth — how much of the product can run unattendedAutomation depth | 2 | none | untested | none yet | |
Schedule recurring jobs or workflows G | ai-native user | Automation depth — how much of the product can run unattendedAutomation depth | 2 | n/a | untested | none yet | |
The key integrates with my identity provider — Okta, Entra ID, Google Workspace — and I can enforce policies requiring hardware-key authentication Idp | it admin | Fleet management — keys at organization scale — bulk provisioning, delivery services, IdP policiesFleet management | 2 | none | untested | none yet | |
Require a physical key touch as the human-approval step for sensitive automated or agent-initiated actions Agent approval | ai-native user | Ecosystem compat — where the key works — platforms, browsers, service compatibility catalogsEcosystem compat | 1 | partial | 3/10 | Tprobed | |
Version, review, and roll back my automations G | ai-native user | Automation depth — how much of the product can run unattendedAutomation depth | 1 | n/a | untested | none yet |
Opportunities — the stories that would move this product's scores, from its own judged verdictsOpportunitiestop 8 of 28 stories with headroom
What would move SoloKeys Solo 2’s scores — derived from its own judged verdicts, biggest headroom first. Each line quotes what the judge found missing; shipping it (or evidencing it publicly) is the fix.
Agenticness — how well agents can access and operate the productDrive the product through a documented public API
nonemoves agent-readyimpact 45
Solo 2 exposes a hardware CLI (solo2 app/list) and standard protocols like FIDO2/PIV/OpenPGP, but there is no documented public REST/programmatic API for AI-driven control, and probes confirm no OpenAPI spec or llms.txt exists (404s) while the closest thing to an SDK (solo-python CLI) is reported bit-rotted and broken via ImportError.
Enrollment recovery — getting keys enrolled and surviving loss — setup flows, backup keys, lockout recoveryThe vendor documents a credible lockout-recovery strategy — registering a backup key, and what is and is not recoverable if a key is lost
nonemoves PA Scoreimpact 30
No evidence in the pack discusses backup key enrollment, multi-key registration strategies, or what is/isn't recoverable if a Solo 2 is lost — documentation covers setup, building, and CLI usage but never addresses lockout/recovery planning.
Fleet management — keys at organization scale — bulk provisioning, delivery services, IdP policiesProvision keys across an organization at scale — pre-registration, bulk configuration, and lifecycle tracking of issued keys
nonemoves PA Scoreimpact 30
Evidence covers individual key setup, CLI device listing/config (`solo2 list`, `admin set led`), and custom attestation-key generation, with one offhand mention of building attestation keys 'for maybe 100,000 devices'—but there is no documented bulk-enrollment workflow, admin console, pre-registration pipeline, or lifecycle/issuance tracking system for organizations.
Openness — open source, data portability, and self-hosting storiesExport all of my data in open formats and leave
nonemoves PA Scoreimpact 30
Missing: any documented data-export/migration path, evidence of extractable key material, or open-format backup/portability tooling.
Agenticness — how well agents can access and operate the productPoint an agent at llms.txt or agent-oriented docs
nonemoves agent-readyimpact 30
Explicit probes confirm docs.solokeys.dev has no llms.txt (404) and no openapi/markdown-alternative endpoints; the only llms.txt found is a generic Shopify shopping-agent file unrelated to technical/product documentation, so there is no agent-oriented documentation to point an AI agent at.
Agenticness — how well agents can access and operate the productRun the product headlessly / in CI for automation
nonemoves agent-readyimpact 30
Solo 2 is a physical security key requiring human touch confirmation for every action, and while a CLI exists (solo2 list, admin commands), there's no documented support for headless/CI automation; a runtime probe shows the official CLI is bit-rotted (ImportError, incompatible fido2 dependency) with no firmware release in 4 years, further undermining any automation use case.
Agenticness — how well agents can access and operate the productBuild against official SDKs
nonemoves agent-readyimpact 30
Evidence shows firmware-build tooling (Rust/cargo builds, solo2 CLI, customization docs) rather than an official SDK for third-party/AI-native application development, and the one CLI tool cited is reported bit-rotted and broken in 2026 (ImportError, no releases in 4 years).
Agenticness — how well agents can access and operate the productDownload a machine-readable API spec (OpenAPI or equivalent)
nonemoves API qualityimpact 30
SoloKeys is a hardware security key with a CLI and firmware documentation, not an API/web service; a machine-readable OpenAPI spec would be a fair thing to ask for if it exposed a network API, but probes explicitly show no OpenAPI/swagger spec exists at any candidate path and no llms.txt for the technical docs.
Showing the top 8 of 28 — every none/partial verdict in the story verdicts table is headroom.
Think a verdict is wrong? Every verdicts-table row has a Flag link — see the methodology.
Coverage map — which docs area, API section, or community source covers which judged storiesCoverage map6 surfaces · 20 covered stories
Where the cited evidence behind each covered verdict came from — the same citations the verdicts table shows, no extra judging.
GitHub README19 stories
- Use an official CLI
- Keep OpenPGP keys on the device and use them for git commit signing and encrypted email
- The key covers legacy one-time-password schemes — TOTP/HOTP slots or challenge-response — for services that still lack WebAuthn
- The key acts as a PIV smart card for certificate-based login — workstation sign-in, VPN, and code signing with keys that never leave the device
- My SSH keys can be hardware-backed on the device — via FIDO2 sk-ssh keys, PIV, or OpenPGP — so server access requires a physical touch
- An agent can read a key's state programmatically — serial, firmware version, enabled applications, stored credentials — to audit security posture across a fleet
- Verify device attestation at registration to enforce that only genuine, approved key models are enrolled
- Configure and manage the key from an official CLI — enable applications, set PINs, manage slots, read device state — scriptably
- Require a physical key touch as the human-approval step for sensitive automated or agent-initiated actions
- The key works across my operating systems and browsers, with a published compatibility catalog of supported services
- First-time setup is guided — clear instructions or a setup app walk me through registering the key with my accounts
- The firmware is open source or independently audited, so I don't have to take the vendor's word for what runs on the device
- The vendor has a clear firmware update and vulnerability-response story — advisories, affected-model lookup, and how fixes reach devices
- Tap the key on my phone over NFC to authenticate in mobile browsers and apps
- Read the product's source under an open license
- Self-host the core product
- Control data retention and deletion
- The key stores discoverable FIDO2 credentials (resident keys / device-bound passkeys) so users can sign in to WebAuthn services without typing a username
- The key works as a WebAuthn/U2F second factor across the major services I already use — Google, GitHub, Microsoft, password managers
solokeys.com8 stories
- Require a physical key touch as the human-approval step for sensitive automated or agent-initiated actions
- The key works across my operating systems and browsers, with a published compatibility catalog of supported services
- First-time setup is guided — clear instructions or a setup app walk me through registering the key with my accounts
- Tap the key on my phone over NFC to authenticate in mobile browsers and apps
- Control data retention and deletion
- Opt out of telemetry and usage tracking
- The key stores discoverable FIDO2 credentials (resident keys / device-bound passkeys) so users can sign in to WebAuthn services without typing a username
- The key works as a WebAuthn/U2F second factor across the major services I already use — Google, GitHub, Microsoft, password managers
Hacker News4 stories
- Keep OpenPGP keys on the device and use them for git commit signing and encrypted email
- My SSH keys can be hardware-backed on the device — via FIDO2 sk-ssh keys, PIV, or OpenPGP — so server access requires a physical touch
- The firmware is open source or independently audited, so I don't have to take the vendor's word for what runs on the device
- Read the product's source under an open license
Building docs3 stories
Customization docs2 stories
Probe proofs — replayable recordings from the probe harnessProbe proofs
Replayable recordings from our probe harness — see the Prove-It protocol to submit one.
$uvx --from solo-python solo versionreproduced$ uvx --from solo-python solo version
File "/Users/judegomila/.cache/uv/archive-v0/nTBUz03_u-or9bi4/lib/python3.13/site-packages/solo/devices/solo_v1.py", line 11, in <module>
from fido2.ctap1 import CTAP1
ImportError: cannot import name 'CTAP1' from 'fido2.ctap1' (/Users/judegomila/.cache/uv/archive-v0/nTBUz03_u-or9bi4/lib/python3.13/site-packages/fido2/ctap1.py). Did you mean: 'ctap1'?
$curl -s https://solokeys.com/llms.txt | head -3reproduced$ curl -s https://solo[redacted]s.com/llms.txt | head -3 # Agent Instructions — Solo[redacted]s This document describes how AI agents can interact with Solo[redacted]s's online store at https://solo[redacted]s.com.
Business model
Hardware purchase ($34–50; Solo 2C $34, Solo 2A+ NFC Hacker $46) with fully open-source Rust firmware on Trussed; unlocked Hacker variants for reflashing.
pricing ↗Score trend
How this product’s scores have moved as evidence and verdicts are re-derived — a point per change, not per day.
Try Experimental
Run it in the microterminal →Recorded agent sessions — and a live MCP handshake where the vendor ships one.
Flag
⚑ Flag a verdictThink a verdict is wrong? Opens a prefilled GitHub issue — or use the ⚑ next to any verdict above.
For agents
